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“They'll wake up in the morning And they will fight. That 
which you saw last night was my dream The other will 
answer: no, it was my dream They will gently retrieve two 
pistols From the sides of the same pillow And at the same 
moment They will fire”
- Salvos of Mercy 
From a selection of poems by Ibrahim Nasrallah 
Translated by Ibrahim Muhawi
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Abstract
This thesis analyses the phenomenon o f suicide bombings as manifested in the Palestinian 
landscape o f conflict and attempts to construct a theoretical framework o f analysis to study 
the phenomenon. It investigates Hamas, and most specifically its resort to suicide 
bombings, from the time o f its inception in 1988 to its electoral victory in 2006. In 
focussing on a particular organisation this work rejects the notion o f a monolithic Islamist 
global threat perpetrated by individuals that are irrational and propelled solely by religion 
and the call to jihad , irrespective o f their organisational affiliation and geographical 
location. Instead such categorisations are rebuffed by using tools provided by International 
Relations theory and examples o f Hamas that illustrate why and how suicide operations are 
adopted in a particular socio-political setting. Hence, at its core, this thesis probes how 
concepts and methods in contemporary International Relations can assist in explaining and 
understanding the phenomenon of suicide bombings using the specific empirical case o f the 
Hamas.
Three broad theoretical methodologies/approaches are utilised in the constructed theoretical 
framework o f analysis, namely Rational Choice Theory, Social Constructivism and the Just 
War thesis. Each of these is believed to grant equally crucial insights into specific aspects 
o f suicide operations, which when amalgamated provide a more holistic understanding o f 
the phenomenon in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Within this given theoretical structure 
the thesis demonstrates how Palestinian suicide operations are, first and foremost, a 
complex combination o f instrumental and expressive violence which are adopted by 
rational actors to assert power, achieve political and/or societal survival and enable 
retaliation and competition. Second, this work reveals how suicide operations perform an 
important role in the formation and consolidation o f Palestinian national identity and also 
demonstrates how such acts are used as a mechanism to delineate both organisational and 
individual space. Finally, this thesis probes how political Islam is employed to facilitate the 
articulation, justification and legitimisation o f suicide operations as a modern-day jihad  to 
Palestinian society through the means o f modem interpretations and fatwas.
In its endeavours to formulate a more holistic understanding o f suicide operations in the 
Israeli -  Palestinian conflict this work consciously uses both positivist and post-positivist 
concepts as part o f its theoretical framework. However, while it employs neo-utilitarian 
choice-theoretic assumptions as a methodological tool to illustrate one facet o f suicide 
bombings it is, both ontologically and epistemologically, more closely aligned with post­
positivists approaches. As such it challenges basic rationalist assumptions that claim value 
neutrality and treat actors as possessing identities and interests that are autogenous and pre­
social. Finally, the methodological structure o f this thesis is based on qualitative research 
which utilises not only primary and secondary source literature but also interview-based 
field data collected in both Israel and the Palestinian territories from December 2004 to 
January 2005.
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ACRONYMS
AQ Al-Qaeda
BSO Black September Organisation
DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
IDF Israel Defence Forces
IRM Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)
DOP Declaration of Principles
HAMAS Harakat al-Muqawma al-Islamiya or the IRM
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MB Muslim Brotherhood
MHM Militant Heroic Martyrdom
PA Palestinian Authority
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PIJ Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PLA Palestine Liberation Army
PLO Palestine Liberation Organisation
PNA Palestinian National Authority
PNC Palestine National Council
PPF Palestinian Police Force
PPP Palestinian People’s Party (formerly Palestinian
Communist Party)
QB The Qassam Brigades
UNC United National Command (also known as UNLU)
UNLU United National Leadership of the Uprising (also
known as UNC)
WBG West Bank and Gaza
GLOSSARY OF ARABIC AND ISLAMIC TERMS
Al-Isra ' wal-Miraj 
Al-Quds
Al- sawa ’ id al-ramiya
Amaliyat ishtish ’hadiyya
A yan
Al-Bayanat
Caliph(ate)
Dar al-harb 
Dor al-Islam 
D a ’wa
Fard Ayn 
Ford Kifaya 
Fatwa
Fellah/ Fellahin 
Fida 7 
Fedayeen
Hadith
Halal
Haram
Hashishiyun
Hijra
Hudna
Ijtihad
Ikhwan
Intihar
Isra
Istish ’had/istish ’hadi(yyin)
the site of the Prophet Muhammad’s ascension to 
heaven, i.e. the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem 
Jerusalem
Hamas’ strike groups; literally translates as “shooting 
arms”
martyrdom operation
city notables of the early twentieth century 
leaflets and communiques
a successor to the Prophet Muhammed (the institution 
of Islamic government after Muhammed)
realm or abode of war 
realm or abode of peace 
call to Islam; preaching
individual obligation 
collective obligation
a religious decree issued by a religious scholar 
peasant/ peasantry 
the revolutionary
revolutionary guerrilla groups based on the ideology 
of self-sacrifice
commentary on Prophet Muhammad’s dictums 
allowed by Qur’anic law; sanctified 
forbidden by Qur’anic law
a 11th and 12th century Persian Shi’ia sect who were 
renowned assassins (also known as Ismaili-Nazaris) 
the emigration of the Prophet and his followers from 
Mecca to Medina following persecution 
unilateral ceasefire
the tradition of interpreting Islamic religious texts 
brethren
suicide, which is haram 
the night journey of the Prophet 
martyrdom/martyrs who sacrifice their lives in jihad, 
generally refers to suicide bombers/bombings in 
contemporary terminology
Jahiliyya
Jihad
Kata ’ib Hzz al-din al-qassam
Qibla
Mahr
Mawwal
Miraj
Mithaq
Mufti
Mullah
Mujahidah
Mujahid/Mujahidin(un)
Murabit(un)
(al-)Nakba
(al-)Naksa
Sabr
Shabb/Shabab
Shahada
Shahadat
Shahid/shuhada
Shari ’a 
Shatat
Shi ’arat 
Shi ’ia
originally referred to the darkness and unrest of total 
pagan ignorance in the pre-Islamic era. In modem 
times it is used to characterise all societies which are 
not genuinely Islamic
traditionally defined as both a holy and just war; 
literally internal striving on the path o f God
Battalions of ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam, Hamas’ formal 
military wing
the direction to face during prayer 
bride-price
the chanted introduction to a song/anthem 
the heavens; the Prophet’s ascent to the heavens 
covenant (in this work Hamas’s Covenant)
Muslim legislator 
a local religious leader 
struggle for the sake of the Lord 
a warrior on the path of God; fighter(s) of the jihad 
Muslim settler(s) of the frontier
the defeat; literally ‘the catastrophe’, a term which 
refers to the 1948-49 war and large-scale expulsion of 
the Palestinians
literally ‘the setback’; the term refers to the defeat of 
1967
patience
literally ‘young men’ or ‘guys’; the term historically 
signifies uprooted peasants and poorer urban strata 
who participated in resistance activity 
the affirmation o f the faith 
martyrdom
martyr, often a non-combatant or civilian casualty in 
contemporary terminology and used as a counterpoint 
to istishJhad 
Islamic law
the dispersal of the Palestinian population following 
the 1948 establishment of the Israeli state and the 
First Arab-Israeli War 
wall graffiti
the followers of Ali; the minority sect in Islam
Sumud steadfastness
Sunna/h Sayings and actions of the Prophet
Sunni the followers of sunnah who accepted the caliphate of
Abu Bakr who was chosen by consensus; the majority 
sect in Islam
Tabligh education
Tajjirat intihariyya suicide operation
Tahdiya cease-fire
Ulama scholars or people trained in the religious sciences
Umma the Muslim community
Waqf a religious endowment
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Chapter I: Introduction
"...suppose they w ere an influence, a  thing invulnerable, 
intangible, w ithout fro n t o r  back, drifting abou t like a  gas?  
Arm ies w ere like plants, im m obile as a  whole, firm -rooted, 
nourished through long stem s to the head.
The A rabs m ight be a vapour. ” 
-T.E. Law rence1
I. Rationale and Argument
On April 16, 1993 twenty-two year old Sahar Tamam Nablusi packed a white Mitsubishi 
van with cooking-gas canisters, placed a copy of the Qur’an on the passenger seat and 
purposely barrelled into two buses, killing himself and another Palestinian and wounding 
eight Israelis2. The militant Palestinian Islamist group, Hamas claimed responsibility for 
the attack which was the first suicide bombing in the decades old landscape of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. The attack was so unexpected and novel that even days later the 
Jerusalem Post continued to call it an “apparent suicide”. Of course today, fourteen years 
later, there no longer exists such hesitation in identifying these increasingly common 
attacks as suicide bombings.
Suicide as a mode of political protest is by no means a recent phenomenon nor has it been 
practiced by one people or faith alone. Early Christian martyrs suffered gruesome tortures 
and deaths for their religious convictions and for these early Christians martyrdom was a 
form of religious persecution3. The early Persian Ismailis -  Nizaris, more commonly 
known as the hashishiyun (assassins), were a Shi’ia sect based in north-western Iran in 
the eleventh and twelfth centuries. These skilled assassins targeted heavily guarded 
political and military leaders in missions where the likelihood of escape was often
1 T.E. Lawrence, ‘Guerrilla’ (1929)
2 Amanda Ripley, ‘Why Suicide Bombing is Now All the Rage’, Time in Partnership with CNN (07 April 
2002), available at: http://www.time.eom/time/magazine/article/0.9171.227546-l.00.html. Date Accessed: 
18 February 2007.
3 Joyce E. Salisbury, Blood o f Martyrs: Unintended Consequences o f Ancient Violence (New York: 
Routledge, 2004)
impossible and characteristically murdered their targets before sometimes killing 
themselves with the same dagger4. The hashishiyun were so effective that they came to 
be feared and demonised by both Sunni leaders in the region and the heads of Christian 
Crusader states alike.
The first contact the modem Western world had with suicide attacks as a pre-meditated 
political-military phenomenon was during the Second World War when over three 
thousand Japanese army and navy pilots died attempting to crash their planes into Allied 
ships and aircraft carriers5. The term ‘Kamikaze’ refers specifically to the Shinpu (‘divine 
wind’) Special Attack Corps formed in October 1944 whose pilots rammed their 
airplanes, gliders and manned torpedoes into Allied vessels. Though the efficacy of 
Kamikaze attacks may be debatable they nonetheless continued unabated till August 1945 
when Japan surrendered. It is commonly accepted that these attacks damaged or sank at 
least 375 U.S. naval vessels and killed over twelve thousand American servicemen6. 
However, even more significant than the military efficacy of the Kamikaze is the fact that 
this was perhaps the first time that modem ‘Western’ nations fought a fully trained and 
equipped army that belonged to a radically different cultural tradition with starkly 
different conventions of war7.
After the Kamikaze missions the wave of suicide bombings conducted by Hizballah (‘the 
party of God’), a Lebanese Shi’ite group, from early 1983 to mid-1985, signalled the re- 
emergence of suicide attacks in their most contemporary form. The first of these attacks 
were the truck bombings of the US Marine and French barracks in Beirut in October 1983 
which killed two hundred and forty one US soldiers and fifty eight French troops. After 
this initial attack Hizballah continued to target U.S., French and Israeli troops in Lebanon
4 Bernard Lewis, The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967); 
Marshall G.S. Hodgson, The Order o f the Assassins: The Struggle o f  the Early Nizari Ismailis Against the 
Islamic World (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1955); W.B. Bartlett, The Assassins: The Story o f Medieval 
Islam's Secret Sect (Stroud, England: Sutton, 2001)
5 Peter Hill, ‘Kamikaze, 1943-5’ in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Making Sense o f  Suicide Missions (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).
6 See also: Emiko Ohnuki-Tiemey, Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms and Nationalisms (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 2002); Albert Axell and Hideaki Kase, Kamikaze: Japan's Suicide Gods (London: 
Longmans, 2002); Hatsuho Naito, Thunder Gods: The Kamikaze Pilots Tell Their Story (Tokyo: Kodansha 
International, 1989); and Rikihei Inoguchi and Tadashi Nakajima, The Divine Wind (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1960)
7 Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Riverside Press, 
1946)
2
conducting a total of thirty-six suicide attacks in the 1980s and successfully evicting these 
forces from Lebanon8.
By 1990 the contemporary use of suicide attacks had spread further. In July 1990, the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a Hindu-Marxist group, began targeting Sri 
Lankan political leaders in their fight for a Tamil homeland. The LTTE is reputed to have 
invented the concealed suicide bomb vests and is known for conducting suicide 
operations on land, sea and air. It is also the only organisation which has successfully 
assassinated two heads of state in suicide missions, including the former Indian Prime 
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi. In the Middle East, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) 
began conducting suicide attacks against Israeli settlers, troops and citizens in 1993 and 
1994 respectively. A number of experts believe that Hamas cadres were trained in the 
tactical use of suicide attacks in 1992 when a few hundred Hamas members were 
deported to southern Lebanon by the Israeli state as punitive action taken for the killing of 
five Israeli servicemen. Still others believe that while Hamas received no direct training, 
Hizballah’s successful deployment of this tactic against the American, French and Israeli 
troops from Lebanon in the early 1980s may have influenced it to adopt suicide missions 
as a “copy-cat phenomenon”9. Either way, it seems that the strategic use of suicide 
missions has slowly become entrenched in the Palestinian consciousness and hence in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Incidents of suicide attacks have also increased dramatically 
in various other parts of the globe since the mid-1990 and can be traced today to regions 
as diverse as Kashmir, Turkey, the Persian Gulf, the United States, Spain, Great Britain, 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq - indicating that a deeper understanding of this 
phenomenon is a definite necessity.
8 See for example: Martin Kramer, ‘The Moral Logic o f Hizballah’, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins o f  
Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States o f Mind (Cambridge and New York: Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge University Press, 1990); Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: 
Born with a Vengeance (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah: 
Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002); Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face o f  
Terrorism (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005)
9 Personal interview with Yoram Schweitzer, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Tel Aviv 
University, 23 December 2004. For a more theoretical approach on the contagion effects o f suicide 
bombing see for example: Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Logic o f Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product o f  
Strategic Choice’, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins o f Terrorism, opt, cit.
3
Robert Pape points out that the defining characteristic of modem suicide attacks is that 
for the first time multiple actors are simultaneously opting to use suicide missions as a 
mechanism of engagement and coercion across the globe where previously there had 
never been more than one suicide bombing campaign active in a given period of time10. 
Suicide attacks have therefore emerged as an operational tactic applied to achieve 
different political and military ends in vastly different conflicts and circumstances. As 
such each conflict must be studied individually to understand what prompts, enables and 
legitimises the resort to suicide attacks in each specific context. The point of entry into 
this research then is, first and foremost, the rejection of the monolithic Islamist global 
threat so evident in popular literature today in favour of an in-depth examination of a 
specific case study, i.e. Hamas’ use of suicide missions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
from 1993 to 2006. It is believed that only a detailed analysis can equip one to trace the 
trajectory of violence in this conflict and thus identify why and how suicidal violence 
emerged and was adopted as a mechanism of engagement on both an individual and 
organisational level in this specific landscape of conflict. Analysing the Israeli-Palestinian 
case in the longue duree also enables one to develop a clearer understanding of why 
suicidal violence emerged and escalated at a given point in time in this conflict.
This thesis does not propose to provide solutions or policy recommendations -  though its 
findings can contribute to both. Instead it constructs a theoretical framework of analysis 
based on empirical evidence and a qualitative methodology. In doing so, this work not only 
attempts to address the ‘theoretical paucity of terrorism literature’11 but also simultaneously 
seeks to question if concepts and methods in contemporary IR theory can explain and 
understand the phenomenon of suicidal violence. It argues that the emergence of suicidal 
violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is based on three interrelated factors:
10 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic o f Suicide Terrorism (London: Gibson Square, 2006)
11 See for example: Martha Crenshaw, ‘Current Research on Terrorism: The Academic Perspective’, Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1992); Magnus Ranstorp, ‘Introduction: Mapping Terrorism 
Research - Challenges and Priorities’, in Magnus Ranstorp (ed.), Mapping Terrorism Research: State o f the 
Art, Gaps and Future Direction (New York: Routledge, 2007); Andrew Silke, ‘The Devil You Know: 
Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter 
2001)
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(i) The expressive and instrumental rationality of suicide missions, which explains 
why suicidal violence emerged and is used as a mechanism of engagement with the 
Israeli state;
(ii) The struggle for a national identity and the culturally entrenched norm of 
militant heroic martyrdom, which explains how suicidal violence evolved 
specifically within the Palestinian socio-political setting; and
(iii) The ideological framework of jihad as reinterpreted by political Islam, which 
explains how suicidal violence is justified, legitimised and enacted within the 
Palestinian milieu.
Having identified these three factors this work then locates them within what are three 
very different theoretical approaches in international relations in order to arrive at a 
framework of analysis which may be applied to accurately study suicidal violence in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The three broad theoretical methodologies/approaches utilised 
in this endeavour are the Rational Actor Model (which is rooted in Rational Choice 
Theory), Social Constructivism and the Just War thesis. This work stresses that despite 
their differences each of these grant equally crucial insights into specific aspects of 
suicide operations, and only when amalgamated enable a more holistic understanding of 
the phenomenon in the Israeli Palestinian conflict. In its endeavours to formulate a more 
holistic understanding of suicide operations in the Israeli -  Palestinian conflict this work 
thus consciously uses both positivist and post-positivist concepts as part of its theoretical 
framework. However, while it employs neo-utilitarian choice-theoretic assumptions as a 
methodological tool to illustrate one facet of suicide bombings it is, both ontologically 
and epistemologically, more closely aligned with post-positivists approaches. As such it 
challenges basic rationalist assumptions that claim value neutrality and treat actors as 
possessing identities and interests that are autogenous and pre-social. At the same time 
this work also acknowledges the merit of utilising specific positivist concepts in order to 
facilitate a deeper understanding of suicidal violence in the Palestinian territories.
5
n . Definitional Parameters, Terminology and Theoretical Framework
It must be noted that while the focus of this research perforce locates it within the broader 
sphere of terrorism literature, this work consciously eschews, when possible, the term 
‘suicide terrorism’ in favour of ‘suicide bombing(s)/attack(s)/operation(s)/or suicidal 
violence’. This is not only in an effort to avoid any normative implications implicit in the 
term ‘terrorism’ but also because the term has, in contemporary times, been extended to 
cover “what used to be called guerrilla warfare, separatism, civil war, armed resistance and
1 *y
all other forms of political violence,” . Consequently the term is now often used 
indiscriminately by parties intending to de-legitimise any armed resistance challenging an 
established authority in order to enhance political mobilisation in favour of the status quo. 
As such the terms specified above are used not only for their tactical specificity but also in 
an attempt to reassert what were previously much more delineated spaces in studies of 
asymmetrical and non-conventional warfare. Occasionally, in attempting to contextualise 
the use of suicide attacks and thereby approaching the phenomenon from a specifically 
Palestinian perspective, the term ‘martyrdom operation’ is also used in this work to 
describe these attacks -  with the full knowledge that it is both heavily normative and 
culturally resonant.
A suicide attack is defined in very specific terms in this thesis. Thus for the purpose of this 
work a suicide attack is “a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware 
individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely causes his own death through 
blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The perpetrator’s ensured death is a 
precondition for the success of his mission”13. Thus a suicide attack is an operational 
method in which the operative is fully aware that the mission “will not be executed if he is 
not killed in the process”14. The precondition of death is what differentiates a suicide attack 
from other types of high-risk attacks where the possibility of death may exist but is not a 
requirement. The attack itself can be conducted by activating explosives either worn or 
carried by the operative as a portable explosive charge (for example in a backpack) or 
alternatively explosives may be planted in a vehicle that is driven by the operative(s). In
12 Daniel Heradstveit and David C. Pugh, ‘The Rhetoric o f Hegemony: How the Extended Definition o f  
Terrorism Redefines International Relations’, NUPI Paper 649 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for International 
Affairs, 2003), p. 1
13 Yoram Schweitzer, ‘Suicide Terrorism: Development and Main Characteristics’ in Countering Suicide 
Terrorism (Herzliya, Israel: (ICT) The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2001)
14 Boaz Ganor, ‘Suicide Attacks in Israel’, in Countering Suicide Terrorism, opt, cit.. p. 134
6
cases where a vehicle is used, the attack is either carried out by parking and detonating the 
vehicle in a densely populated area or by ramming it into a selected target (such as a bus or 
building)15. For this work a failed suicide mission is defined as one in which the attack fails 
as a direct result of either errors made by the bomber at the time of executing the mission or 
if he/she is intercepted by counter-terror forces before completing the mission. 
Additionally, bystander/civilian intervention, if it is a direct cause of complete mission 
failure, is also included in this category. Thus in each case, irrespective of why the mission 
failed, the operative once again consciously intended to kill him/herself from the very onset 
as part of the attack.
The theoretical framework incorporates a number of key concepts in IR. The overarching 
framework for this thesis is provided by nationalism and national identity formation which 
grant the overall context for the study and are used to explain how suicide bombing evolved 
in the Palestinian territories in Chapter IV. Other key concepts used include: the notion of 
expressive and instrumental violence, which is used primarily in Chapter El to highlight 
why suicidal violence is used on both an organisational and individual level; and political 
Islam, which is used mainly in Chapter V to once again illustrate how suicide bombings are 
legitimised and enacted as the religious duty of a jihad specifically within the Palestinian 
socio-political cultural milieu.
(i) Nationalism and National Identity Formation:
Nationalism and the attempt to establish a nation-state are considered by this work to be the 
key reasons behind the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Juval Portugali states that: “Zionism and 
Palestinianism were the very origins, the very generative forces which have brought into 
existence both Israeli and Palestinian societies as well as the conflicts between them”16.
15 It is on the basis o f this definition that this work rejects the assertion that the first ‘suicide’ attack in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context was conducted at the Lod Airport in 1972 by the Japanese Red Army (JRA) on 
behalf o f the Popular Front for the Liberation o f Palestine (PFLP). This attack bore only superficial similarity 
to what are identified as contemporary suicide missions. Of the three Japanese Marxists who conducted the 
operation, one was killed by his own companion when he ran out of ammunition, the other killed himself with 
a grenade when faced with capture and the third was severely injured but captured when trying to flee the 
terminal. Instead, on the basis o f the above definition o f  a suicide mission, the Lod airport attack would be a 
good example o f a high-risk mission instead. See for example, ‘What Happened at Lod Airport in 1972?’ 
httn://www.palestinefacts.ors/vf 1967tol991 lod 1972.php. Date Accessed: 19th November 2005.
16 Juval Portugali, Implicate Relations: Society and Space in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Boston and 
Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), p. 36
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However, this work in trying to identity mainly the internal impetuses for the emergence of 
suicidal violence focuses primarily on Palestinian nationalism, though Zionism and the 
Israeli state are also acknowledged as playing a role in Palestinian identity formation.
Nationalism provides individuals with the means for collective security, belonging and 
identity and at its very core focuses on the “distribution of land among nations”17. Elements 
of “territory, place and environment (i.e. spatial entities) in relation to people and their 
collective memories (i.e. temporal entities)”18 are its fundamental components. Territorial 
and statehood claims are legitimised and justified by nations through a process of referring 
to their history on the land - which in essence tends to take the form of recounting the 
memory of a continuous and long-standing association with the land claimed. Of course 
myths and legends are a part and parcel of such a narration and history is constantly re­
made and reinterpreted in the telling19. At the same time, the remaking and reinterpretation 
of history is rooted in the narrator’s circumstances and experiences of historical processes 
and impacted by those the narrator deems as significant ‘others’20. In other words, 
fundamentally embedded in the construction of history are relations of power.
Nationalism is therefore tied to a specific geographical space, a ‘homeland’, which is 
imbued with meaning and subject to history-creating and myths and romanticed in art and 
literature. It is an “ideology of boundedness”21. Nationalism is also a homogenisation 
project, i.e. it attempts to carve out a common identity on the basis of shared experiences, 
memories, spaces and others. It applies norms of conformity to a given society and is, in 
that sense, about conforming with norms; about “being like others and doing (sic) what 
others do”22. Language, religion, tradition are all vehicles of facilitating homogenisation
17 Ibid. p. 37
18 Helena Lindholm Schulz, The Reconstruction o f Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and 
Statehood (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 6
19 E.H.Carr, What is History? (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001,40th anniversary edition).
20 Thomas H. Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London and Boulder, 
Colorado: Pluto Press, 1993)
21 Schulz, opt, cit... p. 6; See also: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and 
Spread o f Nationalism (London: Verso,1991); Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century 
(Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979); Anthony D. Smith and John Hutchinson, Nationalism (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1994)
22 Zygmunt Bauman, Life in Fragments: Essays in Postmodern Morality (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1995)
and thereby ‘creating’ the nation. Nations are thus socially and culturally constructed; in 
other words they are imagined through language, religion, norms and traditions.
Palestinian nationalism and the process of national identity formation therefore explain 
how a given socio-political, cultural reality impacts the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
facilitates the emergence of suicidal violence. This work focuses on how inter-subjective 
practices between actors in the Israeli-Palestinian setting results in the formation of 
Palestinian identities and interests in the process of interaction. At the same time, it takes 
into account Palestinian identities and interests as they existed prior to the period of 
study, i.e. before 1987. This work recognises the role that violence plays in Palestinian 
identity formation and consolidation and, in recognising the trajectory of protest and 
violence in the Israeli-Palestinian interaction over the past fifty years, it contextualises the 
adoption of suicide bombings as a mode of violent protest from the period commencing 
in the early 1990s. Consequently multiple factors that would otherwise be ignored are 
taken into consideration in attempting to formulate a deeper understanding of how this 
phenomenon emerged specifically in the early 1990s and was adopted as the dominant 
form of protest by the second Intifada.
This background and contextualising not only enables the formulation of this 
understanding on both the organisational and individual levels but also allows one to 
comprehend how the act of suicide bombing serves multiple functions for different levels 
in Palestinian society. The adoption and support of suicide bombings can thus be 
understood as the assertion of power in a situation of powerlessness as well as the 
assertion of an identity. This assertion of power and identity operates simultaneously on 
three different levels, i.e. at the level of the organisation, that of the individual bomber 
and finally at the level of Palestinian society, which constantly interact and influence each 
other. The increasing support for the use of this tool by Palestinian society can also 
explain why suicide bombings were adopted as a strategy by secular Fatah and even the 
left wing PFLP. It is also interesting to note how the act of suicide bombing is used as a 
mechanism to delineate both organisational and individual space. Therefore, suicide 
bombings are a mechanism whereby the organisations/individuals can not only stand 
apart from the society as proactive and powerful actors but also simultaneously a 
mechanism utilised, by all levels, to reintegrate with this society and identify with its
grievances. The success and survival of all levels is consequently based upon the 
sustainable ability to assert an identity distinct from the rest of Palestinian society as well 
as the ability to simultaneously affiliate and identify with the same society. Hence, it is 
essential that both the organisation and the individual be consistently perceived to be 
representative of broader societal sentiments and also be perceived as furthering a 
common cause -in this case that of independence from Israeli occupation.
(ii) Political Islam
Often referred to as Islamism or Fundamentalism, political Islam refers to movements and 
ideologies which draw upon Islamic terms, symbols and events in order to articulate a 
distinctly modem, political agenda23. Modem political Islam therefore co-exists with and 
responds to secular ideologies in the Middle East and operates at the intersections with 
major twentieth century ideologies such as Marxism, fascism, nationalism and capitalism. 
Consequently, it shares with these secular movements both grievances and goals. In recent 
times, political Islam has acquired a central role in the analysis of Middle Eastern politics 
and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not excluded from this focus24. The resurgence of 
political Islam is believed to have resulted from a complex combination of reasons 
including: the overall deterioration of socio-economic conditions in the region, the collapse 
of prevailing political systems, a rejection of foreign influences and the concurrent 
assertion of a specific cultural identity. Moreover, while Islamic resurgence is not a new 
phenomenon and Islamic history has traditionally seen the emergence and decline of 
various revivalist movements, the contemporary resurgence is believed to be significantly 
different in that it has been profoundly impacted by the region’s colonial experience.
23 For discussions o f Islamism versus Muslim politics and other terminology see for example: Ray Takeyh 
and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The Receding Shadow o f the Prophet: The Rise and Fall o f  Radical Political Islam 
(Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 2004); Bassam Tibi, The Challenge o f  Fundamentalism: 
Political Islam and the New World Disorder (Berkley, Los Angeles and London: University o f California 
Press, 1998); Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds.), Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report (Berkley and 
Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 1997)
24 John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); See also 
John L. Esposito and Francois Burgat (ed.), Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle 
East and Europe (London: Hurst, 2003); Bassam Tibi, ‘The Renewed Role o f Islam in the Political and Social 
Development o f the Middle East’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 1983); Ali E. Hillal 
Dessouki, Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (N ew  York: Praeger, 1982)
10
European colonialism introduced into the Middle East, alongside capitalist exploitation and 
numerous artificially created states, a host of Western ideologies including socialism, 
communism and ffee-market capitalism, all of which wrought far-reaching changes in the 
region. The modernisation and industrialisation that was brought about as a result of 
colonisation increased literacy levels and side-lined traditional Islamic-based learning. The 
corresponding urban migration also led to the decline of traditional agrarian modes of 
production. All these factors combined to create conditions in which Arab identity was 
strongly challenged by notions of Western social order. Even when colonial rule ended in 
the region, its legacy, in the shape of Western systems of government and policies that 
encouraged economic and social modernisation, continued to be practiced by Arab regimes. 
While this created ideal conditions for the resurgence of political Islam, it was the 1967 war 
which represented a benchmark in this resurgence. The humiliating Arab defeat not only 
marked the decline of pan-Arabism but also an increasing alienation of Arab masses from 
political rulers and systems along with a disenchantment with Western-inspired approaches 
to politics and power in the Middle East. In other words, it is from 1967 onwards that Arab 
masses began moving away from secular political ideologies and looked instead towards 
Islam to provide them with a sense of identity.
In the Palestinian territories political Islam has also witnessed a remarkable revival, though 
organisations like Hamas are not dedicated to attaining political power for Islamic reasons 
alone. After the 1967 war the Palestinian national struggle was led by secular forces like 
Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO). The Islamic movement remained relatively weak in comparison in this 
period and gained momentum only after the defeat of the PLO in Lebanon in 1982 . 
Hamas gained ground as a highly-politicised Islamic, anti-occupation force in the 
Palestinian territories during the first intifada. Even so, it must be emphasised that political 
Islam has never replaced the ideology of nationalism in the Palestinian territories and the 
struggle for national identity has, as yet, never been superseded by the quest for an Islamic 
identity. Instead Hamas both acquired and maintained legitimacy by deliberately and 
systematically harnessing political Islam to Palestinian nationalist aspirations and 
objectives. In this manner, political Islam, shaped by intersection with modem secular ideas
25 Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 8
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and ideologies, has adapted to address contemporary international realities and co-opted the 
Palestinian nationalist agenda.
Hamas therefore uses the language of political Islam to specifically construct a narrative of 
jihad against the Israeli state as part of the Palestinian national struggle. It is political Islam 
which facilitates the convergence of the Palestinian nationalist project (which would 
obviously establish a state in the Westphalian sense) with the classical Islamic agenda of 
establishing dar al islam (i.e. the abode of peace which transcends all state and national 
boundaries). Political Islam also provides Hamas with the tools to legitimise the use of 
suicidal violence to the Palestinian public as a modem day jihad fought against a 
disproportionately powerful enemy with the only tools available -  suicide bombers. 
Therefore, this work asserts that political Islam facilitates the expansion of the traditional 
concept of jihad (which is by definition a just and limited war) to include the concept of 
total war (which is by definition fought without restraints). This convergence of these 
evidently opposing concepts under the broad rubric of jihad is what is cmcial to explaining 
how suicidal violence is successfully justified and legitimised as jihad in Palestinian 
society. In illustrating the role of political Islam in suicide operations conducted 
specifically by Hamas in the Israeli-Palestinian arena of conflict, this work contributes to 
the debate on the relationship between violence, Islam and the contemporary world and 
demonstrates that Hamas’ use of religious rhetoric to justify violence, in fact, facilitates a 
distinctly modem political agenda. Hamas’ political ambitions are identified as specifically 
state-oriented and the political language of religion, in this case of political Islam, is seen to 
be used to specifically grant legitimacy to the movement. This work locates jihad and 
consequently martyrdom operations as central themes in the political Islamic rhetoric 
adopted by Hamas arguing that Hamas’ ability to resort to suicide operations is rooted in a 
radical interpretation of jihad and martyrdom. In short, this work demonstrates how the 
build up of political Islamic rhetoric in the territories has increasingly facilitated the 
legitimisation of suicidal violence against the Israeli state.
(Hi) Political Violence
The study of violence continues to be a highly problematic area within the social sciences. 
Charles Tilly identifies three broadly competing views of violence which serves to
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categorise the widespread debate to a large extent. The first categorises violence as 
propensity-driven and locates the cause of violence “within the actor, calling attention to 
genetic, emotional, or cognitive peculiarities that incline a particular individual, group, or 
category of persons to damaging behaviour more than others”26. The second view sees
violence as instrumental interaction and portrays violence as a means to a specific end
(power, wealth, prestige etc.). Finally the last view categorises violence as a cultural form 
and argues that “the ready availability of certain ideas, practices, models and beliefs itself 
promotes violent action”27. In all cases, the very term ‘violence’ carries with it an 
inherently negative connotation and by categorising any phenomenon as violent one serves 
to condemn it.
Political violence, as a specific category of collective violence, may be defined as violence 
that is motivated by political conditions. The use of political violence as a potential strategy 
for social and national liberation movements suggests that violence is used to create and 
consolidate identity -  a factor that has already been discussed vis-a-vis Palestinian identity 
formation above28. Approaching violence from this specific perspective fits into Tilly’s 
second categorisation which sees violence as instrumental . However, such an approach 
inadvertently ignores the symbolic dimension of violence, i.e. what the practice of violence 
says. The symbolic or expressive dimension of violence is significant in that it affords us 
crucial insights into how violence transforms a social environment and enables us to
• • o nidentify the ideological message that is conveyed to multiple audiences by the act . 
Violence therefore conveys cultural meanings, most importantly ideas of legitimacy. Max 
Weber states that the concept of legitimacy entails that a social order is accepted as valid 
either due to its historicity, its emotional value or its instrumental reasoning. “The 
legitimacy of violence can be based upon each (and usually all) of the three aspects; it 
presents itself as recreating ideas and behavioural models from the past; it appeals to strong
26 Charles Tilly, ‘Violent and Non-Violent Trajectories in Contentious Politics’ in Kenton Worcester, Sally A. 
Bermanzohn and Mark Ungar (eds.), Violence and Politics: Globalization's Paradox (New York and London: 
Routledge, 2002)
27 Ibid.
28 Jeffrey Murer, ‘The Clash Within: Intrapsychically Created Enemies and Their Roles in Ethnonationalist 
Conflict’, in Kenton Worcester, Sally A. Bermanzohn and Mark Ungar (eds.), Violence and Politics, opt, cit.
29 For a comprehensive view of violence as instrumental action see: Hannah Ardent, On Violence (London: 
Allen Lane, 1970)
30 David Riches, ‘The Phenomenon o f Violence’, in David Riches (ed.), The Anthropology o f Violence 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) , p. 8
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feelings of social closure based on the experience of either superiority or suffering, as 
generated by this very tradition of confrontation; and it offers itself as the most direct route 
to asserting the interests of those collectivities established by the above two 
mechanisms” . Violence is therefore a performative act and the symbolism of violence 
encompasses narratives and inscriptions of violence.
Najib Ghadbian in his study of linkages between political Islam and violence in the Middle 
East identifies four types of politically motivated violence that has existed for at least the 
last two decades in the region . The first type is armed struggle and counter-violence that 
emerges in direct response to extreme repression by a regime, as seen in Iraq, Syria and 
Libya. The second type of political violence has taken the form of conflict between 
governments and radical Islamists as seen in Algeria and Egypt. The third type of political 
violence is motivated by nationalist goals of liberation and can be located in both the 
Islamist and National Resistance Movement in South Lebanon and the Palestinian struggle 
for statehood. The final type of political violence Ghadbian identifies is the attacks 
conducted by supporters and branches of Al-Qaeda (AQ)33. In all cases, Islamic 
movements in the Middle East can be seen as employing violence to achieve specific goals. 
This work categorise Hamas’ use of violence, and suicide bombings, as violence directed 
towards the goal of national liberation. Furthermore, Hamas’ political use of violence is 
also the link between Palestinian national identity formation and political Islam in the 
occupied territories.
This work sees suicide attacks as a volatile and complex combination of instrumental and 
expressive violence. In other words, they are both acts of expediency and practical reason 
as well as acts that are simultaneously symbolic, ritualistic and communicative. This 
combination implicitly reflects a division between the leaders of these movements and the 
individuals who actually commit these acts. Hence, suicidal violence is definitely a case 
of strategic choice for the organisers where the operatives are merely a tool or a weapon
31 Ingo W. Schroder and Bettina E. Schmidt, ‘Introduction: Violent Imaginaries and Violent Practices’ in Ingo 
W. Schroder and Bettina E. Schmidt (eds.), Anthropology o f  Violence and Conflict (London: Routledge, 
2001)
32 Najib Ghadbian, ‘Political Islam: Inclusion or Violence?’ in Kenton Worcester, Sally A. Bermanzohn and 
Mark Ungar (eds.), Violence and Politics, opt, cit.
33 In this case, the geographical area o f study is more ambiguous as are the goals o f the many branches and 
associated organisations o f AQ.
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of war. However, the act is presented to and subsequently internalised by the suicide 
bomber as one with religious and ritual significance. The distinction between the 
organisation and its leaders on the one hand and the bombers on the other can also be 
used to explain the choice of suicidal violence as a ‘rational choice’ for both parties 
involved. For the leaders it is a rational choice because it is economical, flexible and has a 
powerful impact both psychologically and strategically. It is, in other words, the epitome 
of the ‘smart bomb’. For the bombers it is a rational choice because no matter how they 
interpret their personal ‘jihad’- the cost of sacrificing the mortal life is much less than the 
benefits they accrue in doing so. This implicit but vital division between those that are 
willing to die and those that are willing to kill is crucial to understand the phenomenon.
Given this background this work links these three concepts to three theoretical 
approaches/methodologies in international relations, namely: Social Constructivism, the 
Just War thesis and the Rational Actor Model, in order to construct a theoretical framework 
for analysis. However, the model is constructed on a ‘why’ and ‘how’ basis. In other words, 
the rational actor model is first used to explain why suicide attacks, as acts of instrumental 
and expressive violence, are adopted in the Palestinian setting. The model then uses social 
constructivism to account for the ‘box’ of Palestinian nationalism and national identity 
formation and explains how suicide bombings emerged in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Finally, the revised understanding of the just war thesis is applied to enable the reader to 
comprehend how political Islam facilitates the use of suicidal violence in the occupied 
territories. The thesis contends that it is only through a simultaneous application of these 
three approaches in tandem that the phenomenon of suicidal violence in the Palestinian 
milieu can be fully understood, analysed and explained.
III. Literature and its Limitations
This section outlines the key theories forwarded on the causes of suicide attacks and 
highlights some of the limitations inherent in the same. In doing so, it not only locates this 
work within the existing literature but simultaneously attempts to disrupt traditional 
readings of suicidal violence thereby suggesting potential avenues of revising and/or 
expanding this research. It must be noted that this survey by no means professes to be
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exhaustive but aims instead to outline only the main approaches in the study of suicide 
attacks.
In international relations analyses of the causes of suicidal violence emerge from the arena 
of security studies - and even more specifically from the literature on terrorism studies and 
studies in non-conventional and asymmetrical warfare. In fact, studies on suicidal violence 
can be seen as a subset of the broader field of terrorism studies. Till recently the bulk of the 
terrorism literature was produced in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the emergence of 
various left-wing movements in Europe, nationalist movements in South America and of 
religious (primarily Islamic) movements in the Middle East34. The research was conducted 
by a handful of dedicated socials scientists and military experts who formed a committed, 
albeit small, community of specialists in the field. Yet given the Cold War context and the 
concurrent theoretical focus on neorealist theories of interstate conflict, terrorism literature, 
despite being extensive and academically diverse, remained mostly in the periphery. Most 
of the work also tended to address definitional and conceptual problems and empirically 
tested findings on the long-term patterns and causes of terrorism remained limited. Even 
more importantly, terrorism research, fettered by the paucity of systematic data and the 
political sensitivity inherent to the topic, remained mostly unrelated to research in 
international relations and mostly addressed a ‘policy’ audience.
In the post-Cold War era, neo-liberal and constructivist understandings challenged the neo­
realist conception of an anarchical world in unrelenting competition for security. Yet both 
critiques remained, with a few exceptions35, largely focussed on patterns of behaviour in 
interstate relations effectively relegating to the side-line any focus on the activities of 
violent sub-state or non-state actors. Thus a clear disjunct has existed between work in 
terrorism studies and international relations with the former developing more or less 
independently of the research on international relations . Research on the even more
34 Walter Laqueur, The Age o f Terrorism (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1989, reprint)
35 See for example: Peter J. Katzenstein and Yutaka Tsujinaka, Defending the Japanese State: Structures, 
Norms and the Political Response to Terrorism and Violence Social Protest in the 1970s and 1980s (Ithaca, 
New York: East Asia Programme, Cornell University, 1991); See also David Leheny, ‘Symbols, Strategies, 
and Choices for International Relations Scholarship after September 11’, Dialog-10 (Spring 2002)
36 As David Leheny points out specialists looked towards fields other than political science for theoretical 
guidance in the 1980s and made forays into organisational theory and criminology. Indeed by the late 1980s 
the political context was so removed from terrorism studies that doyen Martha Crenshaw organised a
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specific area of ‘suicide terrorism’ has been even further limited and emerged mostly in the 
post-Hizballah context of die 1980s. The successive appearance of suicide bombing 
campaigns in the Sri Lankan and Israeli- Palestinian context, in the late 1980s and early 
1990s respectively, triggered more systematic area-specific work on suicide attacks in 
specific research communities -  yet even so, the field remained comparatively small and 
somewhat removed from the concerns of international relations theory.
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks however, the situation has altered rather dramatically 
for both terrorism research and especially for research on suicidal violence. The 9/11 
suicide attacks have served to catapult terrorism studies from the relative periphery of 
academic interest and policy concern onto centre-stage37, resulting in an absolute profusion 
of literature on this topic in the past few years. This situation is even further bolstered by 
the increasing use of suicide attacks in the Iraqi, Afghani and Pakistani sectors and the 
resumption of attacks in Sri Lanka. Yet the bulk of the work which is emerging in terrorism 
studies continues, like earlier research, to be ideologically biased and fragmented and 
remains “narrative, condemnatory and prescriptive”38. The masses of popular articles that 
have been published since September 11th are repetitive and rarely demonstrate an in-depth 
understanding or analyses of the phenomenon. Furthermore, the long-standing issue of 
definition remains unresolved, as does the “inability to build a cohesive integrated 
cumulative theory”39. Much of the research also continues to be “event driven”40. Expert 
Martha Crenshaw’s assertion that the field of terrorism studies is “theoretically 
impoverished and stands to gain in theoretical scope, precision, and cumulativeness of 
findings”41 also remains valid; and while scholars such as David Leheny have in the recent 
past attempted to link back their work to social movement theories such theoretically 
grounded research still remains in its preliminary stages42. The same set of charges can be 
levied against literature focussing on suicidal violence.
conference titled ‘Terrorism in Context’ in order to emphasise the political context in which terrorist 
campaigns emerged and occurred. See David Leheny, ‘Symbols, Strategies and Choices’, Ibid.
37 Magnus Ranstorp, ‘Introduction: Mapping Terrorism Research’, opt, cit.. p. 3
38 Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Concepts, Data Bases, 
Theories and Literature (Amsterdam and Oxford: North-Holland, 1988, 2nd edition)
39 Magnus Ranstorp, ‘Introduction: Mapping Terrorism Research’, opt, cit.. p. 4; See also: Andrew Silke, 
‘The Devil You Know’, opt, cit.
40 Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Psychology o f Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century’, Political Psychology 
Vol. 21, No. 2 (2000), p. 405
41 Martha Crenshaw, ‘Current Research on Terrorism’, opt, cit.. p. 1
42 See David Leheny, ‘Symbols, Strategies, and Choices’, opt, cit.
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This author believes that the paucity of international relations theory with regard to 
literature on suicidal violence emerges primarily because the approaches which were 
traditionally used in terrorism studies have been transplanted and applied with little or no 
modification to the analyses of suicide attacks. As a result analyses of suicidal violence 
suffer from the same set of drawbacks and limitations as traditional terrorism studies. The 
remainder of this section will therefore briefly outline the key traditional approaches in 
terrorism studies before providing an overview of how these have been applied to the 
phenomenon of suicide attacks in the recent past.
Most terrorism studies use one or more of three very different levels of analysis43. At the 
individual and group level of analysis, on which much of the work is focussed, the spotlight 
is generally upon psychological and tactical explanations (terrorism as a product of 
individual pathology44, relative deprivation45, the contagion effect46, etc.). Hence questions 
such as why individuals opt to become operatives, what keeps them there, and determinants 
of group dynamics are addressed by studies pitched at this level of analysis. The societal or 
national level of explanation are characterised by attempts to identify causal links between 
attacks and specific historical, cultural and socio-political characteristics of the society 
under study (terrorism as a result of economic inequality47, political regime48, societal
43 See for example: Brynjar Lia and Katja Skjolberg, Why Terrorism Occurs -  A Survey o f Theories and 
Hypotheses on the Causes o f  Terrorism, Report 2000/02769 (Kjeller, Norway: The Norwegian Defense 
Research Establishment, 2000). While these levels o f analysis have been used by various studies the detailed 
categories forwarded in this summary are those outlined by Lia and Skjolberg.
44 See for example: Jerrold M. Post, ‘Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of 
Psychological Forces’ in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins o f Terrorism, opt, cit.: Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Causes o f  
Terrorism’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981); Paul Wilkinson, ‘The Sources o f  Terrorism: 
Terrorist’s Ideologies and Beliefs’ in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.), International Terrorism: Characteristics, 
Causes, Controls (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 1990); Ehud Sprinzak, ‘Right-Wing Terrorism in a 
Comparative Perspective: The Case o f Split Delegitimization’, in Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Terror From the Extreme 
Right (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1995)
45 Johan Galtung, ‘A Structural Theory o f  Aggression’, Journal o f Peace Research, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1964); Ted 
Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970); Adam Przeworski, 
Sustainable Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)
46 Martha Crenshaw (ed.), Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The Consequences o f Political Violence 
(Middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1981) and ‘Causes o f Terrorism’ in Charles W. Kegley 
Jr. (ed.), International Terrorism, opt, cit.
47 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986,2nd edition)
48 Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), Internal Conflict and Governance (New York: St. Martin’s Press in association 
with the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1992); Dennis A. Pluchinsky, ‘Terrorism in the Former 
Soviet Union: A Primer, a Puzzle, a Prognosis’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1998)
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norms49, etc.). Finally, the systemic or international level of analysis attempts to 
understand the causal relationship between the international state system and politics and 
occurrence of attacks on an international level (the impact of weak or collapsed states, 
hegemony and the rise of a unipolar world order50, etc.). In each case, the approaches 
utilise psychological explanations, societal explanations or structural explanations in 
isolation or in combination with one or more level of analysis. Exactly the same trend is 
visible in the study of suicidal violence in which, once again, the bulk of the work speaks to 
the first two levels of analyses.
In addition, three broad strands can be observed in the study of suicidal violence: first, 
studies that approach it from a tactical, rational perspective; second, those that use religion 
as an entry point into the research; and third, those that use a range of social factors to 
understand the motivations behind suicide attacks. A significant number of these studies 
either focus exclusively upon suicide attacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or in the very 
least refer to these attacks as one of their many examples. Either way, it is clearly evident 
from the existing literature that the high propensity for suicidal violence in the Palestinian 
territories combined with the Israeli focus on counter-terrorism makes the area nearly 
impossible to ignore by those writing in the field.
Given this situation it is perhaps not surprising that most of the work focussing on suicidal 
violence falls into the first category and is deeply impacted by rational choice theory. In 
other words, it is impacted by the belief that groups and individual which employ or 
participate in suicide attacks “calculate costs and benefits of different courses of action, act 
with purpose, adapt to incentives and opportunities, and pursue means that are logically 
connected to their ends”51. This holds true for the large amount of work available on the 
Palestinian case as well. Therefore various strands of this research, whether focussed on the 
Palestinian case or on suicidal violence more generally, strive to illustrate how suicidal 
attacks are adopted because tactically the benefits outweigh the costs. Most of this literature
49 Martha Crenshaw, ‘Causes o f Terrorism’ in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.), International Terrorism, opt, cit.: 
Dennis A. Pluchinsky, ‘Terrorism in the Former Soviet Union’, opt, cit.
50 Thomas J. Volgy, Lawrence E. Imwalle and Jeff J. Comtassel, ‘Structural Determinants o f  International 
Terrorism: The Effects o f Hegemony and Polarity on Terrorist Activity’, International Interactions, Vol. 23, 
No. 2 (1997)
51 Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making o f  Suicide Bombers: A  
Preliminary Theoretical Synthesis and Illustrative Case Study’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 29, 
No. 2 (2006), p. 167
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also addresses the first level of analysis, i.e. groups and individuals, and focuses 
specifically upon the instrumental significance a suicide attack holds for both levels. For 
these studies then all other factors, i.e. psychological, economic, religious, political, social, 
etc., are peripheral to and feed into the instrumental aims of the suicide attacks perpetrated 
by the individuals and/or groups under study.
Ehud Sprinzak and Boaz Ganor , both Israeli counter-terrorism experts who have written 
extensively on the use of suicidal violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, explain how 
suicide bombing is a rational choice as bombers are a low-cost option for the organisation 
deploying them. This is because while they are easy to recruit and train they inflict high 
levels of damage, are near impossible to deter, do not require escape plans and 
simultaneously attract enormous media attention. Martha Crenshaw54, Rohan 
Gunaratna55and Mia Bloom56 speak of the contagion effect of suicide bombing and explain 
that as suicide campaigns are seen to be effective against ‘an enemy’ bombers emulate one 
another and groups share technology. Bloom, who has also worked specifically on the 
Palestinian case, further asserts that in the occupied territories suicide attacks are a public 
good which possess the ability to increase in direct proportion to rising popular support for 
the tactic as rival groups use it in an attempt to ‘outbid’ the other. Robert Pape57 believes 
that suicide attacks are particularly effective against democracies which traditionally abhor 
high casualty rates; as such for Pape suicidal violence is tactically used to pressure 
democratic governments into altering specific policies, such as withdrawing troops from 
territories that the attackers consider to be their homeland. Scott Atran58 and Nasra 
Hassan59 believe that suicide bombers are not necessarily poor, depressed or uneducated;
52 Ehud Sprinzak, ‘Rational Fanatics’, Foreign Policy 120 (September- October 2000)
53 Boaz Ganor, ‘Suicide Attacks in Israel’ in Countering Suicide Terrorism, opt, cit.: Personal interview with 
Boaz Ganor, 20 January 2005, Herzliya, Israel
54 Martha Crenshaw, ‘“Suicide” Terrorism in Comparative Perspective’ in Countering Suicide Terrorism, opt, 
cit. and ‘The Logic o f Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product o f Strategic Choice’, in Walter Reich (ed.), 
Origins o f Terrorism, opt, cit.
55 Rohan Gunaratna, ‘The LTTE and Suicide Terrorism’, Frontline, Vol. 17, No. 3 (February 05-08, 2000), 
http://www.flonnet.com/fll703/1703106Q.htm
56 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure o f Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) and 
‘Palestinian Suicide Bombings: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding’, Political Science Quarterly, 
Vol. 119, No. 1 (2004)
57 Robert Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic o f Suicide Terrorism’ American Political Science Review 97 (2003) and 
Dying to Win, opt, cit.
58 Scott Atran, ‘Genesis o f Suicide Terrorism’, Science Magazine 299 (March 2003) and ‘Mishandling 
Suicide Terrorism’, The Washington Quarterly, 27 (2004)
59 Nasra Hassan, ‘An Arsenal o f Believers: Talking to Human Bombs’, The New Yorker (19 November 2001)
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though Atran believes that the upsurge in suicide attacks may be linked to the increasing 
disjuncture between rising expectations and lack of opportunities. Hassan, who interviewed 
nearly 250 Palestinian recruiters, trainers, failed suicide bombers and relatives of deceased 
bombers between 1996 and 1999, further asserts that while suicide bombers are “deeply 
religious” they are also politically aware individuals and thus equally driven by military 
considerations. Atran and Crenshaw both explain that suicide attacks are rational in that 
they enable the group using them to push targeted governments towards harsher retaliation 
policies which in turn allows them to gamer greater societal support at home. Bruce 
Hoffman and Gordon McCormick60, who use Hamas’ suicide bombing campaigns as one 
of their case studies, believe that suicide attacks are signalling tactics that convey to the 
targeted opposition the group’s determination to continue an armed struggle and compete in 
a given political landscape.
A second approach towards the study of suicidal violence uses religion as the entry point 
into understanding suicide violence. There are two main strands of thinking in this 
approach. The first believes that religion, Islam in particular, is the key ideational correlate 
to this phenomenon. Thus suicidal violence is seen as a weapon in the confrontation 
between fundamentalist Islam and its adversaries61. In privileging the role of religion this 
strand of thinking tends to depict suicidal violence as devoid of rationality. The second 
points out how suicidal violence can also be located in non-Muslim societies where it is 
carried out by non-Islamic groups citing examples such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey and the 
Kamikaze in Japan. However, these authors tend to revert back to the strategic and rational 
argument as the core behind the use of suicidal violence and at the most credit religion with 
providing an ideological cover for strategic goals. Reuven Paz, for example, writes how the 
greatest success of Islamist movements to date has been their ability to present their 
doctrines as ‘true Islam’62 -  a feat which enables them to accomplish their strategic goals 
behind the facade of religious rhetoric and ideology. Another strand that has recently
60 Bruce Hoffman and Gordon McCormick, ‘Terrorism, Signalling and Suicide Attacks’, Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2004)
61 See for example: Harvey W. Kushner, ‘Suicide Bombers: Business as Usual’, Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1996); Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind o f God: The Global Rise o f  
Religious Violence (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University o f California Press, 2000); Raphael 
Israeli, Islamikaze: Manifestations o f Islamic Martyrology (Portland, Oregon and London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2003)
62 Reuven Paz, ‘The Islamic Legitimacy o f Suicide Terrorism’ in Countering Suicide Terrorism, opt, cit.
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emerged acknowledges the social significance of religious motivations and locates suicidal 
violence as a cultural phenomenon, with religion representing a primary component of 
culture. Mohammed Hafez is a key proponent of this view and he believes that “religious 
notions of martyrdom and self-sacrifice have inspired violent campaigns in all religious 
traditions and can promote extreme violence” . Hafez concludes his study of suicidal 
violence in the Palestinian territories by asserting that religion plays a key role for the 
individual as suicide attacks encompass a redemptive logic for the suicide bombers but a 
more strategic logic for organisations. Hence, for Hafez suicidal violence holds symbolic, 
rather than instrumental, logic for the individual.
Another explanation for suicide bombings locates their source in a range of social 
experiences, including psychological trauma and profiling. On this basis authors like David 
Lester, Bijou Yang and Mark Lindsay64 research individual motivations behind suicidal 
violence and conclude that the psychological profiling of suicide bombers is feasible 
because bombers tend to share authoritarian personality traits. In direct contrast researchers, 
such as Ariel Merari65, who has collected data on bombers from both Palestinian intifadas 
as well as from Lebanon, hold that psychological profiling is impossible as bombers do not 
show any type of psychopathology and point instead towards national humiliation rather 
than religion, culture or revenge a motivating factor behind their attacks. Merari further 
identifies suicidal violence as a group phenomenon rather than an individual one and 
stresses the role of the organisation in ‘creating’ a bomber66. The fact that suicide bombers 
recruited by organisations reflect a wide range of personalities furthers bolsters his position 
that individual profiling is difficult. The idea that humiliation is a key factor behind both 
individuals as well as the societies in which a ‘culture’ of suicide bombing exists is most
63 Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Rationality, Culture, and Structure in the Making o f Suicide Bombers, opt, cit.. p. 
169. Also see by the same author: ‘Dying to be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimensions o f  Suicide Terrorism’, in 
Ami Pedahzur (ed.), Root Causes o f Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization o f Martyrdom (London and New 
York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006) and Manufacturing Human Bombs (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute o f Peace Press, 2006)
64 David Lester, Bijou Yang and Mark Lindsay, ‘Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?’, 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2004)
65 Ariel Merari, ‘The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East’, in Walter Reich (ed.), 
Origins o f  Terrorism, opt, cit. . and ‘Suicide Terrorism’ in Robert I. Yufit and David Lester (eds.), 
Assessment, Treatment and Prevention o f Suicidal Behaviour (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2005).
66 It is worth noting that Merari has changed his position regarding suicide attacks. In his earlier work he had 
identified suicide as an individual rather than a group phenomenon stressing that the organisation merely 
provided a foil and avenue for individuals who already had suicidal personalities.
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fnpowerfully articulated by Palestinian psychiatrist Dr. Eyad El-Sarraj . Sarraj, who is also
the founder and director of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme, explains how
those volunteering for suicide operations in the Al-Aqsa intifada are products of the first
intifada who opt to kill themselves due to personal experiences of loss, hopelessness and
humiliation. Hence these individuals identify so closely with national humiliation and
defeat that they are willing to die to restore both individual and national honour. A recent
study by Judy Kuriansky also identifies and focuses some key psychosocial issues
including revenge, humiliation, imbalance of power, and search for identity in Palestinian 
68groups .
Nichole Argo69 further develops the social approach to suicidal violence by stressing that it 
is important to understand the social groups (family, peer, ethnic, and national) that the 
bombers belong to. This is because suicide bombers and suicide bombings tend to emerge 
in societies where self-sacrifice has a high symbolic significance. From her study of fifteen 
pre-empted Palestinian bombers she concludes the individual’s decision to volunteer for a 
bombing is made “within the rational/emotional parameters of the communal/relational 
world”70 and facilitated by an internalised social identity, exposure to asymmetrical conflict 
and of course the organisation which recruits the bomber.
To date very few studies of suicidal violence adopt a multi-level, multi-causal approach. 
One notable exception is Assaf Moghadam’s study of Palestinian suicide attacks in the 
second intifada71. Moghadam focuses on both the individual and the organisation and in 
doing so attempts to construct an analytical framework for “understanding the processes 
and factors that underlie the development of the suicide bomber and the execution of the
67 Eyad El Sarraj, ‘Wounds and Madness: Why We’ve Become Suicide Bombers’, PeaceWork Magazine 
(May 2002), http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/pwork/0205/0205Q6a.htm: Linda Butler, ‘Suicide 
Bombers: Dignity, Despair and the Need for Hope -  An Interview with Eyad El Sarraj’, Journal o f  Palestine 
Studies, Vol. XXXI, No. 4 (Summer 2002)
68 Judy Kuriansky, Terror in the Holy Land: Inside the Anguish o f the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2006)
69 Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs: The Palestinian Case and the Pursuit o f  a 
Martyrdom Complex’, paper presented at the annual meeting o f the International Studies Association (ISA), 
Montreal, 20 March 2004 and ‘Human Bombs: Rethinking Religion and Terror’, Audit o f  the Conventional 
Wisdom (MIT Centre for International Studies, April 2006)
70 Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs’, Ibid.
71 Assaf Moghadam, ‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational 
Aspects’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (March-April 2003)
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79suicide bombing attack” . He identifies various factors motivating individuals to volunteer 
for suicide missions, including religious, economic, social, nationalist and personal. 
However, his analysis of organisational motives remains under-developed and limited 
primarily to the goal of group survival.
This work in contrast , attempting to construct as holistic and accurate an analytical 
framework as possible, adopts a multi-level, multi-causal approach and not only focuses 
on the role of both the organisation and the individual but also refers to the socio-political 
cultural context from which both emerge. In doing so equal weight is given to the role 
played by the individual and the organisation. While Palestinian society is not a key focus 
for this thesis it is often referred to as this author believes that it provides the broader 
socio-cultural context from which both Hamas and its individual operative emerge. 
Palestinian society also propels the use of suicidal violence by constantly interacting with, 
influencing and, in turn, being influenced by both the organisation and the individual. As 
stated before in constructing a theoretical framework of analysis, this thesis also strives to 
address the theoretical gap which exists in terrorism studies while simultaneously 
providing an in-depth analysis of a single case. In doing so it not only seeks to 
incorporate theoretical analysis to a field that has been accused of being ‘theoretically 
impoverished’ but also to include the phenomenon of suicide bombings into the range of 
contemporary theoretical discourses in international relations.
IV. Methodology and Sources
Methodologically this work applies aspects of constructivist grounded theory to an 
empirical, single-case study, i.e. to Hamas and its use of suicidal violence in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. Grounded theory research specifically aims to move theory away from 
highly abstract conceptual levels and instead ground it in data and so construct 
“explanatory frameworks that specify relationships among concepts”73. As a creative, 
systematic qualitative research approach it begins with an area of study and allows theory
72 Ibid, p. 66
73 Kathy Charmaz, ‘Grounded Theory: Objectivist and Constructivist Methods’, in Norman K. Denzin and 
Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), Handbook o f Qualitative Research (London, New Delhi and Thousand Oaks, 
California: Sage Publications, Inc., 2000, 2nd edition), p. 510; See also: Nick Pidgeon and Karen Henwood, 
‘Grounded Theory’, in Melissa Hardy and Alan Bryman (eds.), Handbook o f Data Analysis, (London, New 
Delhi and Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 2006)
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to emerge rather than fitting empirical data into a preconceived theoretical framework. 
Hence it actively seeks to bridge the gap between theory and empirical research and either 
“generates theory in areas where little is known, or ... provides a fresh slant on existing 
knowledge about a particular social phenomenon”74. For this particular methodological 
approach then research, data collection, analysis and theory stand in reciprocal relationship 
with each other. Constructivist grounded theory takes a step further by recognising the 
interactive nature of both data collection and analysis. In other words, constructivist 
grounded theory is fully cognisant of the fact that the “categories, concepts, and theoretical 
levels of an analysis emerge from the researcher’s interaction within the field and questions 
about the data”75. This research thus uses a single-case study to which it applies aspects of 
constructivist grounded theory to generate both the research question as well as the 
hypotheses.
The case study methodology that is used in this work incorporates aspects of both an 
intrinsic case study (which is aimed at formulating a better understanding of a particular 
case) and an instrumental case study (in which a “particular case is examined... to provide 
insights into an issue or to redraw a generalisation”)76. The rationale behind using the 
method of a single-case study was to enable a ‘thick description’ of suicide operations 
conducted by Hamas and its operatives for two key reasons. First, it was hoped that a 
detailed account of the phenomenon would be able to generate from the data a more holistic 
framework of analysis. Second, it was believed that “the essential task of theory building... 
is not to codify abstract regularities but to make thick descriptions possible, not to 
generalise across cases but to generalise within them”77. Thus a ‘thick description’ of 
suicide operations conducted by Hamas and its operatives successfully revealed three 
interconnected factors during the course of this research: die ideology of political Islam and 
jihad, a historically constructed cultural norm of militant heroic martyrdom in the service of 
Palestinian nationalism, and the rationally driven symbolic and instrumental imperatives of
74 Christina Goulding, ‘Grounded Theory: Some Reflections on Paradigm, Procedures and Misconceptions’, 
in Kate Gilbert (ed.), The Working Paper Series, The Management Research Centre, University o f  
Wolverhampton (June 1999), p. 6; available on: http://www.wlv.ac.uk/PDF/uwbs WP006-
99%20Goulding.pdf, Date Accessed: 03 January 2008
75 Kathy Charmaz, ‘Grounded Theory’, opt, cit.. p. 522;
76 Robert E. Stake, ‘Case Studies’ in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), Handbook o f  
Qualitative Research, opt, it., p. 437
77 Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Towards an Interpretive Theory o f Culture’, in The Interpretation o f  
Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 26
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suicidal violence. These three factors were then, in turn, linked back to established 
theoretical approaches in international relations and became the building blocks of the 
proposed framework of analysis. The research concluded that the phenomenon of suicidal 
violence in the Palestinian territories as practiced by Hamas could not be understood 
comprehensively until all three theoretical understandings were applied simultaneously to 
the data available.
The empirical research methodology utilised was also multi-layered. First and foremost, 
both primary and secondary sources were examined and analysed without attempting to 
use these texts to verify any existing theory. This enabled the author to formulate the 
general research context at the outset of the study and approach primary and secondary 
data collection without forcing a preconceived framework on it. The sources used 
included relevant books, articles (from academic journals, newspapers and magazines), 
government/group documents, academic and policy conference papers, reports from 
think-tank, international security organisations as well as those produced by human rights 
groups. Secondly, extensive field research was undertaken to provide a contextualised, 
practical and holistic understanding of the case. Since the research focused on Hamas, 
field work was undertaken in Israel and the Palestinian territories from December 2004 to 
end-January 2005. Here again the methodology was based on utilizing databases hitherto 
unused and also conducting extensive interviews with both Israeli and Palestinian 
individuals and groups78. The findings from the interviews and databases were first 
compared and meshed with the initial textual research and the resultant theoretical 
framework was then further developed and refined. In the latter stages aspects of content 
analysis were also applied79. This is especially true for Hamas’ political and military 
leaflets as well as for statements made by individual bombers, their families and other 
Palestinians.
The interviews conducted were mostly of a semi-structured type with single respondents 
(the depth interview) or a group of respondents (the focus group). As semi-structured
78 See Appendix I for a list o f ‘on-the-record’ interviews
79 Content analysis is “a technique for making inferences from a focal text to its social context in an 
objectifiable manner ... and often involves statistical treatment o f text units”. See for example: Martin W. 
Bauer, ‘Classical Content Analysis: A Review’, in Martin W. Bauer and George Gaskell (eds.), Qualitative 
Researching with Text, Image and Sound (London, New Delhi and Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications, Inc., 2000)
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interviews the author did not “lead the inquiry with a full set of predetermined questions 
as in a survey or questionnaire”80. Instead the interviews had a fairly open framework 
which encouraged respondents to participate in what were, in essence, focused 
conversations. This allowed respondents to talk at length, in their own terms, and with 
time to reflect. While some questions were predetermined most of them were formulated 
during the interview, especially as Palestinian respondents tended to be self-conscious, 
scared and often defensive, and even more so when confronted with the sensitive nature 
of the research topic (i.e. Hamas and the phenomenon of suicidal violence). Trust was 
also a key issue with both Palestinian depth interviews and focus groups. Consequently, a 
semi-structured framework allowed the author the flexibility to probe for details relevant 
to the research only once a rapport had been built with the respondents. The author was 
also fully aware of the ethical issues involved in conducting fieldwork in a conflict zone, 
including issues of informed consent, respondent privacy, confidentiality, anonymity, and 
no harm81. Every effort was made to ensure that these were strictly observed and 
respondents were always given the option of both terminating the interview at any point if 
they so wished and maintaining the confidentiality of their views. With regard to 
maintaining confidentiality respondents occasionally chose to have their views 
documented as ‘off-the-record’, in which case the information divulged and/or the 
respondent’s identity may not be disclosed. Additionally, respondents were also given the 
right to refuse to answer any of the questions asked82. They were also given the right to 
refuse having their interviews taped or recorded in any other manner.
While the interviews were mostly elite-led a systematic effort was made to also combine 
them with informal discussions with various other key stakeholders to identify and 
formulate a nuanced understanding of the multiple issues related to the research. The 
interviews were targeted towards members and/or supporters of specific political parties 
(Hamas, Fatah, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), individual members 
of both the Knesset and the Palestinian National Council, journalists, political analysts, 
academics, students and also practitioners in the field of counter-terrorism. Informal
80 George Gaskell, ‘Individual and Group Interviewing’, in Martin W. Bauer and George Gaskell (eds.), 
Qualitative Researching, opt, cit.. p. 38
81 Andrea Fontana and Janies H. Frey, ‘The Interview: From Structured Questions to Negotiated Text’ in 
Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds.), Handbook o f  Qualitative Research, opt, cit.
82 Maurice Punch, ‘The Politics and Ethics o f Fieldwork’, Qualitative Research Method Series, Vol. 3 
(London, New Delhi and Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1986)
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discussions were also undertaken with university students, student activists, journalists, 
Israeli military and police personnel and local civilian populations in both Israel and the 
Palestinian territories.
V. Outline of the Thesis
In order to enable a holistic and contextualised understanding of the emergence of suicidal 
violence in the Palestinian territories, and its use by Hamas and its operatives against the 
Israeli state, it is imperative to begin with understanding the historical roots of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. To this end Chapter II provides a brief political history of the conflict 
and locates the evolution and role of two key political players in the Palestinian setting, i.e. 
Fatah and Hamas. In case of Fatah, its development and history are closely linked first to 
the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and then the Palestinian Authority (PA). As 
such Chapter II attempts to make these relations clearer and briefly illustrates how Fatah’s 
dominance over the PLO/PA has impacted the evolution of the Palestinian national 
movement. This chapter also outlines the emergence of Hamas in 1987 and traces its roots 
to the Muslim Brotherhood thereby illustrating the evolution of the Palestinian national 
discourse from a secular one (under the PLO) to a primarily religious one (under the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas)
Having established the context the next three chapters examine the key components that are 
seen to motivate suicidal violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter III traces the 
expressive and instrumental rationality of suicide missions on both the individual and 
organisational level. The first part of this chapter outlines prominent literature on suicidal 
violence which uses choice-theoretic modelling. It then identifies gaps in this literature 
suggesting that current literature largely ignores the non-material, expressive rationality 
that suicidal violence holds for individuals. In doing so, the chapter argues that both the 
organisational and individual resort to suicidal violence may be conflated along three lines: 
survival, competition and retaliation. Part II of this chapter demonstrates the dialectic 
which exists between Hamas and its operatives asserting that this dialectic must be 
considered in order to appreciate the long-term existence and the simultaneously strategic 
and symbolic use of suicidal violence within the Palestinian setting.
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Chapter IV attempts to understand how suicide operations have emerged in the Palestinian 
setting. It begins by accounting for the ‘box’ of Palestinian social reality and in doing so 
locates the Palestinian struggle for national identity as a crucial element in the emergence 
of suicidal violence. As such suicide bombings are seen as the final step in an escalating 
trajectory of violent struggle which is aimed specifically at establishing a Palestinian state. 
This chapter first illustrates how militant heroic martyrdom is a crucial component of 
Palestinian selfhood and how it is a key component of Palestinian national identity. Part II 
of this chapter illustrates how Hamas has inserted itself into a pre-established Palestinian 
culture of militant heroic martyrdom which it has then successfully appropriated, 
reinterpreted and articulated as suicide missions.
Chapter V outlines the ideological reasoning behind suicidal violence and illustrates how 
political Islam is employed to facilitate the articulation, justification and legitimisation of 
suicidal violence as a modern-day jihad  to Palestinian society through the means of modem 
interpretations and fatwas. This chapter illustrates how political Islam plays a crucial role in 
the Palestinian territories in that it supplies the ideological language, symbols and codes 
which legitimise the use of suicide operations against Israel. Part II of this chapter traces 
this religious rhetoric in Hamas literature and in the statements made by its operatives, their 
families and its supporters.
Finally, Chapter VI concludes by amalgamating the findings of the three core chapters to 
construct the proposed theoretical framework of analysis and brings together the main 
arguments and findings of the previous chapters. Finally this chapter also highlights the 
limitations of the thesis and suggests avenues for future research.
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Chapter II: A Brief Political History of the Israeli- 
Palestinian Conflict
“The intifada is m ore than a  war. 
War lasts f o r  days or months, but with us 
it is a w a y  o f  l ife ”. 
- Bana Bassam  al-Sayih1
I. Tracing the Roots of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
thThe roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be traced back to the late 19 century and 
the desire of the European Jewry to establish a Jewish state. Zionism, as the movement to 
establish a Jewish state in Palestine came to be known, had emerged as a Europe-wide 
political movement by 1897 under the leadership of Theodor Herzl; and most importantly, 
Herzl’s influential 1896 pamphlet Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State) had already called for 
a Jewish home in Palestine2. While Palestine had been under the Ottomans since 1517 by 
1897 there were approximately 400,000 Palestinian Arabs and 50,000 Palestinian Jews who 
lived side by side in this area3. The latter were mostly Orthodox Jews who survived largely 
on the charitable offerings of the European Jewry and lived in Palestine to study, pray, 
hoping eventually to die and be buried in the holy land. However, in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries Jews from Europe began arriving in Palestine in successive waves of 
immigration that were known as aliyot (sing, aliyah which means ‘to ascend’)4. These new 
immigrants set up agricultural settlements on purchased land with the aim of establishing a 
Jewish homeland. Hence land was purchased in a highly systematic manner with the aim of
1 Bana was a fourteen year old girl under house arrest in her home in the West Bank at the time this statement 
was made and was shortly to be imprisoned for fourteen months for throwing stones at an Israeli bus. As 
quoted by Eileen MacDonald, ‘Women o f the West Bank’ in Shoot the Women First (London: Fourth Estate,
1991), p. 87
2 John Quigley, The Case fo r  Palestine: An International Law Perspective (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2005, revised and expanded version), p. 3
3 Ahron Bergman, A History o f  Israel (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 7
4 Ahron Bergman, A History o f  Israel, opt, cit.. p. 7. Bergman identifies five aliyot: the first from 1882 -  
1903; the second from 1904- 1914; the third from 1919 -  1923; the fourth from 1924 -  1926; and the fifth 
from 1932- 1939
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establishing a contiguous chain of Jewish villages5. The Jewish National Fund (The Karen 
Kayemeth) was formed in 1901 with the express purpose of buying land for Jewish settlers 
and thereby redeeming “the land of Palestine as the inalienable possession of the Jewish 
people”6. The Fund purchased large tracts of land in Palestine from absentee landlords who 
had emerged as a result of the late 19th century Ottoman implementation of a land 
registration system which had enabled wealthy absentees to gain legal titles to land 
previously owned by Arab farmers and their families under customary law. Under this 
system the family farmers continued to till and live on the land as tenants, mistakenly 
thinking that they preserved their customary rights to the land, though legally this was no 
longer the case7. Instead as land was bought by the Fund these Palestinian Arabs were 
evicted to make space for Jewish settlers. Unsurprisingly over time there was a progressive 
build-up of Arab opposition to such land purchase and consequently to Jewish immigration 
and Zionism8. By the time World War I broke out in 1914 the Arabs were involved in a 
concentrated effort to protest against and prohibit land sales to the Zionists, raise funds to 
purchase lands that could otherwise be sold to the Zionists and boycott goods produced by 
Jewish settlers. By this time dispossessed Arab farmers had also begun raiding the 
settlements built on their former lands9.
Palestinian fears and hostility were further compounded by the formal commitment made 
by the British foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, in November 1917 to the establishment of 
a ‘Jewish national home in Palestine’10. By 1918 Britain had crushed Ottoman armies and 
controlled all of Palestine -  thus marking the end of four centuries of Ottoman rule in the 
region. In April 1920 the British Mandate over Palestine was endorsed by the Allied 
powers and in 1922 formal ratification was obtained from the League of Nations11. More
5 See for example: Neville J. Mandel, The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I  (Berkley: University o f  
California Press, 1976); Sami Hadawi, Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948: A Comprehensive Study 
(London: Saqi, 1988); Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries: A People's History 
(London: Zed Press, 1979)
6 John Quigley, The Case fo r  Palestine, opt, cit.. p. 4
7 Rashid Khalidi, ‘Palestinian Peasant Resistance to Zionism before World War I’ in Edward Said and 
Christopher Hitchens (eds.), Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question 
(London: Verso, 1987), pp. 214, 216-217.
8 Arieh L. Avneri, The Claim o f Dispossession: Jewish Land-Settlement and the Arabs 1878 -  1948 (New 
York: Herzl Press, 1982), pp. 110-114
9 John Quigley, The Case fo r  Palestine, opt, cit.. p. 6
10 See for example: Jehuda Reinharz, ‘The Balfour Declaration and Its Maker: A Reassessment’, The Journal 
o f  Modem History, Vol. 64, No. 3 (September 1992)
11 Ahron Bergman, A History o f  Israel, opt, cit.. pp. 16-18
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significantly, in 1921 Britain divided its Middle Eastern holdings (comprising modern-day 
West Bank, Gaza, Israel and Jordan) into two. The area east of the Jordan River became the 
Emirate of Transjordan while that west of the river the Mandate of Palestine. Ironically, 
while this was the first time in modem history that Palestine emerged as a unified political 
entity, Palestinian Arabs were now governed by a power that was clearly sympathetic with 
the establishment of a Jewish state in that same territory12. Consequently Arab opposition 
towards both Jewish settlers and the British steadily intensified over the next two decades. 
The most obvious expression of this opposition was in 1920-21 and 1929, when violent 
anti-Jewish riots occurred in Palestine. Violence further escalated after the mid-1930s, in 
response to more land purchases and Jewish settlements associated with the waves of 
Jewish immigration which had intensified dramatically as a direct result of Adolf Hitler’s 
rise to power in 1933. Arab hostility was further compounded by the “emergence of a clear 
trend within the Zionist movement calling for the voluntary or compulsory ‘transfer’ of the 
Arab population to make way for the Jewish state” 13.
Palestinian opposition to the British Mandate and Zionist settlements steadily escalated and 
the first real challenge emerged in late 1935 under the leadership of Sheikh ‘Izz-al-Din al- 
Qassam, who created clandestine military cells amongst the fellahin (Palestinian peasants) 
and mral migrants. While Qassam was killed in his very first encounter with the British in 
late-193 5, his death did not prevent the outbreak of a full-scale uprising in April 1936 
which eventually encompassed all of Palestine. The Great Revolt of 1936 -39 began in 
urban centres and spread rapidly into mral areas14. It was finally crushed by the British, 
with the assistance of Jewish militias, through a counter-insurgency campaign in 1939. 
While the collapse of the Great Revolt was overshadowed by developments in Europe as 
Hitler invaded Poland in September 1939, it induced the British to issue the 1939 White 
Paper, i.e. a statement of policy, in an effort to maintain order in an increasingly turbulent
12 See for example: Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar, ‘Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict- A Primer’, 
Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP),
http://www.merip.org/palestine-israel primer/toc-pal-isr-primer.html. Date Accessed: 23 June 2006
13 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search fo r  State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 1-2. See also: Nur Masalha, The Expulsion o f  the 
Palestinians : The Concept o f  Transfer in Zionist Thought, 1882- 1948 (Washington: The Institute for 
Palestine Studies, 1992); Benny Morris, The Birth o f  the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, 2nd edition); Joel Beinin, ‘Forgetfulness for Memory: The Limits o f the 
New Israeli History’, Journal o f  Palestine Studies, Vol. XXXIV, No. 2 (Winter 2005)
14 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search fo r  State, opt, cit.. p. 2
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Palestine. The White Paper limited future Jewish immigration and land purchases and 
effectively marked an end of the alignment of British and Zionist interests in Palestine15.
During the Second World War the British army in Palestine was faced with the dual task of 
guarding against an invasion by German or Vichy French forces while also suppressing the 
militant Zionist underground. Illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine also rose dramatically 
after 1945 as a direct result of the Holocaust, further aggravating Palestinian hostility. Most 
crucially, Britain’s attempts to contain this influx provoked a violent campaign against 
British targets in Palestine by the militant Zionist organisations, Irgun Zvai Leumi and Lehi 
(Stem)16. Faced with an increasingly untenable position in Palestine the British requested 
the United Nations (UN) to intervene. The UN passed Resolution 181 in November 1947 
which formally ended the British Mandate and voted to partition Palestine into two states, 
one Arab and the other Jewish. The Zionists leadership while publicly accepting this 
partition plan hoped to expand the borders allotted to the Jewish state17. On the other hand 
both the Palestinian Arabs and the surrounding Arab states rejected the planned partition 
arguing that the proposed Jewish state was no more than a settler colony that was the direct
1 Q
result of Britain permitting Zionist settlement in Palestine .
Fighting between the Palestinian Arabs and Jewish settlers began just days after the UN 
partition plan was adopted. Yet while Arab military forces were numerically larger than 
their Zionist counterparts they were poorly organised, armed and trained. Consequently, by 
April 1948 Zionist forces controlled most of the territory that had been allotted to the 
Jewish state under the UN plan and approximately 200,000 -  300,000 Palestinians had 
already fled these areas19. Britain formally evacuated Palestine on 15 May 1948 and Zionist
15 John Quigley, The Case fo r  Palestine, opt, cit.. p. 27; For a comprehensive study on the state o f Arab 
resistance and leadership in the decade after the Great Revolt see: Issa Khalaf, Politics in Palestine: Arab 
Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939-1948 (Albany: State University o f  New York, 1991)
16 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search fo r  State, opt, cit.. p. 3. See also J. Bowyer Bell, Terror out 
o f Zion: The Fight fo r  Israeli Independence 1929-1949: Irgun Zvai Leumi, LEHI and the Palestine 
Underground (Dublin: Academy Press, 1979)
17 See for example: Simha Flapan, The Birth o f  Israel: Myths and Realities (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1987, 1st edition), p. 32; Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents 
(Boston and New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2004, 5th edition), especially chapter 5.
18 Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar, ‘Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict- A Primer’, opt, cit.. p. 5
19 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search fo r  State, opt, cit.. p. 3; See also: Michael J. Cohen, Palestine 
and the Great Powers, 1945-1948 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982); Salim Tamari 
(ed.), Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighbourhoods and Their Fate in the War (Jerusalem: Institute o f  
Jerusalem Studies, Badil Resource Centre for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 1999); Walid
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leaders immediately proclaimed the independent state of Israel. The governments of 
neighbouring Arab states which had remained largely uninvolved in the conflict thus far 
limiting “their contribution to the formation of a small irregular force under the command 
of the League of Arab States”20 now intervened militarily. Thus Egyptian, Jordanian, Iraqi, 
Syrian, and Lebanese contingents, as well as a small force from Saudi Arabia, began 
moving into Palestine shortly after the Zionist proclamation of Israel. However, Arab 
military movements lacked coordination and the participating governments were deeply 
suspicious of each other’s territorial ambitions in Palestine. As a result, Arab forces were 
repelled in most sectors and by the end of October 1948 Israel had successfully expanded 
its territory to include 78 percent of Mandate Palestine, as well as West Jerusalem, thereby 
forcing a further 500,000 Palestinians to flee to what came to be known as the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip (WBG), or to cross the border into neighbouring Lebanon, Syria and 
Jordan21. The war ended with Israel and the Arab states signing armistice agreements and 
Palestine was divided into three parts. The state of Israel occupied about 78 percent of the 
total territory. Jordan occupied the West Bank while Egypt took control of the Gaza Strip. 
Amongst the Palestinians, the outcome of the first Arab-Israeli War is dubbed al-nakba, i.e. 
‘the catastrophe’. In a nutshell this ‘catastrophe’ ensured that the Palestinian Arab state of 
the UN partition plan was never established thus setting the stage for what has since 
become a protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the region.
The period following the 1947-48 war was characterised by a huge influx of Jewish 
refugees, mostly survivors of the European Holocaust, to the newly established state of 
Israel. Israel not only continued its policy of forced deportation of Arab populations to 
territories beyond its borders but also introduced legislation which enabled Jewish settlers
99to legally acquire abandoned Arab property . Within Israel only a small minority of 
Palestinians now remained and the large majority were dispersed over the neighbouring 
countries and WBG. Consequently, the Palestinian interaction with Israel in the post-1948 
period was enacted through the wider Arab environment as opposed to direct confrontation
Khalidi (ed.), All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 
(Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992)
20 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search fo r  State, opt, cit.. p. 3
21 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, opt. cit., pp. 196-200; Yezid Sayigh, Armed 
Struggle and the Search fo r  State, opt, cit.. pp. 3-4
22 John Quigley, The Case fo r  Palestine, opt, cit.. pp. 103-110; Ahron Bergman, A History o f  Israel, opt, cit.. 
pp. 70-73
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with the military or political apparatus of the Israeli state. The Middle East in turn the
aftermath of the Second World War was characterised by the “formation or consolidation
of independent national states, the emergence of a distinct Arab state system, and the
• • •replacement of colonial domination with US-Soviet rivalry” . Unsurprisingly Israel was 
regarded with hostility by Arab states which saw it as a legacy of Western imperialism and 
the “region remained imperilled by the prospect of another war”24. Tensions were further 
escalated by the Israeli policy of attacking villages across the 1949 armistice lines to 
prevent refugees from returning from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt25. Meanwhile 
uncoordinated groups of Palestinian guerrillas also began military raids into Israeli territory 
sparking reprisals from Israel. This cycle of guerrilla raids and Israeli reprisals continued 
into the 1960s. Regional relations between Israel and its Arab neighbours were not 
improved by Israel joining Britain and France in the 1956 attack on Egypt, ostensibly to 
reverse Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez Canal which had thus far been under French 
and British control. In this process Israel temporarily captured Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula 
but was forced to retreat back to the 1948 armistice lines as a result of UN pressure .
Disputes in the demilitarised zone between Israel and Syria, while endemic since the 1949 
armistice, had escalated dramatically since February 1966 as a result of the new Syrian 
regime encouraging Palestinian guerrilla activity along its border . In spring 1967 the 
Soviet Union wrongly informed Syria that Israel was amassing forces near the Syrian 
border in preparation for an attack. Egypt responding to Syria’s plea for assistance 
mobilised its troops on 14th May and over the next few days entered the Sinai Peninsular 
bordering Israel and blockaded the Israeli port of Eilat. As the crisis continued, Israel 
responded by launching pre-emptive strikes against Syria and Egypt on 5 June 1967. Jordan 
which had shelled targets in Israel in response to the pre-emptive strike on Egypt was also 
attacked. The war, which lasted a mere six days, humiliated and discredited the Arab 
regimes and established Israel as the region’s dominant military power. As a result of the
23 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search fo r  State, opt, cit.. p. 25
24 Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar, ‘Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict- A  Primer’, opt, cit.. p. 6
25 John Quigley, The Case fo r  Palestine, opt, cit.. p. 154
26 Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar, ‘Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict- A  Primer’, opt, cit.. p. 6
27 Richard B. Parker, ‘The June 1967 War: Some Mysteries Explored’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2 
(Spring 1992), p. 178
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war Israel captured the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the Golan Heights from 
Syria and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) from Jordan28.
The peace process in the Middle East after the 1967 war came to be centred around the UN 
Security Council Resolution 242 which, amongst other things, required Israel to withdraw 
from territories occupied during the six days of military engagement, a just settlement of 
the Palestinian refugee problem and the right of all states in the region to exist in peace 
within recognised political boundaries . While both Jordan and Egypt made clear their 
willingness to comply with Resolution 242 if the West Bank and Sinai Peninsula were 
returned to them, Israel ignored the overture, refusing to withdraw from all the territories 
captured in 1967. Instead Israel stated that significant revisions of the 1949 armistice lines 
would provide it with the ‘secure boundaries’ necessary for maintaining peace in the 
region . Syria refused to sign the resolution and reverted to encouraging Palestinian raids 
across its borders into Israel31. The Palestinians in turn rejected the resolution as it required 
a unilateral Palestinian recognition of Israel without a reciprocal Israeli recognition of 
Palestinian national identity and rights. Consequently tensions continued till late 1970 
when Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, in the hope of breaking the diplomatic deadlock, 
agreed to sign a peace agreement with Israel whereby Egypt would recognise Israel’s 
independence and right to exist in return for the Sinai Peninsula. Israel once again rejected 
Sadat’s terms and refused to withdraw to its pre-1967 lines. Frustrated, Egypt and Syria 
launched a surprise attack on Israeli forces in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights in 
October 1973, on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur32. Peace was brokered by the USA 
which secured partial Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and Golan Heights by 1975 but 
avoided the more difficult negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza.
28 See for example: John Quigley, The Case fo r  Palestine, opt, cit.: Richard B. Parker, ‘The June 1967 War’; 
Gideon Gera, ‘Israel and the June 1967 War: 25 Years Later’, Middle East Journal, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Spring
1992); Ersun N. Kutulus, ‘The Notion o f a “Pre-emptive War”: The Six Day War Revisited’, Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 2007); Moshe Gat, ‘Britain and Israel Before and After the Six Day War, June 
1967: From Support to Hostility’, Contemporary British History, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring 2004)
29 Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest: A Modem History o f  Palestine (Essex: Scorpion Publishing Ltd., 1989), p. 
245
30 See for example: Avner Yaniv, ‘Israeli Foreign Policy since the Six Day War’ and Don Peretz, ‘Israeli 
Policies Towards the Arab States and the Palestinians Since 1967’, both in Yehuda Lukacs and Abdalla M. 
Battah (eds.), The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Two Decades o f  Change (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 
1988)
31 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, opt, cit.. pp. 298-299
32 For a comprehensive summary of the October 1973 war see: Trevor Nevitt Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The 
Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947-1974 (London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1978)
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In 1978 Sadat, the Israeli Prime Minster Menachem Begin and President Jimmy Carter 
worked out two agreements at Camp David: the first of these formed the basis for an 
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty which was signed in 1979, while the second agreement was a 
more general framework for establishing sustainable peace in the Middle East and 
addressed the Palestinian crisis. This second agreement “proposed to grant autonomy to the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and to install a local administration for a 
five-year interim period, after which the final status of the territories would be 
negotiated” . However, only the first of these two agreements reached fruition as the 
second was rejected by both Palestinians and Arab states, as being unable to guarantee 
neither an independent Palestinian state nor a full Israeli withdrawal from the areas 
captured in 1967. Israel, in direct violation of the commitments made at Camp David, also 
further sabotaged the agreement by continuing to build new settlements in the occupied 
territories.
The Palestinian crisis was further compounded by the June 1982 Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, masterminded by the defence minister Ariel Sharon, with the express purpose of 
destroying the Palestine Liberation Organisation (henceforth the PLO) which was 
headquartered in Lebanon; “scattering the Palestinian refugees whose camps were to the 
north and east of Israel; and establishing a regime of the Christian Phalangists who were 
loyal to Israel”34. The gruesome massacre of Palestinian civilians in the camps of Sabra and 
Shatila between September 16th -19th is believed to have occurred with the full knowledge 
of the Israeli officials, some of whom openly stated that they wished to see Lebanon 
‘purged’ of Palestinians35.
The massacres in Lebanon along with the expansion of settlements in the territories, the 
failure to grant autonomy to the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as proposed during 
Camp David and the consistent Israeli refusal to address the issue of Palestinian refugees all 
combined to ferment another Palestinian uprising. The first intifada (literally meaning 
‘rising up and shaking o ff in Arabic) erupted in December 1987 in Gaza and rapidly
33 Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar, ‘Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict- A Primer’, opt, cit.. p. 9
34 Sami Hadawi, Bitter Harvest, opt, cit.. p. 279
35 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, opt, cit.. p. 370. For a comprehensive account of 
the massacres see: Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout, Sabra and Shatila: September 1982 (London and Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: Pluto, 2004)
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spread to encompass the West Bank. The logical culmination of twenty years of frustration 
with Israeli occupation and over a century of upheaval and disruption it was a spontaneous, 
grassroots movement which had mass social participation and drew upon the organisations 
and institutions which had emerged under conditions of occupation. Often compared to the 
1936-39 revolt the intifada cut across political and social affiliations and relied on the 
policies of limited violent confrontation, which involved stone throwing or the use of 
Molotov cocktails, and multiple forms of civil disobedience including mass 
demonstrations, general strikes, political graffiti, the boycott of Israeli goods and the refusal 
to pay taxes. Intifada activism coalesced under the leadership of the Unified National 
Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) , which worked underground to coordinate the 
movement . The UNLU was a coalition of the four PLO parties active in the territories, i.e. 
Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and the Palestinian Communist Party (later known as 
the Palestinian People’s Party, PPP) . Other parties that were active during the intifada, 
though not as a part of the UNLU, were Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PU). The 
Israeli response to the intifada resulted in the arrest and detention of some 10,000 
Palestinians without charges, and the killing of over one thousand Palestinians, including 
200 under the age of sixteen, between 1987 and 199139.
While the intifada did not end Israeli occupation it served to bring the Palestinian issue 
back into the public eye and demonstrated that the status quo was no longer tenable. The 
intifada also moved the leadership of the Palestinian national movement into the territories 
for the first time thereby forcing a moribund PLO in Tunis into action. The intifada has 
been credited with reviving the PLO and its armed struggle, both of which were at their
36 Also referred to in some texts as the Unified National Command (UNC)
37 Cheryl A. Rubenberg, The Palestinians: In Search o f  a Just Peace (Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Rienner 
Publishers Inc., 2003), p. 32; See also Kenneth W. Stein, ‘The Intifada and the Uprising o f 1936-1939: A  
Comparison o f  Arab Communities’ in Robert O. Freedman (ed.), The Intifada: Its Impact on Israel, the Arab 
World, and the Superpowers (Miami: Florida International University Press, 1991) and Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, 
‘Introduction: On Achieving Independence’, in Jamal R. Nasser and Roger Heacock (eds.), Intifada: Palestine 
at the Crossroads (London, New York and Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1990)
38 Also note that the PFLP was established in 1967 but did not join the PLO till 1970. It was for a long time 
the second largest group in the PLO and posed a direct challenge to Fatah. However, the biggest issue with 
the PFLP was infighting. DFLP was formed as one o f its offshoots in 1969. PFLP’s main ideology involved 
the depiction o f Palestine as part o f Arab unity. DFLP on the other hand was more territorial in its conception 
of Palestine.
39 Joel Beinin and Lisa Hajjar, ‘Palestine, Israel and the Arab-Israeli Conflict- A Primer’, opt, cit.. p. 9
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lowest point and in decline by 198740. Responding to the pressure exerted by activists in 
the territories who expected the PLO to adopt a clear political programme for achieving 
independence, the Palestine National Council (PNC), the Palestinian govemment-in-exile, 
recognised Israel in November-December 1988 and also declared an independent state of 
Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza41.
In 1991, after the Gulf War, President George Bush made serious efforts to stabilise the 
Middle East by promoting a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir was unwilling to negotiate directly with the PLO. By 
October 1991, the US managed to open multilateral negotiations in Madrid between the 
Israelis and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Palestinian delegation, which 
comprised of residents from the occupied territories, was subject to Israeli approval and 
residents of East Jerusalem were barred on the pretext that all of Jerusalem was a part of 
Israel. Moreover, while the PLO was formally excluded from both the Madrid conference 
as well as from subsequent negotiations in Washington DC, its leaders were in regular and 
close consultation with the Palestinian delegation42. Negotiations dragged on with little 
progress till Yitzhak Rabin was assumed office in June 1992 and he promised a speedy 
conclusion of die on-going negotiations. The Israeli and Palestinian fatigue with the on­
going intifada combined with deteriorating economic conditions and the rapid rise of 
militant Islamist groups like Hamas in the territories pushed Rabin to break with 
convention and enter into direct negotiations with the PLO through a secret channel 
provided by the Norwegians in early 1993. These secret negotiations, known as the Oslo 
Accords produced the Declaration of Principles (DOP) which was signed in Washington in 
September 1993 43.
The Oslo DOP established a negotiating process which was supposed to take place over a 
five year interim period during which Israel was to withdraw first from Gaza and Jericho
40 Bard E. O’Neil, ‘The Intifada in the Context o f Armed Struggle’ in Robert O. Freedman (ed.), The Intifada, 
opt, cit. p. 37
41 See for example: Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle, opt, cit.. pp. 607-638
42 While it is beyond the scope o f this work to trace in detail the impact that the fall o f the Soviet Union and 
the emergence o f a unipolar world had on the Middle East peace process, suffice it to state that the absence o f  
Soviet power and interest is clearly seen in the expanded influence o f the United States in the region.
43 William B. Quandt, ‘Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks’ in Tamara Cofman Wittes (ed.), How Israelis and 
Palestinians Negotiate: A Cross Cultural Analysis o f  the Oslo Peace Process (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute o f Peace, 2005); David Markovsky, ‘Taba Mythchief, The National Interest (Spring 2003)
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and then from other unspecified areas of the West Bank. The PLO on its part made its 
principal commitments by recognising the state of Israel and promising to cooperate in 
dismantling the ‘terrorist’ network in the occupied territories. Israel’s principle 
commitments, unlike those of the PLO, were to be made in the final status talks. “The May 
1994 Cairo Agreement limited the extent of the initial Israel withdrawal to about 65 percent 
of the Gaza Strip, defined the extent of the Jericho area, established the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) as the governing body in the evacuated territories and inaugurated the 
interim period”44, which was meant to expire on May 4, 1999. The Taba Agreement (Oslo 
II), signed in September 1995, divided the West Bank into three areas. Israel withdrew 
completely from Area A which covered the main cities of the West Bank, i.e. Nablus, 
Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem and by January 1997 also from 80 percent 
of Hebron. This comprised a total of 3 percent of the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority 
was responsible for specific municipal functions in Area B, comprising about 23 percent of 
the territory, while joint Israeli-Palestinian patrols maintained internal security. Israel 
retained full control over Area C, which covered about 74 percent of the West Bank, 
including all settlements and the Jewish neighbourhoods in and around East Jerusalem. Key 
issues like the status of Jerusalem, the right of Palestinian refugees to return and their 
compensation, key elements of Oslo I, were again not discussed45. In October 1988 the 
Wye Accords outlined an Israeli withdrawal from an additional 13.1 percent of the West 
Bank but Israel unilaterally suspended implementation of these terms after withdrawing 
only from an additional 2 percent of the territory. In addition, between 1992 and 1996 
Jewish settlement blocs in the West Bank and East Jerusalem expanded by about 37 
percent46 and were connected, to each other and to Israeli cities, through an expansive 
network of bypass roads which outlawed Palestinian settlement 55 yards on either side. By 
2000 nearly 250 miles of bypass roads had been built on confiscated land again rendering 
hundreds of Palestinians homeless and adding to Palestinian disillusionment with the peace 
process47. Furthermore, Israel’s reluctance to relinquish control over territory combined
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(MERIP), September 2003, http://www.merip.org/newspaper opeds/oped cook092403.html. Date Accessed: 
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with steadily declining economic conditions in WBG and frustration with the peace process 
empowered Palestinian opponents of Oslo, especially parties like Hamas whose suicide 
bombing campaigns further hardened an already uncompromising Israeli stance.
Final status talks which had been initially scheduled for mid-1996 only commenced in mid- 
2000. By then Israeli withdrawal had left about 40 percent of the West Bank and 65 percent 
of Gaza under the direct or partial control of the PA. However, in July 2000 Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak presented his ‘red lines’ at Camp David II: “Israel would not return to 
its pre-1967 borders; East Jerusalem with its 175,000 Jewish settlers would remain under 
Israeli sovereignty; Israel would annex settlement blocs in the West Bank containing some 
80 percent of the 180,000 Jewish settlers; and Israel would accept no legal or moral 
responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem”48. Unsurprisingly, Arafat 
citing the conditions of Resolution 242 and the understanding implicit in the Oslo DOP 
demanded that Israel withdraw from the vast majority of the West Bank and Gaza, 
including East Jerusalem, and the recognise an independent Palestinians state in those 
areas. Thus, despite the fact that Barak offered more territory to the Palestinians than any of 
his predecessors, Camp David II failed as Arafat rejected the terms offered with the full 
support of his constituents.
The Palestinian frustration with what was essentially a failed and unfair peace process, and 
the daily humiliation which characterised Palestinian experience in the occupied territories 
converged to ignite the Al-Aqsa intifada shortly after the failure of Camp David n. In 
September 2000, Ariel Sharon, accompanied by about a thousand armed guards, visited the 
Temple Mount. Coming soon after the negotiations over Jerusalem’s holy places and in 
light of Sharon’s history as the ‘murderer of Sabra and Shatila’ as well as his clear views 
regarding the annexation of East Jerusalem, the visit sparked off protests which resulted in 
the killing of six unarmed Palestinian protesters. This triggered the riots which mark the 
beginning of the bloody Al-Aqsa intifada49. During the first intifada the space of clash and 
conflict was the Palestinian street, neighbourhoods and homes. The second intifada
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however was characterised by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) withdrawing to the borders 
of cities and towns and being thus concentrated around checkpoints and borders within only 
occasional forays into cities. The Al-Aqsa intifada was also marked by greater violence and 
harsher retaliatory measures from the IDF. The first four months of the Al-Aqsa intifada for 
example had more Palestinians hurt and killed violently than in several years of the first 
intifada - a trend which was no doubt further accentuated by the increasing militarization of 
the second intifada. This militarization was directly linked to the proliferation of the 
Palestinian security forces in the Oslo period which had created approximately 40,000 
armed and trained Palestinians in the occupied territories50. Consequently, protests often 
turned into violent clashes between armed and trained young men and the IDF at 
checkpoints and city borders. The Al-Aqsa intifada was also marked by an escalation of 
suicide attacks and Israeli targeted assassinations and military operations. As such from the 
point Camp David II failed and the Al-Aqsa intifada started in 2000, both the PA and 
Arafat steadily lost ground in the occupied territories leaving a vacuum in the leadership of 
the Palestinian national movement and generating the conditions which enabled Hamas to 
project itself as a legitimate alternative to the PA. By successfully projecting itself as 
capable of upholding the social, political and military mantle of the Palestinian national 
struggle Hamas finally achieved electoral victory in January 200651.
H. The Rise and Fall of Fatah and the PLO
Any analysis of Hamas and its rise to power in the occupied territories would be incomplete 
without a consideration of the key political players with whom it interacts. Israel is the most 
significant external political challenge while the Fatah-led PLO (and then the PA) 
represents die most powerful internal challenge. Fatah, the reverse acronym of Harakat al-
c*y
Qawmiyyin al-‘Arab (the Palestinian National Liberation Movement) , was formally 
created on 10 October 1959 and its goal upon inception was the liberation of Palestine 
though armed struggle. In many ways Fatah has been crucial to the articulation of the
50 Penny Johnson and Eileen Kuttab, ‘Where Have All the Women (and Men) Gone? Reflections on Gender 
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Palestinian struggle for independence -  in part due to its long existence but also because of 
its role in defining the direction of the resistance. Hamas, in its turn, has inherited a national 
stuggle shaped by Fatah and has consistently sought to claim it as its own by giving a new, 
more obviously Islamic, hue. Hence because of Fatah’s crucial role it is imperative to fully 
understand both its emergence and evolution within the Israeli-Palestinian landscape of 
conflict.
Fatah emerged in a regional political climate that was dominated by the philosophy of pan- 
Arabism and where the Palestinian issue was subordinated to a transnational ideological 
pursuit. The Palestinian problem was generally seen as a symptom of the greater Arab 
predicament and as an extension of the struggle against the West, and its representative 
Israel, in the Middle East. The Palestinian issue was thus no more than a powerful 
mechanism of garnering domestic and regional legitimacy and mobilising support for 
various Arab regimes in the region53. Fatah’s unique ‘Palestine first’ ideology challenged 
this subordination and articulated the necessity of a distinct Palestinian identity which its 
leaders believed was deliberately suppressed by both Israel and Arab states54. It therefore 
adopted a veiy measured stance vis-a-vis the PLO which was founded primarily under the 
influence of Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser in May 1964 as the primary 
representative of the Palestinian people, and was an effort to control the Palestinian 
resistance movement in accordance with his own regional power ambitions55. Thus on the 
one hand, while Fatah was deeply suspicious of the PLO on the other it welcomed the 
creation of an entity that specifically addressed the Palestinian crisis. Yet despite its 
suspicions Fatah always maintained an overtly accommodating position towards the PLO 
knowing that the latter enjoyed an Arab legitimacy which it still lacked (a policy that was 
later adopted by Hamas vis-a-vis Fatah and the PLO/PA). At the same time the creation of
53 See for example: Albert Hourani, A History o f  the Arab Peoples (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1991); 
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the PLO represented a challenge for Fatah which was forced to initiate its armed struggle 
sooner than planned and thereby end its years as an underground movement56.
Fatah’s thus launched its armed struggle on 1 January 1965, in the name of its military 
wing al- ‘Asifa (the Storm) provoking strong reactions from both the PLO and Egypt. The 
PLO denied any links with al-Asifa while Nasser regarded the start of military action “as 
inopportune and threatening a general loss of control over events”. Moreover, while the 
diplomatic recognition and military capability that the PLO received from Arab states 
provided it with an enhanced status among Palestinians, its inability to match Fatah in 
armed activity eroded this political credibility and strengthened Fatah’s position. Fatah in 
turn faced considerable difficultly in both mounting military operations against Israel and 
surviving as the Jordanian, Lebanese and Egyptian governments began arresting and 
detaining its operatives. But as Fatah’s violent struggle was by no means formulated to 
merely confront Israel but also to gamer popular support and ensure group survival it 
increasingly turned towards Syria for aid and support -  a dependence which allowed it to 
sharply increase in its military activity inside Israeli territory. Thus Fatah conducted 37 
attacks across the Lebanese and Jordanian borders in the first six months of 1967 alone 
thereby consolidating its position as a leading group in the struggle for a free Palestine. 
Most importantly, its ideology and modus operandi also found increasing resonance with 
Palestinians and by 1967 a clear consensus had emerged amongst all Palestinian groups that 
the time was ripe for guerrilla activity against Israel. Therefore, various Palestinian groups 
actively participated in the Six Day War that empted in mid-196757.
The Arab military defeats in the Six Day War reconfirmed for Fatah the inability of Arab 
regimes to achieve Palestinian independence through military means. Moreover, Nasser’s 
acceptance of the ceasefire with Israel also illustrated that the Palestinian issue would 
always be subordinated to the interests of Arab states in the region. At the same time, Fatah 
recognised, in this 1967 defeat, a rare opportunity to break away from the control exerted 
by Arab governments and consolidate popular support for active resistance. In late June
56 Anat N. Kurz, Fatah and the Politics o f  Violence: The Institutionalization o f  a Popular Struggle (Brighton 
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1967, Fatah claimed that it had transferred its leadership to the occupied territories . The 
Fatah Central Committee also approved building secure launching bases for military 
operations in the occupied territories, believing that these would enable armed struggle to 
be successfully waged from within the West Bank. To this end, Yasser Arafat established
fhclandestine headquarters in Nablus by mid-August 1967 and August 28 marked the 
‘second launch’ of Fatah’s armed struggle. The Israelis responded with an intensive 
campaign which destroyed Fatah’s resistance in the territories, forcing Arafat to leave the 
West Bank permanently in December of the same year. Nonetheless, Fatah’s actions 
established it as one of the few organisations resisting occupation in the territories59.
Fatah’s military activity also won it support from various Arab regimes in the aftermath of 
the 1967 War which were either too weak to deny the guerrillas the use of their territory or 
actively encouraged a low-intensity conflict with Israel. Fatah’s reputation was fully sealed 
with the Battle of Karamah. Karamah, a refugee town located in Jordan close to the border, 
was the location of guerrilla bases that were used to launch operations into the West Bank. 
In March 1968 Fatah fighters clashed with the Israeli army which had initiated a punitive 
raid targeting the bases located in the town60. Despite suffering heavy losses in what was a 
militarily imbalanced clash, the incident generated unprecedented support for Fatah from 
various sources -  including from Egyptian President Nasser. Fatah took immediate 
advantage of this support by initiating a process which culminated in its take over of the 
PLO as marked by Arafat’s election as PLO chairman in February 1969.
A wave of volunteers enlisted with the organisation within days after Karamah enabling 
both an expansion of guerrilla units and an escalation of military activity against Israel61. 
Guerrilla attacks were carried on simultaneously from the Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian 
fronts. At the same time there was a distinct shift in the political philosophy of Fatah whose 
bases in the occupied territories had been dismantled by Israeli action. Fatah now believed 
that it was necessary to “acquire a secure base on the East Bank” and the slogan now
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became “there is no difference between the Inside and Outside”62. However, the Jordanian 
government, wary of an organised Palestinian power in the country, were already trying to 
curb their activities, which by now also included international terror attacks and hijackings 
by groups like the PFLP. The crackdown by the Jordanian army on Fatah and other 
guerrilla groups in 1968 had pushed the resistance organisations towards setting up civilian 
militias in Palestinian refugee camps thereby setting the stage for the evolution of the 
Palestinian “state within a state” inside Jordan63. Now the guerrillas responded to Jordanian 
pressure by direct confrontation with the Hashemite monarchy. The battle that ensued in 
1970, often referred to as Black September, resulted in Fatah’s defeat and forced the PLO 
to flee to Lebanon64.
Fatah was also increasingly concerned about challenges posed by other guerrilla groups to 
its position in the PLO. Of the various groups the most troubling was the PFLP which 
enjoyed great prestige due to the successes of its international terror operations and 
hijackings. To counter the influence of the PFLP and enhance its own status, Fatah 
established the Black September Organisation (BSO) which conducted various operations, 
including the high-profile assassinations of the Jordanian Prime Minister in November 
1971 and of seven Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in September 197265. 
Within Lebanon, Fatah established headquarters in Beirut and amassed troops in southern 
Lebanon. As it became more entrenched in Lebanon it slowly shifted focus from 
international operations to conducting attacks against Israel. At the same time, the 
combination of the “Palestinian guerrilla sanctuaries in the south, massive social and 
economic dislocation caused by Israeli counter-insurgency campaigns, and the emergence 
of the PLO’s state-within-a-state brought tensions between Lebanon’s (sic) dominant 
Maronite Christian community and the Muslims majority to crisis points in (sic) 1973”66. 
Alliances between the Palestinian resistance organisations and the Lebanese Muslim
62 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle, opt, cit.. p. 207
63 Anat N. Kurz, Fatah and the Politics o f  Violence, opt, cit.. p. 59
64 Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Secular Terrorism, opt, cit.. p. 2
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opposition made this situation even more explosive while the October 1973 war further 
exacerbated the situation67.
As Lebanon spiralled towards civil war in early 1975, the process was marked by ever- 
escalating violent encounters between the Lebanese oppositional forces and their 
Palestinian supporters and Lebanon’s traditional Maronite leadership. Fatah initially 
maintained a neutral position refusing to interfere in the internal affairs of its host state but 
other Palestinian groups, like the PFLP, participated in the fighting from the very 
beginning. However, by late 1975 Christian forces had escalated attacks against Muslim 
population centres and were focussing specifically on the Palestinian neighbourhoods of 
Beirut thereby forcing Fatah into the fray. Syrian intervention in the war served to push the 
PLO into southern Lebanon where it consolidated its military and civil networks and 
intensified attacks across the border in Israel . The Israeli’s responded with two intensive 
retaliatory operations into Lebanon in 1978 and 1982 which eventually forced the PLO 
leadership to move to Tunis, with other members fleeing to Algeria, Yemen and Iraq. 
Fatah’s headquarters remained in Tunis till 1994 and the expulsion impacted its operational 
capabilities as it was not only unable to conduct effective attacks from such a distance, it 
also exerted less control and influence over the populations in the West Bank and Gaza69. 
Thus from 1982 to 1987 when the intifada erupted in the occupied territories both Fatah 
and the PLO were at their lowest ebb. This situation changed considerably once the Oslo 
peace process commenced and the Fatah-led PLO was institutionalised as the Palestinian 
Authority with Arafat still at its helm. However, as the peace process faltered and both 
Arafat and the PA were dogged by accusations of corruption, patrimonialism and 
inefficiency, conditions were created for the rise of a powerful political challenge in the 
territories. The Islamic forces, especially Hamas, had been slowly consolidating their 
position in WBG vis-a-vis the secular nationalist PLO/PA and they now moved swiftly to 
fill the vacuum that was being left by the PA.
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III. Enter Hamas
Hamas entered the political scene in Palestine with the outbreak of the first intifada in 
December 1987. It was markedly different from the very onset due to its strong revisionist 
stance regarding Palestinian national goals and the means available to achieve the same as 
well as its stance on social and moral rules. Indeed, its very existence as an Islamic 
organisation that rejected secular nationalism posed a challenge to first the PLO, and then 
later on to the PA that was established in the Gaza Strip, as both had always adopted a 
secular nationalistic position on Palestinian statehood. Open political competition with 
other more established political players was thus inevitable and began most obviously with 
Hamas’ rejection of the United National Command (UNC) which led the intifada on behalf 
of the PLO, in favour of charting its own course on strikes, demonstrations, and other 
activities of the resistance70. Thus, while on the one hand, the Hamas’ existence and 
attitudes defied the PLO’s status as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and the 
exclusive political force in the territories, on the other hand its clearly defined Islamic 
identity simultaneously allowed it to appropriate the Palestinian national narrative, 
dominated thus far by the PLO, and give it a specifically Islamic context.71 However, even 
the ability of the Hamas to emerge when it did in January 1988 is rooted in the changes in 
the broader Palestinian socio-political context. The origins of Hamas are first and foremost 
rooted in the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood movement, and most specifically, in its main 
institutional embodiment since the late 1970s, i.e. the Islamic Centre (al-mujamma' al- 
islami) in the Gaza Strip. The Mujamma’ was formally legalised by the Israeli Military 
Administration in 1978 and became “the base for the development, administration, and 
control of religious and educational Islamic institutions in the Gaza Strip, under Sheikh 
Ahmad Yassin’s supervision”72. Hamas in turn was formed directly as a result of the 
decision by the Muslim Brotherhood, its parent organisation, to become more actively 
involved in the resistance upon the spontaneous outburst of the intifada in 1987. A number
70 The United National Command (UNC) is identified as the national camp o f the uprising as opposed to the 
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of other factors also played a role, including the growing Palestinian despair with both the 
PLO and the prospects of peace with Israel.
The PLO, as illustrated in the previous section, had traditionally been the standard bearer of 
Palestinian military resistance, especially after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and had been 
known for its uncompromising political goals. The PLO National Charter of 1968 clearly 
defined these goals as the liberation of all of historic Palestine by armed struggle and the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The PLO also demanded the repatriation 
of Palestinian refugees and asserted that the Palestinian people, with an inalienable link to 
the land within Mandatory borders, existed. However, consistent military and political 
debacles had hounded the PLO and the relocation of the vast majority of the PLO to Tunis 
in 1982 had served to trigger a crisis of hope for the Palestinians. The PLO’s fragmentation 
and political weakness combined with what was effectively the nullification of the 
Palestinian military option caused by the Lebanese debacle, was seen by many as a major 
hurdle in the removal of Israeli occupation from Palestinian lands. It was in these 
circumstances that the national discourse began to change, especially in the 1980s, 
prompted by what had thus far been marginal Islamic groups, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood.
Palestine had traditionally been an issue of core concern for the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood (Ikhwan al-Muslimun) and the society’s first branch was established in 
Jerusalem in October 194574. By 1947 there were about twenty-five Brotherhood branches 
in the West Bank and Gaza and they were all directly supervised from Cairo. The Egyptian 
Brotherhood actively participated in the war of 1948 and allegedly sent at least three 
battalions of volunteers to fight in Palestine. After the war, the Muslim Brothers in the 
West Bank integrated with the Muslim Brothers in Jordan to become the Jordanian Ikhwan.
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Unlike other Jordanian political factions, and despite tensions and frequent disputes, the 
Jordanian Muslim Brothers managed to maintain harmonious relations with the Jordanian 
regime and the king. In Gaza, while under Egyptian administration the Muslim Brothers 
managed to maintain their Palestinian character, their fortunes were closely tied to the 
centre in Egypt and they also suffered brutal persecution under Nasser’s regime. Because of 
such differences in political space, the orientation of the two Ikhwan movements in the 
territories was radically different in the pre-1967 period. In Gaza the Muslim Brother’s 
tended to place a greater emphasis on the Palestinian cause and focussed on resisting 
refugee settlements and the internationalisation of the Gaza Strip through the establishment 
of small paramilitary wings. However, in the West Bank, the Ikhwan was increasingly 
subordinated to the leadership in Amman which eschewed armed struggle and placed the 
Palestinian nationalist programme on the back burner. The Muslim Brotherhood in the 
West Bank instead pursued an anti-imperialist, pro-shari ’a agenda, distancing themselves 
from the national movement. The Arab defeat in the 1948 war had significantly diluted the 
influence of Islam and the Brotherhood in the West Bank under directives from Amman, 
was concentrated upon promoting the revival of Islam through the Islamic notion of tabligh 
wa da ’wa (education and preaching).
By the beginning of 1967 the lack of unity, exacerbated by the divergent political 
experiences of the Brotherhood, permeated the organisation in the West Bank and Gaza. 
Despite the fact that in the post-1967 period, the Brotherhood’s branches in the West Bank 
and Gaza were under the same political administration, the two branches retained distinct 
identities which were predicated entirely upon their respective historical experiences under 
Jordan and Egypt. This translated into the Ikhwan’s inability to think or behave as a unified 
Palestinian-Islamic movement within a specifically Palestinian political arena. While 
initially after the war, it had seemed that the Islamic movement might have a role to play 
against Israeli occupation but it soon became obvious that its leaders were unable to 
articulate or sustain a comprehensive Islamic response to the occupation, its authorities and 
its policies, including the settlement of Palestinian land. This lack of unity was further 
exacerbated by the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood faced a significantly altered political 
landscape, both in the West Bank and Gaza, in the first decade after the Six Day War of
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1967 . In the West Bank not only was Israeli occupation now a sustained reality, but the 
war also successfully disrupted links with the East Bank (Jordan) and isolated the Ikhwan 
from any directives from its Jordanian leadership. In addition, the Brotherhood’s support 
of, and strong identification with, the Hashemite regime, which had often followed policies 
that had been directed against the Palestinians, was now proving to be a liability. Secular 
nationalism was also gathering momentum within the territories as a powerful rallying 
force and the PLO, founded in 1964, was fast establishing itself as the strongest 
representative of the Palestinian national movement.
The Brotherhood recognised the strength of the Palestinian national movement and realised 
that it would need to reconsider its public image and political agenda in response to the 
realities of occupation and the rise of the secularised radical Palestinian national movement. 
It therefore concluded that the time was not right to actively promote its specifically Islamic 
political agenda. Thus in the West Bank, alien occupation, the immediate effect of war, the 
loss of identity and the threat of annexation all combined to almost paralyse the 
Brotherhood. At the same time in Gaza, the Muslim Brotherhood had almost been 
destroyed as a result of the policy of sustained persecution adopted by Nasser, and little 
regret was expressed over the Arab defeat. Despite the respite from persecution after the 
war, the decimated Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza was unable to compete against the rising 
support for the Palestinian national liberation movement. Yet this near political obscurity 
also translated into a long-term advantage in that Israel did not see the Muslim Brotherhood 
as a political or military threat and thus left it well alone. In turn, the Ikhwan also took a 
conscious decision at this time to not engage with the national movement or resist the 
forces of occupation in Gaza. Hence, with the exception of some Brotherhood members 
fighting in the ranks of Fatah, and irrespective of Hamas’ claims today, there is scant 
evidence that the Ikhwan supported, either logistically or ideologically, the struggle against 
Israel in the first decade of occupation.
However, while the Islamic movement was floundering, the late 1960s-early 1970s in Gaza 
saw the rise of a fierce guerrilla movement under the leadership of the PLA. These
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fedayeen fighters were modem revolutionaries who as secularists or socialists fought for
7 f\national liberation rather than religious salvation . The Israeli crackdown ensured that this 
fedayeen movement was brutally crushed. The debilitated and targeted national movement 
was unable to fulfill the comprehensive role assigned to it by the local population and a 
political vacuum emerged as a result in the Gaza Strip. While the national movement was 
able to keep its legitimacy intact, the consistent Israeli pressure frustrated efforts made by 
nationalist parties to establish institutions in this period. At the same time Israel, following 
a classical divide-and-mle policy, funded the Islamic movement in order to counter the 
nationalists. As a result, while the Brotherhood was unable to fill the existent political 
vacuum and redirect the legitimacy that the national movement enjoyed, there was still a 
deliberate shift discemable in its policies as it once again resumed activities in the public 
realm and gradually became increasingly vocal over the coming decade.
The decade before the outbreak of the first intifada saw the rise of religious revivalism in 
the territories and the Islamic movement successfully consolidated itself in the Palestinian 
political arena. In this period both internal and external determinants impacted the 
development of political Islam. The Muslim Brotherhood, under the leadership of the 
charismatic Sheikh Yassin, embarked on a period of rapid expansion in Gaza. The 
movement’s inroads were made easier by the increasingly depressed socio-economic 
conditions in the refugee camps that covered the Gaza Strip and of course Israel’s policy of 
non-interference. The Brotherhood established the Islamic Center, al-Mujamma ’ al-Islami, 
as a voluntary organisation in 1973 and it was formally legalised in 197877. The Mujamma’ 
was a critical step in institutionalising the Ikhwan in Gaza and under Sheikh Yassin the it 
became the base for the development, administration, and control of religious and 
educational Islamic institutions, and thereby the spearhead for the message of revivalist 
Islam in the Gaza Strip. The core challenge for the Mujamma’ was to redirect the 
population away from secularised nationalism as a means to liberation from Israeli 
occupation. It did so by denouncing the nationalists as traitors to the Muslim faith and
76 Interestingly, while these revolutionaries were declared martyrs who would gain paradise, they were always 
referred to as fedayeen  (revolutionaries) and never, like during the Intifadas, as mujahidin (fighters on the 
path o f jihad -  i.e. a holy war). This is a significant indicator o f how the Islamic rhetoric developed over time 
and reflected the strength, or lack thereof, o f religious motifs and concurrently political Islam in the 
Palestinian political landscape. For more details on political Islam and jihad see chapter V
77 For details on the Mujamma’ see for example: Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine, opt, 
cit.: Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, opt, cit
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accusing them of leading the populace away from the path of Islam. In doing so the 
Mujamma’ and the Brotherhood projected the nationalists as directly responsible for the 
resultant Palestinian failure to achieve independence. Education and health care institutions 
in Gaza, as symbols of the de facto state and leadership, also became a contested arena 
between the Islamic movement and the nationalists and the Mujamma’ slowly consolidated 
its control over both in the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, as the Mujamma’ developed a civil 
society power base it became increasingly violent in asserting itself vis-a-vis the 
nationalists in Gaza. By the early 1980s the Islamic Jihad emerged as an organisation 
distinct from the Brotherhood as a result of its emphasis upon resistance rather than 
Islamisation through preaching and education. By 1987 the Islamic impact was palpable in 
the politics of the Gaza Strip and the re-Islamisation of Gazan society ensured that the 
Mujamma’ could rival a national movement that was increasingly corrupt, factionalised and 
weakened.
The West Bank as always took a different route and here the revival of political Islam 
gained momentum independently from the developments in Gaza. In a deeply secularised 
environment the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank attracted a new generation of 
supporters, many of whom had grown up under occupation, and who believed that the 
Islamic message could succeed where the secularists had failed. Thus while the Islamic 
movement could not force the PLO into retreat in the West Bank and gain the ground it did 
in Gaza, it still managed to project itself as a political alternative to the nationalist secular 
rhetoric. Once again it achieved this objective by combining its social activities with 
challenging the national movement in their own institutions, most notably in the 
universities. The spread of its Islamic message was helped in particular by the Iranian 
revolution of 1979, the 1982 PLO debacle in Lebanon and the massacres of Sabra and 
Shatila. These developments bolstered the message of political Islam in the territories. In 
particular the defeat of the national movement in Lebanon aided the Islamic movement’s 
bid for political power by severely weakening and fragmenting its opposition. Thus this 
volatile mix of internal and external determinants resulted in the emergence of political 
Islam as a dynamic national force in the territories by the eve of the first intifada. The 
sustained pressure of occupation and the threat of annexation triggered the spontaneous 
rioting in 1987 which began the intifada and the Ikhwan once again perceptively recognised 
that its message of quiet reform through tabligh wa da ’wa jarred with this new Palestinian
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reality. In response it created Hamas as a nationalist military force with an Islamic hue to 
participate in the uprising. Hence militant political Islam acquired the institutionalised 
nationalist face of Hamas and finally entered the Palestinian political arena in full force as a 
sustainable dynamic reality.
The 1987- 1993 uprising provided the immediate context in which Hamas, founded as the 
combatant arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, emerged as a significant political force in the 
territories. Hamas was initially established as the result of the decision made by the 
‘general guidance bureau’ (maktab al-irshad al-‘am), the Muslim Brotherhood’s supreme 
leadership based out of Egypt, as an ostensibly separate organisation to participate in the 
Intifada and to protect the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood from any potential fallout if
no
either this initiative failed or if the Intifada came to an early, or unsuccessful, end . 
However, as an organisation that was indigenous to the West Bank and Gaza, not only was 
Hamas able to project itself as capable of addressing Palestinian expectations and 
grievances more authentically and appropriately, its ‘local’ base also enabled it to operate 
without having to constantly reconcile its actions and interest with those of host Arab states 
or diaspora communities79. Moreover, at a time when the PLO was weak and appeared 
willing to abandon its original aim of armed stuggle for the liberation of Palestine in 
exchange for a political compromise, Hamas projected itself as the logical alternative by 
clinging to established national aims and values and declaring its intentions to fight
OA
relentlessly for the liberation of the national homeland within its mandatory borders . This 
emphasis upon armed political action combined with its location of the nationalist narrative 
in Islamic rhetoric enabled Hamas to slowly break into the centre stage of the Palestinian
O 1
political community as a movement with its own distinct identity .
While the genesis of Hamas was a response to the spontaneous rioting in Gaza, over time 
and retrospectively, the group also created a pre-intifada history for itself. This not only 
rebuffed the claims that it had been dragged unwillingly into the intifada but also gave it an 
edge over Fatah and PLO as it traced its roots to a pre-PLO Palestinian history. It did so by 
claiming alliance to the ideology of the 1930s revolutionary Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam
78 Yezid Sayigh, Aimed Struggle, opt, cit.. p. 630
79 ‘Dealing With Hamas’, opt, cit.. p. 6
80 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, opt, c it . p. 14
81 See also Appendix D for Hamas’ top leadership over the past twenty years
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and to the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood since its advent into Palestine. This 
retrospective creating of the Hamas ‘myth’ is not only symptomatic of Hamas’ attempts to 
survive and create a distinct identity in the cut-throat revolutionary political arena, but also 
of its growing competition with the PLO and its dominant faction, Fatah. It also explains 
how Hamas managed to overshadow and co-opt the Muslim Brotherhood movement. 
Indeed the Muslim Brotherhood had created Hamas to merely reflect a shift from politics to 
armed struggle within the parent organisation. Hamas was thus in fact meant to 
complement the existing structure and not to replace the social activities traditionally 
associated with the Mujamma’82. Nonetheless, Hamas with its alternative political message 
and ideology grew rapidly as the uprising gained momentum. This revisionist stance 
combined with its military activity and appropriation of established social welfare activities 
enabled it to successfully overshadow its parent organisation.
Hamas’ claim of an indigenous leadership base placed it in a position of being able to 
engage with issues most relevant for its constituency. Indeed, its grassroots base enabled it 
to empathise with and address the daily needs of the Palestinians as well as concurrently 
addressing their long term political aspirations. However, Hamas from its point of genesis 
was forced to manoeuvre politically between established players, most significantly: the 
PLO on the one hand, and Israel and the international community on the other. As such, 
Hamas has had to consistently balance its own agenda and goals with the political reality of 
survival in an internal arena initially dominated by the PLO with Yasser Arafat’s Fatah as 
its dominant faction (fasa’il) and an external arena where impetus is determined by 
prerogatives of the Israeli state. Therefore, any analysis of the relationship between Hamas 
and PLO must be constructed on the understanding that this is in reality an analysis also of 
the relationship between Hamas and Fatah. In fact there has never been a significant 
difference in Hamas policy towards the PLO and Fatah or vice versa.
Hamas’ structural organisation deserves a mention primarily because it is representative of 
how the group, as a relatively new organisation in the Palestinian political landscape, has 
had the advantage of learning from the mistakes made by earlier organisations -  a factor 
that no doubt has contributed to its military and political success. The Israeli crackdown on
82 Shaul Mishal, ‘The Pragmatic Dimension o f the Palestinian Hamas’ opt, cit.. p. 575
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Fatah in the early 1970s for example was successful primarily because of its weak 
organisational structure. Fatah’s early efforts were often poorly planned and security was so 
lax that the arrest of a single operative by the Israelis could lead them to many others. 
Moreover, Fatah’s military cells lacked the organisational roots that Hamas’ possess . In 
sharp contrast, Hamas has consistently separated its political, social and military units and 
while the boundaries between these units may be blurred and unclear communication 
between these segments tends to be conducted through reliable channels only84. Shaul 
Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal use four basic criteria to identify the typology of “terrorist” 
organisations which include: “the communication structure within the organisation; the 
level of specialisation and division of labour; the chain of command and control, and; the 
organisation’s time definitions regarding the implementation of planned actions”85. They 
believe that these four elements are also impacted by the conditions in which an 
organisation operates, i.e. availability of local contracts, resources and so on and as external 
conditions vary does the design of the organisation.
Based on these criteria, Mishal and Rosenthal identify Hamas as a combination of a 
network chain type and network hub type of organisation. A network-chain organisation is 
characterised as one which lacks a strict command and control structure but “retains a 
specific sequence of communication”86. Hamas may be categorised as a network-chain type 
organisation primarily because its political, social and military units are sharply 
compartmentalised. Most importantly, its military ranks tend to recruit on the basis of 
personal connections and information is transferred by “reliable agents through 
predetermined channels of communication”. At the same time, Hamas has also gone 
through a phase in which it was clearly a network-hub type of organisation. The network- 
hub type of organisation is characterised as one which “lacks a strict chain of command and 
control throughout the organisation, yet one player is responsible for the monitoring and 
directing the organisation’s activities”87- as such this player operates as the ‘hub’ in the 
organisation’s structure. Until his arrest in 1989, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin represented the hub
83 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle, opt, cit.. p. 208
84 Personal interview, Sheikh Hasan Yusuf, political spokesperson for Hamas in the West Bank, Ramallah, 
West Bank, 03 January 2005
85 Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal, ‘Al-Qaeda as a Dune Organisation: Towards a Typology o f  Islamic 
Terrorist Organisations’ in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 28 (2005)
86 Ibid. p. 286
87 Ibid
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for Hamas as he controlled both the socio-political as well as military units, consistently 
maintaining clear lines between the two and coordinating the activities conducted by both 
segments. However, it seems that after his arrest Hamas made a conscious shift towards a 
fully compartmentalised, network-chain organisation with perhaps only a few top-level
OO
leaders holding information about how the various units are connected .
Finally, Hamas also adamantly refuses to be associated with any other organisation or 
government -  perhaps another lesson it has learnt from Fatah’s historic experience with 
interference on behalf of various Arab states. Some specialists like Dore Gold, Israel’s 
former ambassador to the UN and the head of the Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs, 
believe otherwise. In a recent interview regarding the recent Hamas electoral victory, Gold 
stated:
“I take Hamas' ideology very seriously, even if most Israelis view it 
as not so different from Fatah. They are an offshoot of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, which has produced so many different kinds of 
offshoots including Khaled Sheikh Muhammad, Ayman al-Zuwahiri 
and the worst one of all, Abdullah al-Azzam, who was Osama bin 
Laden's mentor. There's a supermarket of Islamism out there, but I'm 
most concerned with the extremist ones.” He also stated that “in 
2003, the Israel Defense Forces raided a Hamas training school in 
Gaza and found training materials that included texts from 
Wahhabist clerics”89.
For Gold, Hamas' electoral victory means that it could become a bridgehead for al-Qaeda 
right on Israel's borders. Having said that, there is also consistent evidence of the rift that 
exists between the Hamas and al-Qaeda. Hamas, despite its Islamic identity, is a pragmatic 
organisation which believes in the tactical use of both religion and democratic institutions
88 Personal interview, Sheikh Hasan Yusuf, political spokesperson for Hamas in the West Bank, opt, cit. It is 
also worth noting that Hamas’ decision making structure remains remarkably unclear till date as does the 
degree of contact which exists between its political, military and social leaders and units. Potential differences 
also exist between West Bank and Gaza and o f course the ‘inside’ leadership as represented by Ismail Haniya, 
sworn in as the Prime Minister in March 2006, since Hamas’ take-over o f  Gaza and the ‘outside’ leadership, 
most ostensibly headed by Khaled Mishal out o f Damascus, Syria. See Appendix D for details.
89 Helena Cobban ‘Who is the Real Hamas?’. Salon.com, (2 March 2006). 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2006/03/Q2/hamas/index.html. Date Accessed: 02 March 2006.
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to strengthen its position within the Palestinian society. Its professed aims cease at the 
acquisition of a Palestinian state. Hamas has never declared an all-out ‘jihad’ against the 
West like the al-Qaeda and fissures between political leaderships for both groups can be 
detected from statements made by al-Zawahiri, often referred to as ‘ al-Qaeda’s number 
two’, which take the Hamas to task for compromising pan-Muslim solidarity90. Statements 
by various Hamas leaders also show their irritation at any association with al-Qaeda91.
IV. Conclusion
This chapter highlighted the reasons behind the protracted nature of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and also outlined the emergence and evolution of the two key internal players in 
the Palestinian political arena -  Fatah and Hamas. Given this background, one may note 
how Hamas has closely mimicked Fatah in its rise to power and has used similar tactics (for 
example, non-confrontation and violence) to ensure group survival and consolidation 
within the Palestinian political arena (this is discussed in depth in Chapter HI). This chapter 
illustrated how armed struggle has played a key role for all parties in establishing 
credibility and acquiring legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian constituency and how 
Hamas, like Fatah before it, has successfully used violence to establish itself firmly as a 
sustainable political challenge to both Fatah and the PA. It has, like early Fatah vis-a-vis 
the PLO, also avoided open confrontation with all potential political rivals till it was strong 
enough to project itself as a legitimate alternative and retaliate without compromising its 
survival in the Palestinian political landscape. Moreover, Hamas has demonstrated an 
incredible capacity to avoid the blunders made by Fatah as seen most obviously in the 
compartmentalised organisational structure it has adopted. As a direct corollary, it has also 
consistently recognised the importance of conducting the national struggle from primarily 
within the occupied territories while also maintaining an external base. Hamas has also 
reflected a nuanced awareness and understanding of Palestinian history and sentiments and 
has been successfully able to replace a secular-nationalist narrative with an Islamist- 
nationalist one (discussed in depth in Chapters IV and V). This has not only enabled it to
90 See: Stephen Ulph, Al-Zawahiri Take Hamas to Task’, Terrorism Focus 3.9 (7 March 2006),
http://iamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369916. Date Accessed: 04 March 2006
9 1  thSee personal interview with Sheikh Hasan Yusuf, spokesperson for the Hamas, Ramallah (8 Jan. 2005).
See also Khaled Mishal, Hamas political leader, on BBCNews, ‘Hamas Rejects al-Qaeda’s Support’ (5 March 
2006), www.bbc.co.uk. Date Accessed: 05 March 2006.
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consolidate its unique identity within Palestinian politics but has also simultaneously served 
to weaken its political opposition. Thus learning from mistakes made by earlier groups and 
demonstrating a cunning understanding of the Palestinian street, Hamas has managed to 
manoeuvre within the Palestinian political setting with a dexterity Fatah never evinced.
Hamas may thus be categorised as yet another organisation that is using violence to achieve 
the dual goals of a Palestinian nation-state while also simultaneously ensuring its own 
survival and consolidation within the Palestinian political landscape. This understanding 
places Hamas and its use of suicidal violence in context, suggesting that both, the group 
and its use of suicide bombings, may be a phase in the political transitions occurring with 
the Palestinian territories due to the evolving nature of the national struggle. Even so, it is 
imperative to analyse why and how suicidal violence emerged in the territories and became 
for a considerable stretch of time the preferred means of engagement with the Israeli state. 
To this end the next three chapters will address specific aspects of this phenomenon. 
Chapter HI begins this endeavour by attempting to address why suicidal violence was used 
to resist the Israeli state.
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Chapter III: Suicide Operations as the Convergence of 
Expressive and Instrumental Violence with Multiple 
Rationalities
‘‘Praise to God who made me the one o f the sons o f Hamas, 
the movement o f unstinting sacrifice, 
who made me one of its unique people, 
one of the sons of the ‘Izz al-din al-Qassam Militias ” 
- Martyr Muhammad Hazza al-Ghoul1
Part I
I. Introduction
This chapter seeks to explain why suicide attacks emerged in the Israeli-Palestinian 
landscape of conflict in 1993 and why they continued to escalate and become a 
sustained means of engagement with the Israeli state in the period of study. The first 
part of this chapter outlines recent literature and its limitations before establishing 
specific parameters for analysing the phenomenon. The rest of the chapter seeks to 
demonstrate the strategic logic of both the organisation and the individual who use 
suicide attacks. This chapter illustrates that both the organisational and individual resort 
to suicide violence is rooted in three broadly conflating concerns, i.e. survival, 
competition and retaliation. The argument extended here is based on recognising the 
equal importance of both levels of analysis, i.e. recognising that while strong 
organisational support is necessary for suicide bombings to exist as a protracted 
political phenomenon, individual motivations play an equally important role in 
promulgating such attacks. This chapter thus seeks to demonstrate the dialectic which 
exists between Hamas and its operatives as this is crucial in understanding the long­
term existence and use of suicide violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Locating 
this dialectic enables this chapter to demonstrate how suicide missions are the 
converging point of instrumental (i.e. functional or strategic) and expressive (i.e. 
symbolic) violence for both Hamas and its operatives.
1 The last will o f Muhammad Hazza al-Ghoul who was involved in a suicide operation in Jerusalem on 
18 June 2002, as quoted in Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing the Human Bombs: The Making o f  
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington, DC: United States Institute o f  Peace, 2006), p. 90
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II. Establishing the Param eters of Analysis
A number of recent studies which study the phenomenon of suicide bombings focus on 
its strategic aspects, providing detailed analyses of why organisations prefer this 
particular tactic as opposed to any other method in a given space and time. These 
studies tend to explain suicide bombings as a political and military strategy for 
organisations, i.e. they approach this phenomenon ‘from above’ and assess it in terms 
of its kill-rates, its signalling potential, its tactical efficacy, its psychological impact on 
target populations, its functions in political competition and so on2. In identifying and 
exploring the strategic logic of suicide bombings for the organisation, this recent 
scholarship represents a refreshing break from traditional theses which purported that 
suicide attacks were absolutely devoid o f rationality. Nonetheless a significant amount 
of this new scholarship still tends to focus almost entirely upon the organisation’s role 
and its cost and benefit calculations, and in this unmitigated focus loses sight of the 
individual bomber and the factors that drive individuals to self-sacrifice.
Undoubtedly explaining suicide bombings ‘from below’ is a much more difficult task. 
The rationality of the individual bomber seems to be more unclear and difficult to pin 
down and their motivations obviously much more diverse. How can human beings strap 
explosives around themselves with the clear intention of entering a crowded place in 
order to kill and maim as many people as possible with their own deaths? Studies that 
attempt to answer such questions, and focus on individual motivations, tend to rely on 
the psychology and personal characteristics of individual bombers. Ariel Merari, a 
leading scholar in the field for example, pointed out in his original thesis how ‘terrorist 
suicide’ is an individual rather than group phenomenon in that “it is done by people 
who wish to die for personal reasons and (sic) the terrorist framework offers the excuse 
rather than the real drive”3. Yet since then he has significantly altered his stance and 
believes suicide attacks are an organisational phenomenon instead. In his revised work 
Merari shifts the focus away from individual motivations and instead identifies the
2 See for example: Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic o f  Suicide Terrorism (New York: 
Random House, 2005); Shaul Shay, The Shahids: Islam and Suicide Attacks (Somerset, New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 2004); Bruce Hoffmann and Gordon McCormick, ‘Terrorism, Signalling and 
Suicide Attacks’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21A  (July-August 2004); A ssaf Moghadam, 
‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects’, Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (March-April 2003); Robert Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic o f  Suicide 
Terrorism’ American Political Science Review  97 (2003)
3 Ariel Merari, ‘The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East’, in Walter Reich 
(ed.), Origins o f  Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States o f  Mind (New York: Woodrow 
Wilson International Centre for Scholars and Cambridge University Press, 1990); and ‘Suicide 
Terrorism’ in Robert I. Yufit and David Lester (eds.), Assessment, Treatment and Prevention o f  Suicidal 
Behaviour (New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2005).
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organisation as playing a crucial role in coercing and brainwashing individuals into a 
“production line at the end of which is the ready suicide”4. Scholars such as Scott 
Atran, Anat Berko and Edna Erez who also focus on individual motives similarly point 
out that processes of recruitment, dehumanisation and indoctrination are crucial factors 
in propelling the “suicide industry” and frame bombers as ‘victims’ of these processes5. 
In each case, even when the work’s focus is supposedly upon the individual, the 
organisational aspect is believed to play a much more important role in suicide 
bombing campaigns than individual motivations6.
Some recent works have tried to adopt a more balanced approach and take into 
consideration the role of both the individual and the organisation7. These studies point 
to the multiplicity of individual motivations and illustrate how these motivations 
include aspects of revenge, commitment to a political group, the desire to achieve 
immortality and capture material good for the family, or deep individual belief in 
nationalism or religion8. While these works certainly supply some answers, they still 
tend to locate the impetus of the bombing in organisational or group behaviour rather 
than with the bombers themselves. Thus, they subordinate individual motives and 
rationality to organisational goals. In all cases the individual’s choice is seen to be 
based in a burst of emotion and the rationality o f  individual self-sacrifice is ignored 
and/or subordinated to the instrumental rationality of the organisation. Organisations 
are in turn consistently depicted as strategically manipulating, encouraging and 
exploiting individual motivations -  varied and/or altruistic though they may be - in 
order to achieve group-level instrumental goals.
4 Assaf Moghadam, ‘Fletcher Hosts Ariel Merari, Israeli Expert on Suicide Terrorism’, Fletcher Ledger, 
Vol. 3, No. 8 (4 February 2002), available on: http://www.f1etcherledger.com/archive
5 Anat Berko and Edna Erez, ‘Ordinary People and Death Work: Palestinian Suicide Bombers as 
Victimzers and Victims’, in Violence and Victims 20.6 (December 2005); Scott Atran, ‘Genesis o f  
Suicide Terrorism’, Science Magazine 299 (March 2003)
6 One might say that this bias is rooted in the general tendency in IR to focus on states while largely 
ignoring sub-state and non-state actors. In our case the focus on Hamas may be a testimony to the fact 
that IR scholarship ‘sees’ Hamas more as a state-like/proto-state actor in the Palestinian setting.
7 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure o f  Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) 
and ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombings: Public Support, Market Share and Outbidding’, Political Science 
Quarterly 119.1 (2004); Assaf Moghadam, ‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada, opt, 
cit.: Robert Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic o f  Suicide Terrorism’, opt, cit.
8 See for example: Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill, opt, cit.: Assaf Moghadam, ‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism 
in the Second Intifada’, opt, cit.: Boaz Ganor, ‘Suicide Attacks in Israel’ in Countering Suicide Terrorism 
(Herzliya, Israel: (ICT) The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2002); Shaul Kimhi and 
Shemuel Even, ‘Who are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?’ in Terrorism and Political Violence 16.4 
(Winter 2004); Jerrold M. Post, Ehud Sprinzak and Laura M. Denny, ‘The Terrorists in Their Own 
Words: Interviews with 35 Incarcerated Middle Eastern Terrorists’, in Terrorism and Political Violence 
15.1 (Spring 2003)
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Thus, recent works, while marking a clean break with first generation scholarship in 
suicide bombings, still tends to focus purely upon the instrumental aspects of suicide 
bombings and inevitably ignore its symbolic dimensions. In addition, by either ignoring 
individual rationality or subordinating it to group rationality, these works tacitly assert 
that individual motivations for suicide violence either lack a rational logic altogether or 
this logic, if  it exists, is not as significant and ‘means-ends’ driven as that of the 
organisation. In other words, this academic literature purports that suicide bombings 
cannot exist without organisational impetus and manipulation. While this may be true 
to a certain extent, such a hypothesis provides only a partial analysis of the 
phenomenon because it cannot explain why bombers in the Israeli- Palestinian conflict 
are increasingly unaffiliated or loosely affiliated,9 to specific political groups. Nor can it 
explain the overall increase in the number of volunteers in the Palestinian conflict or 
the proportionate drop in training and ‘indoctrination ’ times or indeed why more and 
more individuals consistently and repeatedly volunteer10 for suicide missions, as 
opposed to other forms of military engagement. In short these works cannot explain the 
individual’s drive for self-sacrifice and hence what their martyrdom signifies both for 
themselves as well as for their society.
Admittedly, a handful of studies have attempted to understand the social meaning that 
martyrdom holds for the individual actors involved11. These explanations tend to ignore 
the organisation and focus more explicitly upon the bomber and his/her self-perception 
of their actions. They try to decipher what meaning(s) these individuals assign to their 
own martyrdom and in doing so contextualise the bomber and his/her individual 
reasoning in a given socio-political cultural milieu. Implicitly then, this literature 
suggests that the role of organisations in recruiting and indoctrinating suicide bombers 
may be overstated and questions if individual martyrs view their actions through the
9 See for example: Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs: The Palestinian Case and 
the Pursuit o f  a Martyrdom Complex’, paper presented at the annual meeting o f  the International Studies 
Association (ISA), Montreal, 20 March 2004 and ‘Human Bombs: Rethinking Religion and Terror’, Audit 
o f  the Conventional Wisdom (MIT Centre for International Studies, April 2006)
10 Personal interview with Dr. Hussein Ahmad, Head o f the An-Najah National University Center for 
Opinion Polls and Survey Studies, 17 January 2005, Nablus.
11 See for example: Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Dying to be Martyrs: The Symbolic Dimensions o f  Suicide 
Terrorism’, in Ami Pedahzur (ed.), Root Causes o f  Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization o f  Martyrdom 
(London and New  York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006); Frahad Khosrokhavar, Suicide 
Bombers: A llah ’s New Martyrs (London: Pluto Press, 2005); Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and 
Defusing the Human Bombs: The Palestinian Case and the Pursuit o f  a Martyrdom Complex’, paper 
presented at the annual meeting o f  the International Studies Association (ISA), Montreal 20 March 2004; 
Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, ‘Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a 
Causal Link?’, Working Paper 9074, National Bureau o f  Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 
Series, (Cambridge, MA: NBER, July 2002)
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same prism as the organisations that they belong to. In other words, are individuals 
motivated by the strategic effectiveness of martyrdom or are there other nationalist, 
emotive, religious motives behind their choice which have “little to do with 
instrumental rationality” 12 that need to be considered? At their core, these studies focus 
on the symbolic dimension of violence and believe that the individual’s choice of 
martyrdom is driven by motives different to those held by their organisation. These 
studies thus purport to question and counter the emerging ‘rationalist paradigm’ for 
studying suicide bombings13.
This is certainly a significant step away from literature that privileges organisational 
aspects over individual ones. Yet these writers still tend to conclude that rationalist 
approaches can explain an organisation’s decisions to use suicide bombings but not 
individual motivations, i.e. rationalist approaches cannot explain why an individual 
would sacrifice him/herself to fulfil organisational objectives. They believe that one 
cannot conflate individual motives with organisational goals and instead advocate 
looking “beyond rationality, into the realm o f symbolic framings, to understand and 
explain, at least in part, why individuals become martyrs” 14. Thus while these studies 
undeniably fill a crucial gap by highlighting the symbolic dimensions of suicide 
violence they also unfortunately dispossesses both individual motivations and symbolic 
action of rationality. Moreover, in doing so they also implicitly reject that symbolic 
action may simultaneously possess and/or serve an instrumental function for both the 
organisation and the individual. This literature thereby creates a false dichotomy 
between expressive and instrumental violence, and thus, despite attempting to counter 
the ‘rationalist paradigm’, it uses the same dichotomies that traditional rationalists 
create by disregarding the rationality of symbolic action and non-material incentives 
and goals15.
This work counters these received views. First and foremost, it believes that 
organisational and individual rationality and motives are of equal importance in 
understanding the emergence and sustainability of suicide bombing campaigns in the
12 Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Dying to be Martyrs’, opt, cit. p. 55
13 Mohammed M. Hafez states this as an explicit aim o f his work. Nichole Argo and Frahad 
Khosrokhavar while not stating it so obviously also focus very clearly on symbolic dimensions that they 
treat as unrelated to the instrumental goals o f the organisation.
14 Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Dying to be Martyrs’, opt, cit. p. 55
15 Recent innovations in the rational actor model take into account non-material ends. These innovations 
are discussed in more detail in the section titled ‘The Revised Rational Actor Model’ which follows
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is because each aspect impacts and propels the other. 
Hence in our case while Hamas can certainly identify and manipulate or encourage 
certain popular emotions, exploitation alone cannot explain the overall increase in both 
volunteers and unaffiliated/ loosely affiliated bombers in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Most importantly organisational recruitment and indoctrination cannot explain how 
suicide missions have become a consistent choice for a section of the Palestinian 
population with widespread, albeit fluctuating, popular support. While the initial 
impetus for suicide attacks in the Palestinian arena may have come from the 
organisation, certain shifts have occurred over time that now challenge the 
organisation’s monopoly over suicidal violence. As such, unearthing the rationality 
behind individual motives, independently from organisational impetus, is crucial to 
understand why so many individuals are willing to volunteer for and/or independently 
undertake such missions. In other words, unless the dialectic between organisational 
and individual rationality and motivations is taken into account, no hypothesis can fully 
explain why suicide attacks have emerged, escalated and become a sustained form of 
engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Until both these aspects are taken into 
consideration any analysis of the phenomenon will remain incomplete.
Second, this work believes that suicide attacks are both acts of expediency and practical 
reason as well as acts that are simultaneously symbolic, ritualistic and communicative. 
In other words, suicide attacks are a volatile and complex combination of expressive 
(i.e. symbolic) and instrumental (i.e. functional or strategic) violence. Third, it accepts 
that there is a division between the organisations which deploy suicide bombers and the 
individuals who actually commit suicide attacks and asserts that despite this distinction 
the choice of suicide attacks is a ‘rational’ one for both parties involved. For the 
organisation and its leaders, i.e. for those who are willing to kill, suicide attacks are a 
rational choice because they are tactically economical, flexible and have a powerful 
impact both psychologically and strategically. For the individual, i.e. those who are 
willing to die, suicide attacks are a rational choice because they represent a powerful 
device to communicate the bomber’s message to multiple audiences and achieve 
equally important material and non-material ends. No matter what the individual’s 
motivation, the cost of sacrificing the mortal life is much less than the benefits they 
accrue in doing so. Hence a calculated rationality exists and simultaneously operates at 
both organisational and individual levels. This work thus asserts that symbolic violence 
is just as rational as functional violence and rationality cannot, and should not, be
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aligned with instrumental violence alone. Moreover, it asserts that all expressive and 
instrumental violence incorporates elements of functionality, symbolism and 
rationality. While individual motivations for resorting to suicide operations are varied 
and may tend to be more obviously expressive than the organisation’s, they also 
possess instrumental elements. Similarly while the organisations motives are more 
overtly instrumental, they also incorporate symbolic elements.
Thus this work sees suicide bombings as the point of convergence of multiple 
rationalities as well as expressive and instrumental violence. On this basis, it asserts 
that only by identifying how organisational and individual rationalities and motivations 
broadly conflate can we begin to more holistically comprehend why suicide bombings 
emerged, escalated and become a sustained form of engagement in the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. To this end, this chapter identifies organisational and individual 
aspects of suicide missions broadly conflating along three lines:
1. suicide attacks as survival (political for Hamas, more visceral for the individual)
2. suicide attacks as retaliation (against Fatah and Israel for Hamas, against ‘the 
occupation’ for the individual)
3. suicide attacks as competition (vis-a-vis Fatah for Hamas, for personal and 
societal honour amongst individuals)
However, before this conflation can be demonstrated in the case of Hamas and its 
operatives the key concepts which have been used to establish the parameters of this 
analysis need to be clarified and expanded upon.
II. Definitions and Concepts
(i) The Revised Rational Actor Model
The rationality assumption that is generally applied to study collective action, in this 
case suicide bombings, is rooted in classical rational choice theory. Rational choice 
theory was first applied by political scientists in the USA from the 1960s onwards to 
study domestic political issues such as interest groups politics, congressional politics 
and electoral politics16. Over the next two decades there was an increasing use of
16 This social science movement, often referred to as the behavioural school in international relations, 
first changed sociology and psychology before moving into political science in the form o f electoral 
politics. David Singer’s Correlates o f  War Project applied this approach to systematically collect 
scientific knowledge about war. The key purpose o f applying such an approach to the study o f world 
politics was to make social sciences more ‘scientific’ and produce testable hypotheses -  making the 
approach positivist in both methodology and ontology.
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empirical tools, statistical techniques and game theory models in the political arena and 
the use of the rational actor model significantly altered the way political scientists study 
a variety of issues ranging from nuclear deterrence and social movements to the effects 
of international institutions and theories of justice.
In International Relations, the rationality assumption first comes across overtly in 
Kenneth N. Waltz’s Theory o f International Politics. While most positivists more or 
less follow the rationality assumption, until the emergence of the formal 
methodological approaches of the neo-realists and neo-liberals, rationality tended to be 
the impressionistic and informally treated underlying element in arguments rather than 
an explicitly stated theory or approach17. It was here that Waltz’s work is most 
significant, for while restating traditional realist tenets, it also utilised analogies drawn 
from neoclassical economics, most specifically the theory of markets and the theory of 
the firm18.
Undoubtedly, rational choice theory is one of the most popular and contentious voices 
within the social sciences. As a theory borrowed from the discipline of Economics, and 
reputed for its ability to bring scientific deductions to bear upon politics and social 
phenomenon, it posits a rather distinctive theoretical hypothesis, i.e. that actors in any 
given scenario will behave in a purposive and intentional manner aimed at maximising 
their interests or, in the very least, attempt to minimise their losses. While this is a very 
broad definition, the rational choice approach to the study of politics tends to be 
caricatured by “being reduced to one or two of its characteristic assumptions and 
presented as a monolithic theory that all practitioners are presumed to accept. A more 
accurate description is that most practitioners agree on some, but not all, the features of 
the definition of rational choice” 19.
There are however a set of assumptions that are generally shared by most rational 
choice theorists and some scholars call this the rationality assumption. This consists of
17 In the behavioural school, rational action is an assumption about the units o f analysis because this 
allows for the aggregation o f individuals into collectives on the basis o f which one can build predictive 
models o f  how things happen. Waltz’s work, with its emphasis on the centrality o f  the state as the unit 
and the international level as the location o f causal explanations, is therefore reflective o f  the double-shift 
between from the individual to the state on the one hand, and from human nature to rational action on the 
other -  i.e. the shift from classical realism to neo-realism.
18 Chris Brown. Understanding International Relations (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001, 2nd edition), p. 47
19 Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies o f  Rational Choice Theory: A Critique o f  Applications 
in Political Science (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 13
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three distinct components, namely purposive action; consistent preferences and utility
JOmaximization . Paul K. MacDonald defines each of these components succinctly: 
“Purposive action posits that most social outcomes can be explained by goal-oriented 
action on part of the actors in the theory, as opposed to being motivated by habit, 
tradition, or social appropriateness. Consistent preferences refers to preferences that are 
ranked, are transitive, and do not depend on the presence or absence of essentially 
independent alternatives. Utility maximization posits that actors will select the 
behaviour that provides them with the most subjective expected utility from a set of 
possible behaviours”21. At its core then, this approach suggests that given enough 
information, behaviour can be predicted, and a rational individual can be subject to 
scientific inquiry. This in turn substantiates the claim that predictive statements can be 
valid.
While classical rational actor models applied this rationality assumption to the cost- 
benefit calculations of material factors alone recent innovations in the rational actor 
model have enabled the incorporation of non-material, ‘selfless’, symbolic or normative 
elements such as concern for one’s reputation or social standing22. In other words, the 
aspects of ‘purposive action’ and ‘utility maximization’ have been significantly altered 
in the revised rational actor model. The key argument here then is that actors are 
considered rational so long as they consistently seek to maximise their benefits and 
limit their costs. Hence they are expected to maximise that which is of value to them, 
even if that value is non-material or altruistic23. Their cultural and social moorings 
impact their values, choices and decision making processes and thereby define their 
goals. Suicide bombing thus becomes an act of utility maximisation because the 
definition of utility now includes normative, symbolic violence. This innovation in the 
rational actor model also allows us to expand the notion of purposive action to
20 Some scholars such as Green and Shapiro add to these a fourth element, namely decision-making 
under conditions o f uncertainty. It is thus evident that even these most basic assumptions are 
controversial. However, for the purpose o f  this work, I shall take the rationality assumption as 
comprising o f  the three elements mentioned above.
21 Paul K. MacDonald, ‘Useful Fiction or Miracle Maker: The Competing Epistemological Foundations 
o f  Rational Choice Theory’, American Political Science Review  Vol. 97, No. 4 (November 2003), p. 552.
22 Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Dying to be Martyrs’, opt, cit. See also: R.G. Noll and B. Weingast, ‘Rational 
Actor Theory, Social Norms and Policy Implementation’ in Kiresten Renwick Monroe (ed.), The 
Economic Approach to Politics: A Critical Reassessment o f  the Theory o f  Rational Action (New York, 
N.Y.: HarperCollins, 1991); Ashutosh Varshney, ‘Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict and Rationality’, 
Perspectives on Politics 1.1 (March 2003)
23 See Mohammed M. Hafez, opt, cit.: Green and Shapiro, opt, cit.: Albert S. Yee, ‘Thick Rationality and 
the Missing ‘Brute Fact’: The Limits o f  Rationalist Incorporation o f  Norms and Ideas’, Journal o f  
Politics Vol. 59, No. 4 (November 1997)
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incorporate goal-oriented action which may be impacted by social and cultural 
traditions. Thus as per this revised model rational actor action can incorporate symbolic 
functions in addition to instrumental ones -  a factor that is crucial to understanding the 
rationality of both the individual and the organisation that opts for suicide bombings.
(ii) Identifying the Links between Violence and the Rationality Assumption 
Having demonstrated how the revised rational actor model incorporates expressive and 
instrumental aspects of violence, this study applies it to understand how an act of 
suicide bombing, is a ‘rational’ act of violence that serves clearly identifiable 
instrumental and expressive functions for both the individual bomber and the 
organisation. A considerable amount of early literature depicts suicide bombing as an 
act of irrational, senseless violence conducted by a handful of radicalised lunatics. This 
is rooted to a large extent in a well established tradition that depicts non-state or 
individual violence as irrational and senseless. Historically, authorised violence has 
come to be the realm of the state24 and consequently the ‘legitimate’ use of violence 
within modem society tends to be viewed as the sole monopoly o f the state. The 
stability of this “relatively impersonal monopoly and the resulting pacification of the 
society at large”25, has led to people to develop strong feelings about both using and 
witnessing violence. In such a scenario, whatever is widely perceived as the 
‘illegitimate and unauthorised’ use of violence, including any violence practiced by 
non-state and/or individual actors, is also viewed as “anomalous, irrational, senseless 
and disruptive-as the reverse of social order, as the antithesis of ‘civilisation’, as 
something that has to be brought under control”26. This conception of violence 
negatively impacts our analysis. Because a pacified society is seen as natural, and 
legitimate violence is commonly perceived to be the monopoly of the state, the very 
practice of violence by non-state or sub-state actors deems them disruptive and 
illegitimate to the received socio-political order and world view. Most nascent national
24 See for example: David Indermaur, ‘Perceptions o f Violence’, Psychiatry, Psychology and the Law  3.2 
(1996); Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); Max Weber, ‘Politics as a 
Vocation’, Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’ and Zygmunt Bauman, 
‘The Uniqueness and Normality o f  the Holocaust’, all in Ingo W. Schroder and Bettina E. Schmidt (eds.), 
Anthropology o f  Violence and Conflict (London and New York: Routledge, 2001)
25 Anton Blok, Honour and Violence (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in association with Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd., 2001), pp. 103-04
26 Ibid. See also: Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London: Allen Lane, 1970); Hannah Arendt, ‘Reflections 
on Violence’ in Ingo W. Schroder and Bettina E. Schmidt (eds.), Anthropology o f  Violence, opt, cit.: 
Georges Sorel (translated by T.E. Hulme and J. Roth), Reflections on Violence (London: Collier- 
Macmillan; New York: Collier Books, 1961); Vittorio Bufacchi, Violence and Social Justice 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007)
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struggles are often seen as illegitimate within an international system of states precisely 
because they challenge established authority and its monopoly of violence.
Anton Blok points out how when the actual use of violence is studied the focus tends to 
be upon the instrumental, where violence tends to be studied in “primarily utilitarian, 
‘rational’ terms, in terms of means and ends”27. Recent scholarship exemplifies this by 
systematically attempting to locate the strategic logic and instrumental rationality (if 
not legitimacy) behind non-state and individual violence. This not only ignores the 
cultural dimension of violence but in doing so also inadvertently disassociates the 
problem of causes from that of function28 thus losing the wider context o f this action. In 
other words, this focus loses sight of what the practice of violence says. Hence the 
question of what violence signifies, ‘says’ or expresses becomes at best of secondary 
importance”29, and at worst ignored completely.
Blok explains that where easily identifiable goals are missing and the relationship 
between the means and the ends is either murky or seemingly absent, violence tends to 
get categorised as irrational and senseless. While instrumental violence, state or non­
state, now tends to be viewed as a rational choice with easily identifiable means and 
ends, expressive violence, i.e. violence that is ritual, symbolic and communicative, 
when considered at all, still tends to be represented as an impulsive irrational act - the 
result of spontaneous emotion30. This tendency is evident in recent studies which, as 
established in the preceding section, take into account the symbolic aspects of suicide 
violence yet view it as devoid of rationality.
However, as Ingo Schroder and Bettina Schmidt point out, violence is never completely 
idiosyncratic and it always says something, expressing some sort of a relationship with 
another party. In other words, symbolic violence is also always rational. Violent acts 
are never random and victims tend to be chosen for their links to the broader category 
which they represent. Neither can violence be seen as an isolated act - it is linked,
27 Anton Blok, Honour and Violence, opt, cit.. p . 104
28 David Keen, ‘A Rational Kind o f  Madness’, Oxford Development Studies 25.1 (1997), p. 68. See also 
David Keen, ‘Since I am a Dog, Beware my Fangs: Beyond a ‘rational violence’ framework in the Sierra 
Leonean War’, Crisis States Programme, Working Paper Series No. 1, Paper No. 14 (LSE: 
Development Research Centre, August 2002)
29 Anton Blok, Honour and Violence, opt, cit. p. 104
30 Interestingly Blok also points out that as long as violence is the domain o f the state it is never studies 
in rational-irrational terms -  all state violence is rational because the state corresponds to rationality and 
order. However the moment violence is practiced by a non-state or sub-state actor not only does the 
question o f rationality and irrationality arise but also the notion o f imminent disorder.
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howsoever remotely, to a competitive relationship and is thus the product of a historical 
process which may extend far back in time. In short, it is a historically situated practice 
with clear social ramification, and while the social context of violence means that it 
cannot be completely disassociated from instrumental rationality, it is more than purely 
instrumental behaviour.
Dominant cultural attitudes about violence play a significant role in determining the 
resort to violence. For example, cultures which judge “violence as a powerful and 
definitive response to ‘insult’ and a good way of restoring ‘honour’ will support 
individual decisions to use violence”31. Killing therefore need not be ‘naturally deviant’ 
because some forms of killing may be culturally or socially sanctioned and not 
classified as homicide or murder. It must be noted that the act remains the same, i.e. it 
involves taking another’s life. However violence is differentiated on the basis of how 
the act is socially and culturally defined and categorised32. The resort to force therefore 
makes perfect sense within the actor’s own set of values, perspectives and beliefs and 
the expression of violence incorporates these values and beliefs. As the product of 
socio-cultural and historical processes, violence is then “informed by material 
constraints and incentives as well as by historical structures and by the cultural 
representation of these two sets of conditions”33. Historical processes and culture thus 
determine the symbolic rationality of violence which is never senseless or meaningless, 
neither for the actor, nor for the victim nor the observer.
In addition to its instrumental function, violence serves a symbolic function by 
conveying cultural meaning, values and choices. Thus, no act of violence, including 
suicide bombing, can be fully understood without viewing it as part of a longer pattern 
of events34 and taking into account both expressive and instrumental facets of the same. 
Expressive violence is also then not automatically devoid of rationality. In addition, due 
to its social context, no simple distinction can be made between functional and
*3 C
symbolic practice as “instrumental action is always simultaneously semantic” . The
31 Anton Blok, Honour and Violence, opt, cit.: David Indermaur, ‘Perceptions o f  Violence’, opt, cit.
32 Stephen J. Pfhol, Images o f  Deviance and Social Control: A Sociological History (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1985)
33 Ingo W. Schroder and Bettina E. Schmidt, ‘Introduction: Violent Imaginaries and Violent Practices’, in 
Schroder and Schmidt (eds.), Anthropology o f  Violence, opt, cit. p. 3
34 Ibid. See also Michael Addison, Violent Politics: Strategies o f  Internal Conflict (Oxford: Palgrave in 
association with St. Antony’s College, Oxford, 2002);
35 Anton Blok, Honour and Violence, opt, cit. p. 30. See also Indermaur, ‘Perceptions o f  Violence’, opt, 
cit; Ingo W. SchrSder and Bettina E. Schmidt, ‘Violent Imaginaries’, opt, cit.
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resort to violent action is a weighed, rational decision where the costs of the violence 
are outweighed by its functional and symbolic benefits. What is evident then is that all 
acts of violence have instrumental and expressive aspects -  and both facets of violence 
incorporate elements of functionality, symbolism and rationality.
This work, as stated before, counters the false dichotomy between expressive and 
instrumental violence by conceptualising a suicide attack as a ‘rational’ act of violence 
with clearly identifiable instrumental and expressive functions that operate in tandem. 
Blok believes that it is useful to see the relationship between the two faces of violence 
in terms of a continuum, i.e. he believes that some actions are more instrumental while 
others are more expressive36. This work contends that a single act of violence can also 
be more instrumental or more expressive depending on the perspective from which it is 
approached. Indeed, a suicide attack is perhaps more overtly expressive for the 
individual operative (though it simultaneously serves instrumental purposes) and more 
obviously instrumental for the organisation -  in this case Hamas (though again 
simultaneously incorporating an expressive aspect). This explains how suicide missions 
are a successful cost-benefit calculation on behalf of both the individual and the 
organisation.
(iii) ‘Altruistic Suicide' as Expressive Violence and Individual Rationality
The question that then needs to be answered is how an individual arrives at a cost- 
benefit decision where the cost of sacrificing one’s life is less than the benefits accrued. 
Since 1993, when suicide bombing emerged in the Israeli-Palestinian scenario, various 
opinion polls have shown a relatively high degree of support for suicide operations 
against Israel. A study of the polls also reveals that support is highest in times when the 
society is under extreme pressure and has little hope for peace or resolution of the 
conflict. For example, a sharp increase in public support can be seen in response to the 
failed Oslo Peace Accords or in periods when Israeli retaliatory policies took heavy 
tolls on the population37. These peaks in public opinion are matched by a 
corresponding rise in suicide attacks in the same periods. While initially the bombers 
sent on these missions were recruited by the organisation in response to public
36 Anton Blok, Honour and Violence, opt, cit. p. 108
37 See polls from 1993-2000 by the Centre fo r  Palestinian Research and Studies (CPRS), Ramallah; polls 
from 2000 -  present by Palestinian Centre fo r  Policy and Survey Research (PSR), Ramallah; polls from 
2003 to present by An-Najah National University Centre fo r  Opinion Polls and Survey Studies, Nablus; 
and polls from 1993 to present by Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre (JMCC), Jerusalem.
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sentiments three points are crucial: first, that even in the initial stages, Hamas did not 
need to necessarily ‘brainwash’ all its recruits though undoubtedly it provided the 
initial impetus for bombings; second, by the time of the al-Aqsa intifada, the large 
number of individuals willing to sacrifice themselves meant that Hamas had to turn 
away volunteers; third, over time, volunteers for suicide missions became more and 
more loosely affiliated with specific organisations, choosing instead to use any group 
willing to provide them with the infrastructure and logistics to conduct an operation.
Based on these key considerations it does not seem illogical to suggest that, to a large 
degree, individual self-sacrifice is impelled by altruistic motives rather than 
organisational pressure, though incidents of the latter certainly also exist. It appears that 
the categories used by Emile Durkheim to classify suicide, as self-inflicted violence, 
can also help analyse violence inflicted on others in the form of suicide attacks38. The 
basic pre-requisite for altruistic suicide, as Durkheim conceived it, is a high level of 
social integration. His analysis includes soldiers amongst those who show high rates of 
suicide due to their “extreme subordination to imperative rules and their excessive
-JQ
integration in a national moral order” . This same logic can be applied to suicide 
bombers whose high degrees of integration enable them to achieve the state of altruism. 
There is thus an excessive subordination of the bomber to the group in a process 
whereby the individual completely subsumes the self to the higher collective order40.
Altruistic motives are heavily influenced by social values and social approval. Socially, 
individual self-sacrifice is perceived as honourable due to its selfless and altruistic 
character and it thereby becomes a strong mechanism for the bomber to bind with and 
represent the values of the Palestinian community. In this manner, the bomber in 
conducting a suicide attack not only reasserts his/her integration with the society but 
also solidifies these bonds and social values. At the same time, the bomber also 
delineates and asserts personal character and space and, in a sense, stands ‘apart’ from 
the very society he/she seeks to represent. Thus, a suicide mission, from at least the 
individual’s perspective, becomes a key link between the bomber and the Palestinian
38 See Emile Durkheim (translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson), Suicide: A Study in 
Sociology (London: Free Press, 1990)
39 Vincenzo Ruggiero, Understanding Political Violence: A Criminological Analysis (New York, N.Y.: 
Open University Press, 2006), p. 51; See also: John Hagen, M odem Criminology: Crime, Criminal 
Behaviour, and its Control (New York and London: McGraw-Hill, 1987); and David Downes and Paul 
Rock, Understanding Deviance: A Guide to the Sociology o f  Crime and Rule-Breaking (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982)
40 See Emile Durkheim’s concept o f ‘collective effervescence’ in Suicide, opt, cit.
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society he/she defends and represents. Consequently as “values are elaborated and 
egotistical interests are provisionally set aside, these periods (or this case, events), 
evanescent though they may be, remain in the memory of the collectivity as periods of
•  •  «41supreme integration .
Altruistic suicide is, at its core, the result of the individual’s sense of responsibility to 
the broader community. In other words, the bomber has an irrevocable belief that 
he/she must defend and preserve his/her family, community and/or nation42. To do so, 
the individual strongly believes that the cost of his/her personal death is less than the 
benefit accrued toward their family’s/community’s/nation’s survival. While the logic 
thus far certainly explains why an individual would choose to be part of a suicide 
mission, it cannot by itself explain the increasing number of volunteers for such 
missions in the Israeli-Palestinian landscape of conflict. George Herbert Mead’s inter- 
subjective account of social reality might provide the answer.
Mead posits a structure of communicative relations between subjects, proposing that 
cooperation between groups and individuals translates into a scenario where individual 
conduct stimulates others to perform a certain act, and that this act, in turn, becomes a 
stimulus engendering a certain reaction, and so on in “ceaseless interaction”43. Symbols 
and symbolic action therefore assume crucial importance as they represent the means of 
eliciting a response from the other -  internal or external. Symbols are thus “acts that 
call out responses of the other while responding to the acts performed by the other”44. 
In other words, suicide bombings are the individual bomber’s response to stimuli that 
originates in both Palestinian and Israeli action. The suicide mission, in turn, is a 
symbolic action that becomes the stimulus engendering a reaction in both the 
Palestinian community as well as in Israeli circles. In this study, the key reaction 
suicidal violence has engendered in the internal ‘other’, i.e. in the Palestinian 
community which has not volunteered for suicide missions, is that they seem to have 
encouraged other individuals in society to adopt them as a means of protest, 
engagement and service to society. It seems then that suicidal violence developed a
41 Vincenzo Ruggiero, Understanding Political Violence. opt, cit. p 54
42 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Times: Living in an Age o f  Uncertainty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 
especially ‘Utopia in the Age o f  Uncertainty’
43 Vincenzo Ruggiero, Understanding Political Violence, opt, cit.. p. 109. See also George Herbert Mead, 
The Philosophy o f  the Present (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1959), and Mind, S elf and Society from  the 
Standpoint o f  a Social Behaviourist (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1967).
44 Vincenzo Ruggiero, Understanding Political Violence, opt, cit.. p. 110
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dynamic of its own within the Palestinian community -  one that moves beyond 
organisational control and/or manipulation45.
Thus it would appear that individual bombers are willing to carry out suicide operations 
most broadly for defence (survival), self-respect (competition) and revenge 
(retaliation). In this manner the individual’s motives can be studied along the same 
lines as those of the organisation with the key difference being that, at their core, 
suicide attacks are altruistic for the individuals committing them, i.e. they are 
committed for sake of the Palestinian community. This work will further demonstrate 
how suicide bombings while being primarily expressive for the individual also 
simultaneously serve a functional purpose for the bombers46.
(iv)Instrumental Violence and Organisational Rationality
The logic of why suicide bombings exist in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is more than 
evident for an organisation like Hamas which uses it as a political and military tactic. 
There have been a considerable number of studies which focus upon the strategic logic 
of suicide missions from an organisational perspective. This section will try to briefly 
outline some of the key motivations behind an organisation’s decision to use suicide 
operations.
According to Martha Crenshaw, “terrorism” can be understood at times as an 
expression of a political strategy. Because a group has collective values or preferences 
it “selects terrorism as a course of action from a range of perceived alternatives (sic) 
with efficacy (emphasis added) being the primary standard by which terrorism is 
compared with other methods of achieving political goals”47. This is a key starting 
point in understanding the strategic use of suicide bombings.
At a purely tactical level, the suicide bomber is the epitome of the smart bomb for the 
organisation because the bomber can select the time and place of the attack in order to
45 See for example: Duncan Watts work on cascading effects in Duncan Watts, Six Degrees: Science o f  a 
Connected Age (New York: Norton, 2003) and Charles Tilly’s thesis on waves o f  violence in Charles 
Tilly, The Politics o f  Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
46 It must be stressed that personal motives behind suicide operations tend to be very diverse and the 
three categories o f analysis outlined here are proposed for their ability to broadly encompass a 
considerable number (though perhaps not all) o f these varying motivations.
47 Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Logic o f  Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product o f  Strategic Choice’, in 
Walter Reich (ed.), Origins o f  Terrorism, opt cit.. p. 8
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ensure that maximum damage is inflicted. In conditions of asymmetrical conflict, this is 
a key consideration for the organisation opting to use this method of engagement. 
According to George Habbash, the leader of PFLP, “the losses the Israelis are 
sustaining [because of suicide operations] are very high ... and unlike (sic) in any 
period of battle in any of the past decades. According to the latest figures, the rate is 
one Israeli killed for every three Palestinian martyrs. This is despite the great 
differential or the great imbalance of power and the minimal fighting means and 
equipment available to the Palestinian people”48. Tactically, the military mission is also 
made simpler for the organisation which never needs to map an escape route and the 
fact that the bomber dies in a successful mission ensures that no information can be 
gleaned through capture and torture49.
Human bombs are also an extremely cost-effective means of engagement for the 
organisation. All that is required are some explosives, nails, a battery and switch with a 
short length of cable, a sturdy belt with large compartments to pack it all in and, of 
course, a volunteer to carry it all to the designated target. In the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, the most expensive part of a suicide operation tends to be the taxi fare to the 
target city50 .Yet the psychological damage inflicted upon the target population is 
disproportionately high in comparison and the message sent is loud and clear, i.e. “we 
will not bow down and we will hit you when we want and where it hurts”51. Suicide 
attacks also simultaneously send a message to the bomber’s own constituency: the 
struggle is continuing and the enemy too is vulnerable. This can potentially motivate 
others to join the armed struggle. Bombings campaigns also serve to effectively attract 
and capture the attention of the international media, thus seeming to represent a ‘win- 
win’ scenario for the organisation that opts to use them.
Other than the most obvious tactical advantages of suicide operations, there are also a 
number of theories on its long- term strategic functions. For example, Robert Pape
48 Mia Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing’, opt, cit p. 85
49 Personal interview with Dr. Riad Malki, General Director o f  Panorama (The Palestinian Center for the 
Dissemination o f Democracy and Community Development), Ramallah, 31 December 2004; Personal 
‘off-the-record’ interview with Israeli psychologist and former Shayetey naval commando, 9 January 
2005. The Shayetet 13 navy seals are an elite ‘special forces’ unit designed and trained to conduct naval 
raids and underwater commando operations. They are also an elite counter-terror unit that specialise in 
covert operations, including targeted assassinations, deep within enemy territory combining assault by 
land, sea and air.
50 Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon: A M odem History o f  Suicide Bombing (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004); Scott Atran, ‘Genesis’, opt, cit.
51 See for example: Bruce Hoffman and Gordon H. McCormick, ‘Terrorism, Signalling, and Suicide 
Attack’, opt, cit.
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locates suicide bombings as a part of organised campaigns aimed specifically at 
coercing modem liberal democracies into making significant territorial concessions52. 
Pape also very clearly privileges the role of the organisation over that of the individual 
because he believes that without consistent organisational motives and goals aspiring 
suicide bombers would be powerless. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela have a more 
nuanced thesis and identify how groups like Hamas have specifically territorial 
demands but also simultaneously seek to ensure their own political survival, thereby 
using suicide operations as a mechanism of negotiation, survival and political 
competition53. Once again in these studies, the individual bomber is ignored in favour 
of the organisation which is the focus of analysis.
Another key thesis is the ‘spoiler thesis’ which is a development of a more 
conventional explanation of Palestinian suicide bombings, and identifies suicidal 
violence as a mechanism utilised by radical Islamic organisations, such as Hamas and 
PU, to derail attempts to improve relations between Israelis and Palestinians54. This 
thesis states that violence serves the express function of undermining and halting a 
negotiated settlement and should be expected whenever a negotiated settlement 
becomes imminent. Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, for example, identify suicide 
bombing as a spoiler policy used by either factions opposing the moderate group which 
is negotiating or by hardliners within the moderate group itself. An alternative thesis 
argues that suicide violence is often retaliatory. This school of thought locates 
Palestinian suicide bombings as a response to Israeli provocation. Examples of these 
provocations are many, ranging from the Hebron massacre to Israel’s policy of targeted 
assassinations to Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount55.
Mia Bloom, in a recent study, has focussed on the aspect of political competition in the 
Palestinian scenario and has identified suicide bombings as a form of outbidding 
amongst factions and a tool used by these factions to accumulate political capital and
52 See for example: Robert Pape, Dying to Win, opt, cit. and ‘The Strategic Logic o f  Suicide Terrorism’, 
opt, cit.
53 See for example: Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, 
Coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000) and ‘Participation without Presence: Hamas, 
the PA and the Politics o f  Negotiated Coexistence’, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 38, No. 3 (July 2002)
54 See for example: Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ‘Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics o f  
Extremist Violence’, International Organizations Vol. 56, No .2 (Spring 2002)
55 See for example: Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, ‘Vicious Cycles: Endogenous Political 
Extremism and Political Violence’, under submission to International Organizations (May 2001).
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prestige56. She identifies two clear phases of public support for the bombing campaigns 
conducted by various groups, including Hamas, and links this data back to the 
increasing support for groups that used the tactic. In the first period, which she 
identifies as ranging from 1994 -1996, public support for suicide operations never 
exceeded a third of the polled group57. However, post-2000 support jumped up to two- 
thirds or more of the Palestinians polled. She states: “the support for militant Islamic 
movements appears to have captured previously ‘non-aligned constituents’ 
demonstrating that martyrdom operations boost the organizational profile of the groups 
utilising them”58.
Thus far, there are multiple strategic motivations and goals that have been identified by 
various studies of suicide bombings. This thesis suggests that while all these 
explanations are valid and certainly need to be factored into any analysis of Hamas’ use 
of suicide operations, they are all partial explanations which either unfairly privilege 
the organisation over the individual or, by discounting the trajectory o f violence in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, ignore the increasing internal momentum for suicide 
operations. This thesis frames Hamas’ use of suicide bombings in terms of its political 
survival, its need to retaliate against Fatah/PA and the Israeli state and finally the 
necessity to compete with a strongly established PLO/PA/Fatah.
These three broad themes enable this analysis to encompass various considerations 
outlined above such as the ‘spoiler’ effects of suicide bombing and the use of suicide 
missions to enhance political prestige and outbid political rivals. In other words, they 
allow this work to provide a more holistic analysis of an organisation’s use of suicide 
operations. In identifying the three broad lines of conflation between the organisation 
and the individual this work applies the rational choice assumption that rational units of 
analysis behave in a sufficiently similar and utility-maximising manner so as to be 
aggregatable while also simultaneously behaving in predictable fashions over time59. In 
addition, by refusing to privilege the organisation over the individual, this thesis also 
attempts to draw attention to the internal changes which have occurred in the
56 Mia Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding’, opt .cit. 
and Dying to K ill, opt .cit.
57 Mia Bloom uses the figures from the Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre Public Opinion 
Polls. See: http://www.imcc.org/publicpo11/results.html for poll results.
58 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill, opt, cit.. p. 19
59 This approach allows predictions and hypotheses to be made and allows one to use a lens to simplify 
the infinite complexity o f the social world and home in on some variables in order to understand and/or 
explain a phenomenon (in our case, suicidal violence in the Israeli-Palestinian setting)
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Palestinian territories enabling the wholesale use of suicide operations. The study 
identifies, a dialectical relationship between the organisation and the individual 
bombers. Finally, this work seeks to demonstrate how suicide bombings, while being 
overwhelmingly instrumental for the organisation, also incorporate an expressive 
function for the group using them.
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Part II
I. Suicide Bombings as the Converging Point of Instrumental and Expressive 
Violence
As established in the previous section suicide bombings in the Israeli-Palestinian 
context can be understood using a rational actor determination of costs and benefits 
involved in conducting a bombing campaign at the level o f both the organisation and 
the individual. Both organisational and individual aspects need to be considered when 
analysing this phenomenon as each impacts and propels the other. Furthermore, as 
established previously, suicide attacks simultaneously encompass both expressive and 
instrumental facets of violence, though they tend to be more overtly instrumental for 
the organisation and more overtly expressive for the individual. This section illustrates 
this theoretical understanding by demonstrating how both the organisational and 
individual resort to suicide violence is rooted in three broadly conflating concerns, i.e. 
survival, competition and retaliation.
The argument extended here is based on recognising the equal importance of both 
levels of analysis, i.e. recognising that while strong organisational support is necessary 
for suicide bombings to exist as a protracted political phenomenon, individual 
motivations play an equally important role in promulgating these missions. Having 
once identified the organisation as the point of initial impetus for suicide campaigns, 
this analysis then considers the increasingly independent role of individual bombers. 
This dual focus places the spotlight firmly on Palestinian developments and dynamics 
and enables one to trace how both external impetus, as represented by Israeli policy, 
and internal dynamics, as reflected by inter-group and inter-level interactions, have 
enabled suicide missions to develop into a sustainable phenomenon within the 
Palestinian scenario. To this end, this section first traces the use of violence by Hamas 
over the past nineteen years, from mid-1987 to 2006 and then locates suicide bombings 
as being part of a broader strategy of violent confrontation geared to accomplish the 
three central goals of survival, competition and retaliation. Having illustrated 
organisational motivations and rationality behind suicide attacks, this section then 
locates these same three themes in the logic of the individuals who carry out these 
suicide missions. This chapter concludes by demonstrating that the dialectic between 
Hamas and its operatives conflates along these three key themes of survival,
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competition and retaliation and is crucial in understanding the long-term existence and 
use of suicidal violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In doing so, this chapter 
demonstrates how suicide missions incorporate instrumental and expressive aspects for 
both Hamas and its operatives.
H. Hamas and the Instrumental Logic of Suicide Bombings
Hamas’ resort to violence and suicide attacks must be understood as being rooted, first 
and foremost, in its need to survive in a political landscape that was overwhelmingly 
dominated by two key players -  Israel and the PLO/PA, with Fatah representing its 
main faction60. Hamas has had to consistently balance its own agenda and goals with 
the political reality of survival in an arena impacted by these two external and internal 
players. All Palestinian groups, including Hamas, are under intense pressure to 
‘perform’ within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Performance is closely tied into group 
legitimacy within Palestinian political space as well as support from the Palestinian 
‘constituency’. Various strategies of violent confrontation have been consistently used 
by all groups to gamer public support and gain a political advantage over rival 
organisations. Till about 2000, Hamas was still not a fully established stable 
organisation in the Palestinian political arena. As such, its use of suicide bombings 
prior to 2000 was intermittent and implemented in conjunction with other armed attacks 
specifically to raise its profile and assert a unique group identity61. Unable to pose a 
direct political challenge to the PA in this period, Hamas used suicide attacks instead to 
indirectly undermine its legitimacy and hamper the Oslo peace process .
The 1993 - 2000 period also saw Hamas steadily attempt to normalise suicide violence 
as a legitimate means of retaliating against the policies of the Israeli state. Hamas’ 
suicide operations were also a retaliatory response to Israeli policies which 
simultaneously incited a harsher Israeli response thereby engendering an escalating tit- 
for-tat cycle of violence. This escalation enabled Hamas to both successfully justify
60 As explained in Chapter II, Fatah has consistently represented the dominant faction in the PLO/PA 
Hamas’ interaction with both is exactly the same. As such Hamas’ policy towards Fatah at any given 
point also applies to the PLO/PA and vice versa in this analysis.
61 See also Appendix C
62 Zeev Ma’oz, ‘The Unlimited Use o f  the Limited Use o f Force: Israel and Low Intensity Warfare, 1949 
-  2004’, paper presented at the annual meeting o f  the International Studies Association (ISA), Montreal, 
17- 20 March 2004
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suicide violence as a defensive policy against Israeli punitive action and portray itself as 
an able,military successor to the now passive PA and Fatah.
After 2000, Hamas made a conscious shift from being a predominantly social and 
military resistance party to one that was increasingly willing and able to challenge 
Fatah in the conventional political arena. However, Hamas continued to maintain its 
distinctive identity by following a dual policy of military and political activity with an 
equally strong foundation of social activism. That Fatah also began using suicide 
operatives in 2002 indicates not only the successful normalisation of suicide violence in 
the Palestinian scenario but also the intense pressure that the PA and Fatah faced vis-a- 
vis an increasingly popular Hamas. Thus 2002 also marks the beginning of a period in 
which suicide bombings demonstrated competition between more equal political 
factions which now vied for power with the full support of the rank and file63.
In this complex balancing act Hamas’ position vis-a-vis the PLO/PA/ Fatah and Israel 
has consistently been that of survival, competition or retaliation -  or a varying 
combinations of all three. The strategies at the disposal of Hamas to achieve any of 
these perceived central goal(s) have been those of negotiated coexistence, controlled 
violence and finally, as we have seen after 2006, fu ll political integration64. These 
strategies have either been used alone or in combination with each other to ensure 
survival and enable competition and retaliation. Suicide bombings are a part of the 
policy of controlled violence which facilitates Hamas’ policy of negotiated coexistence 
and enabled it to maintain a unique position in the Palestinian political landscape even 
after full political integration.
(i) Violence in the Pre-Suicide Bombing Phase: Hamas from 1987 -1993
With the outbreak of the first intifada in December 1987, Hamas was seen to adopt 
policies that would ensure its survival. As a new organisation, it not only had to 
contend with the power of more established groups but also had to identify a public 
stand distinctly its own to ensure that it was not absorbed into the PLO or
63 This notion o f suicide missions reflecting a strategy o f  outbidding was first introduced by Mia Bloom  
in ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding’, opt, cit. and Dying to 
Kill, opt, cit. Other scholars worked on the idea o f political competition and survival much before the 
concept o f  outbidding was introduced in Bloom’s work, see for example: Shaul Mishal and Avraham 
Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, opt, cit. and ‘Participation without Presence, opt, cit.
64 The strategies o f  controlled violence and negotiated co-existence are introduced and outlined in detail 
in Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, opt, cit.
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overshadowed by the UNC. Thus, the strategies used in this period were primarily those 
of controlled violence and negotiated co-existence, the former to raise its visibility and 
the latter to try and avoid even hints of open political confrontation.
Despite its attempts to avoid open confrontation, the very fact that Hamas needed to 
define its own position vis-a-vis the PLO and UNC, inadvertently forced intra-group 
competition and thereby demanded a delicate balancing act on Hamas’ part. Hamas 
achieved this balance by eschewing open competition in favour of stressing the Islamic 
opposition to any peace process which would leave any part of Palestine in the hands of 
the Israelis. This stance was taken and consolidated in light of the increasing 
willingness of the PLO and UNC to opt for a peaceful solution through diplomatic 
negotiations. Hamas also made no calls for mass demonstrations in the early months of 
the intifada for fears of confrontation with the Israeli security forces which would have 
been disastrous for its survival as a nascent organisation.
Yet despite its attempts to avoid direct confrontation, Hamas was a violent organisation 
from the very offset65. Violence not only propelled the intifada and secured political 
prestige, it also provided the Palestinians with an important outlet for the political 
frustrations and ideological fervour that had developed over the long years of 
occupation. Hamas consciously used violence to assure the Palestinian public that it 
was an able inheritor of the PLO’s mantle as leader of the armed struggle against Israel 
and to simultaneously accumulate political prestige. By 1989 Hamas was notorious for 
conducting operations using its ‘strike groups’ {al- sawa’ id al-ramiya or the “shooting 
arms” of the movement). These groups were not only responsible for the daily intifada 
activities, such as throwing stones, blocking roads and writing slogans on the walls, 
they were also responsible for the enforcement of intifada directives on the population 
and taking punitive action against alleged collaborators. Hamas had also been directing 
attacks upon the Israelis starting August 1988, although at this point these attacks, 
which took the form of shootings, knife attacks and kidnappings, were directed at the 
military and symbols of the occupation -  no bombings had appeared on the scene as 
yet.
65 Mishal and Sela’s analysis o f  the first 30 leaflets issued show that violent directives comprised 30.5% 
o f the total, i.e. violent and non-violent, instructions leaflets 1 to 10. This figure rose to 40% in leaflets 
11 to 20, and remained at 39.7% in leaflets 21 to 30. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian 
Hamas, opt, cit. p. 61
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The arrest of Sheikh Yassin66, Hamas’ spiritual leader, and about 250 activists in WBG 
in May 1989, created a vacuum at the top level of the leadership and represented a 
serious blow to Hamas. This removal of direction can be seen in the near absence of 
violent activities conducted by Hamas in the period immediately after these arrests67. 
Indeed Hamas was so shaken that its next violent attack did not occur till December 
1990, when a Hamas operative claimed responsibility for a knife attack in Petah 
Tikva68. This attack shortly followed the 8th October Temple Mount incident in 
Jerusalem where seventeen Palestinians had been shot dead by Israeli security forces. 
Hamas had at that point demanded a jihad  against Israel and had widened its targets to 
include civilians and settlers, in both Israel and the territories69. This shift, based in 
purely strategic considerations, boosted its operational success rate and Petah Tikva 
became the first of a spate of Hamas retaliatory attacks between December 1990 and 
February 1991, which incited a sharp Israeli crackdown in response which translated 
into severe security and economic controls in the territories70.
Yassin’s arrest combined with internal pressures and Israeli counter-measures also 
triggered significant shifts in Hamas’ organisation and leadership71 and conscious 
efforts were made to rehabilitate the movement by recruiting younger activist members. 
This shift in membership might explain how the internal reorganisation, which resulted 
in the concomitant increase in military activity, combined with the Israeli crackdown 
between December 1990-91 contributed to the formation of the Battalions of ‘Izz al- 
Din al-Qassam (kata’ib ‘izz al-din al-qassam), as the formal military wing of the 
Hamas in 1991. The Qassam Brigades became steadily active over the next year, 
primarily using knife attacks and shootings72. Violence and terror thus preceded and
66 See Appendix D
67 See Appendix C
68 Incidents Database, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Interdisciplinary Center 
(IDC), Herzliya, Israel, http://www.ict.org.il/apage/6218.php
69 The aspect o f jihad  against the state o f Israel is treated in-depth in Chapter V
70 International Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 21, ‘Dealing With H am as' (Amman/Brussels: ICG, 
26 January 2004),
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/librarv/documents/middle east north africa/21 dealing with hamas.doc 
>, Date Accessed: 28 February 2006, p. 7
71 Yassin’s arrest prompted the visit o f  Hamas activists from the USA, led by Musa Abu Marzuq (See 
Appendix D), who introduced a strict hierarchy into the organisation. The WBG was divided by into 
seven and five sub-districts respectively each led by a separate headquarter which coordinated four 
activities -  i.e. security, da ’w a , political activity, and coordination. The West Bank and Gaza were linked 
by a coordinating committee composed o f  three committees -  political, military and da ’w a . However, the 
Israeli crackdown showed a failure o f this horizontal compartmentalisation and separation o f the military 
and civilian apparatuses. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, opt, cit. pp. 58, 64
72 See for example: Incidents Database, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), opt, 
cit.: Anat Kurz and Nahman Tal, Hamas: Radical Islam in a National Struggle, Memorandum No. 47
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accompanied the official Oslo negotiations between the PA and Israel from 1991 to 
1993, and was used to both retaliate against the Israeli state and to undercut ongoing 
negotiations.
Database analysis shows that while Hamas violence remained almost non-existent 
before the Madrid Conference in October 1991 there was a sharp upswing in especially 
externally directed violence before the June 1992 Israeli general elections which 
brought back the labour party (Avoda) and brightened prospects of peace. It seems that 
prior to the Madrid Conference, Hamas’ ^ changing internal structure combined with the 
Israeli crackdown had forced the group to curtail violent activity towards Israel. In this 
period Hamas predominantly opted for an overall policy of negotiated co-existence 
with the intention of avoiding open confrontation within the Palestinian political arena 
while it rebuilt its ranks and reconsolidated its position. However, by October 1991 a 
stronger, reconsolidated Hamas joined forces with other groups, including the Islamic 
Jihad, PFLP and DFLP in a statement opposing the PLO decision to send a Palestinian 
delegation to the Madrid conference. Over the next few months, inter-group 
competition escalated and clashes broke out between a younger, more militant Hamas 
and Fatah. Despite two reconciliation agreements, violent altercations occurred 
sporadically in the territories for the next eight months73. Thus it would appear, that in 
the lead up to and immediately after the 1991 Madrid conference, Hamas’ escalating 
competition with Fatah forced it to focus on endogenous circumstances resulting in 
relatively low levels of violent activity directed towards Israel.
This changed drastically in the lead up to the June 1992 elections, and the months 
immediately after, with an unprecedented rise in Hamas attacks with a total of thirteen 
attacks conducted between May and December 1992. This shift seems to have been a 
strategic response aimed at derailing the peace process with Israel for the specific 
purpose of group survival. The Madrid conference effectively signalled the end of the 
intifada and had thus removed Hamas’ raison d'etre. As Israeli-PLO negotiations also 
left it out in the cold, the only way Hamas could survive both as an organisation and in
(Tel Aviv University: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, July 1997); Yonah Alexander, Palestinian 
Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc, 2002)
73 See Hisham H. Ahmad, From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise o f  Hamas in 
Palestinian Society (Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study o f International Affairs, 
1994); Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History With Documents (Boston 
and New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s Press. 2005, 5th edition); Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the 
Search fo r  State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 (Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997)
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the political consciousness of the Palestinian population was to disrupt peace efforts. Its 
‘spoiler’ role74 in both the lead up to the June 1992 Israeli elections and the September 
1993 Declaration of Peace (DOP) involved escalating violence. In the first instance, 
Hamas hoped that the violence would bring a hard-line Likud into power with the 
knowledge that Likud, unlike Avoda, would be less likely to negotiate with the PLO. 
When that failed, and the June 1992 elections brought back the labour party under 
Yitzhack Rabin, Hamas hoped to discredit the peace process instead. Hamas hoped that 
its resort to the violent activity that would serve the dual purpose of hampering the 
peace process while also keeping it in the limelight. This trajectory o f events seems to 
suggest that the use of violence was already an established mechanism of ensuring 
survival for Hamas before the introduction of suicide bombings.
(ii) Suicide Campaigns Begin and Gain Momentum: Hamas from 1993 -2000
The first suicide attack in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict occurred in April 1993 and 
was claimed by Hamas. Interestingly, other violent (non-suicidal) attacks continued in 
199375, suggesting that this first suicide bombing was Hamas’ attempt to deliberately 
escalate violent confrontation with the Israeli state. The next series of Hamas attacks 
seem to have been conducted in direct response to the September 1993 signing of the 
Oslo I peace accords. Hamas’ rejection of the peace process was based in its struggle 
for survival given that the DOP formally ended the uprising which had given it the 
opportunity to develop into an authentic political alternative to the PLO. Moreover, the 
PLO’s agreement to desist from and prevent hostile actions against Israel, a 
commitment that was to be implemented by the PA, threatened Hamas’ political 
manoeuvrability, and its very existence, by removing a crucial prestige and support 
amassing tool from its political kit. At the same time Oslo had widespread public 
support in both WBG and the population threatened to turn against any group that 
derailed this fragile peace process or sparked internecine conflict. Hamas thus 
recognised that it had to operate carefully because it could not afford to lose its, as yet 
small percentage of, public support.
It resolved this dilemma by escalating external attacks against the Israeli soldiers and 
civilians in the period immediately after Oslo I, but confining them to conventional
74 Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ‘Sabotaging the Peace, opt, cit.
75 A total o f  nine other attacks occurred in this period -  seven shootings and two knife attacks
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knife attacks and shootings. Hamas justified these attacks as necessary actions against 
the occupation. While the lack of suicide attacks ensured that it did not attract too much 
attention, and thereby public hostility, conventional attacks enabled it to continue to 
project itself as the standard bearer for Palestinian rights under conditions of continuing 
occupation. Moreover, while tensions between Hamas and Fatah factions also 
continued Hamas could not afford to settle for abandoning military activity against 
Israel and for peaceful coexistence with the PLO, as that would put it at risk of losing 
its distinctiveness as the leading movement for the liberation of Palestine and the 
establishment of an Islamic Palestinian state. By refraining from ‘spectacular terrorism’ 
and maintaining its position on conventional attacks, Hamas managed to retain the 
unique identity it had developed in the uprising. It adopted a policy of negotiated 
coexistence with the PLO/Fatah, successfully avoiding direct confrontation in the 
internal arena, and simultaneously exercised a policy of controlled violence against the 
Israelis. It was thus not only able to assure its survival as a distinct movement in WBG, 
but also use the space it had created vis-a-vis the PLO to conduct a propaganda war 
against it. It did so by consistently depicting the DOP as illegitimate and inconsistent 
with LIN Resolution 242, and the PLO as compromising upon core Palestinian 
demands.
In the midst of this political manoeuvring, there was the additional pressure of 
deteriorating economic conditions in the Gaza Strip, a direct result of the full curfew 
implemented by Rabin in June 1993 which was still in place in January 1994. Anti- 
Israeli sentiments were also running high as a result of widespread violence and settler
nftprovocation in both WBG . Poll results during this period show increasing impatience 
and frustration among Palestinians with the “no-change” situation on the ground. 
Hamas, took advantage of this increasing public frustration and continued to advocate 
armed struggle against Israel, a position that was facilitated by the massacre at the Cave 
of the Patriarchs in Hebron by the settler Baruch Goldstein in February 1994 in which 
29 Palestinians were killed. The timing of the attack in the midst of Israeli-PLO 
negotiations on the implementation of the Gaza-Jericho phase of the DOP gave Hamas 
a fresh chance to swear revenge and once again allowed it to enhance its popularity and 
consolidate its political identity by opting for retaliatory suicide attacks against Israel.
76 Alain Gresh, The PLO: The Struggle Within -  Towards an Independent Palestinian State (London and 
New Jersey: Zed Books, 1988,2nd edition), p. 446
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Two Hamas bombings swiftly followed in April77 and Israel responded by reverting to 
a policy of closure for WBG, putting undue pressure on the Palestinian population and 
the newly formed PA, and indirectly weakening Arafat. Hamas further manipulated this 
situation by carrying out two more suicide bombings later that year. It seems that at 
least the second attack, which followed the November 1994 targeted assassination of a 
PU leader, was an attempt by the Hamas to further weaken Arafat’s position vis-a-vis 
both an angry Palestinian population78 and the Israelis who had no faith in the PA to 
control a violent Hamas79, without clashing head-on with the PA. The relatively weak 
PA was in turn unable to take decisive action against Hamas as it was also unwilling to 
directly clash with Hamas at this stage. By the end of 1994, Hamas was able to using 
strategically timed suicide operations to maintain a negotiated co-existence with 
Fatah/PA on the one hand, and to gamer popular support by appearing to retaliate 
against what were widely perceived as unjust Israeli policies of closure, collective 
punishment and targeted assassinations on the other.
Hamas’ increasing consolidation and ability to challenge the PA is what seems to have 
triggered the PA-Hamas dialogue of summer and fall 1995, which was conducted with 
the express purpose of settling differences between both groups. Hamas blatantly 
continued violent activity against Israel during this inter-group dialogue, including 
three more suicide bombings, hoping to force Arafat to officially recognise it as 
legitimate opposition, which would enable Hamas to continue its uninterrupted 
development under the PA80. These three suicide attacks also coincided with the final 
phase of Israeli-PA negotiations regarding Israel’s withdrawal from all primary 
Palestinian towns in the West Bank. Once more these suicide attacks served to pressure 
the PA/Fatah and escalate competition and were also simultaneously timed to derail the 
peace process and trigger a harsh Israeli response, which would in turn justify a policy 
of violent retaliation, enabling Hamas to maintain visibility vis-a-vis the PA in this 
cmcial period. At best the escalation of violence by Hamas could have rekindled an 
uprising, regenerating ideal conditions for it to further consolidate itself. At the very 
least, these attacks forced the PA to recognise Hamas as an force to reckon within a 
rapidly emerging proto-state thus giving it leverage in the talks being held. However,
77 Incidents Database, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), opt, cit.
78 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, ont. cit.
79 Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ‘Sabotaging the Peace’, opt, cit.
80 See Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, opt, cit.
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Hamas’ attempts to derail the peace process failed and the PA-Israel talks continued 
and were concluded with the Taba accords of September 1995.
Once the Taba accords (Oslo II) were signed in September 1995, Hamas became very 
silent, suspending all violent activity against Israel potentially to avoid alienating the 
Palestinian public by either slowing down the withdrawal of the Israeli military from 
Palestinian cities or provoking a response from them in the run up to the first-ever PA 
Council elections in January 1996. Data shows that Arafat not only won a landslide 
88% of the votes in the January elections, reflecting a tremendous resurgence of 
Palestinian hopes for peace, but also that the largest turn-out of voters came from Gaza, 
Hamas’ stronghold81. This strengthened Arafat’s stance vis-a-vis Hamas as this support 
from Gaza suggested that the PA could take harsh action against any force that might 
compromise this fragile peace without any loss of public support or legitimacy. This 
effectively fenced in Hamas which came under increasing pressure from both Israel and 
the PA. Fearing any crackdown that would threaten its survival, Hamas reverted to its 
traditionally cautious ‘wait-and-watch’ policy of silent cooperation. As a result, after 
the August 1995 suicide attack in Jerusalem, there was close to a six month suspension 
of all violent activity conducted by Hamas82.
This fragile truce was shattered by Israel’s continuing counter-terrorism measures 
against Hamas, which in addition to strategies of general closures, arrests, detentions 
and curfews, also continued to include the controversial policy of targeted 
assassinations. At a time when Hamas activists had been cornered and had agreed to 
stop military operations against Israel in return for the PA discontinuing action against 
the Bridges, had promised to facilitate the January 1996 PA elections and had also 
begun negotiating a mutual cessation of hostilities with Israel (via the PA), Israel 
liquidated ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam’s Yahya ‘Ayyash, popularly known as ‘The 
Engineer’, in January 1996. Hamas promised to retaliate and thus began the worst 
assault on Israel yet. From February to March 1996, Hamas conducted three suicide 
bombings in which over forty Israelis were killed and more than eighty injured. At 
least one of these bombings was claimed by a group which called itself ‘Squads of the 
New Disciples of Martyr Yahya ‘Ayyash’83- a military cell of Hamas.
81 Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ‘Sabotaging the Peace’, ont. cit. p. 284
82 Incidents Database, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), opt, cit.
83 Ibid.
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In response the Israeli authorities closed WBG, prevented movement between 
Palestinian villages and cities and also suspended peace negotiations. The PA, under 
heavy external pressure, also condemned Hamas attacks. In both WBG, the PA’s 
Preventative Security Force, the bulk of which was comprised by former members of 
the local Fatah militia effectively targeted and dismantled the Qassam squads, 
confiscated arms, raided, ransacked and/or shut down many Islamic social welfare 
organisations and universities, and arrested hundreds of Hamas activists who were 
imprisoned and often tortured.84. For the PA, this was the ideal opportunity to 
effectively decimate opposition with Israeli support under the camouflage of protecting 
Palestinian interests.
Opinion poll results in this period showed a decrease in support for Hamas reflecting 
the Palestinian support for the peace process and anger against Hamas for sabotaging 
the same and bringing further hardships upon the population. However, paradoxically, 
there was at the same time a slight increase in the overall support for armed attacks 
against Israel, perhaps indicating that Hamas’ reading of Palestinian resentment 
towards Israel’s policies of liquidation and collective punishment was not misplaced. 
At the same time, there was also a drop in support for the PA and Fatah in this period 
reflecting a negative public reaction to the PA’s policy towards Hamas85. Thus polls 
once again indicate Palestinian despair with the peace process and the political situation 
as a whole and confer Hamas with a degree of political legitimacy and public 
acceptance albeit not outright support vis-a-vis the PA.
The Likud victory in May 1996 brought Benjamin Netanyahu into power and the 
effective suspension of the Oslo accords. Confronted with increasing public unrest, the 
PA was forced to re-open dialogue with the Islamic bloc and ease the repressive 
measures that had been taken towards Hamas. This once again engendered co-existence 
with Hamas allowing it the space necessary to regroup and develop further. The first 
nine months of the Likud government were marked by very little violent activity and no 
suicide attacks, probably due to Hamas’ fragile state and Netanyahu’s stated
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willingness to use force to crush any reversion to violence by the Palestinians . Hamas 
also had to concede that their policy of ‘ceaseless confrontation’ had been rejected by
84 International Crisis Group Middle East Report No. 21, ‘Dealing With Hamas', opt, cit.. p. 10
85 Centre for Palestinian Research and Studies (CPRS) Polls -Survey Research Unit, Public Opinion Poll 
No. 22, ‘Armed Attacks, Peace Process, Elections, Unemployment’, 29-31 March 1996.
86 Benjamin Netanyahu, ‘We Can Stop the Terror’, Jerusalem Post, 4 June 2001
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the Palestinian public, and despite the public’s opposition to the measures adopted by 
the PA against them their support base had dropped from 18% to 8% in the wake of the 
1996 suicide bombing campaign87. Hamas also noted that “Netanyahu’s 
uncompromising stance was discrediting. Oslo and the PA among the Palestinians more 
effectively than they could, thus rendering a new campaign of suicide bombings 
superfluous”88.
The March 1997 Tel Aviv suicide bombing of a coffee shop ended this ceasefire. This 
attack seems to represent Hamas taking advantage of the growing public despair at the 
economic decline in WBG and the frustration with the continuing situation of 
occupation. This attack was swiftly followed by two more bombings in July and 
September. However, Hamas’ attempts to avoid being associated with the 1997 suicide 
operations characterises these three attacks as different from any others carried out 
before or indeed after 1997. The attacks appear to be an attempt to probe Palestinian 
sentiments towards the renewal of suicide attacks while attempts at disassociation may 
have been rooted in Hamas’ fear of extreme repression by the Israeli authorities or, in 
tactical reasons concerning Hamas-PA cooperation, or in its fear of further alienating 
the Palestinian population.
In July 1998, a van filled with fuel and nails failed to explode in Jerusalem. The badly 
burnt Palestinian driver was rushed to the hospital where it was revealed that he was a 
Hamas activist who had undertaken the attempted suicide bombing on his own. Both 
the PA and Hamas took this opportunity to blame the incident on the Israeli induced 
stalemate of the peace process89. Once again, this attack came in the midst of the 
diplomatic activity that preceded the October 1998 Wye Agreement between 
Netanyahu and Arafat. The agreement set a detailed timetable for the withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from an additional 13% of the West Bank contingent on the Palestinian 
compliance with weapons collection, arrest o f suspects and other security provisions. 
However, Netanyahu once again refused to implement the redeployments as promised. 
A public opinion poll conducted in WBG in early October 1998 showed that while the
87 Jerusalem Media & Communication Center (JMCC) Public Opinion Polls, No. 14, ‘On Attitudes o f  
East Jerusalemites on the Recent Hamas Bombings’, March 1996; Also see Opinion Polls No. 15 -  No. 
18, ‘On Palestinian Attitudes Towards Current Issues’, August, November and December 1996 
respectively.
88 ICG Middle East Report No. 21 , Dealing With Hamas’, opt, cit.. p. 10
89 Incidents Database, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), opt, cit.: Shaul Mishal 
and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: opt, cit.. pp. 79
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level of support for the peace process remained at a high 66% there was concurrently a 
rise in the levels of support for armed attacks against Israel. Support for violent attacks 
rose sharply from 44% in early August 1998 to 51% in October90. This might explain 
why from July to October, when the agreement was signed, Hamas carried out a total of 
ten violent attacks, including one suicide bombing. However, polls conducted a month 
after the Wye Agreement showed only 41% supported violence against Israelis in 
general -  a significant 10% drop from the 51% recorded a month ago. Support for 
Hamas also dropped to 11% in this poll from the 12% of a month before91.
Once again this seems to suggest that Palestinian support for suicide operations/armed 
attacks and groups which conduct them is higher when prospects for a political 
settlement seem dim. However, the moment any substantial measure is taken for peace, 
in this case the Wye Agreement, the support drops. Hamas, in turn, has demonstrated 
time and time again that it can accurately gauge popular sentiments. This understanding 
combined with the PA crackdown, Yassin’s house arrest and the return of the Ehud 
Barak led Avoda party in the July 1999 Israeli elections, ensured another long period of 
relative inactivity for Hamas. From October 1998 to December 2000 there were no 
suicide operations and only four other low-causality violent attacks. An opinion poll 
conducted in June 1999 showed that public support for armed attacks remained at a 
relatively high 45% with 49% opposition. This support was highest in refugee camps 
(49%) and amongst the young and educated (52%), suggesting that despite the high 
levels of support for the peace process, support for armed attacks continued because of 
the failure in implementing the Wye Agreement92.
(Hi) Suicide Bombings in theAl-Aqsa Intifada: Hamas from 2000 -2006
Palestinian despair with the peace process was strengthened by Barak’s choice to adopt 
a ‘Damascus first’ policy in the period immediately after July 1999 which effectively
90 Centre for Palestinian Research and Studies (CPRS) Polls -Survey Research Unit, Public Opinion Poll 
No. 36, ‘The Peace Process, Violence Against Israelis, Domestic Situation, Presidential Elections and 
Political Affiliation’, 8-10 October 1998
91 Centre for Palestinian Research and Studies (CPRS) Polls -Survey Research Unit, Public Opinion Poll 
No. 37, ‘The Peace Process and the Wye Memorandum, Elections for the President and Vice President, 
and Political Affiliations’, 12-14 November 1998
92 Centre for Palestinian Research and Studies (CPRS) Polls -Survey Research Unit, Public Opinion Poll 
No. 41, ‘Barak’s Victory and the Peace Process, Economic Conditions and Future Outlooks, Perceptions 
o f Corruption, Waste, Democracy, and Freedom o f the Press, Elections for the President and Vice 
President and Political Sympathy’, 03-05 June 1999; Also see: Jerusalem Media & Communication 
Center (JMCC) Public Opinion Polls, No. 32, ‘On Palestinian Attitudes Towards Politics’, August 1999
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sidelined the Palestinian issue and weakened Arafat’s position which was already under 
attack on account of the rising corruption within the PA and deteriorating economic 
conditions in WBG. The failure of the Camp David talks in July 2000 was the final 
blow to this mounting sense of despair and frustration in WBG. The Palestinians 
understood that Oslo had failed, felt victimised by the peace process and once again 
believed that the UN Security Council Resolution 242 was the only peace that could be
Q*a
achieved . Support for Fatah collapsed rapidly and continued to do so over the next 
few years.
Concurrently the collapse of Camp David bolstered Hamas, whose popularity rose to an 
unprecedented 19% in the six weeks that followed94. It was in this atmosphere that 
Sharon visited the Temple Mount in September 2000 accompanied by about a thousand 
Israeli policemen. This triggered Palestinian riots and Israeli armed reprisals in which 
four Palestinians were killed and at least sixty six wounded. And so began the Al-Aqsa 
intifada. Hamas took almost immediate advantage o f the re-emergence o f revolutionary 
conditions and swiftly reverted to an unmitigated policy of controlled violence. On 30 
October 2000, almost two years after the last Hamas suicide operation, a bomber 
walked into the Sbarro pizzeria in the centre of Jerusalem95conducting a bombing that 
sparked off what was to be the most gruesome two years of conflict between the Israeli 
state and the Palestinians. Another bombing followed in January 2001. The situation 
was further aggravated by the unsuccessful Taba Summit of late January 2001, which 
despite its handicaps and failure was the closest consensus between both sides to date.
The escalating violence aided Sharon’s electoral victory in February 2001. Elected on 
specifically a security platform, the Sharon government came to be characterised by its 
heavy-handed, disproportionate response towards the Palestinian uprising. Israel now 
targeted and deliberately dismantled the PA’s political, security and institutional 
infrastructure which had been established under the Oslo Accords, inevitably 
facilitating Hamas’ political hold on WBG. In addition, the PA and Fatah now focussed 
their attention away from Hamas and towards participating in the intifada. Hamas, thus 
unfettered, was able to revert fully to its policy of “resistance by all means”, and from 
January 2001 to May 2001, it conducted six more suicide bombings in Israel. Israeli
93 For the full text o f Article 242 see United Nations (22 November 1967), Security Council Resolution 
242, http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm. Date Accessed: 16 January 2007
94 Jamil Hilal, ‘Hamas’s Rise as Charted in the Polls, 1994 -2005’, Journal o f  Palestine Studies Vol. 
XXXV. 3 (Spring 2006)
95 Incidents Database, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), opt, cit.
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sources assert that this period was also characterised by the beginning of an 
unprecedented cooperation between secular and Islamic Palestinian factions with 
activists from ‘cocktail cells’, mostly comprising of Fatah Tanzim96, Hamas and/or the 
PIJ, conducting joint operations inside Israel97.
Despite being urged back to the negotiating table98, violence from both sides continued 
to escalate. Arafat perhaps believed that a minimally acceptable peace deal with Sharon 
was impossible and that the continued violence would eventually topple the Sharon 
government as the Israeli public saw him unable to live up to his promise of providing 
security. This, at least partially, explains his initial reluctance to curb the suicide 
missions conducted by Hamas and other groups. Hamas had, in the meanwhile, grown 
so powerful within the Palestinian political arena that even Arafat’s loyalists were 
calling for the group to be included in the governing body of the PA. Moreover, public 
opinion also strongly favoured Hamas and its strategy of suicide operations, preventing 
Arafat from moving decisively against it. At the same time, Arafat and the PA were 
under mounting international and Israeli pressure to stop the suicide attacks on Israeli 
citizens by arresting, detaining and disrupting Hamas infrastructure and leadership. 
Arafat, afraid of losing more public support, reacted with crackdowns which arrested 
Hamas members and political leaders only to release them shortly after. While 
internally expedient this was a gross miscalculation on Arafat’s part because it allowed 
Hamas to progressively strengthen its position vis-a-vis the PA and Fatah and continue 
using violence as a mechanism of amassing public support. Hamas thus managed to 
create a scenario where its suicide operations placed Fatah/PA under tremendous 
pressure from the Israeli state and effectively weakened it. This successfully created a 
situation in which Hamas realised, perhaps for the first time, that it could fully replace 
an increasingly fragile PA99.
By the second year of the Al-Aqsa intifada, Hamas was a fully established player in 
national resistance able to directly challenge the PA and engage with Israel. This was 
most clearly manifested when Sheikh Yassin was put under house arrest in December
96 The Tanzim is Fatah’s armed militia and consists o f  Fatah’s street cadre and elements o f  the PA’s 
Preventive Security Force. It has undertaken a number o f  military operations.
97 Ibid; Personal interview with Erik Schecter, Worldpress (Tel Aviv, Israel, January 2005)
98 For the full text o f the Mitchell Report see BBC News Key Documents (29 November 2001), 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/in depth/middle east/2001/israel and the nalestinians/kev documents/16320 
64.stm. Date Accessed: 24 October 2006.
99 Personal interview with Riad Malki, General Director o f Panorama (The Palestinian Centre for the 
Dissemination o f Democracy and Community Development), Ramallah, 31 December 2004
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2001 and a hundred and eighty Hamas activists arrested. Hundreds of Hamas supporters 
came out in protest and clashed with the Palestinian police in Gaza. Hamas instructed 
its followers not to support or obey Arafat’s PA, and these instructions were upheld 
without a breach. In turn, Israel complained that those detained by the PA were lower- 
level activists and the planners and dispatchers of suicide bombings were still at large 
suggesting that the PA feared the fallout of arresting Hamas’ higher cadres100. The 
rising political cost of curbing violence combined with the Israeli attack on the PA’s 
infrastructure and an increasingly powerful Hamas effectively degraded Arafat’s 
internal control and placed him in a precarious position. Indeed, his leadership status 
became increasingly dependent upon acknowledging the ever-growing Palestinian 
anger towards Israeli policies and ensuring the continued allegiance o f armed groups 
like Hamas101. This in turn prevented any substantial action against Hamas which 
continued its unmitigated policy of suicide attacks against the Israeli civilian population 
in an escalating tit-for-tat strategy, conducting a total of eleven suicide attacks between 
June 2001 and 27th March 2002.
On 28th March 2002, Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield, the stated goal of 
which was to dismantle the “terrorist infrastructure” that existed in PA controlled 
territories102. However, the tactics adopted involved reoccupying vast tracts of West 
Bank and Gaza and punitive measures that resulted in considerable civilian casualties. 
Israeli troops also began an assault on Arafat’s compound in Ramallah cornering him 
there for about five weeks in the first instance. Arafat’s siege gave him a fresh lease of 
life as the Palestinians rallied around their ‘living martyr’ who was refusing to 
surrender103. Hamas cunningly suspended all activities against the PA and Fatah and 
extended full support to the besieged Arafat, thereby denying the PA the expected 
monopoly over popular sentiments and instead diverting public attention in order to 
secure its own continued political visibility. The April 2002 massacre in Jenin104 and 
the June 2002 Israeli reoccupation of all the areas of Zones A and B that had been 
formerly handed over to the Palestinians further hardened public opinion. This enabled
100 Guardian Unlimited (6 December 2001), ‘Hamas Supporters Clash with Palestinian Police’. 
http://www.guardian.co.Uk/israel/Storv/0.2763.614521.00.html. Date Accessed: 23 April 2003.
101 Yezid Sayigh, ‘The Palestinian Strategic Impasse’, Survival 44.4 (Winter 2002-03)
102 Ariel Sharon (8 April 2002), Address to the Knesset, Jerusalem. The full text o f the speech can be 
seen at: http://www.palestinefacts.org/sharon speech 8apr02.php. Date Accessed: 23 April 2003.
103 Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, opt, cit.
104 See for example: Tarik Kafala (12 April 2002), BBC News Online ‘The Battle for Jenin’, 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle east/1926194.stm. Date Accessed: 24 October 2004; B T ’ Salem, 
‘Operation Defensive Shield: Soldiers’ Testimonies, Palestinian Testimonies’, 
www.btselem.org/Download/200207 Defensive Shield Eng.pdf. Date Accessed: 25 June 2007
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Hamas to justify its ‘defensive strategy’ of suicide operations conducted within Israel 
as well as against military installations and settlements within the occupied territories 
with ever increasing public support105.
This hardening Palestinian stance also explains how secular groups began utilising 
suicide operations for the first time in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
These bombings reflected a change of guard within Fatah and also its escalating 
competition with Hamas in a steadily deteriorating political situation where public 
sentiments for retaliatory attacks against Israel remained high and various groups used 
suicide bombings as a mechanism to ‘outbid’ one another for political capital. By July 
2002 alone, Fatah and its affiliated Martyrs of Al-Aqsa Brigades, had conducted sixteen 
bombings, while PIJ had conducted four and Hamas, seven. Israel retaliated by 
tightening the stranglehold on the territories, further cornering the Palestinian 
population.
In July 2002, Fatah Tanzim and Hamas, in attempting to address public suffering, 
reached an agreement to stop all suicide bombings inside Israel. As they were preparing 
to issue a formal statement to that effect, Israel bombed the Gaza apartment of Hamas 
military wing leader Sheikh Selah Shehada, killing him along with sixteen other 
individuals, including eleven children. Hamas, forced to defend its cadres and maintain 
its image as an organisation that possessed the ability to strike back, once more 
retaliated with more suicide attacks. Israel conducted thirty three politically ordered 
liquidations in 2001 and thirty seven in 2002, killing at least forty four Palestinian 
bystanders including children. Each time Hamas swore to retaliate and what resulted 
was an escalating tit-for-tat policy that continued through out 2002 -03106.
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was assassinated in March 2004, followed swiftly by ‘Abd al- 
Aziz Rantisi’s in April - effectively destroying Hamas’ top leadership within the 
territories. While the assassination of its top leadership within the territories weakened 
the Hamas, paradoxically, and as a direct result of the wave of sympathy and rage that 
followed the assassinations, public opinion polls showed that for the first time, Hamas 
was the strongest and most popular movement in WBG. Hamas’ rise and the 
PA’s/Arafat’s corresponding decline indicated for the first time that it could potentially
105 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents (Boston, New  
York: Bedfords/StMartin’s, 2004, 5th edition), p. 505
106 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, opt, cit.. p. 505
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fill any vacuum created by the destruction of the PA, perhaps replacing it altogether. 
Simultaneously, the destruction of Hamas core leadership in WBG also created for the 
first time an imbalance between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ leadership, with Khaled 
Mishal, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, effectively heading the organisation in the 
post-Yassin period from Damascus.
While there had been competition and disagreement between the two strands earlier as 
well, traditionally the internal leadership had tended to be stronger by the very fact of 
being on the ground and in touch with the Palestinian street. The external leadership, in 
turn, had always been more radical and heavily favoured the use of violence while the 
internal leadership, perhaps as a result o f being more attuned to the political situation, 
had always been more pragmatic and willing to negotiate and cooperate with other 
factions and Israel107. Thus Yassin and Rantisi’s assassinations and the mass arrests 
which followed, weakened Hamas by the decimating its local ranks. This was most 
evident in the overall decrease in number of suicide attacks conducted by Hamas as 
well as in its inability to retaliate immediately for the assassination of its top brass. 
However, Hamas being structurally based on local level cells meant that even if  the 
local leadership or one or more cells were destroyed, its network-chain structure 
enabled some cells to continue functioning and communicating with the external
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leadership . Consequently despite being weakened, Hamas remained intact and was 
able to use the surge in public support to remain visible and swiftly recover.
Arafat’s death in November 2004 and the elections that followed once again relegated 
Hamas to the periphery of the spotlight that was focussed upon Fatah. Hamas’ policy of 
suicide attacks as a mechanism of forcing the Israeli’s to pressurise Fatah/PA had 
successfully weakened the PA but Hamas had also suffered in the process. Hamas 
chose not to participate in the January 2005 elections which brought Mahmud Abbas 
(Abu Mazen) into power with a resurgence of hope on the Palestinian street for various 
reasons. Firstly, it needed the time to regroup in the aftermath of Yassin’s and Rantisi’s 
assassinations. Secondly, Hamas in the absence of high-profile leaders pragmatically 
participated in the local government elections instead and thereby retained a significant
107 See for example: Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, opt, cit.: Yezid Sayigh, 
Armed Struggle and the Search fo r  State, opt, cit.: Khaled Hroub, ‘Hamas After Sheikh Yassin and 
Rantisi’, Journal o f  Palestine Studies XXXIII.4 (Summer 2004)
108 For details o f  Hamas’ organisational structure see for example: Shaul Mishal and Ma’oz Rosenthal, 
‘A1 Qaeda as a Dune Organisation: Towards a Typology o f  Islamic Terrorist Organisations’, Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005). See also Chapter II for details.
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level o f its popular support. This local base gave them ensured that they continued to 
remain influential as they wielded the ability to ask their constituents not to vote for 
Abu Mazen. Thus Hamas managed to find a way to influence the Palestinian political 
scene without directly participating in the PA109. Hamas also accepted a tahdiya (cease­
fire) in March 2005, which lasted a little over a year and was conditional on Israel’s 
suspension of military incursions and assassinations and the release of all Palestinian 
prisoners in jail. However, as Israeli military operations continued Hamas carried out 
one suicide attack and one kidnapping in violation of its self-declared hudna (unilateral 
cease-fire)110.
Experts believe that Hamas offers hudna only in times when the movement is weak or 
under incredible pressure from the PA and/or Israel. However, the increasing 
propensity o f the Hamas to opt for unilateral declarations of cease-fire suggests that 
other incentives are also at play. This work suggests that Hamas’ 2005 hudna reflects 
not only its ability to accurately gauge the popular mood and shift its policies 
accordingly but also its conscious efforts to shift from a predominantly military 
movement into a political movement with a fully developed military arm.
This shift is most evident in Hamas’ decision to participate in the 2006 parliamentary 
elections. Before 2006, Hamas, while participating in municipal and other local 
elections, had steadfastly refused to participate in any national elections, either for the 
Palestinian Council (PC) or the PA, because it considered both these structures 
illegitimate, linked as they were to the Oslo accords. Its decision to integrate with this 
political structure thus not only legitimised the established political system, but also 
reflected Hamas’ inability to continue armed resistance with the same vigour as it did in 
the first years of the intifada. Its policy of full political integration is thus a concession 
based on the understanding that the population needed a cooling-off period and that its 
long-term political survival could no longer be ensured by its image as the military 
alternative to Fatah. Instead Hamas understood that it was necessary to now project
109 Personal interview with Riad Malki, General Director o f Panorama (The Palestinian Centre for the 
Dissemination o f  Democracy and Community Development), Ramallah, 31 December 2004 and Yasser 
Ahmad Shalabi, Associate Researcher, The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), 
Ramallah, 02 January 2005.
110 See Yaniv Berman (10 December 2006), ‘Israeli-Palestinian Cease-Fires: Facts and Fantasy, Institute 
for Counter Terrorism.
http://www.ict.org.il/index.php?sid=l 19&lang=en&act=page&id=8169&str=hudna. Date Accessed: 12 
December 2006; Haim Malka, ‘Forcing Choices: Testing the Transformation o f  Hamas’, The Washington 
Quarterly 28.4 (Autumn 2005)
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itself as a political entity with the strength to replace Fatah, both militarily and 
politically.
Hamas continues to believe that military operations strengthen the Palestinian political 
and negotiation positions111. Sheikh Hasan Yusuf, Hamas’ most prominent leader in the 
West Bank, stated for example that: “for Hamas political activity is part of the whole 
package and (sic) the movement’s political activities are not an indication of the 
cessation of its resistance enterprise, which is the cornerstone of Hamas” 112. Hamas’ 
January 2006 election victory thus represents the culmination of this dual strategy of 
military and political resistance. What is-clear then is that Hamas has and will continue 
to strategically use both violent and non-violent policies in combination and in a 
pragmatic manner in order to ensure its continuing survival in the Palestinian political 
arena. It is also obvious that Hamas will continue to use violence and suicide violence, 
if  need be, as a mechanism of political competition and retaliation in the Israeli- 
Palestinian landscape of conflict.
I I I .  Hamas Operatives and the Expressive Logic of Suicide Bombings
The individual operatives’ decision to opt for a suicide attack, as established 
previously, must be understood as rooted in altruistic motives and as an expression of 
their social responsibility. A significant number of Palestinian suicide bombers firmly 
believe that their deaths will contribute to the survival o f their society while also 
allowing them to retaliate against the Israeli state. ‘Martyrdom’ (shahadat/istish ’had)113 
therefore becomes the mechanism by which bombers assert their affiliation and 
integration with Palestinian society while simultaneously delineating personal space 
and standing out from the crowd. This belief certainly explains why the exponential rise 
in individuals willing to volunteer for these missions corresponds with the failure of the 
peace process and Israel’s concurrently increasing use of the policy of collective 
punishment. The motivation and psychology of the bomber is therefore not too different
111 Mohammed Daraghmeh, ‘Hamas Official Okays State in West Bank’, Associated Press, 3 December 
2004
112 Haim Malka, ‘Forcing Choices: Testing the Transformation o f  Hamas’, opt, cit.. p. 41
113 The term martyrdom is used in Palestine today to refer to all suicide missions. It derives from the 
Islamic term ‘shuhadd’ (the martyr) who achieves ‘shuhadaf (martyrdom) when fighting for his/her 
country-not necessarily by suicide. There are clear religious connotation to the use o f  this term and it 
carries considerable cultural weight in the Palestinian context. It must be pointed out that shuhadat since 
the first intifada is much more loosely used and virtually anyone killed by the Israeli Defence Forces now 
qualifies as a shuhada, even those not actively involved in fighting, such as a bystander caught and killed 
in cross-fire. Informal discussion with Abu Ali, Ramallah, 10 Jan. 2005.
99
from a soldier sent on a high-risk mission, though the cmcial point of departure is that 
for the bomber, unlike the soldier, his/her mission’s success is dependent upon the 
surety o f his/her death.
Palestinian society’s increasingly ritualistic portrayals of its suicide bombers as heroic 
martyrs have converted them into powerful role models and thus inevitably as examples 
to be followed. So strong is this societal support that people consistently speak of 
bombers with awe or, at the very least, with grudging respect. Even those who do not 
condone suicide bombings remain disinclined to talk negatively about these heroic 
“sons and daughters of Palestine”114. Thus as self-sacrifice is increasingly honoured, 
celebrated and idealised in Palestinian culture and society, martyrdom has become an 
avenue of amassing prestige and honour, both for the self and also for one’s family. 
Martyrdom, as a mechanism of amassing honour and social prestige, seems to have also 
become steadily competitive over time -  a case of “if they can do it, why can’t I?” 115 
Using Mead’s logic of ‘ceaseless interaction’ outline in part I o f this chapter, suicide 
bombers seem to have successfully ‘inspired’ others to follow their path by providing 
the necessary first impetus for suicidal violence to be replicated over and over again. 
This explains the increasing number of individuals willing to carry out attacks alone or 
in the name of any organisation willing to provide them with the opportunity. Hence a 
concept that was initially introduced into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and propelled 
by Hamas has evolved and developed a certain momentum of its own. Obviously, 
competitive self-sacrifice as a mechanism of amassing honour and social prestige 
would probably not be an option under ‘normal’ circumstances. Instead it seems that 
protracted conflict has provided the necessary conditions for enabling suicide attacks to 
become an acceptable means of protest, engagement and service to society pushing 
individuals to use their martyrdom, with or without organisational support, as a 
mechanism to simultaneously ensure societal survival on the one hand, and enable 
competition and retaliation on the other.
114 In over 50 interviews and discussions which I conducted between December 2004 and January 2005, 
not one individual criticised suicide bombers. Even the ‘pacifists’ I spoke to tended to criticise the 
organisational use o f suicide operations because they felt that these attacks negatively impacted the 
revolution and national struggle. However, suicide bombers tended to be consistently referred to as 
martyrs and respected for their willingness to sacrifice themselves for Palestinian liberation. In most 
cases interviewees justified the individual’s decision by placing the onus on the conditions o f  ‘Israeli 
occupation’. More details on the socio-cultural-religious moorings o f  the narrative o f  martyrdom and 
sacrifice are provided in Chapter IV and V  respectively.
115 Informal discussion with a group o f street level activists o f  various affiliations, Nablus, 19 January 
2005
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(i) Suicide Bombings as an Expression o f  Retaliation for Individual Bombers
Scott Atran describes how the genius of groups like Hamas lies in its ability to recruit 
and turn ordinary people into killing machines through training and processes of intense 
indoctrination often lasting eighteen months or more116. This statement seems to be 
supported by the fact that in the 1990s Hamas seemed to spend a much longer time 
recruiting and preparing its bombers, which in turn might also explain why suicide 
attacks were still relatively rare in comparison to other forms of armed attacks between 
1993 and 2000117. In this period, potential bombers were subjected to intense 
indoctrination and anti-Israeli propaganda. They also undertook religious training and 
went through a process of cleansing and spiritual purification118. The final steps before 
a mission generally involved the candidate leaving his home and family without a trace, 
and in this period of total segregation from society and his family, the bomber was once 
again exposed to intensive indoctrination and training which lasted for several days. It 
was in this period, that the bomber became acquainted with the operational details of 
his mission, including how to detonate the explosive device, before finally preparing 
his will and last testament in the form of a letter, audio tape or video cassette119.
However since the Al-Aqsa intifada, this is no longer seems to be an accurate 
representation of the phenomenon in the Palestinian scenario. Various sources now 
suggest that because volunteers are increasingly more common, active recruitment, 
indoctrination and training is becoming progressively unnecessary. As a direct result, 
indoctrination seems to be increasingly rare and training time is now also minimal, 
potentially concentrating only upon familiarising the candidate with the explosive 
devise and the mission’s details120. Christopher Reuter in his interview of an individual 
who was potentially a Hamas activist was told how: “nowadays (sic) it [the process 
behind suicide operations] all happens much faster. The more hopeless the situation 
becomes, and the larger the numbers of people who have gone before, the more quickly 
the next lot are ready”121. Nichole Argo’s data also seems to verify this change. Argo
116 Scott Atran, ‘Genesis’, opt, cit.
117 See for example, the Incidents Database, International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), 
opt, cit.
118 Asaf Moghadam, ‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism’, opt, cit. p. 84
119 Nasra Hassan, ‘An Arsenal o f  Believers: Talking to the ‘Human Bombs” , The New Yorker, 22 
November 2001, p. 38
120 Informal discussion with Hamas supporter (name withheld), Nablus, 16 January 2005. He explained 
that this assessment o f training sessions in the Al-Aqsa intifada was based upon his interactions and 
conversations with various Hamas members/activist in neighbouring refugee camps.
121 Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon, opt, cit.. p. 87; see also Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and 
Defusing die Human Bombs’ and ‘Human Bombs’, opt, cit.: Personal interviews with Yasser Ahmad
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who conducted interviews with fifteen pre-empted suicide bombers in Israeli prisons in 
2002, mentions how eight of the fifteen had volunteered for their missions. Most 
importantly, she points out that five of the fifteen began executing their missions within 
ten days of committing to the operations and ninety percent of them began within the
1 99month . Another identifiable shift is the increase in the number of family members 
who are aware and supportive of a bomber’s decision to participate in a suicide 
mission. A key example of this awareness and support is the videotape of a Hamas 
operative’s last will which shows him holding hands with his mother who is shown 
blessing him and wishing him success before he leaves for the attack123. Candidates 
also increasingly go to active members of their families to volunteer for operations. 
Two of the bombers that Argo interviewed also explained how they had had no prior 
involvement with the organisation they had conducted the operation for and were 
instead recruited specifically for their mission by family members. Hence a process that 
was originally initiated by Hamas in 1993 seems to have developed a momentum of its 
own by 2000.
Palestinian psychiatrist, Dr. Eyad Sarraj, believes that the motives behind suicide 
bombing tend to be rooted in personal trauma -  such as injury to a father or brother or 
the death of a friend or distant relative. He states that: “in every case of suicide 
bombing there is a personal tragedy or trauma [involved] ... the people doing the 
suicide bombings today are the children of the first intifada and they have witnessed or 
suffered personal trauma in one form or another”124. Argo ads that a bomber’s personal 
connections to persons killed or hurt might sometimes be distant, if  they existing at all, 
and for some bombers watching “the death of children from other villages or towns was 
... crucial to their mobilisation” 125. Given the unfortunate realities of the Israeli-
Shalabi, Associate Researcher, The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), Ramallah, 02 
January 2005 and Prof. Hisham A. Ahmad, Associate Professor at the Department o f Political Science, 
Birzeit University, in Ramallah, 30 December 2004.
122 Another Hamas supporter I spoke to in Nablus suggested that an additional reason behind this 
shortened time lapse between picking the bomber who would execute the mission and the mission itself 
might be a direct response to the harsh Israeli crackdown that began with the Al-Aqsa intifada.
123 Ira Sharkansky, Coping With Terror: An Israeli Perspective (Maryland and Oxford: Lexington Books, 
2003)
124 As quoted in Hisham H. Ahmad, ‘Palestinian Resistance and ‘Suicide Bombing’: Causes and 
Consequences’, in Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes o f  Terrorism: Proceedings from  an International 
Expert Meeting in Oslo, 9-11 June 2003 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute o f International Affairs, 2003), p. 
133
125 Mia Bloom, Dying to K ill opt, cit. p. 87. This difference between Sarraj and Argo might be based on 
the inherent differences that exist between a densely populated and pressured Gaza, where Sarraj is 
based, and the West Bank where the images from the north, especially Nablus and Jenin, have made a 
huge impact on the population.
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Palestinian conflict, a significant percentage of the Palestinian population is either 
directly related to, or knows someone who has been arrested hurt or killed by Israeli 
forces, and all Palestinians are familiar with the images of Israeli occupation and 
military action. This trauma combined with the pressure generated by the rapid Israeli 
military deployment post- Oslo, its shoot-to-kill policy, the constant curfews, targeted 
assassinations and the ever increasing number of settlements all seem to have further 
deepened the Palestinian community’s sense of victimization and exposure. 
Consequently, a significant number of those who are willing to participate in suicide 
missions, as either volunteers or recruits, are motivated by their desire to retaliate 
against an asymmetrically stronger enemy. Hamas’ instrumental goals have been 
directly benefited by channelising and responding to Palestinian society’s heightened 
sensibility of retaliation and revenge.
Closely meshed with, and underlying, the overarching theme of retaliation is the 
conscious attempt to equalize the pain and suffering on both sides of the conflict by 
establishing a ‘balance of terror’ or a ‘balance of suffering’. Suicide bombers believe 
that by inflicting terror on the Israeli state, their mission contributes towards 
establishing a more level playing field instead of the unequal one that exists while 
simultaneously proving the undefeated/undefeatable nature of the Palestinian cause. 
Bombers also recognise the instrumental value of their actions. All these themes are 
clearly evident in statements made by individual bombers, for example:
“I want the Jews to feel how we feel. If I wasn’t convinced that it 
would benefit us, Iwouldn 't do //” 126. (emphasis added)
“I know the bombing will hurt Israel and prove to them we are still 
ready to fight... someone told me the operation would be a benefit to 
the [refugee] camp, to create pressure on the Israelis in order they 
retreat from the territory...The most important thing was that we 
should make an operation in the heart of Israel after the [military] 
penetration in order to prove that we were not influenced by the 
military attack”127, (emphasis added)
126 Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs’, opt, cit. p . 12
127 Ibid. It must be noted that Argo states very clearly that this candidate was not recruited but had 
volunteered for the mission.
103
When Argo specifically asked a bomber what motivated him to become an istish ’had 
(martyr) he answered:
“It was after the istish’had of a friend, and of the shaheed (also a 
martyr, but a non-combatant, killed in this case by the Israeli forces) 
o f a baby, Iman Hagu. These two cases made me think human life is 
threatened every moment without good cause. Just because I ’m 
Palestinian, the missiles are falling everywhere without distinction 
between those who are soldiers, civilians, kids, adults” 128 (emphasis 
added)
This sense of outrage against Israeli policies and presence and concurrently the 
necessity for retaliation also comes across in last wills. For example, Mahmoud Ahmad 
Marmash, who carried out a suicide operation in May 2001 in Netenya killing five 
Israelis and injuring over 100, begins his last will and testament with the following 
lines:
“The Palestinian people are encountering the cruellest times, 
enduring daily killings, bombardment, displacement, and the most 
extreme forms o f violence. Everyday its suffering increases. A group 
must rise to sacrifice itself and strive in the path of God to defend its 
honour and its people”129, (emphasis added)
Similarly, Ismail Masawabi who killed two Israeli soldiers in a suicide operation states 
in his will:
“/  reject this terrible and dark situation which I  know and 
experience, and I have decided to become a shining light, 
illuminating the way for all Muslims ... Just standing there and 
watching our Muslim people being slaughtered [by the Israelis] and 
not taking any action to change the situation is a dirty game I  will 
not tolerate” 130 . (emphasis added)
128 Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs’, opt, cit. p . 11
129 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making o f  Palestinian Suicide Bombers 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute o f Peace, 2006), p. 48
130 Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon, opt .cit. p . 91
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It is interesting to note that while personal revenge may be a motivation it tends to be 
subsumed in most explanations under the rubric of retaliating against the enemy on 
behalf of the entire community. This is perhaps a direct consequence of the fact that at 
least the rhetoric of istish ’had requires the individual to be absolutely selfless and thus 
self-sacrifice must be in the name of God and not to fulfil individual desire. The reality 
however suggests that personal revenge and retaliation is definitely a powerful 
motivator and yet, while personal explanations exist, they tend to be mentioned briefly 
before the candidate reverts to justifying his/her decision on the basis of retaliating on 
behalf o f the entire community. The individual therefore aggregates personal 
motivations with those of the Palestinian collective and then retaliates (simultaneously 
on behalf of both and with full knowledge of the strategic imperatives) through the 
single act of a suicide attack131.
(ii) Suicide Bombings as an Expression o f  Survival fo r  Individual Bombers
As mentioned previously a survey of poll results suggests that public support is highest 
in times when the society is under extreme pressure and has little hope for peace or 
resolution of the conflict. These peaks in public opinion are matched by a 
corresponding rise in suicide attacks in the same periods indicating what is potentially a 
rise in volunteers for suicide missions during such periods. As such, it seems that 
individual self-sacrifice is also impelled by altruistic motives rather than by 
organisational pressure alone and represents the individual’s attempts to serve and 
defend their society when all other avenues seem to be closed. In other words, the 
bomber, as a highly integrated individual in Palestinian society, believes that his/her 
personal self-sacrifice furthers the possibility of his/her community’s survival in times 
of extreme pressure. This sense of commitment to the survival of the community comes 
across very clearly in the statements made by individual candidates. For example, the 
last will of Hamas operative Muhammad Hazza al-Ghoul stated:
“How beautiful for the splinters of my bones to be the response that 
blows up the enemy, not fo r  the love o f killing, but so we can live as 
other people /z've...We do not sing the song of death, but recite the
131 See for example Hisham H. Ahmed, ‘Palestinian Resistance and ‘Suicide Bombing’, opt, cit.
105
hymns of life... We die so that future generations might live 
(emphasis added)”132.
Similarly when Argo asked a bomber what the term istish *had (martyr) meant to him, 
he replied, “the istish ’had will sacrifice his life/or the community in order to please the 
will of God” 133 (emphasis added). Another bomber told her: “I believe that it would 
improve the situation o f  the Palestinian people in the future because the action would 
deter the Israelis from  [continuing to] commit crimes against us (emphasis added)”134. 
It is clear that the bombers believe that their self-sacrifice is a service to their 
community, and one which will ensure its survival and enable others to live in a better 
future. As such, the act of suicidal violence, as an act of extreme altruism, serves both 
expressive and instrumental purposes for the individual operative.
Such sentiments seem to be increasingly shared and supported by the bomber’s close 
friends and family135. The family also invokes the sense o f community service when 
speaking of the bomber’s deeds. The mother of Hanadi Jaradat, for example, stated 
“she has done what she has done, thank God, and I am sure what she has done is not a 
shameful thing, she has done it for the sake of her people” 136. Similarly Miriam Farhat, 
a nominated Hamas candidate and the mother of Mohammed, Rawad and Nidal, all 
Qassam Bridges operatives who have died fighting for the Palestinian cause, 
remembers how she cried when Mohammed read out his last will before leaving for his 
suicide mission. When her son saw her tears and laughingly threatened to pull out of 
the mission, she encouraged him to carry out the attack and “aim true”. She also 
remembers fearing that he would be arrested before “he was glorified with martyrdom” 
and describes herself as “his partner in jih a d ' 121.
The bomber also consciously uses his/her self-sacrifice to convey multiple messages to 
multiple audiences. For example, one of Argo’s interviewees stated how he believed
132 For the full text o f the will see Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, opt, cit.. p. 90
133Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs’, opt, cit. p . 11
134 Ibid.
135 An analysis o f available data suggests that at least some o f  parents are unhappy with their children’s 
choice to participate in a martyrdom operation. However, as Reuter points out, to not support their 
children’s decision would be a double betrayal -  o f  both the children as well as the community for which 
they sacrificed their lives. As such they remain silent or make a show o f pride and support. However, 
there are also those who wholeheartedly encourage and support the choice o f  martyrdom.
136 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, opt, cit. p. 49
137 Zaki Chehab, Inside Hamas: The Untold Story o f  Militants, Martyrs and Spies (London and New  
York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 86-87
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that “the operation would hurt the enemy ... [and how a] successful mission greatly 
influences society. It raises the morale of the people; they are happy, they feel 
strong” 138. This suggests that self-sacrifice is used to not only ensure the survival of the 
community but also of the struggle against the enemy by bolstering the community’s 
morale. Martyrdom is also a conscious decision adopted by some bombers in order to 
encourage fellow Palestinians to follow in their footsteps. When Nasra Hassan asked a 
bomber when and why he had taken the decision to volunteer for a martyrdom 
operation he replied:
“In the spring of 1993,1 began to pester our military leaders to let 
me do an operation.. .It was around the time of the Oslo accords, and 
it was quiet, too quiet. I  wanted to do an operation that would incite 
others to do the same (emphasis added). Finally, I was given the 
green light to leave Gaza for an operation inside Israel” 139.
Suicide operatives also wish to convey a message to the world and the Israeli state. For 
example, graduate student preparing for a suicide operation explained how: “At the 
moment of executing my mission, it will not be purely to kill Israelis. The killing is not 
my ultimate goal ... My act will carry a message beyond to those responsible and the 
world at large that the ugliest thing fo r a human being is to be forced to live without 
freedom (emphasis added)” 140. The operatives know that the short- term benefits of 
their sacrifice may be minimal but are still willing to volunteer for an operation in order 
to send a message to the world. For example, an operative Argo interviewed stated: 
“you cannot win by yourself, but your sacrifice will help show the world the true nature 
o f your sacrificial self and o f  your inhuman opponent (emphasis added)” 141.
The conscious step taken towards militarisation and radicalisation is sometimes also 
rooted in frustration with the peace process or moderate politics. Luca Ricolfi gives the 
example of an individual named Ali who was enlisted as a member of al-Fatah after 
personally witnessing Israeli soldiers killing a number of his friends and family 
members during the first intifada. However eventually, disenchanted with the lack of 
any real progress made by peace negotiations, he volunteered for a martyrdom
138 Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs’, opt, cit. p . 12
139 Nasra Hassan, as quoted in Kydd and Walter, ‘Sabotaging the Peace’, opt, cit. p . 263
140 Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill, opt cit. p . 90
141 Mia Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombers’, opt cit. p.74
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operation with the PIJ142. My own interviews143, as well as poll results, also point to a 
trend where individuals often shift from moderate organisations to those more willing 
to undertake suicide missions as a direct result of frustration with the peace process and 
despair with conditions of Israeli occupation.
It seems that another key audience for the bomber is that of the Palestinian political 
factions. The individual’s attitude towards suicide operations encourages hard-line 
groups such as Hamas to continue escalating the use of suicide operations as a policy of 
engagement and competition in order to constantly ‘live up’ to the expectations of their 
support base. In other words, the individual can force the Hamas to consistently prove 
its image of a party willing to ‘resist by all means’. At the same time, the individual’s 
willingness to shift political allegiances to parties which use suicide operations 
pressurises moderate political factions to adopt suicide operation or else risk losing 
popular support. Thus the individual’s attitude is a crucial determinant of the dialectic 
that exists between both levels of analysis.
(ii) Suicide Bombings as an Expression o f  Competition for Individual Bombers
Martyrdom has become a powerful source of honour in Palestinian society and one 
which is portrayed as such by both the organisational leaders as well as members of the 
society at large. Former Hamas leader and spokesperson in Gaza, Dr. Abdel Aziz 
Rantisi, for example, stated how “for Hamas and Palestinian society in general, 
becoming a martyr is amongst the highest, if not the highest, honour” 144. This stand 
seems to be verified by the overall attitude towards suicide operations and martyrs in 
Palestinian society. The glorification of the martyr has become almost ritualistic in 
Palestinian society. A martyr’s last will, often videotaped, is widely publicised, his 
parents are visited and the organisation he died in the name of often organises his 
funeral. Funerals are, in turn, becoming more and more like rallies and large-scale 
demonstrations. The martyr is remembered through posters, murals, photographs and 
plaques exhibited in public spaces. Generally, the martyr’s family also displays his 
photographs and last will in the main room of the house where guests are received. The 
martyr’s family is honoured and respected by not only the organisation but also by the
142 Luca Ricolfi, ‘Palestinians, 1981- 2003’ in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Making Sense o f  Suicide Missions 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)
143 See Appendix A for a list o f  ‘on-the-record’ interviews
144 Mia Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombers’, opt, cit. p. 74
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entire village/camp. It’s a social obligation, especially in smaller villages and camps, to 
visit and pay respect to a martyr’s family. Most members of Palestinian society 
consider it an honour to help a family whose house has been demolished by the Israelis 
as a punitive measure for producing a suicide operative145.
A direct result of this glorification appears to be a degree of competition amongst the 
increasing number of candidates willing to volunteer for suicide operations. In January 
2002, Reem Rayashi became Hamas’ first woman suicide bomber. Hamas candidate 
Miriam Farhat describes the response to Rayashi’s suicide:
“Hundreds of females came to me to complain about Reem being 
chosen ahead of them. They were very jealous about that. Many of 
the young girls descended on my house and begged to be given 
priority to follow Reem”146. (emphasis added)
Another Hamas volunteer, Salim speaking to Zaki Chehab, described how “martyrdom 
is like a dream” and how when he failed in accomplishing his mission he “broke (sic) 
down in tears”. Chehab writes how Salim’s anguish was further compounded when he 
discovered that one of his comrades had successfully completed his mission and was 
honoured with martyrdom147. A Hamas supporter I spoke to in Nablus also mentioned 
how he would be shamed if his friend was chosen for a suicide operation instead of 
him148.
Overall this seems to suggest that suicide bombers are regarded, at least by a section of 
Palestinian society, as a positive source of inspiration. Surprisingly those with close
145 See for example: Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon, opt, cit.: Luca Ricolfi, ‘Palestinians’, opt, 
cit.: Personal interviews with Anat Kurz, Jaffee Centre o f Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 27 
December 2004; Hisham A. Ahmad, Associate Professor at the Department o f  Political Science, Birzeit 
University, in Ramallah, 30 December 2004; Amira Hass, Ramallah, 01 January 2005; Yasser Ahmad 
Shalabi, Associate Researcher, The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), Ramallah, 02 
January 2005;
146 Zaki Chehab, Inside Hamas, opt, cit. p. 88
147 Ibid. pp. 91-93
148 Informal discussion with Hamas supporter (name withheld), Nablus, 16 January 2005. It must be 
noted that he had never volunteered for an operation. He also explained how someone he knew had 
volunteered for a mission but had been rejected because he did not have a criminal record. According to 
him this meant that Hamas could use him for other military activities or even other aspects o f a suicide 
operation without attracting too much attention from the authorities. However he then almost 
immediately contradicted himself by stating how this individual would be an ideal bombing candidate as 
he in the absence o f a police record he could penetrate far into Israeli territory without being recognised. 
This is why, he continued to explain, he himself was also a good candidate for a suicide bombing.
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links to suicide bombers seem to also see the act in a positive light. Neda Taweel, the 
sister of the bomber Diya Taweel, for example believes that “it must be a great feeling 
to be able to do that [participate in a suicide operation]” 149. Others stated how “how 
anyone with honour would choose the path of martyrdom” 150. Luca Ricolfi’s analysis 
determines that suicide operatives seem to originate from a very small number of places 
in WBG. A majority of suicide operatives come from the refugee camps surrounding 
Hebron, Nablus and Jenin. According to Ricolfi, this ‘clustering’ shows that emulation 
plays an important role in promulgating martyrdom in Palestinian society.
Edward Said, in his book End o f the Peace Process, explained how the failure of the 
Oslo peace process and resulting closure of the territories shrunk Palestinian reality to a 
minimum151. There is no doubt that Israeli policies are placing the territories under 
tremendous pressure and this might explain why more and more people are willing to 
emulate suicide bombers. Ricolfi believes that in this contracting reality, where social 
life is frozen and normal careers no longer exist, the resistance movement has become 
the only real social system and as such the only available careers are now inevitably 
linked to the resistance. Among these ‘careers’ then, the highest position is that of the 
martyr since it confers upon the candidate eternal prestige, honour and glory152. That 
Palestinian society is following such a path seems most evident in the statements made 
by youngsters and school children. In conditions of protracted conflict even they seem 
to realise that their deaths might amount to more than their lives: children as young as 
four years old want to ‘grow up to be martyrs’153. In an interview, some school 
children said: “we know it’s a bad idea to run at heavily armed people with stones. But 
we can’t stop it. As a living person here, you’re nothing. As a dead person you become 
a hero, at least for a moment” 154.
Another key reason for martyrdom operations becoming increasingly competitive may 
be the cash compensation received by the martyr’s family both from the group which 
organised the mission and, until he was overthrown in 2003, from representatives of the 
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Various sources point out that Iraq began compensating
149 Hisham H. Ahmed, ‘Palestinian Resistance and ‘Suicide Bombing’, opt, cit. p . 126
150 Informal discussions with students and members o f youth movements (Hamas and Fatah) in Nablus, 
Birzeit and Bethlehem.
151 Edward Said, The End o f  the Peace Process : Oslo and After (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000)
152 Luca Ricolfi, ‘Palestinians’, opt, cit.
153 Informal discussion with Abu Ali, Ramallah, 01 January 2005
154 Christopher Reuter, M y Life is a Weapon, opt, cit.. p. 108
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the families of Palestinian martyrs in 2000. Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova 
speculate if the sharp rise in suicide operations in March 2002 is linked to the increase 
in Iraqi compensation from $10,000 to $25,000 between February and March 2002155. 
Israel appeared to counter this incentive almost immediately by implementing a policy 
of inflicting heavy punitive measures on the bomber’s family after his/her operation. 
Thus from July 2002, Israel began to systematically destroy the family homes of 
Palestinian martyrs. However, in the absence of solid econometric evidence these 
connections remain unverifiable to a large extent156.
What is obvious then is that martyrdom and suicide operations have been normalised in 
Palestinian society. Reuter, amongst others, describes how school children discuss and 
fantasize about martyrdom operations they will grow up to participate in. Sarraj 
explains how children now ‘play martyr’ in the streets. A young boy who spoke to 
Reuter described the details of the banquet that would be thrown in his honour after his 
martyrdom and hoped that would be lots of chocolate cake with coconut flakes which 
was his favourite desert. His headmaster states: “I don’t know [what will become of 
him]. It doesn’t make any difference to him anymore whether he is shot dead while 
throwing stones or blows himself up” 157.
IV. Conclusion
What is evident is that the dialectic between the individual and the organisation plays a 
crucial role in propelling the use of suicide operations within the Palestinian context. 
Suicide operations become the converging point of both instrumental and expressive 
violence, for both Hamas and its operatives. Hamas leader Abu Shanab explained the 
organisation’s logic behind the resort to suicide attacks after September 2000:
“I want to emphasise that at the beginning of the Al-Aqsa intifada, we in 
Hamas did not commit any acts of violence. Nothing. Israel, however, 
killed scores of Palestinian civilians. The Palestinian street began to 
criticise us, even people in the PA began to criticise us. What is the 
philosophy of resistance? To inflict losses upon the enemy. We have no
155 Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, ‘Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism’, opt, cit.
156 See also: Luca Ricolfi, ‘Palestinians’, opt, cit.: Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity and 
Terrorism in the Service o f  Jihad (New Haven and London: Yale University Press in association with 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006)
157 Christopher Reuter, M y Life is a Weapon, opt, cit. p . 108
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way to defend ourselves. We can only put pressure on Israel, and make 
clear that “if you do not withdraw, then we will be able to cause death 
and destruction on your side”. The Palestinians turned from a cat into a 
tiger, because they put us in a cage with no chance to move.158
This statement demonstrates that the opinion of the common Palestinian is key to the way
Hamas operates: “because ‘Hamas will never act against the Palestinian street”.159 In 2003
an Israeli security official stated that:
“Hamas always seeks to be part of the Palestinian consensus and
operates within it. We see this in the suicide operations. If the
grassroots want operations, they will go for big attacks, because they 
do not want to lose support”.160
Hence Hamas’ consistently shifting attitude towards violence and its strategic use of 
suicide operations can be seen as intricately linked to broader popular attitudes. In fact, in 
times of open conflict, the Palestinian street tends to support Hamas, as opposed to a 
pacifict PA, primarily for its ability to strike back at the Israelis. As Ismail Habbash, a 
film-maker from Ramallah says:
“I can’t even get from Ramallah to Birzeit University because of the 
Israeli roadblocks, but Hamas can get to the very heart of Tel Aviv.
In the eyes of very many people, they are taking revenge upon those 
who prevented me from reaching Birzeit, and this only enhances 
their stature”.161
The way that Hamas used suicide bombings against Israeli civilian targets, initially in 
1994 and with increasing frequency during 1995 and 1996, is illustrative. It has been 
suggested that the use of suicide bombings in this period reflected Hamas’ judgment that 
Palestinian public opinion would tolerate them. “The assessment initially appeared correct,
158 Interview with Abu Shanab, 5 August 2003. As quoted in the ICG Middle East Report No. 21, 
Dealing with Hamas, opt, cit.
159 ICG interview with former Israeli security official. December 2003. See: ICG Middle East Report 
N°21, Dealing with Hamas, opt .cit.
160 ICG interview, former senior Israeli intelligence official, Ramat Gan, 5 November 2003. See: ICG 
Middle East Report N°21, Dealing with Hamas, opt .cit.
161 ICG interview, Ismail Habbash, Palestinian film maker, Ramallah, 4 December 2003. See: ICG 
Middle East Report N°21, Dealing with Hamas, opt, cit.
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but the movement badly miscalculated in thinking that it could cripple both the Oslo 
process and the PA by consistently escalating. Hamas, like other Palestinian opposition 
movements, was also initially hesitant to jump into the second intifada, which it feared 
was merely a temporary tactical ploy by the PA to extract Israeli concessions. It was only 
after the Islamists were persuaded that the uprising had sufficient autonomy and popular 
support that, as in 1987-1988, they committed their forces. By mid 2001, they were 
increasingly setting the pace, in no small part because they carried the conflict into Israel 
by resorting, with increasing frequency, to horrendous suicide attacks. Since September 
2000, there has been a consistent pattern of suicide attacks after high-profile Israeli 
assassinations”162.
In turn, there has been a shift in the Palestinian public with an increasing number of 
individuals volunteering to participate in suicide operations and, most importantly, 
becoming increasingly loosely affiliated with specific organisations, choosing instead 
to use any group willing to provide them with the infrastructure and logistics to conduct 
an operation. This seems to suggest that not only has suicide bombing been fully 
instrumentalised by Hamas, but also that it has been internalised to a considerable degree 
by a significant proportion of the Palestinian population. In turn, this hints at its 
emergence as a fully developed norm -  an aspect that will be addressed in the following 
chapter. Overall the result is the generation of an arena of political competition in a 
quasi-govemment and proto-state setting with suicide attacks serving the purpose of 
delineating organisational capacity and individual space. In other words, the 
instrumental and expressive use of martyrdom in its newest avatar, in this setting 
enables Hamas and its operatives to utilise suicide bombings as mechanisms to ensure 
survival, competition and retaliation.
162 ICG Middle East Report No. 21 (26 January 2004), Dealing With Hamas, opt, cit.
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Chapter IV: Identity, Power and the Palestinian Norm of 
Militant Heroic Martyrdom
“When the blood o f martyrs irrigates 
the land then roses appear ” 
-Hamas song1
Parti
I. Introduction
The last chapter located the instrumental and expressive rationality of suicidal violence in 
order to explain why it is adopted as a form of protest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
This chapter constructs the second pillar of the proposed theoretical framework of analysis 
by locating how a culturally specific concept of self-sacrifice and martyrdom was 
appropriated and re-articulated as suicide bombings by Hamas. In other words, this chapter 
seeks to explain how suicidal violence emerged within the Israeli-Palestinian landscape of 
conflict and thus endeavours to account for the specific ‘box’ of Palestinian social reality in 
which such attacks operate.
This chapter begins by identifying Palestinian nationalism as the vital determinant in the 
emergence of suicidal violence in this setting. To this end the first part of this chapter 
outlines the evolution of Palestinian nationalism over the course of the twentieth century 
and locates certain re-occurring key themes in the construction of Palestinian national 
identity which include: humiliation, dispossession, suffering, sacrifice and most 
significantly for this analysis, martyrdom. This account of Palestinian socio-political reality 
in the longue duree enables one to locate the trajectory of protest and violence in the 
Israeli-Palestinian interaction over the past fifty years in direct relation to the crystallisation 
of Palestinian nationalism and national identity. Further, it enables one to locate ‘identity 
politics’ and the ‘notion of the other’ as crucial elements in facilitating what this work
1 As quoted in Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs Square: A Journey into the World 
o f the Suicide Bomber (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 92
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identifies as the historically developed ‘norm of militant heroic martyrdom’. This 
contextualisation ensures that multiple factors that would otherwise be ignored are taken 
into consideration in attempting to formulate a deeper understanding of how suicidal 
violence emerged in the early 1990s and was adopted as a powerful form of protest and 
engagement by the start of the Al-Aqsa intifada. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to 
demonstrating how Palestinian identity is historically rooted in a cyclical active-passive 
dichotomy of armed struggle/militant heroic martyrdom and suffering/sacrifice. In this 
section, Hamas is identified as appropriating and re-Islamising the pre-existing, culturally 
entrenched norm of militant heroic martyrdom (also referred to as MHM) before re- 
articulating it as suicidal violence at a specific point within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
The broad background assumptions of this chapter are therefore rooted in a constructivist 
understanding which stresses the importance of specific social context.
This background and contextualisation once again facilitates an understanding of suicidal 
violence on both the organisational and individual levels of analysis and allows one to 
comprehend how the act of suicide bombing serves multiple functions for different levels in 
Palestinian society. Overall then this work asserts that the adoption and support of suicide 
bombings may be understood as the assertion of power in a situation of powerlessness as 
well as the assertion of a new more proactive Palestinian identity. This assertion of power 
and identity operates simultaneously on three different levels, i.e. at the level of the 
organisation (i.e. Hamas), that of the individual bomber and finally at the level of the 
Palestinian society. These three levels also appear to constantly interact and influence each 
other’s behaviour and expectations. For example, the increasing support for suicidal 
violence in Palestinian society may serve to explain why suicide bombings were adopted as 
a strategy by secular Fatah and even the left-wing PFLP and thereby enable one to argue for 
the existence of what may be identified as a norm o f militant heroic martyrdom (with 
suicide bombing being articulated by Hamas as its most recent expression).
This work also notes how suicide bombings are used as a mechanism to delineate both 
organisational and individual space within the Palestinian socio-political setting. Therefore 
suicidal violence is identified as a mechanism whereby the organisations/individuals can 
not only stand apart from the society as proactive and powerful actors but also 
simultaneously a mechanism utilised, by both levels, to reintegrate with Palestinian society
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and identify with its grievances. This work asserts that the success and survival of both 
levels is based upon the sustainable ability to assert an identity distinct from the rest of 
Palestinian society as well as the ability to simultaneously affiliate and identify with the 
same society. Hence it is essential that both the organisation and the individual be 
consistently perceived to be representative of broader societal sentiments and also be 
perceived as furthering a common cause - in this case articulated as removing ‘Israeli 
occupation’ and establishing an independent Palestinian state.
n. Social Constructivism
While constructivism is of considerable importance in the field of International Relations 
(henceforth IR) and IR theory it is rather difficult to pin down. A key reason for this is the 
range of distinct varieties of scholarship that may be categorised as part of the 
‘constructivist turn’ in IR. A significant section of this scholarship attempts to locate 
constructivism in the broader landscape of theoretical engagement in IR. Thus scholars 
such as Richard Price, Christian Reus-Smit, Peter Katzenstein, Robert Keohane and John 
Ruggie see in the development of constructivism a challenge to the dominance of neo­
realism and neo-liberal institutionalism, and they locate the central debate in IR as ongoing 
(or emerging) between the rationalists on the one hand, and the constructivists on the 
other2. Others such as Emanuel Adler, see constructivism instead as occupying the ‘middle 
ground’ between the traditional rationalist approaches which subscribe to the tenets of 
positivism and other more radical approaches to studying the international system . The 
study is further complicated by a host of other categorisations and foci. Scholars studying 
international phenomenon in the constructivist vein tend to focus on a wide variety of 
issues, ranging from security communities to political economy to the culture and 
construction of national interest4. Additionally they also focus on and use concepts that are
2 See for example: Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory 
and Constructivism’, European Journal o f International Relations, Vol. 4 (1998); Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert 
O. Keohane and Stephen Krasner, ‘International Organization and the Study o f World Politics’, International 
Organization, Vol. 52 (1998); John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International 
Institutionalization (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).
3 See Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European Journal o f  
International Relations, Vol. 3 (1997).
4 See for example: Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Martha Finnemore, National Interest and 
International Society (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996); Audie Klotz, Norms in 
International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1995);
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equally varied. For example, while some constructivists investigate the significance of 
norms and rules for the construction of reality, others choose to focus in on identity and 
inter-subjective practices.5 This complexity has led some writers to suggest that 
constructivism may be no more than a general rubric under which a range of approaches are 
subsumed and a spectrum of topics studied6. It is also this very diversity which is identified 
by the critics of constructivism as problematic. Combined with what critics see as 
constructivism’s inability to apply either its conceptual or methodological apparatus to 
successful empirical analysis and, related to this, its failure to advance a comprehensive 
alternative research programme, this complexity merely serves to accentuate the scepticism 
about constructivist thought in mainstream IR circles .
Maya Zehfuss’ states: “Although constructivism has been defined, explained, assessed and
• • R •positioned there is as yet little agreement about what it is” . But such scepticism is both 
misplaced and misleading. While it is true that the scholars who purport to work in a 
constructivist vein concentrate on a wide range of concepts and issues, to believe that this 
variety necessarily translates into the absence of any common ground would be wrong. In 
fact understanding the constructivists as second generation critical theorists enables one to 
categorise them epistemologically, methodologically, ontologically and normatively9:
“Epistemologically, critical theorists question positivist approaches to 
knowledge, criticizing attempts to formulate objective, empirically
Kurt Burch and Robert A. Denemark (eds.), Constitution International Political Economy (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997)
5 See for example: Fredrich V. Kratochwil, Rules Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions o f Practical and 
Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, (Cambridge University Press, 1989); 
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f  International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999);
6 See for example: Maya Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics o f  Reality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 ), p. 7.
7 Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise o f Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International Security, Vol. 
23 (1998), p. 171; Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory After the Cold War’, 
Working Paper 1996/4 (Canberra, Australia: Department o f International Relations, Research School o f  
Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, August 1996).
8 Maya Zehfuss, Constructivism in International Relations, opt, cit.. p. 6.
9 See: Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Constructivist Turn: Critical Theory After the Cold War’ Working Paper 
1996/4 (Canberra, Australia: Department o f International Relations, Research School o f Pacific and Asian 
Studies, Australian National University, August 1996); Ted Hopf, ‘The Promise o f Constructivism’, opt, cit.: 
Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Dangerous Liaisons?’, opt, cit.: Mark Hoffman, ‘Restructuring, 
Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation: Four Voices in Critical International Theory’, Millennium 
Journal o f International Studies, Vol. 20 (1991); Yosef Lapid, ‘The Third Debate: On the Prospects on 
International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33 (1989).
117
verifiable truth statements about the natural and social world. 
Methodologically, they reject the hegemony of a single scientific 
method, advocating a plurality of approaches to the generation of 
knowledge while highlighting the importance of interpretative strategies. 
Ontologically, they challenge rationalist conceptions of human nature 
and action, stressing instead the social construction of interests and 
actions. And normatively they condemn value neutral theorizing, 
denying its very possibility, and calling for the development of theories 
explicitly committed to the exposure and dissolution of structures of 
domination”10.
Consequently one can identify three core ontological propositions in constructivist writing. 
The first of these “asserts the importance of normative or ideational structures as well as 
material structures; [the second]...asserts that identities constitute interests and actions; 
[and the third] ...ontological proposition claims that agents and structures are mutually 
constituted”11. This thesis shares these three core ontological propositions about social life 
and uses them as its broad background assumptions while seeking to construct an 
understanding of suicide bombings in the Palestinian context. In other words, this work 
regards constructivism as a ‘meta-theoretical commitment’ and as such asserts the 
importance of defining and constructing the nature of social reality.
III. Definitions
Having established the importance of social reality one can specifically draw attention to 
Palestinian nationalism and the struggle against the Israeli state as the most significant and 
sustained reality within the occupied territories. Within this ‘box’ of the Palestinian 
national struggle, three ideational forces are seen to play a key role, i.e. identity, the notion 
of the other and the concept of norms. Before proceeding any further however it is
10 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Dangerous Liaisons?’, opt, c it . , p. 261. See also: Christian Reus- 
Smit, ‘The Constructivist Turn’, opt, cit.: Mark Hoffman, ‘Restructuring, Reconstruction, Reinscription, 
Rearticulation’, opt, cit.: Yosef Lapid, ‘The Third Debate’, opt, cit.
11 Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, ‘Dangerous Liaisons?’, opt, cit.. p. 266-67.
See also: Emanuel Adler, ‘Seizing the Middle Ground’, opt, cit.: Mark Hoffman, ‘Restructuring, 
Reconstruction, Reinscription, Rearticulation’, opt, cit.: Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International 
Politics and ‘Anarchy is what States Make o f it: The Social Construction o f Power Politics’, International 
Organization Vol. 46 (1992).
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necessary to delineate what each of these terms denotes and thereby establish the 
parameters of analysis.
While it is beyond the scope of this work to address theories of nationalism in any great
1 ^
length certain definitional parameters need to be established . First, this thesis uses Antony 
Smith’s definition of ‘nations and ‘national identities” , i.e. “a named human population 
sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, 
a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”13. This 
definition stresses the importance of the longue duree in studying the formation of nations 
while also throwing light upon the constructed nature of nations and nationalism. Hence, 
“the nation that emerges in the modem era must be regarded as both construct and 
process”14. Second, ‘national movements’ are identified as an extension of the politicised 
dynamic nation and therefore understood as the phenomenon of a nation mobilised. In other 
words, a national movement may be seen as a protest community that seeks statehood for 
the nation it represents15. In turn ‘nationalism’ is not identified as a latent force that 
spontaneously and unpredictably manifests itself under only extraordinary circumstances 
and situations of pressure. Instead this work, in line with Umut Ozkirimli’s study, endorses 
a very broad definition of nationalism which enables it to circumvent ‘terminological 
chaos’16 caused, for example, by making distinctions between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
nationalisms. Endorsing this broad theoretical framework, one may define nationalism as a 
discourse that consistently shapes the consciousness of a nation and thus determines how
12 For a comprehensive overview of current debates on nationalism see Umut Ozkirimli, Theories o f  
Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2000). For further reading by some key 
writers on nationalism see amongst others: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origins and Spread o f Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991, 2nd edition); John A. Armstrong, Nations Before 
Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1982); Homi K. Bhaba, Nations and Narration 
(London: Routledge, 1990); Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (New Delhi 
and Newbury Park: Sage, 1991); Ernest Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) and 
Culture, Identity and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Antony D. Smith, National 
Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991); and Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: 
Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)
13 Antony D. Smith, National Identity, opt, cit.. p. 14
14 Anthony D. Smith, ‘The Origins o f Nations’, Ethnic and Religious Studies Vol. 12, No. 3 (July 1989). See 
also his book The Ethnic Origins o f  Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986)
15 There is debate whether only full statehood engenders political sovereignty or if  there are exceptions. 
Ernest Gellner suggests the former in Nations and Nationalisms (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) while David 
Miller is a proponent o f the latter as evidenced in On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
This thesis aligns itself with Miller’s views.
16 Walker Conner, Ethnonationalism: The Quest fo r  Understanding, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1994)
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that nation constitutes the meaning of the world . Nationalism determines the collective 
identity of a people by “producing and reproducing them as nationals. It is a form of seeing
1 ftand interpreting that conditions a people’s (sic) daily speech, behaviours and attitudes” . 
Nationalism is thus a real political force that serves to construct nations and identities19.
The constructivist conceptualisation of actor identity is that it is not pre-given but 
developed, sustained or transformed in processes of interaction . The term itself originates 
in social psychology and refers to “images of individuality and distinctiveness (‘selfhood’) 
held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with 
significant ‘others’. Thus the term (by convention) references mutually constructed and 
evolving images of self and other”21. Within international relations, nations are seen to 
construct and project collective identities. Identities have two basic forms, i.e. they can be 
“intrinsic to an actor (at least relative to a given social structure) and/or (sic) relationally 
defined within a social structure”22. Identities that are intrinsic to an actor are constituted 
exogenously to interaction even though they can be transformed, developed or sustained by 
the process of interaction. However identities that are relationally defined (also referred to 
as ‘roles’) are specifically constituted by interaction . What is key is that identity is a 
prescriptive representation of actors themselves as well as an account of their relationships
17 See Etienne Balibar, ‘The Nation Form: History and Ideology’, New Left Review 13.3 (1990), Michael 
Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995); Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and 
the National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) and ‘Myths and Misconceptions in the Study o f Nationalism’ in J.A. Hall (ed.), The State o f the Nation: 
Ernest Gellner and the Theory o f Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
18 Umut Ozkirimli, Theories o f Nationalism, opt, cit.. p. 4. See also Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, opt. 
cit.
19 See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, opt, cit: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, opt, cit: 
and Eric Hobsbawm in Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), The Invention o f Tradition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
20 See Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what States Make o f it’, opt, cit.. p. 391-425; ‘Collective Identity 
Formation and the International State’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 (1994), p. 384- 
396; ‘Identity and Structural Change in International Politics’, in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil 
(eds.), Return o f Culture and Identity in IR Theory (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996); 
Social Theory o f International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
21 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity and Culture in National 
Security’, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture o f National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 59.
22 Ibid. p. 59
23 Ibid. p. 59. “Being democratic, for example, is an intrinsic feature o f the U.S. state relative to the structure 
of the international system. Being sovereign is a relational identity that exists only by virtue o f intersubjective 
relationships at the systemic level”.
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with each other. As such identity serves to regulate actor behaviour, motivation and 
character24.
Actors can share identities and form collectives or groups -  as seen with nations. However, 
it has also been noted in various studies that shared identities do not necessarily engender a 
structure of peace and cooperation (as opposed to conflict) . This potential for divergence 
is crucial for comprehending the existence of competition and conflict within given identity 
groups -  in our case this would refer to clashes between various Palestinian political 
groups. Additionally, the existence of a shared identity implicitly points to the existence of 
others or outsiders.
In direct relation to the concept of ‘negative others’, social scientists have stressed that an 
important relationship exists between identity and the construction of threats. While this is 
not to say that those with a shared identity will either define threats in the same way, treat 
given others outside the group as threats or concur on the means to confront the threat, this 
does suggest that those with a shared identity are more likely to “generate a shared 
definition of the threat”26. The fact that there are such differences within shared identities 
not only implicitly points towards conflicts within given identity groups, as has already 
been mentioned above, but also towards the existence of levels of identities, with multiple 
processes of interaction between various levels27. Thus the logic of threat construction can 
be extended to suggest that when a shared identity is confronted with a threat, it (the threat) 
often represents an external pressure which can serve to unify the group under the rubric of 
its overarching collective identity by silencing to a significant degree alternative 
perceptions and internal strife between levels. This logic of unification under external 
pressure is further exaggerated under conditions of high politico-military shock and stress.
24 Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, ‘Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise’, in Peter 
Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture o f National Security, opt, cit.. pp. 452-3; Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f  
International Politics, opt, cit.. p. 224
25 Michael N. Barnett, ‘Identity and Alliance in the Middle East’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture o f  
National Security, opt, cit.. p. 408. See also Anton Blok’s treatment o f the ‘Narcissism o f Minor Differences’ 
in Honour and Violence (Oxford and Malden, MA: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 
2001)
26 Ibid. p. 408
27 In our case, the overarching collective identity would be that o f ‘Palestinianism’, i.e. o f being Palestinian. 
However, within this overarching collective, multiple levels o f identities would co-exist and interact. For 
example: the identity based in belonging to the West Bank instead o f Gaza; the city instead o f a refugee camp; 
of being Muslim; a Hamas supporter and so on.
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This is however not to suggest in any way that external pressure causes levels of identity to 
collapse or coalesce. In other words, while external pressure can cause broad unification of 
the collective identity, it does not necessarily completely subsume conflict and competition 
between levels of identities within the broad collective .
The external pressure or ‘threat’ discussed above can alternatively be identified as ‘the 
other’ (albeit the negative other). The notion of the other is of considerable significance 
because it plays a decisive functional role in the evolution of identity. In other words, 
identity is often defined, at least partially, on the basis of what it is not. Such 
juxtapositioning serves to facilitate cohesiveness for the identity group29. Others can be 
represented not only by external antagonists but also by culturally, ethnically and 
religiously peripheral minorities. Hence the other does not necessarily have to be located 
spatially outside but can be also be an “internal other” or even a past version of oneself30. 
This ties into the logic of competition and conflict between different levels within a given 
identity group. However, for the purpose of our analysis it seems that the Israeli state (and 
before that the Zionist presence in Mandate Palestine) represents the most sustained threat 
to the Palestinian collective and thereby influences the evolution of Palestinian national 
identity. The state of Israel as an external antagonist is both militarily much stronger and 
also located in close physical proximity.
This work does not study identity in abstract. Instead identity is seen as being defined and 
asserted by the adoption of value positions that in turn impact normative behaviour. This 
brings us to the concept of norms which can be defined as describing “collective 
expectations for proper behaviour of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms 
operate like rules that define the identity of an actor with this having ‘constitutive effects’ 
that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognise a particular identity. In 
other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already 
defined identity. In such instances norms have ‘regulative’ effects that specify standards of
28 Again in our case while external pressure (represented by the threat o f the Israeli state) can facilitate the 
unification o f Palestinians as a collective it cannot fully subsume competition between Hamas and Fatah 
factions within this collective.
29 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The Other in European Self-definition’, Review o f International 
Studies, Vol. 17, No.4 (1991), p. 329. See also Iver B. Neumann, ‘Self and Other in International Relations’, 
European Journal o f International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1996), pp. 139-174
30 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, ‘The Other in European Self-definition’, opt, cit.. p. 330.
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proper behaviour. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or 
regulate) behaviour, or they do both”.31 Norms can also be evaluative, in that they place 
emphasis upon questions of morality, or practical, in that they focus on “commonly 
accepted notions o f ‘best solutions’ for any given situation” 32.
This chapter identifies martyrdom as a norm in Palestinian society which manifests itself in 
myriad ways, including as suicide missions. However, and most importantly, it must be 
stressed that because martyrdom operates simultaneously as a constitutive and regulatory 
(also known as prescriptive33 or behavioural34), it wields enormous power in the 
development and transformation of Palestinian social reality35. Its strength as a norm can 
also be illustrated by the high levels of agreement that it commands despite vigorous
■ jr
internal debate on the efficacy and correctness of suicide bombings . In other words, as a 
norm it possesses both instrumental power and agency. However, the mere existence of 
norms does not generate compliance and new or emerging norms have to perforce compete 
with existing ones37. I argue that this element of competition might also explain the 
construction of elaborate language justifying and linking suicide missions to more
- j o
traditional conceptions of militant heroic martyrdom in Palestinian society . This ties in 
with the idea that norms are built upon and transformed rather than created as they are 
rooted in pre-existing cultural39 knowledge, institutions and memory40. Furthermore,
31 Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture o f National Security, opt, cit.. pp. 5, 54
32 Ibid. p. 5
33 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, 
International Organization, Vol.52, No. 4 (1998), p. 891.
34 Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, ‘Norms, Identity, and Their Limits’, opt, cit.. p. 453
35 This is in line with the view that norms can be placed on a continuum o f strength, running between weak 
and strong, in terms o f their casual effects. See Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, 
‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’, opt, cit.. p. 55
36 On empirical issues o f how many actors must share an assessment before it qualifies as a norm see the 
concept o f ‘life-cycles’ o f  norms in Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics 
and Political Change’, opt, cit.
37 Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National 
Security’, opt, cit.. p. 56
38 This is in line with Finnemore and Sikkink who state that: “because norms by definition embody a quality 
o f ‘oughtness’ and shared moral assessment, norms prompt justification for action and leave an extensive trail 
o f communication among actors we can study”. This justification o f action also enables us to identify a norm 
when we see one.
39 This work uses culture as a broad label to denote collective models o f national identity carried by custom or 
law. “Culture refers to both a set o f evaluative standards (such as norms and values) and a set o f cognitive 
standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they operate, and 
how they relate to one another”. Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction’ in Culture o f  National Security, opt, cit.. 
p. 6. See also: Dominique Jacquin-Berdal, Andrew Oros and Marco Verweij, Culture in World Politics 
(Basingstoke, Macmillan Press, Ltd. 1998)
123
because norms interact with constantly developing identities they can either be 
strengthened or weakened in the process; as such strong norms can ‘solidify’ while weak 
norms can either ‘fade’ away, both potentially also transforming to suit newer situations 
and identities41.
A final crucial point that must be made regarding norms is that often a given actor complies 
with a norm in order to demonstrate his/her adaptation to the social environment to which 
the he/she belongs. Thus norm compliance reinforces identity and generates a community 
by fulfilling the actor’s psychological need to be part of a broader group. As such norm 
compliance ties in closely with ideas of legitimacy, conformity and esteem. Actors can thus 
sometimes conform with certain norms because they “want others to think well of them and 
they want to think well of themselves” and this imparts both legitimacy and strengthens 
identification with a specific group. Also because identity is based, at least partially, on 
aspects of the self “from which an individual gains self-esteem” the “desire to gain, or 
defend, one’s esteem”, i.e. the desire to delineate identity, can explain norm compliance; 
where the failure to do so can lead to a loss of esteem and legitimacy42.
Given these parameters the following section provides a brief historical narrative of 
Palestinian nationalism and locates MHM as a key component in the construction, 
definition and assertion of Palestinian national identity. MHM is identified as a constitutive 
and regulatory norm that has existed in Palestinian cultural memory, knowledge and 
practice since at least the early twentieth century. In other words, historically establishing 
MHM as the standard of proper behaviour under conditions of high stress enables this work 
to identity the act of martyrdom as one which conveys a very specifically proactive
40 Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, ‘Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise’, opt, cit.. pp. 
469, propose that norms are built rather than created. My own research, as well as other writing in sociology, 
suggests that norms are also transformed over time and space by processes o f interaction with both the 
structure and other agents. See also Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics 
and Political Change’, opt, cit.. for a discussion o f the role o f  ‘norm entrepreneurs’ and ‘organisational 
platforms’ in the origins and emergence o f norms.
41 For a discussion o f ‘solidifying’ and ‘fading’ norms see: Martha Finnemore, ‘Constructing Norms o f  
Humanitarian Intervention’, and Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, ‘Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A 
Theoretical Reprise’, both in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture o f National Security, opt, cit.
42 See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, opt, cit.. 
and Michael N. Barnett, ‘Identity and Alliance in the Middle East’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture o f  
National Security, opt, cit.
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Palestinian identity to relevant others. Relevant others in this case are represented by both 
the Israeli state as well we other (passive) members of the Palestinian collective.
Part II of this chapter is dedicated to illustrating dedicated to illustrating how Hamas 
transformed the historically and culturally entrenched norm of MHM into suicidal violence 
in 1993. This section demonstrates how the norm of MHM was successfully appropriated 
and rearticulated by Hamas to suit a new situation and also renew a proactive Palestinian 
identity. This part of the chapter also demonstrates how the assertion of this more proactive 
identity is in fact an assertion of power and is closely tied into issues of legitimacy and 
esteem in Palestinian society. In short, the chapter will reveals that while suicidal violence 
in the Palestinian territories is rooted in ideational factors, changing material structures 
have also impacted its evolution and implementation. Thus, martyrdom has come to be 
fully constructed and operationalised in the conflict against the negative other, i.e. the 
Israeli state and people.
IV. Locating the Role of Militarised Martyrdom in the Construction of Palestinian 
National Identity:
The Palestinian struggle for national identity is a crucial element in comprehending the 
emergence of suicide operations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Suicide bombings in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the most recent (albeit the most brutal) manifestation of the 
Palestinian norm of martyrdom - which is not only historically entrenched in the Palestinian 
consciousness but which has also consistently evolved over time to finally produce this 
phenomenon. In other words, this chapter locates suicide bombings as another step in the 
progressively escalating violence that is aimed at constructing a Palestinian identity and 
state. As stated above, this work also identifies Hamas as inserting itself into a pre-existing 
culture of heroic martyrdom that it has merely reinterpreted and articulated as suicidal 
violence.
Palestinian national identity is seen by many as exceptional and unique given the conflict 
ridden history of the region. Scholars such as Helena Lindholm Schulz and Rashid Khalidi 
successfully identify two broad approaches adopted whilst studying this phenomenon and
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not surprisingly these emerge from two diametrically opposite political poles43. The first 
approach researches Palestinian nationalism and uses it to bolster the image of a divided 
people with no real national identity. These studies, primarily Israeli in origin, tend to 
regard the Palestinian national consciousness as merely reactive and thereby assert the non­
existence or illegitimacy of a separate Palestinian identity44. The second approach 
emphasises instead die essentialism of the Palestinians and thereby stresses their presence 
and linkages with the land since time immemorial45. Schulz acknowledges and combines 
these two approaches and instead depicts Palestinian nationalism and identity as being 
consistently constructed and re-constructed at the point where both external and internal 
factors convene46.
This chapter adopts this combined method of analysis with the belief that this more holistic 
approach would enable the researcher to take into consideration a number of structures, 
processes and actors that would otherwise be overlooked. In addition, it is believed that any 
genuine understanding of the formation of Palestinian national identity must be based in a 
long term study of how it has evolved over time. As Schulz and Khalidi rightly point out, 
nationalism and national identity are not monolithic but are multi-faceted and fluid 
concepts that are continuously negotiated-both internally and externally47. Thus because 
nationalism changes with historical processes it is misleading to speak of one Palestinian 
nationalism and instead what needs to be developed is an understanding of how 
nationalism, as it exists in Palestine today, was arrived at .To this end, what follows is a
43 Helena Lindholm Schulz, The Reconstruction o f Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and 
Statehood (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p.2 and Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: 
The Construction o f  Modem National Consciousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 145
44 See for example Joan Peter, From Time Immemorial: The Origins o f  the Arab- Jewish Conflict Over 
Palestine (New York: Harper & Row, 1984, 1st edition); Yehoshua Porath, The Emergence o f the Palestinian- 
Arab National Movement 1918-1929 (London: Frank Cass, 1974)
45 See for example: Walid Khalidi (ed.), From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine 
Problem Until 1948 (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971); Abdallah Farangi, The PLO and 
Palestine (London: Zed Books, 1982); Muhammed Muslih, The Origins o f Palestinian Nationalism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Abdul-Wahhab Kayyali, Palestine: A Modem History (London: 
Croom Helm, 1978);
46 Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 2
47 Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, opt, cit. especially chapter 7; Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit
48 Ibid. p. 4-9. Despite the existence o f multiple nationalisms Schulz also identifies homogenisation as the 
primary aim of nationalism as this generates a common collective identity. Hence the attempt to create a 
common identity remains a constant aim o f nationalism irrespective o f temporal and spatial locations o f the 
same. Concurrently, the process o f homogenisation requires a dominant political elite, which serves to 
implement it and which may change over time. This political elite must be legitimised by the population and 
as such the ideology which is used by this political elite to integrate a population must be acceptable to a 
majority of the same. Hence, Schulz combines Gellner’s conception o f the ‘homogenisation o f culture’ with
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brief history of the evolution and construction of Palestinian national identity as may be 
seen from the early twentieth century to the present. Recounting this history allows one to 
locate certain re-occurring key themes in the construction of Palestinian national identity, 
which included oppression, emasculation, degradation, dispossession, humiliation, 
sacrifice, suffering, by the late 1960s defeat, and most crucially, martyrdom. The evolution 
of this narrative of dispossession, disaster and martyrdom can be traced through Palestinian 
prose, poetry, graffiti, slogans, murals, posters and leaflets of the twentieth century. Hamas’ 
literature, leaflets, slogans and graffiti also reflect these very themes as will be illustrated in 
the next section.
The modem ideology of nationalism may be identified as emerging in Palestine in the early 
twentieth century. Pre-Mandatory Palestine was merely an occasional administrative or 
cultural concept and certainly did not constitute a politico-cultural boundary distinct from 
modem Syria49. Palestinian society under the Ottomans was composed mostly of peasants 
(fellahin) whose primary identification was with local reference groups, i.e. kin, faction, 
village and region50. The Ottoman Land Law of 1858 created an increasingly strong 
landowning class which was comprised of local clan leaders and city notables or a ‘'yan. 
Over time the a ’yan, as urban based landlords, emerged as the dominant political, economic 
and cultural elites51. The a ’yan were closely tied into the Ottoman rulers and functioned as 
an intermediary political structure whose aim was to facilitate the mle of the Ottomans in 
the region . Yet in the post-Ottoman period the a ’yans saw in an independent Palestine a 
chance to further their own ambitions and while their policies seem to subordinate national 
interest to personal aspirations they still fermented the notion of an autonomous Palestinian 
state.
Paul R. Brass’s ‘instrumentalism’. See Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, opt, cit and Paul R. Brass, 
Ethnicity and Nationalism, opt, cit. See also Umut Ozkirimli, Theories o f Nationalism, opt, cit. A lso see the 
section on theoretical frameworks outlined in Chapter I.
49 William B. Quandt, Faud Jabber and Ann Mosely Lesch, The Politics o f Palestinian Nationalism (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1973), p. 14
50 Nels Johnson, Islam and the Politics o f Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism (London: Kegan Paul 
International, 1982), pp. 9, 11, 99
51 The a ’yan came into being in the nineteenth century and remained dominant till about the 1930s. Johnson, 
p. 9
52 Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 23.
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The period during the First World War saw the rise of Arab nationalism which was inspired 
by British and French models and was used by both the British and the French governments 
to manipulate the growing anti-Turkish sentiment in the region for their own ends. The
S3division of the Middle East into British and French mandates provided this early Arab 
nationalism the impetus to develop into an anti-imperialist nationalism. Interestingly, Arab 
nationalism had only a marginal appeal in Palestine and Palestinian nationalism which 
began taking shape around 1910 was based more on local patriotism than on Arabism. This 
was the direct result of the intimate links which existed between Ottomanism and the 
Palestinian elite54. By early 1920s this Palestinian nationalism was fast being consolidated. 
The social structure of the region, based on a system of family and clan networks which 
were attached to the a \'yan through a complex network of patron-client relationships also 
ensured that all levels of society were mobilised and participative in the crystallisation of 
this nationalism55. However, factional differences between the a ’yan posed hurdles for a 
unified national movement as did differences between the landowners and peasants as well 
as differences between the Muslims and Christians56. The early 20th century was marked by 
an indecisive, fragmented nationalism that oscillated between Arabism, Ottomanism and 
Palestinianism57. Even so, despite the hurdles and drawbacks, by the early to mid- 1920s a 
proto-national elite had emerged with not only a national programme but also the initiation 
of a Palestinian identity as distinct from other Arabs. The period immediately preceding the 
First World War, as detailed in Chapter II, also saw an immense increase in Jewish 
immigration and land purchase while the post-war period was characterised by increasing 
land alienation and urbanisation for the Palestinian peasantry58. What thus emerged was an
53 As explained in Chapter II, British rule over Palestine was established in 1918 and initially commenced as a 
military administration over the area east and west o f the River Jordan. In 1922, and after the Middle East was 
divided between France and Great Britain at the San Remo Conference o f 1920, Palestine became a British 
Mandate. “In 1918, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine had been divided into three areas which were referred to as 
the Occupied Enemy Territories (OET), based on the Sykes-Picot Agreement o f 1916. Palestine thus became 
the OET-South. When the British mandate was approved in 1922, the area east o f the River Jordan was 
separated from the mandate and established as Trans-Jordan under Amir ‘ Abdallah”. See for example: Schulz^ 
opt, cit.. pp. 49, 25 and Walid Khalidi, Palestine Reborn (London and New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 
1992).
54 Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 24
55 Rashid Khalidi, ‘Palestinian Peasant Resistance to Zionism Before World War I’, in Edward Said and 
Christopher Hitchens (eds.), Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question 
(London and New York: Verso, 1988).
56 William B. Quandt et al., opt, cit.. pp. 14, 17.
57 Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p.26
58 See for example: Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed Press, 
1979); Walid Khalidi, Palestine Reborn , opt, cit.. pp. 28-41; Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 23. Khalidi and 
Sayigh also provide figures for Jewish immigration and Arab displacement over this crucial period.
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addressal of Palestinian specific problems as is best exemplified by the Zionist enterprise 
and the gradual creation of the most stable ‘other’ in Palestinian politics.
These very early expressions of Palestinian nationalism already reflect themes of impotence 
and degradation vis-a-vis the imperial and Zionist presence in Palestine. For example in the 
text of a ‘General Summons to Palestinians’, issued in June 1918, by one of the several 
societies that had been newly founded to wage violent and non-violent struggle against the 
imperialist and Zionist forces, the Palestinians are described as a fallen and degraded 
people. They are described as having plummeted from the position of “masters, leaders and 
scholars... [to] the lowest and most despicable of people”. The text goes on to state: “Our 
spirit has been blunted; our heart has died. Evil straits have taken possession of us in a way 
that disaster follows disaster...Dangers have surrounded us already from every side, every 
direction, every comer”59. A study of the Palestinian literature from this period shows a 
high degree of self-loathing and criticism that is levelled at the general populace and its 
inability to resist British and Zionist powers. A sense of futility and despair also begins to 
characterises the narrative from this period onwards.
By the 1930s, the category of shabab had emerged as a new social force in the Palestinian 
setting. The shabab were young men “who in the social context of land dispossession, 
Jewish immigration, British rule and incorporation into the world economy took on the 
connotation of men who were no longer bound by family and clan ties”60. This shift in the 
social structure enabled political parties in the 1930s to mobilise the shabab and the 
professionals against the a ’yan while increasing Jewish immigration and land dispossession 
provided fertile grounds for popular political action. Yet neither the institutionalised elite 
nor the new intellectual stratum was able to channel the grievances of the underprivileged 
social strata into cohesive political action. The resulting vacuum in leadership was filled by 
Sheikh ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam who called for the peasant rebellion of 1936.
59 Ian S. Lustick, ‘Changing Rationales for Political Violence in the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, Journal o f  
Palestine Studies 20.1 (1990), pp. 64-5
60 Helena L. Schulz, opt, c it ., p. 27
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The Great Revolt, as it is often referred to, brought together dispossessed peasants and the 
shabab to give rise to the first Islamic-nationalistic militancy in Palestine61. Qassam called 
for a revolt against the traditional elite, the British and the Zionists and the successful 
response to this call marks the spread of nationalist ideas to the underprivileged classes in 
Palestinian society62. Already in the period leading up to the Great Revolt, the traditional 
portrayals of Palestinian impotence and degradation were increasingly accompanied by 
celebrations of Palestinian violence perpetrated against the British and the Jews. Violence 
was thus used not only to raise Palestinian morale but also to enhance self-esteem by 
glorifying the heroism of the slain, as those who resisted inevitably were. At the same time, 
the narrative continued to renounce the cowardice and moral degeneracy of the Palestinian 
people as a whole while also calling upon them to participate in the resistance for the 
homeland. Thus heroic martyrdom and sacrifice came to be increasingly lauded and 
consistently juxtaposed against shameful cowardice and moral degeneracy. This narrative 
was further strengthened by the revolutionary fervour of those who participated in the 
revolt in this period and who emphasised the necessity of courage and self-sacrifice. 
Qassam himself is remembered in Palestinian history as one of the first fedayeen63 and is 
reputed to have ordered his men to “die as martyrs”64. Abudullah Schleifer states how “Al- 
Qassam continuously returned to the theme that it is not a necessary condition that the 
Muslim be as strong in number and weaponry as their enemy when the fighting 
starts...even if he knows he is going to die...martyrdom inspires the other Muslims to 
continue the struggle and the martyr’s death is kindling wood for jihad  and Islam... The 
mujahid (i.e. a warrior on the path of God) must be the vanguard and light the way for those 
who will follow”65. Thus the revolutionaries of 1936 initiated the militarisation of the 
Palestinian notion of martyrdom.
61 William B. Quandt, et. al., opt, cit.. p. 33; Nels Johnson, opt, cit.. pp. 38-46; Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 
28;
62 Ted Swedenberg, ‘The Role o f the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-1939)’, in Edmund 
Burke, III and Ira M. Lapidus (eds.), Islam, Politics and Social Movements (Berkeley: University of 
California Press,1988)
63 The term fedayeen is rooted in the ideology o f fida  or sacrifice and refer to ‘those who sacrifice’ 
themselves. Personal interview with Abu Ali, former-PFLP activist, Ramallah, 01 January 2005. See also 
Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. pp. 31, 50;
64 Ian S. Lustick, ‘Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences’, in Martha Crenshaw (ed.), 
Terrorism in Context (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005, 3rd edition), p. 535
65 S. Abudullah Schleifer, ‘The Life and Thought o f ‘Izz-id-Din al-Qassam’, in Islamic Quarterly, Vol. 5, No. 
23 (1979), pp. 69, 72. This heavily Islamised language is echoed by Hamas (see Chapter V  for details). This 
statement also recalls Mead’s concept o f ‘ceaseless interaction’ detailed in Chapter III, Part I.
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In addition, socio-economic adversity led to the mingling of nationalist grievances with 
Islamic symbolism to construct a powerful nationalist discourse. “The religious discourse 
did not stand in opposition to nationalism; rather religiousness augmented nationalist 
sentiments in an effective combination of the use of symbols connected to the land, 
peasantry and national idiom66”. Indeed, the Revolt of 1936 marked the invention of a ‘folk 
nationalism’ and a popular culture emerged which romanticised the peasants and lower 
classes and emphasised Palestinian links to land. Many of the ideas that Qassam 
instrumentalised, including those of self-sacrifice; martyrdom and struggle have been used 
consistently in the brand of nationalism advocated by not only Hamas which claims him as 
its predecessor, but also Fatah.
The next phase of Palestinian nationalism did not emerge till the massacres of 1948 
essentially because of the heavy handed British response to the uprising in 1936. By the 
1940s, significant socio-political transformations had occurred with the rise of a working 
class67 and an emerging bourgeoisie consisting of entrepreneurs, merchants, professionals 
and intellectuals, who posed a strong challenge to the economic authority of the a ’yan. 
Political authority remained with the notables as a result of the British repression of the 
revolt and the removal of any alternative political leadership and they maintained political 
legitimacy by their consistently anti-Western position. The United Nations voted for the 
partition of Palestine in 1947 and by then the Palestinian question had become a pan-Arab 
one as a result of the spread of Palestinian nationalism amongst the educated youth of the 
Arab world who then pressurised their respective governments. Yet it was, according to 
Yezid Sayigh, only after the disintegration of the British Mandate that the political elite
/TO
commenced territorialising their claims . The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 
resulted in the first Arab-Israeli war and the resulting dispersal (shatat) and large-scale
66 See Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 29; Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making o f  
a People (New York: The Free Press, 1993), p. 123.
67 Issa Khalaf, Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration 1939-1948 (New York: 
State University o f New York Press), p. 47; Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 30. The Second World War resulted 
in the emergence of a working class in this region as a result o f the British war effort which produced a 
growing sector in construction. While the Arab economy boomed in this period it was obvious that the British 
favoured the Jewish economic sector. This might have had something to do with the large number o f Zionist 
sympathisers in Britain and the increasing US pressure to allow greater Jewish immigration into the region. 
See also Peter Mansfield, A History o f the Middle East (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 234 and Walid 
Khalidi, Palestine Reborn , opt, cit.. chapter 1.
68 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search fo r  State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 10
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displacement of the Palestinian population. The nakba, i.e. ‘the catastrophe’, was 
characterised by violence, fear and the resultant increase in refugee flows69. Additionally, 
as a direct result of the war, the Gaza Strip was brought under Egyptian administration and 
what was left of what is now called the West Bank came to be united with the newly 
proclaimed Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The nakba built upon ‘folk nationalism’ of the 
late 1930s with its emphasis upon Palestinian links to land and engendered a Palestinian 
identity of the dispossessed and oppressed people -  an identity that was based in 
emasculation, degradation and humiliation till a resurgence of armed struggle in the 1960s 
recovered agency and power for the Palestinian people. Rosemary Sayigh’s work 
reproduces accounts of the nakba given to British Mandate officials and international aid 
and media organisations by eye-witnesses :
“Probably the most affecting sight in the hills is at Bir Zeit, north of 
Jerusalem, where about 14,000 destitutes are ranged on terrace upon 
terrace under the olive trees -  a tree to a family -  and are forced to 
consume bark and bum the living wood that has meant a livelihood 
for generations. Here and at Nablus, where the organization is 
slightly more systematic, there is at present so little milk for babies 
that abortion seems the kindest way out” 70.
“I was twelve when we left our village. We went to a village called 
Abu Sinan. We were a family...and we had nothing to eat. I used to 
...creep back to get things from our home...I used to go in and get 
soap, flour, food to eat. One time ...I trod on an electric wire which 
rang an alarm bell...It was our country, but we had become thieves 
in it! ...We stayed the whole winter in Abu Sinan and then, in 
March, the Israelis started pressing on the ‘refugees’ -  we were 
refugees in our own country!- to leave. They came at five o’clock at 
night, surrounded the village ... [and told us] to get into the trucks.
69 For a powerful account o f the Palestinian dispersal experience see Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians, opt, cit.
70 An eye-witness account carried in The Economist o f 2 October 1948 as quoted in Rosemary Sayigh, 
Palestinians, opt, cit.. p. 82. Sayigh gives a chilling account o f the war o f 1948 and its repercussions for the 
Palestinian population in chapters 2 and 3.
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We weren’t allowed to take anything with us.. .then they took us and 
threw us over the border, on the Merj al-Amer road”71.
This illustrates how themes of impotence, loss, shame, sadness and overwhelming shock 
dominated the vocalisation of Palestinian identity in this period. In other words, themes of 
martyrdom and self-sacrifice that were such prominent elements of Palestinian identity the 
1930s were now overtaken by those of humiliation and degradation. Yet despite the 
immense social, political and economic fracturing engendered by the nakba, the 1948 
experience of defeat and dispossession also served to unite the Palestinians. Hence, the 
refugee experience and the Palestinian social and political marginality in host Arab states 
combined with the shared displacement and trauma of 1948 coalesced to generate a 
common Palestinian identity like never before.
However, due to the shatat the period immediately after the first Arab-Israeli war is yet 
again marked by a lacuna in Palestinian leadership. The flight of the middle class ensured 
that they were discredited thus weakening their claims to leadership in this period. The 
nakba also caused immense fragmentation of all social strata and additional distinctions 
were introduced between the refugees moving into the West Bank and Gaza and the
79established Palestinian residents of the same areas . As refugee populations in Arab states 
grew, the Palestinian refugees demonstrated susceptibility to the political ideologies of their 
resident states. What thus emerged during this period was the active use of Arab 
nationalism to rescue the Palestinian cause. In the 1940s, Palestinian liberation had became 
an important element in the broader Arabism and anti-Western rhetoric of the Middle East. 
Now with Arab universities constituting the primary medium for the spread of new 
ideologies, educated Palestinians routed the diffusion of this Arab nationalism into 
Palestinian ranks where it served as the key ideology implemented to rescue the fractured 
Palestinian movement. Thus, the 1950s saw the emergence of a new generation of 
Palestinian activists and a resurgence in violent tactics. These activists often emerged in the 
form of small Arab groups, often based out of refugee camps, and became known as 
fedayeen. The fedayeen were significant in assisting the re-emergence of Palestinian
71 The account o f a middle-aged woman from the village o f Kweikat who then became a resident o f the Bouij 
al-Barajneh refugee camp in Lebanon, as cited in Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians, opt, cit.. pp. 88-9.
72 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search fo r State, opt, cit.. p. 35
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nationalism towards the late 1950s . Yezid Sayigh believes that while the common 
experience of the nakba gave rise to a common Palestinian identity, it was perhaps the 
sudden, collective loss of land which transformed “Palestinianism.. .from a popular grass­
roots patriotism into a proto-nationalism in the decade after 1948”74. Certainly the narrative 
constructed as a result of the 1948 nakba helped create the context in the camps in the late 
1950s/early 1960s for the emergence of the fedayeen ideology. Thus, according to Ian 
Lustick, the emphasis on the experience of misery and humiliation enabled the Palestinians 
to construct a paradigm for interpreting violence against Israel. This paradigm helped frame 
all violence as a necessary and heroic contribution to the national struggle. Hence violence 
and militarised heroic martyrdom once again became the means to redress the loss of land 
and prestige and to regain agency and power. In turn, this encouraged the growth of 
fedayeen groups in the camps and created internal pressures, especially in Jordan and 
Egypt, to provide them with support75.
Of the newly emerging radical political activist groups, al-Fatah which was founded by 
radical students, including Yasser Arafat, from Cairo and the Gaza Strip in 1959, was the 
first to articulate Palestinian nationalism in territorial terms and was hence crucial to the 
construction of the idea of a Palestinian identity that was state-based. Fatah’s most 
significant contribution to the construction of a Palestinian identity, as stated in Chapter II, 
was the inversion of the dominant pan-Arabist strategy according to which Palestinian 
liberation would never be achieved without the prior establishment of Arab unity . Fatah 
instead insisted that as Palestine was central to the Arab cause, Arab unity was 
unachievable without Palestinian liberation and consequently took priority77. Fatah 
forwarded a Palestinian national ideology in which Palestine would be liberated by 
Palestinian action. Both the formation and ultimate success of Fatah was hugely influenced 
by the experience of the Palestinian diaspora:
73 The term fida  ’i over time has come to refer to the guerrilla, revolutionary or combatant and its “root carries 
the semantic content of ‘redemption’ or ‘self-sacrifice’ in a cause”. See Nels Johnson, opt, cit.. p. 85.
74 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle, opt, cit.. p. 46
75 Ian S. Lustick, ‘Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict’, opt, cit.. and ‘Changing Rationales for Political 
Violence’, opt, cit.
76 See for example Helena Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation : People, Power and Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)
77 William B. Quandt, et. al., opt, cit. pp. 107, 57. This reversal was in direct contrast to George Habbash’s 
Movement o f Arab Nationalists (MAN).
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“...Life in the tent has become as miserable as death..[T]o die for 
our beloved Fatherland is better and more honourable than life, 
which forces us to eat our daily bread under humiliation or to receive 
it as charity at the cost of our honour... We, the sons of catastrophe, 
are no longer willing to live this dirt, despicable life, this life which 
has destroyed our cultural, moral and political existence and 
destroyed our human dignity”. 78.
Fatah also was the first group to call for the formation of a Palestinian state in which the 
Arabs, Jews and Christians could live in peace and in this regard was also the first group to 
demonstrate a pragmatic accommodationist strategy vis-a-vis the state of Israel79. Abu 
‘Iyad, a Fatah leader, articulated the above in 1969 when he stated:
“We have always believed and declared ... that armed struggle is not 
an end in itself. It is a means for a great humanitarian aim. Since 
1917 Palestine has been subjected to wars, revolutions and bloody 
fighting. The time has come for this land and its people to live in 
peace as other human beings. We carry arms in order to achieve a 
truly peaceful settlement of the problem, and not a false settlement 
based on the imposition of aggression and racism. Such peace cannot 
be achieved except within the framework of a democratic state in 
Palestine”80.
While Fatah managed to gain widespread support due to its cohesive nationalist message, 
this is not to state that there was no Islamism/Islamist rhetoric present in its message. 
Indeed the method of articulating its nationalist goals using the language of patriotism and 
Islam in conjuncture enabled Fatah to gamer support from diverse sections of the 
Palestinian society including the traditional elite, the conservative Islamists as well as the 
radical left-wing elements. Fatah was characterised by its revolutionary national liberation
78 Fatah’s underground journal Filastinuna 2 (November 1959) as quoted in Helga Baumgarten, ‘The Three 
Faces/Phases o f Palestinian Nationalism 1948-2005’, Journal o f  Palestine Studies XXXIV. 4 (Summer 2005)
79 Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 32
80 Abu ‘Iyad, in an interview with Lutfi Khouli, Egyptian sociologist and editor o f al-Tali’ah in June 1969. 
From Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians, opt, cit.. p. 144.
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ideology and its primary goal was the unification of the Palestinian people in the course of 
revolution. In a sense, the Islamism of Fatah is representative of the fact that camp politics 
were more prone to Islamism whilst the educated intellectuals and professionals tended
o 1
towards Arab nationalism in this period .
Simultaneously, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was formed primarily under 
the influence of the Egyptian leader Nasser in May 1964. It has been suggested that 
Nasser’s interest in the formation of the PLO as the primary representative of the 
Palestinian people was an effort to control the fedayeen movement in accordance with his 
regional power ambitions82. Yet, Sayigh points out that the PLO’s formation was also 
simultaneously based in the statist ambitions of PLO’s founders, most significantly Ahmad 
al-Shuqayri83. Thus over this period Arab nationalism continued to interact in a myriad of 
complex ways with Palestinian identity formation. Fatah soon emerged as the dominant 
fedayeen group and launched its armed struggle in January 1965 and guerrilla activities 
increased in the period leading up to the 1967 war. Consequently, led by Fatah and various 
other fedayeen groups, sacrifice and active struggle once again became an important 
component of Palestinian national identity.
It can thus be asserted that by the mid-1960s the Palestinian national identity was 
constructed on a fedayeen ideology and incorporated symbols of the nakba -  i.e. shatat, 
defeat, expulsion, dispossession, suffering, as well as sacrifice and martyrdom. The 1967 
defeat of the Arab alliance against the Israelis in the Six Days War not only consolidated 
this disaster and resistance based Palestinian identity, but also led to the emergence of a 
belief that the Arab nations were impotent in their ability to effectively assist the 
Palestinians in their quest for statehood. Yet the fact that the landless Palestinian fedayeen 
based in the East Bank could challenge the Israeli army, as was seen during the battle for 
Karamah gave birth to the mythification and glorification of the fedayeen and generated 
self-confidence and hope within the Palestinians. This re-introduction of armed struggle 
successfully infused the humiliated and broken Palestinian identity with renewed dignity, 
pride and vigour:
81 Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 32.
82 Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 33. See also Beverly Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, Conflicts in the 
Middle East Since 1945 (Second edition; London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
83 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search fo r  State, opt, cit.. pp. 95-100
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“The Palestinian felt after the Revolution that he’s living like a 
normal person again after a life of humiliation. The camps now are 
like fortresses, where in the past people had nothing to do but die 
under these zinco roofs”84.
“The circle of fear was over, and now there was active movement in 
the camp. For the first time in our history women took their right 
role, and there was military training for girls as well as boys. We felt 
we had regained our identity, not just as Palestinians, but as human 
beings”85.
“I feel proud to be Palestinian, one of a people that is revolutionary, 
struggling and suffering. We were lied to many times, others tried to 
bury our existence as Palestinians. But with the Revolution we broke 
our handcuffs. Before I was living in a refugee camp, now I feel it is 
a training camp”86.
Fatah further bolstered this glorification of the guerrilla and added to the image of the 
Palestinians as a military, revolutionary people willing and able to fight and die for their 
lost homeland- representing the re-emergence of the Qassamite concept of self-sacrifice 
and martyrdom. As Sayigh states:
The dramatic rise of the guerrilla movement after the battle of 
Karamah, created a new myth. “To declare Palestinian identity no 
longer means that one is a “refugee” or second-class citizen. Rather, 
it is a declaration that arouses pride, because the Palestinian has 
become the fida ’i or revolutionary who bears arms. Armed struggle 
was the source of political legitimacy and national identity, the new 
substance of the ‘imagined community’ of the Palestinians.87
84 Cheryl A. Rubenberg, The Palestinians: In Search o f a Just Peace (Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Rienner 
Publishers Inc., 2003), p. 164
85 Ibid. pp. 165-66
86 Ibid. p. 167
87 Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle, opt, cit.. p. 195
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It is interesting to note the ‘secular-nationalist’ Fatah’s consistent use of symbolically 
religious language in the articulation of its revolutionary nationalistic politics. The 
following communique, from the post 1967 period, is a good example :
[We washed] away the shame of our Defeat [al-hazimah, the 1967 
war] with the blood of our martyrs. We openly declared the jihad 
among the ranks of our youth and we gave up the best of them on 
that path....Our pledge to you and God is to bear arms until victory 
or martyrdom [ishtishad\ . 88
Interestingly this is precisely the same terminology and rhetoric found not only in the 
literature from the period of the Great Revolt but also in Hamas leaflets of both intifadas. 
This seems to vouch for the fact that militant heroic martyrdom was firmly entrenched in 
the Palestinian cultural consciousness as a constitutive and regulatory norm by at least the 
1960s. Thereafter Fatah’s armed struggle further steered the course of evolution for this 
norm in Palestinian society.
This was possible because by 1969 Fatah had emerged as the dominant group in the PLO 
and this successfully merged the Palestinian Resistance Movement, which had been 
established in refugee camps in the Arab world through the fedayeen and their activism, 
with the PLO. This generated both a formalised Palestinian national identity as well as a 
consolidated political arena as the nationalist legitimacy of the guerrillas was blended with 
the institutional legacy of the PLO. It is imperative to once again emphasise the pre­
dominantly external construction of modem Palestinian identity. The definition of what it is 
to be Palestinian was formulated by the refugee and camp populations dispersed around the 
world. These were the people who, deprived of their lands and property in the nakba, re-
OQ
created the Palestinian identity from deeply personal experiences of exile and loss . This 
outside -  inside division was also reflected in Fatah’s organisational base. Based out of 
Jordan and heavily involved in local politics, it was in a sense removed from the ground 
realities of WBG. Yet this very distance from the ‘inside’ also enabled Fatah to organise
88 Nels Johnson, opt, cit.. p. 75. Fatah communique dated 1968.
89 Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 37; Yezid Sayigh, Armed Struggle, opt, cit.. Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian 
Identity, opt, cit.
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itself militarily, a task it so successful accomplished that it was able to challenge the Israeli 
army during the battle of Karamah in 1968.
However, as detailed in Chapter II, it was this very militant face of Palestinian identity 
which also resulted in the Jordan debacle of 1970 which caused the This debacle resulted in 
the virtual destruction of PLO bases and infrastructure and resulted in its expulsion from 
Jordan thereby increasing the vulnerability of the Palestinian diaspora that was based in 
Jordanian territory. In addition, the 1976 attacks of the Christian Falangist against the 
Palestinian refugee camps in East Beirut once again consolidated Palestinian feelings of 
vulnerability, hopelessness and the belief that they were alone in their quest. Indeed, despite 
the fact that the Palestinian cause has been used time and time again as a tool of 
legitimisation and as a call for Arab/Muslim unity in the Middle East and elsewhere, the 
fact that the Palestinians call themselves qamis uthman (Uthman’s shirt) perhaps best 
reflects their view on this:
We are only Uthman’s shirt. After the Caliph Uthman was murdered, 
leaders would say, ‘I do this in the name of Uthman’ when they 
wanted people to believe them. But they only used his name. They 
waved his bloody shirt/ Today we Palestinians are Uthman’s shirt.90
By the late 1970s, the PLO had fully formed statist aspirations. This was assisted by the 
influx of money from other Arab states especially after 1978. What thus emerged over time 
was a quasi-government structure with an additional militant face as represented by various 
fedayeen groups, such as Fatah’s military wings, as well as PFLP and DFLP, who were 
Marxist in their leanings. The PLO structure now constituted of a ‘parliament’ (PNC), a 
‘government’ (the executive Committee) and a military apparatus (the PLA). 
Simultaneously, the 1970s also saw the rise of strong waves of Palestinian nationalism in 
WBG. This was the direct result of the increasing Israeli policy of suppression as well as 
the drive to build new settlements in the Occupied Territories combined with a policy to 
“de-develop” the Palestinian economy and to tie it with the Israeli economy in a structural 
relationship of dependency91. The feeling of dispossession and frustration continued to
90 Interview with a Palestinian in Nels Johnson, opt, cit.. p. 60
91 Cheryl A. Rubenberg, opt, cit.. p. 23.
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build within the Palestinian community. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 served to 
not only destroy PLO bases in southern Lebanon but also killed thousands of Palestinian 
civilians. This combined with Arafat’s policy shift from pure guerrilla warfare to a 
combination of military and diplomatic tactics leading eventually to a use of diplomacy to 
the exclusion of other means, generated increasing discontentment with the impotency of 
Palestinian leadership92.
The period from about 1967 to 1987 was also marked by increasingly harsh Israeli policies 
towards the Palestinians. Its would thus not be misleading to state that the outbreak of the 
first intifada in 1987 was the logical culmination of twenty years of frustration with Israeli 
occupation, over a century of upheaval and disruption and the evolution of Palestinian 
nationalism. The intifada not only illustrated the pent-up Palestinian frustration with the 
political and economic situation of occupation but also demonstrated the younger 
generation’s loss of faith in the PLO and Fatah’s ability to resolve the crisis -  either 
through military or diplomatic means93.
The heavy-handed Israeli response to the intifada was characterised by mass detentions, the 
use of live fire against unarmed civilians and the deployment of the army inside the towns 
and cities of WBG. This response served to strengthen the Palestinian resolve and 
combined with disillusionment with the PLO/Fatah also assisted the emergence of Hamas 
as a new movement that arose to challenge Fatah’s dominance in the Palestinian political 
arena for the first time in twenty years on the very issues that had been Fatah’s founding 
doctrine: armed struggle and the liberation of historic Palestine94. What also re-emerged in 
this period was the image of the heroic martyr willing to die for his homeland. This cultural 
construction of heroic martyrdom enabled the Palestinians to capture the higher moral 
ground and fuelled the dominant rhetoric surrounding Israeli occupation, which in turn 
resulted in a justifiable escalation of violent resistance. Hamas used this opportunity to fully 
articulate a socio-political and religious justification to resort to an increasingly violent 
military struggle and this allowed them to gamer popular support from a dissatisfied and 
frustrated Palestinian population. By 1993, the intifada was significantly more militarised
92 Ibid., p. 24.
93 Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit.. p. 61
94 Helga Baumgarten, ‘The Three Faces/Phases o f  Palestinian Nationalism’, opt, cit.
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as evident by the appearance of the conflict’s first suicide attacks. Hence it seems that by 
1993, Hamas had managed to successfully appropriate and re-articulate the Palestinian 
norm of militant heroic martyrdom as suicidal violence.
141
Part II
I. Hamas Inserts Itself into an Established Narrative of Palestinian Selfhood
Hamas, unlike Fatah, has never enjoyed an undisputed pre-eminence within Palestinian 
politics. However, at the same time Hamas has been able to successfully tap into popular 
sentiments in order to project itself as a legitimate alternative to the PLO and Fatah. As 
such, it has managed to play an instrumental role in steering the course of Palestinian 
nationalism and national identity since 1987. The previous section illustrated the evolution 
of this national identity and nationalism over the greater part of the twentieth century. In 
doing so, it also located key political players that impacted this continuous evolution of 
Palestinian collective identity. These players included the Ottomans, the Zionist (the 
Israelis post-1948), the British as well as the Palestinians as represented by peasants, the 
notables, Qassamites and then various fedayeen groups such as Fatah. Hamas must be seen 
as yet another party in this long line of political players impacting the consistently evolving 
Palestinian national identity.
The previous section also identified certain re-occurring key themes in the construction of 
Palestinian national identity, which included oppression, emasculation, dispossession, 
humiliation, sacrifice, martyrdom, suffering, and by the late 1960s also defeat and 
occupation. These key themes of Palestinian collective identity have consistently propelled 
the evolution of Palestinian nationalism and the national struggle. Yet simultaneously, and 
as established in the previous section, depending on the time and circumstances, some of 
these themes tend to play a more prominent role than others. Even a cursory analysis of 
Palestinian politics since the emergence of Hamas suggests that the norm of militant heroic 
martyrdom (shahadat) has increasingly played a more prominent role in the evolution of 
Palestinian national identity since 1987.
Yet this norm of heroic martyrdom, as demonstrated above, had already emerged and 
developed as a key component of Palestinian collective identity much before the first 
intifada and the rise of Hamas. As such, rather than actively creating it Hamas merely 
needed to insert itself into a pre-existing ideology of heroic martyrdom in 1987. At the
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same time Hamas can certainly be credited with first appropriating this norm before re- 
Islamising it, and then finally rearticulating it as suicide bombings from 1993 onwards. As 
a result, a historically developed and culturally entrenched norm of militant heroic 
martyrdom was consciously and coldly escalated to a new level of violent self-sacrifice by 
Hamas.
In a nutshell, the key reason for the prominence and re-emergence of militant heroic 
martyrdom was the sheer powerlessness experienced by Palestinian society in the period 
immediately preceding the first intifada. Indeed Palestinian nationalism, when examined in 
the longue duree, reflects a cyclical pattern whereby the sense of powerlessness, itself 
rooted in themes of suffering, degradation, dispossession, humiliation etc., repeatedly 
engenders a renewal of armed struggle within Palestinian society. The violence inherent in 
armed struggle enables the Palestinians to recapture agency and thereby power, in a 
situation that otherwise denies them any. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu states that honour 
supposes “ an individual who sees himself always though the eyes of others, who has need 
of others for his existence, because the image he has of himself is indistinguishable from 
that presented to him by other people”95. In other words, honour is a social construction 
inextricably linked to narratives of selfhood. Richard Sennett explains that the affirmation 
of honour within a group can lead to destructive behaviour towards those who fall outside 
the group’s boundaries. In short, the Palestinian exercise of agency in the form of self- 
sacrifice also allows them to ‘reinvent’ themselves and regain Tost’ honour, dignity and 
self-respect vis-a-vis a negative other.
Sacrifice is thus a core ingredient of Palestinian national identity, and when agency is 
exercised in periods of resistance, sacrifice assumes the fully developed form of heroic 
martyrdom. While this seizure of agency may or may not have tangible political results, 
every time it is exercised, it further propels the evolution of Palestinian nationalism by 
regenerating the vital component of active identity creation. However, once armed struggle 
loses momentum, as it inevitably does, and agency is lost, the core national identity reverts 
back to the passive one of the powerless, dispossessed and degraded. Thus the basic
95 Richard Sennett, Respect: The Formation o f Character in an Age o f  Inequality (London: Penguin Books, 
2003), p. 55
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narrative of Palestinian selfhood and history embodies a basic ‘active-passive’ cyclical 
dichotomy o f ‘armed struggle/ heroic martyrdom’ and ‘suffering/sacrifice’96.
Interestingly, those who opt for armed struggle always escalate the violence and thereby 
raise the bench-mark of militant heroic martyrdom each time. This steady long-term 
escalation may be a response to the absence of tangible political results. Yet what is most 
significant is that each time the violence is justified by basing it on the unchanging nature 
of other components of Palestinian selfhood, especially the experience of misery, 
humiliation, occupation, emasculation and dispossession. Hence, violence and militarised 
heroic martyrdom consistently, and cyclically, become the means to redress the trauma 
caused by the loss of land and prestige. The remainder of this section aims to illustrate how 
Hamas, by basing itself on this pre-existing logic and pattern, has in its turn not only been 
able to resort to and justify violence but also how it has also escalated it to the level of 
suicidal violence. It must be stressed that Hamas has by no means created a new paradigm 
of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation; instead it has merely re-defined the 
parameters of the one it inherited.
A survey of Hamas’ politico-ideological texts, including its Covenant (mithaq), leaflets (al- 
bayanat), wall graffiti (shi’arat), murals, posters, songs, videos and official statements 
reflects how it is, like its political predecessors, preoccupied with the key components of 
Palestinian identity discussed above. Indeed, despite envisioning a radically different 
ultimate vision for Palestine, i.e. an Islamic Palestinian state as opposed to Fatah’s 
Palestinian secular nation-state, Hamas’ key concerns echo those of Fatah in its early years. 
The key themes for Hamas include: (i) the trauma of defeat and concurrently the crisis of 
oppression and dispossession; (ii) the long-standing experience of humiliation, suffering 
and degradation; (iii) a deeply ingrained sense of helplessness and emasculation and; (iv) 
the necessity to exercise heroic martyrdom to regain freedom, land and dignity. Hamas 
inherits these concerns and uses them to define its own identity as a truly Palestinian 
organisation; reconfirm the Israeli identity as the most prominent ‘other’ for the 
Palestinians; and to propel its particular version of militant heroic martyrdom as a means of
96 It is Schulz who first identifies and links a basic dichotomy o f struggle/resistance and suffering/sacrifice to 
the Palestinian narrative o f selfhood and history in her work. However, while she identifies this dichotomy 
she neither develops it further nor uses it in her analysis o f Palestinian nationalism.
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confronting occupation. Of these four themes, while the last is central to our analysis of 
suicide bombings, the other three are also vital in that they represent the foundation upon 
which Hamas constructs and justifies its logic of self-sacrifice and militarised heroic 
martyrdom.
(i) The trauma o f defeat and concurrently the crisis o f oppression and dispossession 
First and foremost, Hamas clearly recognises and draws upon the deeply internalised 
trauma of oppression and dispossession that traces its historical roots to first the British 
Mandate and Jewish immigration and then the experiences of the 1948 nakba and the 1967 
naksa (i.e. ‘the setback’, as the defeat in the Six Day War is often referred to). This is 
reflected in how it repeatedly refers back to nakba and naksa in its literature, especially in 
its earlier leaflets. Each time it refreshes its audience’s memory of violence, dispersal and 
dispossession. For example:
“On April 9 [1948], the Jewish butchers perpetrated the massacre of 
Deir Yassin, killing the aged, women, and infants, and ripping open 
the bellies of pregnant women in order to destroy the seed of our 
people ...”97
Key events that are constantly referred to also include the Balfour Declaration, and less 
often the Peel Commission of 1937 (which “proposed the creation of a Jewish and Arab 
state on the soil of Palestine”98). Again in both cases, these events are part of the 
Palestinian memory of oppression and dispossession and are kept alive in popular 
consciousness by various political factions. Hamas tends to call for general strikes and an 
escalation of violence to commemorate all such events and dates that are perceived to have 
impacted the Palestinian national struggle99. For example:
97 Hamas Leaflet No. 13, dated 7 April 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones: 
Communiques from the Intifada Underground (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994)
98 Hamas Leaflet No. 32, dated 25 November 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones, 
opt, cit.
99 The exception to this rule are calls for prayer and fasting when commemorating the death anniversaries o f  
martyrs and for marking important dates on the Islamic calendar.
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“November 2, 1989 -  A general strike on the anniversary of the 
wretched Balfour Declaration, as a proclamation by our people of 
their opposition to solutions that infringe on its rights and [causes 
them] to lose its land”100.
“A general strike on Saturday, April 9, 1989 -  marking the advent of
iL
the 5 month in the second year of the blessed uprising. The uprising 
should be escalated to commemorate the massacre at Deir Yassin by 
Jewish terrorists”101.
This motif of violence and abandonment can also be located in popular Hamas sources. For 
example in Ahmad Ziad Ghanima’s comic-book hagiography for children, Ahmad Yassin: 
Sheikh o f Palestine, the following dialogue occurs between Yassin and his mother. Note 
how in the established tradition of saints Yassin speaks like a judge and holy man despite 
the fact that he was only twelve years old when he left his home in 1948 for a UN refugee 
camp in Gaza:
“Why are we leaving our house, O my mother?”
“Because, O Ahmad, when the criminal Jews arrive at our village, 
they will kill us”
“Where are our brothers? Why don’t they rise up to defend us?”
“They have forsaken us, May Allah forgive them, except for a small
• 109portion of them who are resisting the Jews with courage” .
Occasionally in its literature, Hamas attributes the 1948 and 1967 defeats to the weakness 
of Arab regimes, reminding the Palestinians that they are, as always, alone in their struggle 
for freedom103. Emphasising this isolation assists Hamas in naturalising its call for sacrifice 
and martyrdom as a pre-requisite for liberation. Yet at the same time, and in response to the
100 Hamas Leaflet No. 45, dated 27 October 1989 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones, opt, 
cit.
101 Hamas Leaflet No. 39, dated 5 April 1989 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones, opt, cit
102 Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs Square, opt, cit.. p. 26
103 See for example Hamas Leaflet No. 2, dated January 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking 
Stones, opt, cit.
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strategic ramifications of this isolation, Hamas also calls to the ‘Arab and Islamic masses 
everywhere’ to shoulder their duty towards Palestine:
“There is no excuse today for the Nation [i.e. the Arab and Islamic 
masses] for not shouldering its duty towards Palestine and its people.
Consequently, it is high time for an Arab and Islamic change to take 
place quickly and seriously. This necessitates ... [concern] with his 
Palestinian brother who is slaughtered daily and who is fighting 
alone with modest weapons against an army equipped with a huge 
military arsenal...”104
Thus Hamas first keeps a disaster-based historical memory alive before highlighting the 
isolated nature of the Palestinian struggle. Then based upon this construction, and using 
similarly imagery, it articulates a powerful narrative of present-day oppression and 
dispossession experienced at the hands of the old enemy, the Jewish state of Israel.
“...An army equipped from head to foot is fighting our chained and 
weaponless people. Tanks, armoured vehicles, and airplanes pursue 
the inhabitants...toxic bombs are hurled at our masses...Curfew is 
imposed on towns, villages and camps; houses are broken into by 
day and by night... women are intimidated and children 
terrorized...mosques are invaded...youth are murdered in their 
houses and at road junctions and their bodies thrown between the 
trees; children are kidnapped and their feet broken; universities, 
schools, and scientific institutions are closed. The plunderer has 
revealed his malice and unmasked his true face, wielding an iron fist 
to impose a death sentence on the liberty and honour of our 
people”105.
104 Hamas Communique dated 1 August 2001, in Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002). This is a clear reference to the 
‘three circles’ that the Hamas believes need to be involved in the liberation o f Palestine -  the Palestinians, the 
Arabs and the Muslims. For details on these three spheres see Article 14 o f the Hamas Charter in Khaled 
Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought and Practice (Washington D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000)
105 Hamas Leaflet No. 4, dated February 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones, opt, cit.
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In all its literature, Hamas consistently portrays the Palestinians as the weaker party and 
thereby re-creates a David-Goliath scenario. This asymmetry in the confrontation is crucial 
for its construction of the Palestinian need for militant heroic martyrdom. Hamas also 
consistently identifies the Israeli state as a shared threat and in doing so contributes to the 
process of consolidating a collective disaster based national identity. In repeatedly 
highlighting the Palestinian lack of security and freedom, it reflects an acute identification 
with, and instrumentalisation of, day-to-day Palestinian experiences and concerns. This 
empathy enables it to cast itself as an organisation that is rooted in Palestinian daily reality 
and hence attract popular support106.
Interestingly, an analysis of Hamas leaflets suggests that it tended to refer back to the 
nakba, naksa and other disasters much more frequently during the first intifada. These 
references are less frequent by the time the Al-Aqsa intifada erupts, and leaflets from this 
period are more focussed on the Oslo Peace process, the first intifada and, what is by then, 
a fully developed narrative of militant heroic martyrdom in its current manifestation. This 
shift suggests that the themes of historical disaster had already served their dual purpose of 
imparting legitimacy to Hamas and enabling it to renew the norm of MHM and could now 
be overshadowed by more contemporary narratives of ‘disaster’, i.e. the first intifada and 
the failed Oslo Peace process.
(ii) The long-standing experience of humiliation, suffering and degradation
The second theme that Hamas consistently draws upon and instrumentalises is the long­
standing and widespread experience of humiliation, suffering and degradation. This 
humiliation and suffering has historical roots in the defeats of 1948 and 1967 and the 
corresponding loss of land, resources and population dispersal. Suffering at the hand of the 
Israeli state has thus been historically internalised by the population and continues to be a 
key component of Palestinian selfhood, and one which is consistently evident in popular 
contemporary depictions of the Israeli occupation. A good example is the poem ‘And What 
Next’ written in 1986, i.e. in the period immediately preceding the first intifada. The
106 This is in direct contrast to the ‘external’ leadership o f the Fatah. See for example Yezid Sayigh, Armed 
Struggle, opt, cit.: Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity, opt, cit.
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imagery in this work reflects a continuation from earlier literature, and if not identified as a 
more recent piece, this poem could well be from the 1948 or 1967 period:
“ ...They [the Israeli occupiers] have burnt it [the land], O my son
They stole the za’tar107 and uprooted the threshing floor
They burned the churches, O Virgin
They burned the mosques and destroyed the minbar
They have killed my brother
The body of my father
Woe unto you, O settler . . .108”
Contemporary day-to-day circumstances have definitely built upon the cultural memory of 
humiliation and suffering. Many Palestinians have grown up watching their houses 
destroyed by Israeli bulldozers in retaliation for attacks on Jewish settlements. Others have 
seen their friends shot down by Israeli soldiers. Most have watched their fathers humiliated 
at Israeli checkpoints after waiting in line for hours. Dr. Eyad Sarraj, succinctly sums up the 
daily life of a Palestinian:
“You are given an identity number and permit to reside. If you leave 
the country for more than three years in succession, you lose the 
right to residence. When you leave the country on a trip, you are 
given a laissez passer, a travelling document, valid for one year that 
tells you...that you are of undefined nationality. Israeli occupation 
means that you are called twice a year by the intelligence for routine 
interrogation and persuasion to work as an informer on your brothers 
and sisters...To survive under Israeli occupation you are given a 
chance to work in jobs that the Israelis do not like ... You will have 
to leave your home in the refugee camp at 3 am, go through the road 
blocks and check posts, spend your day under the sun and
107 Za’tar is a popular mixture o f herbs and spices made by combining dried powdered ingredients such as 
hyssop, sumac, sesame seeds, oil and salt and is most commonly consumed with yogurt in the Palestinian 
territories.
108 Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs Square, opt, cit.
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surveillance, returning home in the evening to collapse in bed for a 
few hours...”109
Statements made by Palestinians echo these themes. In a personal interview Assam, a 
young student at the An-Najah University in Nablus, said, “We live in misery and are 
treated like dogs. The Israelis kick us, spit on us, insult us and treat us like criminals for 
living on the land of our fathers. They want to break us and so they don’t treat us like 
humans” n0. Another student of the university who requested to remain unnamed described 
how she was sick of being humiliated at checkpoints: “We are always searched and insulted 
at checkpoints. The j  ’aish [the Israeli army] decides if we can come to university, go to 
work, visit our families -  if we can live and breathe. I don’t know how much longer I can 
stand it”.111 This ‘checkpoint syndrome’ has built up a feeling of immense humiliation and 
frustration in the Palestinian population and has had, according to Dr. Sarraj, an extremely 
negative impact on the youth of Palestine: “Do you know what it means for a child to see 
his father spat at and beaten before his eyes by an Israeli soldier?...we observe that they 
lose respect for their fathers. So they... tried the intifada”.
Once again it must be stressed that Hamas did not need to create this feeling of suffering 
and degradation but instead it merely tapped into a pre-existing sentiment - one which 
continues to be widespread, deeply rooted and consistently revisited in Hamas literature. 
Hamas thus cunningly absorbed an established sentiment into its own narrative and used it 
to instrumentalise the option of MHM.
Hamas’ references to the themes of humiliation, suffering and degradation of the 
Palestinian people can be traced throughout its literature, its songs, slogans, murals etc. as 
well as in the statements made by its supporters and operatives. In consistently referring 
back to what is a deep-rooted sentiment, Hamas displays an effective identification with 
popular grievances and its understanding of Palestinian circumstances while also 
simultaneously highlighting its ability to channel these grievances into political action.
109 Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs: Innocence, Vengeance and Despair in the Middle East (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), p. 105
110 Personal interview with Assam (last name withheld) at An-Najah University, 17 January 2005, Nablus, 
West Bank.
111 Personal interview with female student (name withheld), age 21 years, 17 January 2005, Nablus, West 
Bank.
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Hamas literature consciously underscores harsh Israeli policies and glorifies the suffering 
of the Palestinian people, constantly using this juxtapositioning as a rallying point for its 
resistance activity. It meticulously weaves the narrative of defeat, oppression and 
dispossession with that of humiliation, suffering and degradation. It therefore paints a 
picture of a people who suffer under an occupation yet who, despite being dispossessed, 
humiliated and degraded, possess the strength to fight back and regain their dignity and 
honour:
“The inhuman policy against a defenceless people was expressed in 
the arrest of thousands of men, women and children, who were 
beaten and tortured with abuse... the...resentful ruler [i.e. the Israeli 
state] ...thought our people had indeed sunk into a state of despair 
and helplessness and was asking for mercy on bent knee...They 
expected the generation that grew up after 1967 to be wretched and 
cowed...Yet what actually happened... was the awakening of the 
people...avenging its honour and restoring its formal glory” 112.
It therefore manipulates this ingrained sense of humiliation and suffering to justify violence 
against the Israeli state.
“Qassam Brigades declare responsibility for the missile bombing this 
morning...[which were fired] as a retaliatory warning to the Zionist 
criminals over their criminal bombardment of our people...along 
with the constant insults, murder, destruction, displacement and 
detention o f our people” (emphasis added) 113.
“The uprising continues, to flinch from it is death, the Zionist 
occupiers torture and humiliate the people at every opportunity. Let
112 Leaflet No. 2, dated January 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones, opt, cit
113 Military Communique issued by the Qassam Brigades dated 16 February 2002 in Yonah Alexander, 
Palestinian Religious Terrorism, opt, cit.
the stone be our strong weapon against the occupiersV\$mphasis 
added)114
Hamas operatives also echo this general sense of humiliation and degradation and refer to 
past honour and glory. For example, the last will of Ismail Masawabi, a Hamas operative 
from Khan Yunis who blew himself up at the edge of a nearby Israeli settlement states: 
“..Before we had power, then we became weak. We live in humiliation, where we once 
lived in dignity...”115
An important subtext to this narrative of humiliation and suffering which deserves a 
mention is the concept of sumud (steadfastness) and sabr (patience). Both can be traced as 
long-standing components of Palestinian selfhood. Sumud as a political strategy was based 
in the idealised image of the Palestinian peasant who stayed on his land and refused to 
leave. It was therefore a passive strategy of resistance and symbolised an unbreakable 
connection to the soil of Palestine which countered the uprootedness of 1948 and 1967. 
While the genealogy of the concept is rather murky, sumud as a political strategy was 
actively pursued only from about 1967 and is believed to have failed as such116. Yet this 
thesis asserts that sumud as a component of Palestinian selfhood has been undoubtedly and
117irreversibly incorporated into contemporary Palestinian consciousness .
Closely aligned with the concept of sumud is the concept of sabr, which literally translates 
as ‘patience’. Sabr is a quality that every ideal Palestinian needs to possess and exercise for 
it is believed that it is this quality alone that enables Palestinians to bear the torment, 
oppression and the humiliation of defeat and occupation without breaking. The concept of 
sabr also seems to be closely linked to land, agriculture and indigenousness and is rooted in
11 o
the image of the hardy peasant who unhurriedly works his land to make it bloom . The
114 Leaflet No. 7, dated 4 March 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones, opt. cit
115 Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon: A Modem History o f Suicide Bombing (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 90
116 For details on the strategy o f sumud and its failures see Salim Tamari, ‘The Palestinian Movement in 
Transition: Historical Reversals and the Uprising’, Journal o f Palestine Studies, Vol. XX, No. 2 (Winter 
1991)
117 Yasser Arafat identified sumud as a key element in the Palestinian programme. He stated: ‘The most 
important element in the Palestinian programme is holding on to the land....and not warfare alone. Warfare 
comes at a different level...The important thing is that you hold on to the land and afterward -  combat”. 
Arafat on sumud as quoted in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit. p. 13.
118 Informal discussion with Abu Ali, 1 January 2005, Ramallah, West Bank.
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concept of sabr is, like sumud, firmly rooted in the Palestinian consciousness and is once 
again a powerful construct because it draws upon the cultural memory of the land and the 
fellah, i.e. the peasant. Once again it represents a counter-narrative to the reality of 
dispossession and uprootedness. The following poem, which was popular much before the 
first intifada, and was often found written on the walls of Israeli prison cells, reflects the 
centrality of the concept of sabr as a component of Palestinian selfhood and resistance:
“I will be patient until patience is worn out from my patience
and I will be patient until Allah decrees my condition
and I will be patient until patience knows
that I will bear stoutly that which is more bitter than patience”119.
Hamas consistently draws upon both these concepts in its leaflets and political statements, 
thereby demonstrating its enormous dexterity in tapping into an established subtext. For 
example, it often addresses the Palestinians as “Our patient Palestinian people” or “Our 
Mujahid and patient people” or “Our Mujahid, patient and steadfast people” or “O patient 
murabitun”120, thereby framing the passive qualities of patience and steadfastness as 
necessary correlates to active resistance. Hamas also often advises the masses to adopt the 
“wait and see” 121 stance of a true Mujahid and stresses that the people need to “remain 
patient and steadfast”122 for the sake of the resistance and Allah and face the enemy with 
“determination and constancy”123. It also often represents the Palestinians as “patient ones 
who resist all forms of oppression, humiliation, and surrender”124, again invoking the well 
established prior narrative while simultaneously referring to the established subtext of 
sumud and sabr. Hamas thus consciously plays an active role in the developing the identity 
of the Palestinians as a people who can wait patiently and steadfastly bear oppression 
before striking the enemy at the most opportune moment.
119 Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs Square, opt, cit. p. 74
120 See Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism, opt, cit and Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, 
opt, cit. The term ‘mujahid’ literally translates to a warrior on the path o f God. The term ‘murabitun’ refers to 
Muslim settlers o f the frontier implicitly referring to those who face hardship and hostility.
121 See for example Military Communique issued by the Qassam Brigades, dated 4 June 2001 in Yonah 
Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism, opt, cit
122 See for example Hamas Political Communique, dated 24 October 2001, in Yonah Alexander, opt, cit.
123 Hamas Leaflet No. 45, dated 21 July 1989 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit.
124 Hamas Leaflet No. 8, dated 13 March 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit.
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(iii) The deeply ingrained sense o f helplessness and emasculation
The third key components of Palestinian identity, which Hamas is keenly concerned with is 
the deeply ingrained Palestinian sense of helplessness and emasculation. This sense of 
helplessness as established above originates in the Palestinian experiences of colonisation 
and the violence faced in 1948 and 1967. Hamas both revives and builds upon this 
experience in its literature. It encourages the Palestinian people to resist the occupation and, 
most importantly, it justifies its resort to violent activity by highlighting the unchanging 
brutal nature of occupation and the helplessness of the Palestinian society in the face of this 
suffering. Thus, Hamas’ logic resonates with that of the literature from the period leading 
up to the Great Revolt of 1936 in which traditional portrayals of Palestinian impotence and 
degradation were increasingly accompanied by calls for sacrifice and martyrdom as well as 
celebrations of Palestinian violence against the British and the Jews. Once again Hamas 
inserts itself into and replicates an established traditional narrative.
“Now they [the Israelis] intend to expel a new group of inhabitants 
from their own land and their own native city to Lebanon -  and they 
are killing and blowing up houses everywhere, particularly in the 
suffering village of Beita in which settlers sowed corruption -  and 
the aged and children fall martyrs to the gas bombs that are hurled at 
them indiscriminately in houses and in every place” 125.
“The Zionists have exceeded all limits, they killed, displaced, 
imprisoned, destroyed houses and property even our graveyards were 
not spared. We have no other choice but Jihad and developing its 
means until victory or martyrdom”126.
Like its Qassamite and PLO predecessors, Hamas also identifies active resistance as the 
answer to Palestinian helplessness and emasculation. It juxtapositions cowardice and 
dishonour with daring activism, pride and honour. It accuses the Arab regimes of cowardice 
and of abandoning the Palestinian cause and in doing so once again underscores the isolated
125 Leaflet No. 14, dated 15 April 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit.
126 Military Communique issued by the Qassam Brigades, dated 22 March 2001, in Yonah Alexander, opt, cit.
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nature of the Palestinian struggle, and in turn the bravery of those who participate in the 
resistance against all odds. However, unlike the Qassamites, Hamas never refers to 
‘Palestinian cowardice and inactivity’ potentially because the population was already 
mobilised and actively resisting Israeli occupation in 1987 when the group emerged. It is 
also quite possible that a pre-established and strong tradition of armed struggle made it both 
impossible and unnecessary to mobilise the Palestinians by accusing them of cowardice. 
Thus Hamas develops the ‘cowardice/dishonour -  activism/honour’ narrative further by 
framing the Arab nations as impotent and dishonourable as opposed to the oppressed yet 
brave and active Palestinians.
“Our Mujahid, patient and steadfast people ... in the entire land of 
Palestine are asking today, what is our Nation waiting for? What is 
our Nation’s reaction while witnessing its sons in the holy land 
murdered, slaughtered, and their houses and villages demolished and 
destroyed? Is such silence towards this pogrom permissible among 
brothers and holders of the same religion? Will Arab dignity and 
chivalry accept continuation of that silence?”127
Or:
“What has happened to you, O rulers of Egypt?... Has your national 
zealousness died and your pride run out while the Jews daily 
perpetrate grave and base crimes against the people and the children 
[of Palestine]...Have the rulers paralyzed your movement and 
stripped you of your power, making you so impotent that even the 
usurpers are no longer frightened of you”128
As opposed to:
“Our courageous pupils [the Palestinian youth] have taken active 
part in escalating the uprising, devoting all their time and effort.
They were fired with the spirit of revolt against the occupation, the 
plundering, and the oppression. With chest bared they met the armed
127 Hamas Political Communique, dated 24 October 2001, in Yonah Alexander, opt, cit.
128 Hamas Leaflet No. 1, dated January 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit.
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forces, determined to attain their freedom and to expel the usurpers 
of their land and homeland. They sacrificed martyr after martyr.
Their spirit did not falter. They did not show weakness and had no 
fear of the Jewish nazism”129.
And:
“Despite the ugly Zionist oppression and despite the policy of the 
iron fist and the thick club, despite the continuing procession of 
martyrs, the broken hands and legs that fill the hospitals, despite all 
this your blessed uprising continues...declaring to the world...that 
our people is opposed to the occupation and refuses to forgo its right 
to Palestine”130.
A noteworthy subtext to the main narrative of impotence and emasculation is one that
frames Palestine as a ‘bride’ whose honour every good Palestinian has a duty to defend.
Again, this subtext has long-standing historical roots and is significant especially because
of the progressive construction of what may best be described as the ‘blood cult’ in
1 <11
Palestinian social consciousness by the end of the first intifada . In casting the country as 
the bride of the martyr, this imagery refers back to a rich tradition where female honour 
must be defended at all costs. The main imagery here is that of Palestine as the bride of the 
martyr and of her mahr (bride-price) which must be paid, not in gold but in blood: “My 
country is my bride, and her mahr is my martyrdom”132. It is therefore not surprising that 
the martyrs’ blood also often takes the place of the traditional wedding henna that decorates 
a bride’s hands and forms a graphic, but effective, symbol of sacrifice and heroic 
martyrdom in defence of national honour. Such symbolism is clearly reminiscent of the folk 
nationalism of the fellahin whose honour was inextricably linked to land. Hamas imbibes 
this melodramatic, yet powerful, subtext and plays its own part in furthering the 
construction the blood cult in Palestine.
129 Hamas Leaflet No. 11, dated 1 April 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit.
130 Hamas Leaflet No. 7, dated 4 March 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit.
131 The term ‘blood cult’ is first used by Helena L. Schulz in her work.
132 Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, The Road to Martyrs Square, opt, cit.. p. 76
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(iv)Militant heroic martyrdom: reinterpreting and escalating an established norm
Just as Hamas inherited the three core components of Palestinian national identity 
delineated above, it also inherited an established norm of militant heroic martyrdom. As 
stated previously, this norm traces its roots to the armed resistance of the Great Revolt, the 
military action of 1948 and the fedayeen ideology of the 1960s. Militant heroic martyrdom 
had already emerged as a violent expression against occupation and served clearly 
instrumental purposes for both political parties as well as individuals. While the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Hamas’ parent organisation, had participated militarily in both 1948 and 
1967, thereby very clearly contributing to the construction of this norm, its policy in the 
two decades after 1967 eschewed military action in favour of social service . The creation 
of Hamas marked a clear break with this twenty year old policy when in 1987 it entered the 
intifada as the ‘military arm’ of the Brotherhood. It is therefore not surprising that armed 
resistance and heroic martyrdom are identified as pre-requisites to freedom in Hamas 
literature, slogans and graffiti from the very beginning. For example, Hamas’ very first 
leaflet issued in January 1988 states:
“Let the whole world hear that the Muslim Palestinian people rejects 
the surrender solution, rejects an international conference, for these 
will not restore our people’s rights in its homeland and on its soil.
The Palestinian people accuse all who seek this [solution] of 
weaving a plot against its rights and its sacred national cause.
Liberation will not be completed without sacrifice, blood and jihad  
that continues until victory” (emphasis added)134.
It is evident from the language in this very first political communique that Hamas 
consciously rejected peaceful political solutions in favour of militant activism. It has been 
illustrated elsewhere in this thesis how, at least partially, this was a strategic decision rooted 
in the Brotherhood’s fear of losing ground in the Palestinian political arena, especially in
133 For details on the participation o f the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948 and 1967 see for example, Yezid 
Sayigh, Armed Struggle, opt, cit. ; Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad El-Awaisi, The Muslim Brothers and the 
Palestine Question 1928-1947 (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998); Shaul Mishal and 
Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2000)
134 Hamas Leaflet No. 1, dated January 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit.
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1 'X^light of the activism that characterised the 1987 intifada . However, what is most 
significant here is the way in which Hamas, from the very first instance, revitalised 
entrenched notions of sacrifice and martyrdom on the one hand, while also re-introducing 
Islam into the narrative of Palestinian nationalism. In other words, Hamas, like all previous 
armed movements in Palestine, re-linked the traditional idea of sacrifice with the Islamic 
concepts of jihad  (holy war) and ishtishad (martyrdom) . Therefore from the time of its 
inception, Hamas consciously inserted itself into and attempted to both appropriate and 
operationalised an established narrative of militant heroic martyrdom.
It is crucial to note the way in which Hamas used other key narratives of Palestinian 
collective identity, alone or in combination, to re-articulate the necessity of self-sacrifice 
and heroic martyrdom. Hamas achieved this by first highlighting the key themes of 
Palestinian selfhood outlined above in its literature. In doing so, it painted for a modem 
audience, a picture of passive Palestinian suffering and sacrifice. Based on this, it then 
articulated the need to recapture agency through active armed struggle and militant heroic 
martyrdom. In entering the intifada as the military arm of an established Palestinian 
political entity, Hamas successfully wove itself into the active face of what is a complex 
and multi-layered narrative of Palestinian nationalism. More importantly it once again 
placed sacrifice and martyrdom at the very core of this narrative. Thus, Hamas not only 
inserted itself into but also propelled the basic ‘active-passive’ cyclical dichotomy of 
‘armed struggle/ heroic martyrdom’ and ‘suffering/sacrifice’ that characterises the narrative 
of Palestinian selfhood. In short Hamas’ militant struggle signified the active reclamation 
of Palestinian honour, dignity and glory through militant heroic martyrdom, and thus 
contributed to the evolution of Palestinian national identity.
By placing militant heroic martyrdom at the very centre of its resistance narrative Hamas 
also revived and propagated the powerful Palestinian tradition of the blood cult, thereby 
normalising and legitimising violence in the intifada. Hamas was certainly not the only 
political faction to evoke the traditional imagery of blood and honour, and by the time the 
first intifada ended, this occasional concept had evolved into a fully developed narrative of 
the blood cult. The message conveyed by the narrative of the blood cult was that the only
135 For details see Chapter III
136 For details on Hamas’ deliberate Islamisation o f Palestinian nationalism see Chapter V
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way to stop the bloodshed caused by occupation was to kill and die for the nation, i.e. spill 
more blood. Blood was literally everywhere -  it “soaked the land, which was commonly 
described as haemorrhaging’ like a wound”, the streets were awashed or ‘hennaed’ with it, 
the revolutionaries “paid a tax of blood and martyrdom” and the blood of martyrs “was said 
to light up the way, make henna on the hands of the living... flow across the land or cover 
the land like a libation, and perhaps the most common of all intifada figures, irrigate the 
soil of the homeland”137. Another common metaphor was the martyr ingesting the blood 
and/or flesh of his enemy while offering his own blood as a sacrificial gift at the altar of the 
nation. Thus the “intifada was a tree irrigated by the blood of its martyrs” and when this 
“pure blood irrigated the land roses would appear”138 and suffering would be alleviated. 
Blood therefore came to be synonymous with purity, martyrdom, sacrifice and nationalism 
and blood allegories became acceptable expressions of militant heroic martyrdom serving 
to normalise and ritualise the escalating violence. Hamas encapsulated this symbolic 
imagery of blood and martyrdom in many of its songs, videos, leaflets and speeches:
“Palestinian blood has been flowing since the feet of the new Tatars 
set foot on a land blessed by Allah ... this torrent will not be stopped 
except by a torrent of revolution and giving... ”139
“Flay my bones with a whip; put my neck under the knife.
Break, break my bones and shed my blood.. .140”
“Kill me, rend me, drown me in my blood;
You will never live in my land, you will never fly in my sky . . .141 ”
“...the only solution is to the problem is blood, knee-deep...142”
137 Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, opt, cit. pp. 91-92
138 Ibid., p. 92
139 Ibid., p. 59. The lines from song no. 2, side 1 o f Call o f Jihad
140 Ibid., p. 93. A mawwal (chanted introduction) from a Hamas anthem.
141 Ibid., p. 105. These words are spoken by Sheikh Hamid al-Beitawi, a Hamas cleric in a video that first 
depicts Palestinian before calling for martyrdom.
142 Ibid., p. 98. A line from a song in the Hamas-produced audiocassette, Islamic Zajel 3
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Thus Hamas gradually re-created an environment where violence was normalised and the 
martyr and bloodshed glorified. By using imagery reminiscent of the fedayeen culture of 
the 1960s, the blood cult rebuilt the image of the martyr as a cultural hero. Martyrs 
represented Palestinian performative identity because martyrdom signified struggling in 
response to suffering. As such, martyrs were again the living embodiment of active 
Palestinian nationalism. They were to be cherished and specific days were devoted to 
honour them. Symbolic funerals processions were held and death for the nation glorified. 
Funerals increasingly became large-scale “nationalist demonstrations and 
manifestations”143. All this served to create a space where Palestinians could revel in the 
pride and glory of militant heroic martyrdom -  an exercise that was fully facilitated by 
Hamas. Hamas revived martyrdom as the honourable way of confronting the enemy and 
reclaiming agency. Like its predecessors, it again juxtapositioned the honour of martyrdom 
with the dishonour of negotiations, oppression and occupation through slogans like, “Yes to 
martyrdom and immolation ... no to disgrace”144.
Having re-established the position of self-sacrifice in the nationalist discourse, Hamas then 
played a key role in escalating the manifestation of heroic martyrdom, thereby consciously 
participating in the evolution of Palestinian nationalism and national identity formation. A 
survey of early Hamas leaflets suggests that it had adopted a pre-meditated strategy of 
confrontation and escalation from the very beginning of the intifada. It justified this 
escalation by drawing upon other key themes of Palestinian selfhood and the violent 
response of the Israeli state towards the Palestinian intifada:
“Today as the Muslim Palestinian people persist in rejecting the 
Jews’ policy, a policy of deporting Palestinians from their homeland 
and leaving behind families and children -  the people stresses to the 
Jews that the struggle will continue and escalate, its methods and 
instruments will be improved, until the Jews drink what they have 
given our unarmed people to drink!' (emphasis added)145.
143 Helena L. Schulz, opt, cit. p. 65
144 Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, opt, cit. p. 59
145 Hamas Leaflet No. 1, Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit.
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“O plundering occupier, violence on your part will only bring about 
an escalation o f the outburst. What has taken place so far is a 
prologue to what is yet to come, and the land will not be able to bear 
the oppression (emphasis added)”146.
Hamas therefore actively encouraged the Palestinians to graduate from using stones 
towards more violent confrontation through slogans like: “Strike, strike by Molotov...after 
the stone, the Kalashnikov!”147 A survey of Hamas literature from the first intifada reflects 
a consistent escalation in the weapons its shabab used against the Israeli army. Yet it must 
be emphasised that while early Hamas leaflets speak of martyrs, no mention is ever made of 
suicide bombings. In other words, despite Hamas’ deliberate efforts to escalate the conflict 
and revive the blood cult, it had as yet not evolved its narrative of militant heroic 
martyrdom to the point that it was manifested as a suicide attack:
“The blood of our martyrs shall not be forgotten. Every drop of 
blood shall become a Molotov cocktail, a time bomb and a roadside 
charge that will rip out the intestines of the Jews (emphasis 
added).”148
This however changed by the early 1990s. Many scholars attribute this shift towards suicide 
missions to the December 1992 deportation in which 415 Islamic activists were deported to 
southern Lebanon by the Rabin government as punitive action taken for the killing of five 
Israeli servicemen149. The Lebanese government refused to take in these deportees. Unable 
to take shelter in Lebanon and not allowed to return to the territories, these deportees were 
therefore forced to live in makeshift camps in the hills of southern Lebanon for much of 
1993. It was in these circumstances that they came into contact with the Hizballah which 
provided them with both material and moral support. Consequently, a strategic transfer of
146 Hamas Leaflet No. 2, Ibid.
147 Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, opt, cit. p. 59
148 Hamas Leaflet No. 1, Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit.
149 It must be noted that the successful ejection o f Israeli and American forces from Lebanon as a result o f the 
suicide bombings campaign o f the 1980s is widely regarded as proof o f the effectiveness o f this tactic. Within 
the Palestinian territories Fathi al-Shiqaqi, the founding leader o f the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), 
advocated the use o f this tactic against the Israel’s military superiority as early as the mid-1980s though the 
first suicide attack did not take place till 1993 and then by then Hamas operative, Tamam Nablusi. Personal 
interview, Anat Kurz, Tel Aviv University, 27 December 2004.
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military skills and tactics is believed by many to have occurred at this point, resulting in the 
first successful suicide bombings in 1993.
Scholars like Yoram Schweitzer believe that the idea that suicide bombings were 
“imported” from Lebanon is a myth because suicide missions had been attempted in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict before the deportees returned from southern Lebanon. Instead he 
attributes the emergence of suicide bombings in Palestine to a “copy-cat phenomenon” 
which was based on purely strategic considerations150. However, that the first successful 
attacks were conducted only from 1993 onwards suggests that while the concept of suicide 
attacks may not have been directly imported, there was at least some degree of transfer in 
military technology as a result of the 1992 deportations, making the attacks conducted post- 
1992 more effective151.
In the early 1990s, Hamas merged this newfound military expertise with its original 
rhetoric of militant heroic martyrdom, successfully negotiating the shift, in which the 
narrative of martyrdom escalated and acquired the profile of a suicide operation. With this 
shift it was no longer enough that agents of the nation were willing to die for its 
preservation. Now their deaths became a necessary prerequisite. Hamas’ literature shows 
this shift quite clearly. Its narrative progressed to clearly identify militant heroic martyrdom 
with suicide bombings as the next step in confronting the enemy: “After the stone, a knife, 
and after that martyrdom”152. Hamas further bolstered and normalised this interpretation of 
militant heroic martyrdom through a concentrated campaign of glorifying bombers. 
Palestinian society was inundated with the image of the heroic martyr from the early 1990s. 
Hamas’ text and electronic publications carried elaborate eulogies of each suicide bomber 
which described in-depth the operation in which he was killed along with the casualties he
150 Personal interview with Yoram Schweitzer, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Tel Aviv 
University, 23 December 2004. For a more theoretical approach on the contagion effects o f suicide bombing 
see for example: Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Logic o f Terrorism: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product o f Strategic 
Choice’, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins o f Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States o f  Mind 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Mia Bloom, ‘The Contagion Effect o f Suicide Bombing’, 
paper presented at the annual meeting o f the International Studies Association (ISA), Montreal, 17 March 
2004; and Mia Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure o f Suicide Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005)
151 For more on the copy-cat characteristics o f terrorism see Martha Crenshaw, ‘Logic o f Terrorism’, opt, cit.
152 Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service o f Jihad (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press in association with Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006). These are the 
lyrics o f a song from the Hamas audiocassette, The Pearl o f the Al-Aqsa Martyrs, as quoted in Matthew 
Levitt, p. 137
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inflicted upon the enemy. Hamas’ children’s magazine, al-Fatih, carried stories about the 
life and death of its martyrs. Often the magazine also reproduced their last wills. The 
shahid’s family was visited and assisted. Hamas literature and videos often showed the 
shahid’s family expressing pride and joy at his martyrdom. Pictures of the martyr were 
distributed as fliers and posters and larger-than-life murals were drawn on buildings. 
Hamas posters often showed its bombers as irrigating the land with their blood or marrying
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the land of Palestine. Faces of martyrs were printed on t-shirts and caps . All this worked 
towards normalising suicide attacks as an acceptable version of militant heroic martyrdom 
for Palestinian society.
Sporadic martyrdom operations were conducted by Hamas and other organisations between 
1993 and 2000. But by the time the Al-Aqsa intifada erupted in 2000, the total number of 
incidents had increased significantly as had the number of individuals volunteering to take 
part in such missions. This increase suggests that suicide missions had by now been fully 
entrenched into and operationalised within the Palestinian landscape thereby reflecting a 
consolidation of the re-interpreted norm of MHM. Hamas continued to actively disseminate 
this narrative through various means including its leaflets, graffiti and poetry. A July 2001 
Palestinian television broadcast, for example, featured a programme on Hamas summer 
camps in which a young boy was shown reciting a poem he had learnt in his time there:
“I dedicate this poem to the prisoners, martyrs, and the wounded,
Oh nation, oh, my people, make your roar and the sound of thunder 
heard
Strike the rock, explode, stop the soldier’s advance
Make your scream of anger heard by everyone everywhere.. .”154
Another Hamas poem revives memories of suffering before portraying the fearlessness that 
is supposedly characteristic of a suicide bomber:
“My life, although one of suffering and strife,
153 Personal interview with Meir Litvak, The Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 
Tel Aviv University, 26 December 2004. Personal interview with Prof. Manuel Hassassian, Executive Vice 
President and Middle East and International Relations Specialist, Bethlehem University, 4 January 2005.
154 Ibid. p . 125
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My path crossing places where troubles are rife,
Still I am oblivious to fear and the wicked do not scare me 
Since my flesh, like wolves, will tear apart its prey”155
As these statements illustrate, Hamas’ imagery of MHM became progressively more 
reflective of suicidal violence. While Hamas played a part in reviving and escalating the 
norm of heroic martyrdom in Palestinian society, the concept of the militant martyr, as 
established above, was already very much a part of the cultural struggle for national 
validation and legitimacy. There is no denying that Hamas reinterpreted the concept of 
heroic martyrdom as suicide attacks. It is also evident that it channelised key themes of 
Palestinian selfhood into constructing a narrative which glorified and actively encouraged a 
new variant of militant heroic martyrdom, thereby creating a conducive environment for the 
progressive normalisation of suicide attacks. This conscious radicalisation of the 1987 
intifada served to engender a climate of relentless violent struggle which opposed any form 
of negotiation or compromise. It is perhaps because Hamas adopted such an active role in 
steering the intifada that some writers attribute the emergence and rise of suicide attacks in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to organisational brainwashing and coercion156. However, 
while the role of the organisation was certainly a factor, the sheer number of individuals 
willing to volunteer for suicide operations by September 2000 suggests that traditional 
explanations of ‘brainwashing’ and organisational manipulation/recruitment are not enough
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to explain the society's willingness to support suicide bombings . The active-passive 
dichotomy of the national struggle delineated above offers a more nuanced explanation by 
highlighting how Palestinian society, already steeped in the norm of heroic martyrdom, 
opted for violent struggle which gradually escalated to a new level. Moreover, the manner 
in which martyrdom was revived and re-constructed enabled individuals to achieve a
155 Ibid. p. 133
156 While a number o f writers profess this view some well known ones include for example: Scott Atran, 
‘Genesis o f Suicide Terror’, Science Magazine, Vol. 299 (March 2003) and ‘Individual Factors in Suicide 
Terrorism and Fictive Kin in Suicide Terrorism’, Science Magazine, April 2004 letters ; Ariel Merari, 
‘Deterring Fear’, Harvard International Review Vol. 23.4 (2002)
157 See for example: Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs: The Palestinian Case and 
the Pursuit o f a Martyrdom Complex’, paper presented at the annual meeting o f the International Studies 
Association (ISA), Montreal, 20 March 2004; Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Symbolic Dimensions o f  Suicide 
Terrorism, in Ami Pedahzur (ed.), Root Causes o f Suicide Terrorism: The Globalisation o f Martyrdom 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2006)
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significant degree of moral disengagement and de-individuation (where social identity 
subsumes individual self) vis-a-vis the enemy, and thereby sanctioned suicidal violence.
As described in the previous chapter, the Palestinian reversion to violent struggle and its 
acceptance of suicide missions at a societal level is well demonstrated in Nichole Argo’s 
November 2002 study of 15 pre-empted suicide bombers which she conducted in Israeli 
prisons. Of the 15 bombers she interviewed, one had attempted his operation without any 
aid from any Palestinian organisation, 2 had first attempted operations on their own and 
turned to organisations for support only upon incurring problems, 8 out of die 15 had 
volunteered for their suicide missions, and 5 out of the 15 had commenced executing their 
missions within 10 days of committing to the operation, and over 90 percent undertook 
their mission within a month of committing to them158. Thus Argo concludes that 
“throughout the course of the second intifada, the ability for bombers to de-individuate -  
that is, completely assume actions for a social identity -  without ties to a ‘cell’, ‘training’, 
long- or even medium-term preparation” 159, became evident. In other words, more and 
more bombers seem to have been self-selected and the role of organisations as facilitators 
seems to have declined considerably. This, as mentioned in Chapter III, is clearly 
manifested in the loose allegiances that many bombers have to organisations. Argo’s 
interviews indicate that the lack of material or logistical expertise caused 3 out of 8 
bombers who volunteered for a mission with one organisation to ultimately switch to 
another.
For our purposes, that Hamas conducted the first suicide operation may have initially been 
significant in terms of how the norm of martyrdom came to be re-articulated and expressed 
in Palestinian society. But by September 2000, the rearticulated norm seems to have gained 
enough legitimacy in its new avatar to deem organisations peripheral. Again this suggests 
that the norm of MHM as a component of Palestinian identity was far more embedded in 
society than the organisation(s) articulating or escalating it. It was, therefore, potentially 
uncomplicated for certain sections of society to internalise a new variation of an older 
established norm. In other words, suicide missions were propelled not only by 
organisations like Hamas but also by Palestinian society. Furthermore, it must be stressed
158 All interview figures from Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs, opt, cit.
159 Ibid. p. 9
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that suicide attacks emerged and continue to exist side-by-side with more traditional forms 
of violent struggle, i.e. roadside bombs, knife attacks etc. Research reveals how only the 
number of total suicide attacks has increased in the Palestinian scenario rather than the 
overall propensity for suicide missions in preference to conventional attacks160. This further 
suggests that the norm of MHM has merely expanded to make ‘space’ for a newer form of 
violent confrontation rather than altered significantly. This might also explain how the 
debate on the validity of suicide operations is accommodated within Palestinian society.
Interestingly, data shows that individuals who took part in suicide missions echo Hamas’ 
logic when explaining why they opted for these operations. In other words, these 
individuals also refer back to key themes of Palestinian selfhood that Hamas uses to 
construct its narrative of escalated heroic martyrdom. This suggests that the discourse that 
Hamas constructed to legitimise suicide operations has been internalised by the society to a 
certain degree. Again, it must be stressed that this internalisation while facilitated by 
Hamas cleverly tapping into established narratives of the Palestinian national struggle and 
selfhood was relatively simple because these narratives already existed. Therefore 
individuals justify their MHM by evoking established discourses of Palestinian selfhood 
and reframing them in the context of a modem suicide attack. For example Argo’s 
interviewees when asked what motivated them to become istishhadi (martyrs) stated:
“I did this because of the suffering of the Palestinian people. The 
falling of the shahadin [those killed by Israeli forces] ... and the 
destruction everywhere in Palestine” 161
Or:
“I didn’t decide in one moment. I had been thinking about it from the 
beginning of the intifada, looking for an opportunity and an 
organisation to help me do it. There were few factors affecting the
160 Luca Ricolfi, ‘Palestinian’, in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Making Sense o f Suicide Missions (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005)
161 Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing Human Bombs, opt, cit. p. 11
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decision -  the stress of the occupation, the humiliation of my cousin 
being searched by soldiers, the killing ... against the kids...”
In every instance, the case for suicide bombing is built upon the perceived injustice of 
occupation. As stated above Hamas builds the narrative of martyrdom by highlighting the 
inhumanities of Israeli oppression which enables it to justify suicide attacks against this 
apparatus as an act of selfless martyrdom. Hamas also highlights the obvious asymmetry in 
the conflict and the helplessness of the Palestinian population. In doing so Hamas 
successfully dehumanises the enemy and formulates the mechanisms of moral 
disengagement which enables the option of suicide attacks to be practiced without guilt. 
Palestinian society seems to have internalised this very clearly constructed narrative and 
thus in turn imbibed the mechanisms of moral disengagement to such an extent so as to be 
able to both volunteer for and support suicide missions163.
Munabrahim Daoud, the mother of Mohammed al Daoud, who was killed shortly after the 
beginning of the second intifada, explains why her son was killed: “The soldiers that were 
there that day are savages. They came to kill. They thought that by killing a lot of people 
they would end it [the intifada] quickly”164. The helplessness, anger and dehumanisation 
voiced by Munabrahim are typical of many Palestinians and it is this which fuels suicide 
attacks against the Israelis. The element of revenge and retaliation as established in the 
previous chapter is also a common feature that emerges in individual motivations for 
suicide attacks. Dr. Eyad Sarraj, describes how the motives behind a suicide bombing are 
often rooted in personal tragedy or trauma -  injury to a family member or the death of a 
friend165. Again, the logic of revenge is built upon experiences of humiliation and 
oppression under occupation but a recent trauma seems to often act as a trigger. Ala, a 
Hamas activist, asked me in an informal discussion: “The Israelis take your father from 
your home in the middle of the night with no explanation; you hear nothing about how he 
is, where he is or even if he is alive for months. Then he comes back, paralysed neck-down.
163 See Albert Bandura, ‘Mechanisms o f Moral Disengagement’, in Walter Reich, Origins o f Terrorism, opt, 
cit.
164 As quoted in Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs, opt, cit. p. 123
165 As quoted in Hisham H. Ahmed, ‘Palestinian Resistance and ‘Suicide Bombing’: Causes and 
Consequences’, in Tore Bjorgo (ed.), Root Causes o f  Terrorism: Proceedings from an International Expert 
Meeting in Oslo, 9-11 June 2003 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute o f International Affairs, 2003), p. 133
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What would you do? Stay quiet or take action? Take revenge?166” Hence conditions of 
protracted conflict have fed the construction of a culture of misery and blood in which 
revenge is not discouraged but instead framed as an acceptable and even desirable course of 
action.
Issues of asymmetry, fear and victimisation are clearly evident in these statements and it 
seems that violent action not only expresses frustration and revenge, but in doing so enables 
the individual to seize back agency and therefore power in a situation of powerlessness. 
Sarraj describes how children in Palestinian territories dream of martyrdom. The way the 
shahid is honoured and glorified in Palestinian society certainly contributes to this desire. 
However, Sarraj also stresses that “martyrdom gives [the child] the feeling of power to 
compensate for the weakness of the father who cannot defend his family”167 -  a feeling 
again very clearly rooted in the humiliation, helplessness and violence that is so intrinsic to 
the Palestinian experience. Numerous other statements suggest that violence imparts 
agency to the individual exercising it. When Argo asked the bombers she interviewed what 
the term istash ’had (martyrdom) meant to them one of them replied: “it is martyrdom: the 
holding of land, religion, respect”168. A suicide bombing thus incorporates for the 
individual an assertion of identity, respect and sumud, all of which enable the individual to 
seize power and agency.
Moreover, these statements also suggest that suicide bombing enables agency to be 
exercised in the only sphere which the Israelis cannot control, i.e. the body: “We do not 
have highly-advanced weaponry with which to face a regular army. All we are in control of 
is our bodies. We do not like or want to die. But if this is what it takes to terrorise them as 
they brutalise us all the time, why not do it”?169The bombers believe that their actions will 
“destroy Israeli social life... and force them to leave the country because they are 
afraid”170. Thus suicide attacks are used specifically to retaliate against Israeli occupation 
by instilling the same insecurities within Israeli society as those faced by the Palestinians. It 
is in other words, as described in Chapter III, an attempt to establish a balance of terror. It
166 Informal discussion with Ala (last name withheld), Nablus, 18 January 2005
167 Discussion with journalist Erik Schechter, Tel Aviv, 15 January 2005. See also Erik Schechter, ‘Where 
have all the Bombers Gone?’, Jerusalem Post (6 August 2004)
168 Nichole Argo, ‘Understanding and Defusing the Human Bomb’, opt, cit. p. 11
169 Un-named Palestinian youth quoted in Hisham H. Ahmed, ‘Palestinian Resistance’, opt, cit. p. 129
170 Ibid.
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is thus obvious that individual motivations of survival, retaliation and competition as 
outlined in the previous chapter are encouraged and exacerbated by the narratives of 
humiliation, misery and blood.
Thus militant heroic martyrdom is framed as the “natural response to the brutality of Israeli 
occupation”171. This response also consolidates the image of an active Palestinian identity. 
Closely aligned to this is an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ subtext which frames the Israelis as weak, 
brutal, violent, greedy, dishonourable, cunning and corrupt negative others and the 
Palestinians as their direct opposite172. Thus Israelis love life while the Palestinians not 
only do not fear death but love it passionately -  a trait which gives them the edge over the 
Israelis despite the latter’s military superiority173. This subtext frames Palestinian martyrs 
as positive internal others, i.e. individuals to be admired, imitated and avenged174. These 
internal others are special carriers of Palestinian identity as they alone exercise agency 
within the society though the act of bombing. In other words, they defend the helpless 
through their selfless sacrifice. Once again this subtext has been internalised by Palestinian 
society. For example Shaheel al-Masri, the father of the 2001 Sbarro Pizzeria bomber 
Izzidene al-Masri, stated how proud he was at his son’s wake: “He [Ariel Sharon] is 
continuing the policy of killing our people, and my son succeeded in carrying out a suitable 
response”175. In short, the operationalised norm of militant heroic martyrdom enables the 
Palestinians to consolidate the active-passive dichotomy of their national identity while also 
framing positive and negative others vis-a-vis this identity. Needless to state, the narrative 
of MHM as a component of Palestinian nationalism is in constant flux and made more 
complex by a continuing internal battle between rival perspectives and political factions 
who see different futures for it176.
171 Informal discussion with Ala (last name withheld), opt, cit.
172 See leaflets in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, opt, cit.
173 See for example Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, Road to Martyrs Square, opt, cit. p. 32
174 I would like to thank Dr. Michelle Pace, University o f Birmingham, for introducing me to the concept o f  
the positive other in the context o f suicide bombings in the Palestinian territories.
175 As quoted in Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs, opt, cit. p. 131
176 Needless to state, the narrative o f MHM as a component o f Palestinian nationalism is in constant flux and 
made more complex by a continuing internal battle between rival perspectives and political factions who see 
different futures for it. For studies on how Israeli and Palestinian narratives o f national identity mirror each 
other see for example: Stephen Cohen, ‘Intractability and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’ and Shibley 
Telhami, ‘Beyond Resolution? The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict’, both in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier 
Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.), Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases o f Intractable Conflict (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Institute o f Peace, 2005); Farhad Khosrokhavar (translated by David Macey), Suicide 
Bombers: A llah’s New Martyrs (Ann Arbor, MI and London: Pluto Press, 2005)
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II. Conclusion: Identity, the Other and the Norm of Martyrdom in Palestinian Social 
Reality
Having first assumed the importance of social context this chapter has specifically drawn 
attention to the element of changing Palestinian identity and its emergence and 
(re)definition in direct relation to the ‘significant other’, as represented by the Israeli state. 
This approach does not reduce Palestinian national identity to a reactive, residual category 
which is merely parasitic on the Israeli one. Instead, highlighting the element of ‘identity’ 
and ‘the other’ forces us to hone in on the process of Palestinian identity formation and 
recognise it as an intersubjective practice. It also implicitly places attention on the 
Palestinian narrative of social reality as opposed to the Israeli one, a logical focus given the 
social and political origins of the suicide bomber. This focus on processes of identity 
formation allows the chapter to tease out the layers of political identity that exist under the 
overarching, seemingly monolithic, rubric of the Palestinian national identity, which in turn 
facilitates an understanding of political competition and conflict within Palestinian society 
and political groups. The complexity which must be highlighted here arises because the 
focus of this research, i.e. Palestinian identity, is in a state of constant flux and 
reformulation as a result of interactions with the other. The same can be said for the identity 
of the significant other. This chapter attempts to circumvent these complications and at the 
same time avoid “conceptualising identity as a unitary circumscribable concept”177 by 
establishing some base givens. This is in line with Wendt’s conception that actors already 
have “private, domestically rooted beliefs”178 about both self and the other even prior to a 
first encounter. Thus despite shifting identities, Palestinian self perception is shown to be 
based consistently on a narrative of suffering and dispossession. Similarly the Palestinian 
construction of the Israeli other in negative terms of the coloniser, the oppressor and 
occupier, and its chosen strategy to confront the same is shown as evolving in processes of 
interaction. Most striking in this construction was the unswerving attribution of power in 
the Palestinian narrative to this significant other. This held true in all situations except 
those where violence was exercised by the Palestinians; in those situations the power was 
re-distributed, if not equally between both actors, at least more evenly than in situations of
177 Maya Zehfiiss, Constructivism in International Relations, opt, cit.. p. 92.
178 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f International Politics, op t. cit.. p. 141
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170non-violent passivity . The chapter also identifies this attribution of power as the crucial 
point where a self-image of heroic martyrdom is inserted into the analysis and which 
acquires significance as a historically important facet in Palestinian identity formation. In 
other words, MHM in the Palestinian consciousness may be understood as emerging within 
the confines of the two broad stabilities of ‘foundational’ identity (based on suffering and 
dispossession) and the ‘foundational’ other (based on oppression and occupation). 
Identifying these two stable foundational elements then permits the chapter to recognise 
MHM as a long-standing powerful norm in Palestinian society and thereby categorise 
suicide bombings as its latest, most violent manifestation. In other words, the chapter 
contextualises suicide operations as a more violent articulation of a foundational identity 
based primarily in suffering, dispossession and martyrdom. This allows it to successfully 
position suicide bombings in the escalating trajectory of MHM within the Palestinian 
context and understand how they emerged within this specific context. This escalation, 
illustrated today via the normalisation and internalisation of suicide operations by 
significant sections of the Palestinian population, demonstrates the inter-subjective 
evolution of MHM as a norm.
There are a number of questions which this chapter has not addressed or circumvented due 
to limitations of space. Questions like: Has suicide bombing as MHM acquired the status of 
a sustainable norm in Palestinian society? Can understanding the intersubjective nature of 
norms enable us to manipulate ideational structure in order to make suicide bombings 
‘fade’? These are avenues where research is necessary. Any sustained empirical analysis of 
the Israeli- Palestinian conflict from the early 1980s to the present, which also takes into 
account historical interactions between the Israeli and Palestinian populations in the 20th 
century, reveals that the politics of identity, with its focus on ideational rather than material 
forces, drives Palestinian politics in general and suicide bombings in particular. Thus, 
research that focuses on ideational forces as primary, causal and independent, is sorely 
needed for this area of study. This is where social constructivism can play a key role in 
understanding facets of suicidal violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and thereby form 
a crucial component of this work’s proposed theoretical framework of analysis.
179 This is not to suggest that modes o f non-violent protest in the Palestinian context are devoid o f all power. 
Instead on a spectrum it seems that the Palestinians exercise more power when adopting violent means. This 
holds for both self-perception and external observation.
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Chapter V: Jihad, Political Islam and the Duality of 
Suicide Bombings
"...And it is a Jihad until 
either victory or martyrdom. ” 
-Hamas slogan
PARTI
I. Introduction
The preceding chapter, seeking to construct the second pillar of the proposed theoretical 
framework of analysis, illustrated how the culturally specific norm of militant heroic 
martyrdom was appropriated and re-articulated as suicidal violence by Hamas in order to 
explain how this phenomenon emerged within the Israeli-Palestinian landscape of conflict. 
In line with the assertions made in the previous chapters, that suicide attacks, as practiced 
by Hamas, are rational acts of violence rooted in the norm of militant heroic martyrdom 
historically constructed within the specifically Palestinian socio-political reality, this 
chapter will strive to probe and illustrate the role of religion in these operations. In doing 
so, this chapter will contribute to the debate on the relationship between violence, Islam, 
politics and the contemporary world and demonstrate that Hamas’ use of religious rhetoric 
to justify the violence it uses facilitates a distinctly state-oriented political agenda, where 
the language of religion, in this case political Islam, is used specifically to grant legitimacy 
to the movement. In addition, by identifying how the ideological framework of jihad is 
reinterpreted by Hamas using political Islam, this chapter will also construct the third, and 
final, pillar of the proposed theoretical framework of analysis and explain how suicidal 
violence is justified, legitimised and enacted specifically within the Palestinian socio­
political, cultural reality.
Of the many theological concepts invoked by Hamas, the call to jihad is central to the fight 
for the Palestinian state. Classical Islam divides the world into the ‘domain of Islam’ {dor 
al-islam) and the ‘domain of war’ {dor al-harb) and believes that participation in the jihad
172
to overcome dar al-harb is the moral responsibility of all Muslims capable of assuming it. 
Hamas not only alludes to this moral responsibility but also harnesses it to the Palestinian 
nationalist project in its call for jihad. The Islamic tradition of jihad is usually interpreted 
by scholars as being equivalent to the Western just war tradition. This work therefore 
believes that just war theory provides a successful entry point into understanding and 
contextualising the phenomenon of suicidal violence as used by Hamas as part of its jihad 
against the Israeli state1.
The first part of this chapter addresses the main components of just war theory as accepted 
in international relations before asserting that this received understanding must be 
expanded in order to incorporate the concept of modem jihad in its full scope . The Islamic 
convention of jihad in its classical form not only incorporate the Western conceptions of 
‘just war’ and ‘limited war’ but also that of ‘holy war’, even though the latter is 
traditionally seen in Western just war theory as irreconcilable with the just and limited war 
ideals. This work asserts that political Islam further expands the concept of jihad to include, 
in addition to these three traditional components, the even more contradictory conception of 
‘total war’, understood in this work in its broad philosophical sense, as a war fought 
without limits. It is this inclusion of the total war idea within this broad rubric that enables 
Hamas to successfully justify, legitimise and enact suicidal violence as a modern-day jihad 
against the Israeli state.
Having expanded the parameters of traditional just war theory, part two of the chapter 
proceeds to demonstrate how this nuanced theoretical understanding can be applied to 
contemporary realities, specifically in relation to Hamas. This section of the chapter 
contextualises ‘martyrdom operations’, i.e. suicide bombings, as an intrinsic part of the 
broader jihad narrative constructed by Hamas and demonstrates how the language of
1 Chris Brown defines the normative approach as one which addresses the moral dimensions o f international 
relations. He delineates three focal points o f the normative theory agenda as: the moral basis o f state 
autonomy, the ethics o f force (which incorporates the Just War tradition) and international justice with the 
focus being the obligations o f richer states towards their poorer counterparts. This work will address only the 
aspect o f the just war tradition and ethics o f force thesis. See Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: 
New Normative Approaches (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
2 This work recognises that the just war tradition, unlike the social science methodologies/theories o f rational 
choice or social constructivism is a philosophy and one way o f thinking about the relationship between war 
and politics. However, in contemporary scholarship it has been ‘reduced to’ and used as a theory, which is 
how this work chooses to apply it. A further discussion o f this is included in the section that follows.
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political Islam enables Hamas to place suicidal violence at the very core of this rhetoric. 
This focus on political Islam as an alternative value system also explains how, for a radical 
Muslim organisation like Hamas, there is no real conflict between the state, modernity and 
religion. Instead, Hamas’ political ambitions are identified as being clearly state-oriented 
where political Islam is used specifically as a tool to facilitate the goal of establishing a 
Palestinian nation-state. In short, political Islam facilitates the expansion of the traditional 
jihad concept to include suicidal violence and also enables Hamas to harness this classical 
Islamic concept the modem ideology of nationalism.
n. The Just War-Holy War and Limited War-Total War Dichotomies: Some 
Conceptual Parameters
The just war theory that has metamorphosed over time and space is a tradition of justifying 
and limiting wars descended from early Christian just war thinking3. It is however difficult 
to speak of a single doctrine of just war or trace the linear development of a single idea. 
Neither is it possible to outline a continuous history of the concept or confine it to one 
particular culture4. Consequently, at best we may state that the “just war doctrine is a set of 
recurrent issues and themes in the discussion of warfare and reflects a general philosophical 
orientation towards the subject”5. In particular, the just war tradition is the military portion 
of the broader theory of statecraft and provides guidance about die place of force in the 
attempt to develop a just social order6.
3 William V. O'Brian states: “From its statement by St. Thomas and its mature elaboration by the seventeenth 
century at the hands o f the Scholastics, just-war doctrine evolved from wholly religious sources to a mixture 
o f religious and secular sources. Thus, the two secular sources- the chivalric code and customary law (jus 
gentium) - were added to the basic doctrine called the Classic Just War Doctrine. After the decline o f both 
Scholastic and secular just-war theories in the period from the seventeenth century to the twentieth centuries, 
there has been a twentieth century revival o f just-war thinking referred to as Modem Just War Doctrine. Its 
components are both religious and secular”. William V. O'Brian, The Conduct o f Just and Limited War (New 
York: Praeger, 1981), p. 13
4 Christian theologians claim just war as a doctrine that both emerged and attained its fully developed form 
within the church while international lawyers identify the just war idea in the articulation of the principles and 
precepts o f their discipline. Simultaneously, military professionals claim that the concepts highlighting the 
restraint o f war and fair play are rooted in considerations o f courtesy and chivalry. See for example, James 
Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint o f  War (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981)
5 Ian Clark, Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 31
6 John Kelsay, Islam and War: The Gulf War and Beyond (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox 
Press, 1993, 1st edition), p. 29
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The just war tradition is composed of two main components: concepts relating to the 
justification for going to war (jus ad bellum) and the concepts relating to restraint in war 
(jus in bello). As per the just war tradition whether or not force may be used is governed by 
a number of criteria namely: just cause, comparative justice, legitimate authority, right 
intention, probability of success, proportionality and last resort. These criteria (jus ad 
bellum), taken as a whole, must be satisfied in order to override the presumption against the 
use of force7. The just war tradition also seeks to curb the degree of violence in a situation 
of war by restraining armed combat between contending parties. This restraint is achieved 
by imposing moral standards and restraints (jus in bello) for the conduct of armed conflict 
which include: non-combatant immunity and proportionality. Historically, these moral 
restraints take the form of the extent of harm that may be done to non-combatants as well as 
the restraints on weapons of war. For the purpose of this work this concept of restraint on 
legitimate weapons in the arena of war as well as non-combatant immunity is of utmost 
importance8.
It must be pointed out that while the Christian/Western just war tradition evolved over the 
space of a thousand years or so, its main precepts were produced and refined roughly 
between the fifth and the seventeenth centuries through the works of Francisco Suarez, 
Francisco de Vitoria and Hugo Grotius9. However, from approximately the late eighteenth 
century onwards little of importance was written in the tradition. This changed dramatically 
in the mid-twentieth century, when something of a “renaissance” occurred in writing and 
thinking about the just war tradition. Nicholas Rengger points out that in the twentieth 
century, the specific context for writing about the just war tended to be generated by events 
in the political world. As a result, the just war tradition developed several faces over the
7 It must be noted that ‘presumption against the use o f force’ is an area o f debate within contemporary just 
war thinking. Thinkers such as James Turner Johnson and Paul Ramsey see there being a strong presumption 
against injustice, rather than against war. The presumption against war, which is applied in much just war 
thinking today, seems to have been introduced by developments in international law.
8 See for example: James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition, opt, cit.: John Kelsay and James Turner 
Johnson (eds.), Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in the 
Western and Islamic Traditions (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991); Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust 
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2006,4th edition)
9 See for example: Chris Brown, Terry Nardin and Nicholas Rengger (eds.), International Relations in 
Political Thought: Texts from Ancient Greece to the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002)
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course of this period of which the secular face became increasingly important10. In the 
twentieth century the tradition also came to be increasingly seen in terms of international 
jurisprudence, rather than a tradition of moral and ethical reflection. This legalisation of the 
just war tradition in combination with the dominance of ‘principles’, ‘rules’ and ‘theories’ 
in contemporary intellectual and political traditions gave rise to notions of set moral rules 
with universal applicability as well as efforts to create a just war theory which could be 
applied to the analysis of the modem political world. James Turner Johnson points out how 
over time jus ad bellum and jus in bello aspects of the just war tradition had come to 
revolve around a given set of central principles. However, it is perhaps this legalisation and 
attempt to generate a just war theory which explain why so, “many of these assumptions 
have either narrowed markedly from their original sense or disappeared altogether, while 
those that remain have become legal, rather than principally ethical, in their force”. The key 
question however is, if the just war tradition, which was as a traditional of practical 
reasoning intimately connected to related understandings of practical life in the late 
medieval and early modem era now, before it was eclipsed by the rise of the state and the 
development of international positive law, can be successfully distilled into and applied as a 
modem theory with a characteristic set of core principles11.
The answer is perhaps best supplied by Johnson’s logic. Johnson, who prefers to refer to a 
tradition of just war rather than to a just war theory, explains how in the West, the just war 
concept is claimed theologians, philosophers, jurists, soldiers and statesmen alike. Christian 
theologians, for example, claim just war as a doctrine that both emerged and attained its 
fully developed form within the church while international lawyers identify the just war 
idea in the articulation of the principles and precepts of their discipline. Simultaneously, 
military professionals claim that the concepts highlighting the restraint of war and fair play 
are rooted in considerations of courtesy and chivalry. Johnson emphasises that despite such 
contradictory claims, all of these categories contributed over the centuries to the growth of 
a tradition in which certain reasons for war are considered appropriate while others are not. 
Further, a remarkable degree of common ground may be identified between the proponents
10 Nicholas Rengger, ‘On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century’, International Affairs, Vol. 78, 
No. 2, April. 2002, p. 358
11 For a discussion on theory see for example: Emre Lakatos (edited by John Worrall and Gregory Currie),
The Methodology o f Scientific Research Programmes, Philosophical Papers Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978), especially the introduction and chapter I.
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of these very different perspectives. Johnson believes that, “when different individuals, 
whatever their perspective, approach the subject of war and its restraints to deal creatively 
with it, no one should expect to find anything but what we do in fact find: differences of 
emphasis, of interpretation, of order, of the way concepts are related to one another, and so 
on”12. Yet beyond these minor differences there is a considerable degree of consensus 
which makes it more meaningful to talk in terms of a tradition of just war, rather than mere 
just war theory.
Extending this logic to modem leanings in intellectual and political traditions, which favour 
theories over abstract philosophies or traditions, Johnson believes that the expression of 
the just war idea as a tradition would enable one to formulate a theory o f just war, as long 
as it is expressed generally and with a sense of open-endedness. Such a method would 
allow for varying interpretations of the general provisions of the theory and also for the 
development of its ideas in correspondence with the changing faces of reality and context. 
In other words, accepting just war foremost as a tradition would be enable one to use it as a 
theory (like any other theory in international relations) to study and analyse a given 
phenomenon. On this basis, this diesis aligns itself with Rengger’s view that the core 
proposition of just war theory is its opposition to injustice.
Limited war doctrine, like the just war doctrine, is an old tradition derived from a variety of 
distinct intellectual foundations. This thesis aligns itself with James Turner Johnson’s view 
that “the limited war idea is but a particular expression of the larger Western consensus on 
restraining war called the ‘just war tradition’”13. The concept of limited war is therefore 
intricately and inextricably interwoven with the ideas of just conduct of war (jus in bello). 
However, while the just war doctrine represents in its development the great traditions 
regarding philosophical speculations about war, the limited war doctrine has evolved 
primarily as a political tradition. Tracing its roots back to thinkers such as Niccolo 
Machiavelli and Carl von Clausewitz, limited war has taken many different shapes and 
forms over the centuries and the term can thus have either a historical or a contemporary 
referent. Historically, the term limited war traditionally referred to the specific kind of 
warfare prevalent in eighteenth century Europe. In the contemporary context however,
12 James Turner Johnson. Just War Tradition and the Restraint o f War, opt, cit.. pp xxi -xxii.
13 Ibid. p. 224
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especially from the 1960s, the term limited war may be used to refer to a number of 
different and more recent ways of conceiving war. Johnson formulates a composite 
definition of limited war in the contemporary context asserting that modem limited wars 
are: wars that are local in nature; fought for limited objectives; fought using limited means 
with regards to the quality and quantity of weaponry used; wars where restraint is reflected 
in the choice of targets for attacks; and finally wars where restraint is also imposed by 
economic and manpower resources14. In this manner, the political tradition of limited war 
has continued to evolve closely intertwined with modem just war thinking, a process that 
has been facilitated by developments in international law which regards setting limits jus in 
bello as a crucial component of what constitutes a modem just war. Hence, restraints in the 
choice of targets and quality of weaponry are, once again, of particular relevance to the 
analysis forwarded later in this chapter.
The constraints placed on war, which formed the main precepts of the traditions of both just 
and limited war date back to the Middle Ages in Europe. The norms of war in Medieval 
Europe were those of bellum hostile, concerned primarily with the regulation of violence, 
plunder and the ransoming of prisoners. However, in wars against outsiders, infidels or 
barbarians, Europe followed the brutal Roman legacy of bellum romanum or guerre 
mortelle, a “conflict in which no holds were barred and all those designated as enemy, 
whether bearing arms or not, could be indiscriminately slaughtered”15. By identifying 
Romanitas (literally, “Romanness”) with an adherence to Roman Christianity the early 
Middle Ages integrated with this traditional conception of bellum romanum an idea of a 
war fought by God’s people for God’s own purposes, chief amongst which was to protect 
and expand the realm of Christianity, in other words a holy war. Thereby as long as a war 
was fought for pious ends there were no effective limits applied16. The Christian 
conception of holy war thus incorporated and meshed with religion the traditions of bellum 
romanum under which prisoners could be enslaved or massacred, where there were no 
privileges of ransom, and no distinction was made between combatants and non­
14 Ibid. pp. 191-196. For a detailed analysis o f similarities and differences between just and limited war see 
also Ian Clark, Waging War, opt, cit.
15 Michael Howard, ‘Constraints o f Warfare’ in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. 
Shulman (eds.) The Laws o f War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (London: Yale University 
Press, 1994), p. 3
16 Robert Stacy, ‘Age o f  Chivalry’ in Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman (eds.) 
The Laws o f War, opt, cit.. p. 28
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combatants. The Western philosophical tradition of holy war traces its roots back to this 
Christian conception17. In other words, in the Western tradition, a war fought for religious 
ends (i.e. a holy war) evolved, at least theoretically, as a total war fought without limits and 
hence with an inherent tendency to degenerate into an unrestrained conflict. On this basis 
total war may be philosophically defined as a military confrontation that is ultimate in 
nature and reflects a complete disregard of restraints imposed by custom, law and morality
I Q ,
in the conduct of war . Such a war tends to be driven overwhelmingly by ideology and 
bears the hardest on non-combatants. Consequently Western just war thinking has evolved 
by juxtaposing total war and just war where a total war is not equivalent to a just war19. 
Johnson points for example how “total war” denotes a form of conflict that has been 
referred to by a variety of other names -  including “holy war”. This statement bolsters John 
Kelsay’s suggestion that within the Western tradition of just war, when resort to war is 
governed by religion as opposed to moral or political causes, restraint tends to be lost and 
therefore, at least in theory, a religious or holy war is a total war in conduct and hence not a 
part of the modern Western just war understanding as it has evolved20.
HI. Jihad: Just War, Holy War or Both?
Despite being a notion central to Islam, the concept of jihad is frustratingly elusive and this 
can be credited to its essentially polyvalent nature which has been made even more
17 See for example James Turner Johnson, The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997)
18 It must be noted that there is no agreement on the term ‘total war’. For some scholars ‘total war’ refers to a 
phenomenon specific only to the 19th and 20th centuries in which both the state and its population was fully 
mobilised in the war effort and there exists literature which uses the term in this narrow sense. However, 
while this work acknowledges this usage it utilises the term in its broader philosophical and descriptive sense 
where ‘total war’ connotes a war without limits and restraints. Philosophically then this thesis uses the term 
‘total war’ to describe a failure to abide by ju s in bello norms.
19 Scholars such as Michael Walzer outline conditions o f ‘supreme emergency’ where limits and restraints in 
the conduct o f war may be relaxed. However, this is a contentious area within contemporary just war thinking 
and international law primarily because o f the traditional compartmentalisation o f just war (most specifically 
its ju s in bello aspect) and total war (in its descriptive and philosophical sense where it connotes a war fought 
without limits). See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, opt, cit.
20 James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition, opt cit.. pp. 229; John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.. p. 45. 
This is also not to suggest a false dichotomy between the historical development o f the just war and holy war 
traditions. According to Johnson and LeRoy Walters, historically holy war and just war “interpenetrated each 
other” and as such, at least historically, these traditions develop in tandem with each impacting the evolution 
of the other. Moreover, prior to the division o f the Church and the state, religion was a matter o f state and 
therefore defence of religion, directly in line with classical just war thinking, constituted a ju st cause for war. 
See also: James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation o f War: Religious and Secular 
Concepts, 1200- 1740 (Princeton, London: Princeton University Press, 1975)
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complex by being layered over with interpretations of political Islam. It is commonly 
accepted that the Islamic tradition of jihad is equivalent to the Western tradition of just war. 
The Shi’ia and the Sunni, despite historical differences, tend to share the same overall 
conceptions of jihad. They both agree that jihad is a struggle in the path of God and a 
religious duty incumbent upon all Muslims to defend land, life, the faith and the freedom to 
spread the faith21. They both believe in the distinction that exists between the greater jihad 
of personal spiritual struggle, and the lesser jihad of battle and strife. Yet despite these 
broad similarities even a cursory glance at the historical use and development of jihad 
illustrates that there is no single doctrine of jihad that has existed consistently, always and 
everywhere, or that been universally accepted. This is primarily because there has been no 
unanimity of opinion amongst various schools of thought on interpretations of the Qur’an 
and surma. Hence the Shi’ia and Sunni disagree, for example, with regard to who possesses 
the proper authority to sanction a jihad22. Even so, like the Western tradition of just war, 
jihad too can be located within the broader Islamic theory of statecraft and its struggle for a 
just and equal social order. The tradition of jihad can therefore be described as the “special 
military aspect of a working politico-military doctrine by which Muslims attempt to foster 
stable relations between peace, order, and justice in human affairs”23. In Islamic legal 
theory then, jihad is a temporary design devised to achieve the ideal Islamic public order24.
There does exist some degree of debate and questioning if jihad is truly the equivalent of 
the Western just war tradition. Scholars such as Bassam Tibi assert that the Western 
distinction between just and unjust wars, especially with regard to grounds for war, is
9 c
unknown in Islam . Tibi states that all religious wars fought against non-believers are 
morally justifiable and therefore to read jihad as a just war in the Western sense is entirely 
misreading the Islamic concept. John Kelsay, on the other hand, believes that despite the 
fact that the Islamic tradition of jihad is based upon religion constituting just grounds for
21 The hostility faced by early Muslims from their non-Muslim neighbours necessitated a struggle for survival 
that led to a harsh, aggressive interpretation o f jihad which ignored, to a large part, earlier Qur’anic verses 
addressing persuasion, patience, tolerance etc. See M. Raquibuz Zaman, ‘Islamic Perspectives on Territorial 
Boundaries and Autonomy’, in Sohail H. Hashmi (ed.), Islamic Political Ethics: Civil Society, Pluralism and 
Conflict ((Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002)
22 It must be noted that there are a multitude o f other disagreements within each sect as well. While this work 
acknowledges these debates, it is beyond its scope to address them in any depth.
23 Kelsay, opt, cit. p. 42
24 Hilmi. M Zatawi, Is Jihad a Just War? War, Peace and Human Rights Under Islamic and Public 
International Law (New York and Ontario: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001), p. 110
25 Bassam Tibi, ‘War and Peace in Islam’ in Sohail H. Hashmi (ed.), Islamic Political Ethics, opt, cit.
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war, there are still persistent commonalities between jihad and the Western just war 
tradition that override the differences26. Writers such as Sohail Hashmi also agree with 
Kelsay that there are distinct similarities between the Islamic tradition of jihad and the 
Western tradition of just war. However and perhaps more crucially, Hashmi identifies both 
just war and jihad as dynamic, constantly evolving concepts which are increasingly 
showing a greater degree of convergence in the process of adapting to changing 
international realities27. This work adopts a stance similar to Kelsay and Hashmi and 
thereby believes that there are distinct parallels between the Islamic tradition of jihad and 
the Western just war conception, especially with regard to the conduct o f war. This section 
will briefly delineate the concept of jihad and address specific components ofjus ad bellum 
and jus in bello in jihad which are of significance to the analysis being constructed. Special 
emphasis will be placed on the evolution of Sunni conceptions of jihad as the focus of this 
study, i.e. Hamas, is a Sunni Muslim organisation.
Traditional Islam divides the world into dar al-islam and dar al-harb. The former is the 
realm of Islam, as exemplified by a political entity which acknowledges the supremacy of 
Islamic values. The latter is the realm of war and is exemplified by human ignorance and 
heedlessness. The realm of Islam is theoretically a territory of peace and justice while the 
realm of war is a territory characterised by internal strife and disorder. Hence, in order to 
fully secure the peace of the world, all people need to be a part of an Islamic state. 
Therefore, traditionally there has always existed the imperative for all Muslims to extend 
the boundaries of dar al-islam with the aim of establishing peace with justice within a
n o
secure political order . Jihad is therefore the struggle to expand the boundaries of the 
realm of Islam and thus, for especially the Sunni jurists, jihad occurs at the intersection of 
dar al-islam and dar al-harb and as the Prophet stated: “it is the duty of every Muslim to
26 John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.
27 Sohail H. Hashmi, ‘Interpreting the Islamic Ethics o f War and Peace’ in Sohail H. Hashmi (ed.), Islamic 
Political Ethics, opt, cit.
28 It must be noted that at least in the Sunni conception the citizens o f dar al-islam need not all be Muslims. 
Space was made for religious pluralism via the notion o f protected religious groups called dhimmiyya which 
were free to practice another religion so long as they paid tribute and acknowledged Islamic sovereignty. For 
a frill delineation o f Shi’ia and Sunni conceptions o f dar al-islam and dar al-harb see for example: John 
Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.: Richard Bonney, Jihad: From Qur'an to bin Laden (London and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)
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command the good and forbid the evil with the heart, the tongue, and the hand (or 
sword)”29.
Yet jihad is not necessarily a “holy war” (i.e. a religious war) or indeed even a violent 
struggle as the struggle to expand the boundaries of dar al-islam can take place in many 
ways. Within classical Islam the two broad faces of jihad, the violent and the non-violent, 
are contrasted in a well-known prophetic tradition. It is said that when Muhammad returned 
from battle he told his followers: “we return from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad” 30. 
This greater jihad is an internal struggle against one’s own ego, selfishness, greed and evil 
and the attempt to bring oneself into accordance with the will of God. This peaceful striving 
in the path of God is essential because logically guidance cannot be brought into the world 
if the mujahid himself lacks discipline and an awareness of God’s will. Ibn Rushd (better 
known in the West as Averroes), a medieval writer of the twelfth century, also implicitly 
separates the grounds for jihad from the grounds for war. He identifies jihad as the 
perpetual condition that exists between dar al-islam and dar al-harb, and as such a 
consistent moral obligation (fard kifaya) for all those capable of assuming it. Actual 
warfare, qital or harb, was only the final step in the ladder of escalation31. Yet what is 
crucial here is that, for the Sunni jurists, force represents an accepted and useful means o f  
extending the territory o f Islam. Thus the use of force, while never a first resort, is a valid 
option if it satisfies the requirements of just cause and the legitimate authority -  criteria 
which are closely aligned to the principles of jus ad bellum of the Western just war 
tradition. Moreover, once force is used it is closely regulated in accordance with Islamic 
values32. Given the Sunni acceptance of using of force to extend dar al-islam, the criterion 
of right authority functions as a powerful tool in limiting the prerogative of political leaders 
to resort to war in situations of conflict.
The criterion of right authority also translates into a vital difference between the Sunni and 
the Shi’ia perceptions of jihad. The Sunnis believe that authority rests with the caliph who 
with the support of the ulema, i.e. the religious scholars, wields the necessary political and
29John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.. p. 34
30 John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name o f Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 
28
31 Sohail H. Hashmi, ‘Interpreting the Islamic Ethics o f War and Peace’, opt, cit.. p. 205
32 See for example: Hilmi M. Zatawi, Is Jihad a Just War?, opt, cit.: John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.: 
Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law o f Islam (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1955)
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religious right to declare a jihad. The Shi’ias, on the other hand, believe that the religious 
and political authority to declare a jihad was unjustly wrestled away from the Imams who 
were the true successors to Prophet Muhammad and initially “in (sic) the absence of their 
Imam, only a defensive jihad was considered permissible”33. Thus while the Sunni position 
traditionally regards religion as a legitimate cause for extending dar al islam by means of 
war, the Shi’ite view rejects this expansionist dimensions of the Sunni perspective. This 
conceptual difference translates into the evolution of two different typologies of jihad -  one 
defensive and the other offensive. The idea of a defensive jihad is based upon a defence of 
religion, or more precisely, the defence of a political entity identified with Islamic values. 
Yet modem Sunni thought has evolved striking parallels with the Shi’ite position. As 
opposed to the classical Sunni perspective, ‘modernists’ argue that according to the Qur’an 
military force may only be used to defend Islamic territory or values. One of the main 
proponents of this position is the formidable Sheikh al-Azhar, the leading spokesperson for 
‘establishment Islam’ in Egypt34. These shifts and evolutions are of particular importance 
when understanding the rhetoric of defensive jihad constructed by Hamas.
Conceptually what is of cmcial significance is that the Islamic tradition of jihad does not 
make exactly the same distinctions between just and unjust grounds for war as does the 
Western just war tradition. Hence, while there are distinct parallels between the two 
traditions, in the modem Western just war tradition a “holy war” (i.e. a religious war) is not 
considered to be a “just war”. However, the modem Islamic concept of jihad, whether it is 
defensive or offensive in nature, by accepting religion as just grounds (i.e. jus ad bellum) 
fo r waging war, merges the contemporary Western understanding of a “just war” with that 
of “holy war”. As Ibn Khaldun, the great medieval Muslim historian, states: there are four 
kinds of war. The first occurs between neighbouring tribes and competing families, the 
second is caused by hostility and focuses upon depriving the other of his possessions, the 
third are religious wars called the ‘holy war’, and the fourth are dynastic wars fought 
against seceders and those who refuse obedience. “The first two are unjust and lawless; the 
other two are holy and just”35. While this medieval analysis cannot be directly transposed
33 John L. Esposito, Unholy War, opt, cit..p. 39
34 John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.. p. 40
35 Ibn Khaldun from Franz Rosenthal (ed.) and N.J. Daood (abridged). The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to 
History. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967, in Lawrence Freedman (ed.) War. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994. p. 90
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upon the modem Islamic conception of jihad, it certainly indicates that historically the 
Islamic concepts of “just war” and “holy war”, unlike the more strictly compartmentalised 
Western/Christian tradition, evolved with far greater linkages between the two. In part, this 
may be directly linked to the absence of an overt division between the state and religion in 
Islam. This crossover between these two apparently opposing concepts of “just war” and 
“holy war” in the modem Islamic conception of jihad is a cmcial component of our analysis 
because the term ‘jihad’, despite ongoing debate, seems to have evolved and is used as an 
umbrella term encompassing both “just war” and “holy war”. While other jus ad bellum 
principles can also be seen in the Islamic traditions of jihad they are not of central relevance 
to this work and will not be expanded upon here.
Principles of the Western tradition of jus in bello can also be located within the Islamic 
conception of jihad, though once again not exactly in the same manner. Most important in 
connection with this study are the jus in bello concepts of non-combatant immunity and 
means of war as they exist in the Islamic tradition of jihad. First, with regards to means of 
war, the Sunni jurists seem to adhere to die Western just war principle of vim vi repellere 
licit, which approximately translates into: “it is allowed to repel force with equal force”36. 
This is again of vital significance to this study of Hamas and its justification for the use of 
suicidal violence against the state of Israel.
The case of non-combatant immunity however is a bit more complex. The Qur’an, the 
Sunna as well as later jurists expressively exempt women, children and die elderly from 
war and killing. Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, the first Muslim Caliph for example, conveyed the 
following to his army on their march to Syria:
“Do not commit treachery, nor depart from the right path. You must 
not mutilate, neither kill a child or aged man or woman. Do not 
destroy a palm tree, nor bum it with fire and do not cut any fruitful 
tree. You must not slay any of the flock or the herd or the camel, 
save for your subsistence. You are likely to pass by people who have
36 John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.. pp. 64-65
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devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them to that which 
they have devoted their lives ”
A number of hadith in the text entitled, Kitab al-Siyar (literally ‘the book of conduct’, 
especially the conduct of international relations), written by the Sunni jurist Muhammad 
ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani (d. 804-805), also highlight principles for the ideal conduct of 
war. In one of these Muhammad states:
“ ....he [the Apostle of God] enjoined the Muslims who were with 
him to do good...Fight in the name of God and in the “path of 
God”...Combat [only] those who disbelieve in God. Do not cheat or 
commit treachery, nor should you mutilate or kill children”38.
As the Kitab al-Siyar progresses what emerges is a comprehensive list of non-combatants 
granted immunity from direct and intentional assault. This list includes women, children, 
old men, the blind, the crippled, the insane, and so on, with the resulting definition of non- 
combatant immunity as it evolved being easily comparable with that of the Western just 
war doctrine and contemporary international norms. Also inherent in the text is an 
acknowledgement of the rule of double-effect and the limited application of violence during 
the course of the conflict39. Hence it seems that modem Islamic conceptions of jihad have 
largely evolved in adherence to these basic criteria of jus in bello which find significant 
parallels in the modem Western just war thinking.
However this thesis also agrees with Kelsay’s statement that the Islamic tradition of jus in 
bello restraints, like its Western counterpart, “reflects a cultural consensus on the conduct 
of war; a consensus that owes much to moral principles and theological concerns but is also 
indebted to political and military factors”40. As such, jihad could, and in certain circles still 
can, legitimately be waged against all those who refused to either convert to Islam or 
submit to Islamic hegemony by paying tribute. Thus people living in the territory of war, 
both individually and collectively, by refusing to acknowledge Islam become categorised as
37 Hilmi M. Zatawi, Is Jihad a Just War?, opt, cit.. p. 90
38 John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.. p. 59
39 James Turner Johnson (eds.), Just War and Jihad, opt, cit.
40 John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.. p. 59
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ahl al-harb or the “people of war”, and thus party to collective guilt. This is in direct 
contradiction to the Qur’an and Sunna which, as mentioned above categorises, women, 
children and other non-combatants as exempted from killing in war.
How then does this moral-theological exemption granted via the concept of immunity co­
exist with the politico-military idea of collective guilt? Sunni scholars resolve this 
discrepancy by referring to the Prophetic saying: “they are from them”, which is what 
Muhammad supposedly uttered upon discovering that some women and children had been 
killed in a night raid. On the basis of this prophetic statement, Muslim forces waging a 
jihad are not considered to be responsible for the welfare o f non-Muslim civilians. 
Responsibility is instead devolved to those who, in their decision making capacities, have 
chosen to resist Islam and thereby placed these non-combatants under risk of attack. The 
justification which is inherent to the phenomenon of double-effect in the Western just war 
tradition, i.e. justification for killing that is unintentional or coincidental to the main object 
of battle, is wholly missing in the Islamic jihad tradition when referring to non-Muslim 
civilians. Therefore while the jihad and the Western just war tradition do share a number of 
jus in bello concerns, it must be emphasised that they have sometimes developed along 
radically different trajectories as a direct result of the interaction of moral concerns with 
specific religious, political and military factors41. Again, as Hashmi states, it may be 
emphasised that traditional conceptions of Western just war and jihad are increasingly 
showing a greater degree of convergence in the process of adapting to changing 
international realities. This adaptation might explain the concentrated effort made by 
Hamas to justify its actions using multiple frames of reference -  including the Islamic, the 
traditional, the modem and also those represented by international law.
The theological debates that have raged within Islam have therefore consistently struggled 
to capture the concept and draw boundaries between understandings of jihad that stretch 
across “self-defence and aggression, resistance and rebellion, reform and terrorism”42. The 
understanding of jihad has changed and altered with time and the resultant doctrine, as 
stated earlier, is not the “product of a single authoritative individual or organization’s
41 For further elucidation on other concepts o f ju s in bello see for example: James Turner Johnson (eds.), Just 
War and Jihad, opt, cit.: John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.: Hilmi M. Zatawi, Is Jihad a Just War, opt, 
cit..: Richard Bonney, Jihad: From Qur’an to bin Laden, opt, cit.
42 John L. Esposito, Unholy War, opt, cit.. p. 29
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interpretation. It is rather the product of diverse individuals and authorities interpreting and 
applying the principles of sacred texts in specific historical and political contexts”43. 
Nonetheless, what is often seen is the replication of historical mentalities towards jihad by 
its latter day proponents, which simultaneously depicts the invocation of cultural memory 
and a reliance on the past for guidance intricately meshed with modem elucidation. In other 
words, a conception of jihad based more on the expediencies of political Islam rather than 
upon Islam as a theology.
IV. Enter Political Islam
To reiterate, the Western tradition of just war is firmly based in the belief that religion as a 
cause of war leads ineluctably to a disintegration in the standards of discrimination and 
proportionality. Thus in the Western conception, when resort to war is governed by 
religion, as opposed to moral or political causes, limitation in war tends to be lost and 
therefore, at least in theory, religious or holy war moves towards a total war in conduct. In 
Islam however, while religion constitutes a just cause for military action this does not 
necessarily translate into a war without limits. Hence Kelsay counters the Western 
perception and asserts that “the Islamic tradition, in both its classical and contemporary 
manifestations, suggests that religion as resort to war provides a way to limit the occasion 
and damage of war. In short, contrary to the Western understanding, “the Islamic tradition 
suggests that ‘holy war’ is not the equivalent o f ‘total war’, any more than ‘just war’ always 
means ‘limited war’”44. On the basis of such an understanding the question that then arises 
is: how does Hamas justify suicide operations, which violate basic jus in bello principles of 
non-combatant immunity, as part of a jihad against the Israeli state?
Suicide attacks are by nature deliberately aimed at non-combatants/civilians and 
accompanied by a degree of moral disengagement that place them in practice firmly into 
the category of a “total war” declared upon illegitimate targets. Both the Islamic tradition of 
jihad and the Western tradition of just war with their emphasis on restraint in the conduct of 
war (as a key component of jus in bello) are irreconcilable with the use of the “total” 
violence associated with the tactic of suicide operations. Western just war theory asserts
43 Ibid. p. 64
44 John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.. p. 45
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that: “A justified war (sic) is not necessarily a just war. To be fully “just” a war must be 
characterized by both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. A war obviously cannot be just if  one 
is unjustified in entering upon it in the first place, but neither can it be just, however just the 
cause and right the intention, if it utilizes indefensible means”45. The traditional Islamic 
conception of jihad would also find the lack of restraint in war problematic. Thus 
traditional normative theory, with its equal emphasis on just grounds for war as well as the 
just conduct of war, would not categorise the “total war” of suicide attacks as a “just war” 
or a “jihad”. In other words, understandings of just war/jihad constructed by traditional 
normative theory make Hamas’ legitimisation of suicide operations in the Israeli- 
Palestinian confrontation as a jihad both unconceivable and invalid.
However, this work asserts that there are distinct crossovers between the two apparently 
opposing concepts of “total war” and “just war”, which operate in the Palestinian socio­
political reality and facilitate the use of suicide missions against the Israeli state. It is these 
crossovers that need to be recognised if we are to understand how suicide bombing as a 
form of protest and resistance against the Israeli state is legitimised, rationalised and finally 
enacted through the medium of Hamas. In short, this work asserts that the act of 
‘martyrdom’ merges just grounds for war (jus ad bellum) with the use of total force in the 
conduct of that war -  thereby merging concepts that are traditionally seen as irreconcilable 
unless framed in terms of the condition of supreme emergency. The cause of freedom, as 
presented to and subsequently internalised by the larger public and the suicide operatives, is 
just. However, while this would traditionally imply, at least in theory, limiting damage in 
war, the tools used on the ground, i.e. suicide bombings, extend the idea of just cause into 
the realm of total, and hence unlimited, conduct. In other words, as the cause is just the 
ends are seen to justify the means. This crucial jump between the supposedly irreconcilable 
concepts of “just war/jihad” and “total war” is facilitated by political Islam which provides 
Hamas the necessary rhetoric to legitimise this total war as a jihad  to the Palestinian street. 
This rhetoric is crucial because it represents a tacit acceptance of the Islamic distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants while also acknowledging the same distinction in 
international law. The resulting problematic is addressed by framing all resistance activity 
as a defensive act o f  jihad against an asymmetrically powerful enemy, i.e. by constructing
45 Robert L. Holmes. On War and Morality (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989) p 175
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conditions of supreme emergency. As explained in the previous section, the concept of 
jihad encompasses both the traditional Western just war and the holy war ideals -  though 
both are ideally supposed to be practices with limits and restraints according to classical 
Islam. However, political Islam, by enabling Hamas to frame suicidal violence under the 
same rubric, facilitates the absorption if the total war concept into modem interpretations of 
jihad. In doing so, contemporary interpretations of jihad appear to more closely echo 
traditional Western conceptions of religious wars (i.e. holy wars) with their corresponding 
tendency to degenerate into unrestrained confrontations against an external ‘other’. It is this 
dual face of contemporary martyrdom operations, i.e. of just ends- unrestrained means, both 
of which are encompassed by the single concept o f modern jihad, which must be grasped if 
we hope to formulate any concrete understanding of how this phenomenon is practiced 
today. As such, this thesis believes that a suicide attack represents the exact point o f 
interstice between these two supposedly opposing concepts of “just war” and “total war”. 
What emerges then is a spectrum of violence where the moderate pole of modem jihad is 
characterised by a “just and limited war” and the opposite pole by what is, in essence, a 
“total war”. To paraphrase Kelsay: when facilitated by political Islam, an Islamist “holy 
war” can indeed be the equivalent of a “total war” in conduct.
So what exactly is political Islam? Often referred to as Islamism or Fundamentalism, 
political Islam refers to movements and ideologies which draw upon Islamic terms, 
symbols and events in order to articulate a distinctly modem, political agenda46. Typically 
the political Islam project supplies a comprehensive critique of the existing order, 
challenges it and strives to change it. It is therefore a political instrumentalisation of Islam 
in that it provides a political response to contemporary challenges by attempting to create a 
future based on re-appropriated, reinvented concepts rooted in Islamic traditions. It is an 
essentially modem phenomenon in that it addresses contemporary political, social, 
economic and cultural realities and challenges faced by Muslim societies. At its core 
political Islam is a political activist project dressed in the garb of religious rhetoric. Its
46 For discussions o f  Islamism versus Muslim politics and other terminology see for example: Ray Takeyh 
and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The Receding Shadow o f the Prophet: The Rise and Fall o f  Radical Political Islam 
(Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 2004); Bassam Tibi, The Challenge o f  Fundamentalism: 
Political Islam and the New World Disorder (Berkley, Los Angeles and London: University o f California 
Press, 1998); Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (eds.), Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report (Berkley and 
Los Angeles: University o f California Press, 1997)
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primary concern is power in the world order and its activism rests upon the belief that an 
Islamic society is a just one.
Furthermore, political Islam does not exist in a vacuum and is in many ways a response to 
secular ideologies in the Middle East that “flourished under the banner of anti-colonialism, 
economic and social justice, nationalism and development independent of the West”47. It 
thus operates at the intersections with major twentieth century ideologies -  Marxism, 
fascism, nationalism and capitalism, to name just a few. As such, it shares with these 
secular movements both grievances and goals and also contests the same set of symbols and 
memories. It has been employed both ‘from above’ to legitimise a certain regime or ‘from 
below’ to provide a basis for opposition to the status quo. Political Islam generally preaches 
a return to the Qur’an, the Sunna and shari’a while rejecting the commentaries that have 
been a part of the tradition, demanding instead the right to ijtihad or individual 
interpretation. Because of its unmitigated belief that an Islamised society is a just one the 
Islamisation project is central to political Islam. However, it is also believed that such 
Islamisation is possible only through concentrated social and political action. The followers 
of political Islam believe that it is the duty of every Muslim to revolt against a corrupt state 
and leader and see the application of shari’a as the key to the Islamisation of society48. The 
more radical Islamists see this application of shari’a as a project based in a full reformation 
of the society if the Islamisation mission is to be more than mere insincere lip-service. As 
such, to reiterate, political Islam is a movement ground in centuries of thought that has been 
adapted to address contemporary international realities and which is shaped by an 
intersection with modem secular ideas and ideologies.
The origins of political Islam as we know it today can be traced to the Society of the 
Muslim Brotherhood established by the schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, 
and the Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan, created by Abul-Ala Mawdudi in 1941. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, which is the focus of our study as the parent organisation of Hamas, was 
inspired by the thinking of Sayyid Qutb, and spawned a whole host of radical Islamist
47 Anthony Shadid, Legacy o f the Prophet: Despots, Democrats, and the New Politics o f Islam (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 2001)
48 A considerable rift developed within the Islamist movement between the revolutionaries and the ‘neo- 
fundamentalist’ over this idea o f the Muslim duty to “excommunicate (takfir) the sovereign considered 
apostate and to move into violent action (terrorism and revolution). Olivier Roy, The Failure o f Political 
Islam (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 36
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organisations since the 1970s49. Along with al-Banna, Mawdudi and Qutb, the Ayatollah 
Khomeini of Iran was also instrumental in developing the ideology of political Islam to its 
current theoretical understanding. However, Islamic activist organisations today run the full 
length of the spectrum, ranging from those who work within the system (like the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan or Sudan) to those which resort to violence to challenge the 
status quo (such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizballah)50.
Jihad occupies a prominent position in the thinking of both contemporary ‘modernist’ 
scholars as well as the Islamists51. As stated earlier, modernists tend to believe that 
according to the Qur’an an aggressive jihad may only be invoked to defend Islamic territory 
or values. The more radical political Islamists however, believe in a much more assertive, 
militant and violent interpretation and expression of jihad. Given their position as 
movements that tend to challenge the status quo and seek to overthrow established regimes, 
such an interpretation is not unexpected . Even so, a major divergence may be located in 
the radical Islamist’s use of religious expression and their medieval connotations. Thus the 
medieval dichotomy between dor al-islam and dar al-harb was predicated on the jurist’s 
understanding of the moral and military superiority of the Islamic civilisation. Yet this 
dichotomy in the works of twentieth century writers like al-Banna, Qutb and Khomeini 
reflects an understanding based on a radically different historical reality -  that of European 
colonialism and unfavourable American policies in the Middle East53. These thinkers, 
unlike their medieval counterparts, therefore tend to depict the dar al-islam and dar al-harb
49 Ibid. p. 35
50 John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999, 3rd edition), p. 9
51 The categorisations may be understood as follows: The classical view is represented by the Qur’an, Sunna, 
hadith and texts o f the medieval scholars and jurists. In contemporary times, the conformists, better known as 
the modernists, represent the traditional Muslim establishment o f the ulema often accused o f practicing an 
obscure and passive Islam. There are also reformers in the ulema that may be credited for various re­
interpretations including the development o f the concept o f a purely defensive jihad. In contrast the political 
Islamists, also referred to as fundamentalists in contemporary literature, follow a more militant interpretation 
o f the Qur’an and see themselves in opposition to the status quo powers. They consider themselves to be 
vanguards o f the righteous and as preparing the way for the establishment o f a just Islamic order by the 
elimination o f jahili values in their societies. The revolutionary branch o f political Islam believes that 
Islamisation is possible through the seizure o f power, legally or violently. The reformist branch o f political 
Islam, referred to as neo-fundamentalism, believes that the Islamic state can only be achieved through a long­
term, incremental process o f Islamisation via social action and education. See for example: Sohail H. Hashmi, 
‘Interpreting the Islamic Ethics o f War and Peace’, opt, cit.: Ray Takeyh and Nikolas K. Gvosdev, The 
Receding Shadow of the Prophet, opt, cit.: John Kelsay, Islam and War, opt, cit.: Olivier Roy, The Failure o f  
Political Islam, opt, cit.
52 Sohail H. Hashmi, ‘Interpreting the Islamic Ethics o f War and Peace’, opt, cit.. p. 208
53 See also Chapter I
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dichotomy in international relations as a struggle between Islam and the West. Similarly 
whereas the medieval jurists’ treatment of jihad was preoccupied by concerns of right 
authority, for the contemporary radical Islamist, jihad is the duty incumbent upon all true 
believers who must use whatever means are necessary, including violence, to overthrow 
unpopular, corrupt regimes to establish a just Islamic order. Hence jihad, facilitated by 
political Islam, has also become for the contemporary Islamists “an instrument for the 
realisation of political and social justice in their own societies, a powerful tool for internal 
reform and one that is required by the Qur’an’s command that Muslims ‘enjoin the right 
and forbid the wrong’”54. Of the main proponents that have shaped contemporary 
understandings of political Islam this thesis will focus briefly on al-Banna and Qutb due to 
their direct ideological links with the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore, Hamas.
Hasan al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood ([Ikhwan al-Muslimuri) in 
Egypt and a proponent of Islamisation by education and missionary activity (tabligh wa- 
da’wa). Al-Banna incorporated social and political goals within the movement in a bottom- 
up approach and believed that a reformed, virtuous society would give rise to a just Islamic 
state. As the movement gained momentum in Egypt, al-Banna expanded its original 
character and from a solely reformist missionary project, the Muslim Brotherhood grew to 
incorporate revolutionary methods, including a “penetration of the military, the use of 
political violence, and the creation of an armed force”55, which led to a clash with Nasser’s 
regime. Thus for most of its initial years since its foundation in 1928, the fortunes of the 
Brotherhood, and its members, remained intricately linked to Nasser and his ideology of 
Arab nationalism. For the most part, under al-Banna, the state was never an arena of contest 
for the Muslim Brotherhood which insisted upon societal reform before all else. Al-Banna’s 
was assassinated at the hands of the Egyptian police in 1949 and in 1954, Nasser’s regime 
began a brutal crackdown on the organisation which drove it effectively underground56. It 
was this environment of persecution and violent repression that gave shape to the radical 
ideology of Sayyid Qutb.
54 Sohail H. Hashmi, ‘Interpreting the Islamic Ethics o f War and Peace’, opt, cit.. p. 210
55 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 29
56 For a detailed overview of Hasan al-Banna’s thoughts see for example: Anthony Shadid, Legacy o f the 
Prophet, opt, cit.: Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad El-Awaisi, The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 
1928 -1 9 4 7  (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1998)
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Qutb, who joined the movement in 1951, had already been forced to resign from his 
government post as a result of his increasingly radical political views. Qutb spent most of 
his Brotherhood years in prison before being hanged in 1966 and it was in prison that he 
produced five books which marked a decisive break with al-Banna’s philosophy57. He was 
deeply impacted by the writings of Mawdudi and his theory of modem jahiliyya, i.e. the 
pre-Islamic era which is regarded as a period of darkness, disorder and ignorance. Qutb’s 
central idea concerned his own views on modem jahiliyya which he expounded in his 1953 
publication, In the Shade o f the Qur’an. In this text, he merged Mawdudi’s concept of 
modem jahiliyya with those of the medieval Salafi scholar, Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya, who 
argued that the unity of God required all Muslims to follow the divine law. Thus Qutb 
created a harsh social dichotomy in which those who did not put “faith into action through 
an Islamic legal system and strictly obey the commands of God were part of the modem 
jahiliyya and no longer Muslims”58. In the Egyptian context this implied members of the 
Muslim community who were then categorised as apostates. Qutb advocated jihad to 
establish an Islamic state and in doing so argued against established ideas of a defensive 
jihad. He legitimised this call for jihad by stressing that as rulers in the Muslim world were 
apostates, and therefore a part of the modem jahiliyya, they could be overthrown by having 
a jihad declared against them. Thus, this modem jihad was interpreted as an eternal armed 
struggle against “every obstacle that came (sic) into the way of worshipping God and the 
implementation of the divine authority on earth, hakimiya, and [involved] returning this 
authority to God [by] taking it away from the rebellious usurpers”59. In preaching to the 
masses, Qutb maintained the Brotherhood’s traditional audience but simultaneously 
represented a critical break from its earlier philosophy as he now urged the people to shed 
their passive roles and engender political change against the illegitimate state. Qutb’s 
message of violent revolution as a means of establishing the Islamic state has inspired a 
number of radical Islamist groups, both in Egypt and elsewhere and he is often regarded as 
the founder of radical political Islam.
Given this background, one may see how political Islam is central to this analysis because, 
firstly, it enables the absorption of the total war logic into the traditional concept of jihad,
57 Anthony Shadid,, opt, cit.. p. 58
58 Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘A Genealogy o f Radical Islam’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28 (2005), p. 79
59 Sayid Qutb, Milestones as quoted in Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York 
and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
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and therefore facilitates the use of suicidal violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Secondly, it enables classical Islamic symbols and conceptions to be harnessed to modem 
secular ideologies -  in this case, nationalism. Hamas clearly follows the parameters of 
political Islam established by both al-Banna and Qutb. It continues, like the Palestinian 
Muslim Brotherhood, to maintain a social programme of reform in addition to its more 
activist political and military agendas. Further, it consolidates its unique position as an 
Islamic revolutionary organisation by accusing Fatah and the PLO of compromising with 
the Israeli state and of straying from the path of the Islamic faith. It holds Fatah and the 
PLO responsible for hindering the establishment of a free and Islamic Palestine. Thus, 
Hamas weaves an intricate narrative of jihad that meshes the ideals of an offensive jihad, 
waged against all those in the path of establishing a free, Islamic Palestinian state, with 
those of a defensive one. Hamas therefore justifies suicidal violence as a defensive jihad 
against a disproportionately powerful Israeli state. It is possible that the narrative of 
defensive jihad is rooted in Hamas’ awareness of modem international perspectives on 
issues such as non-combatant immunity, and consequently in its attempts to circumvent 
such concerns. Either way, what is clear is that political Islam is used specifically by 
Hamas as a tool to legitimise an escalation in violent confrontation with Israel as part of the 
Palestinian struggle for a state. This legitimisation not only propels the use of suicidal 
violence in the territories but also consolidates Hamas’ unique position in the Palestinian 
political arena vis-a-vis more established players, like Fatah and the PLO.
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PART II
I. Locating Political Islam in the Message of Hamas: The Legitimisation of Jihad and 
Martyrdom
Hamas’ radical political activism marked the beginning of the Brotherhood’s militant jihad 
against the Israeli state and the positioning of Islam as an ideological, political and military 
mode of struggle against the occupation. In presenting itself as an alternative to the secular 
national movement, Hamas may be categorised as a modem political movement which is 
involved in a traditional struggle for power and whose oppositional discourse is based on 
political Islam. Beverly Milton-Edwards points out that a lack of an indigenous tradition of 
ijtihad (interpretation) has led Islamist organisations in Palestine, including Hamas, to 
depend overwhelmingly upon external Islamic ideologues. Consequently, Hamas’ religious 
rhetoric exhibits a unique combination of Palestinian concerns with larger pan-Islamic 
perspectives, including the relationship between the Arab world and the West. The anti- 
secular, anti-colonial ideology of Hamas is fused with an anti-Zionist, anti-Jewish 
perspective that has been “shaped both by doctrine drawn from the Qur’an and other 
Islamic sources as well as by Eurocentric anti-Semitic perspectives” 60. An additional layer 
is added to its ideology by its dialogue with modem international ideas and approaches. 
Thus, despite its repetitive use of specific religious concepts, Hamas demonstrates an 
impressive flexibility and expediency in how it interprets these concepts and tailors them to 
suit its purposes and also address rapidly changing political realities. In this regard, Hamas 
despite its Islamic hue has always functioned, first and foremost, as a pragmatic political 
organisation with a distinctly modem agenda. This section will briefly outline the main 
issues of concern for Hamas and endeavour to illustrate how Hamas’ ideology not only 
links its political objectives with religious rhetoric but also how the latter is shaped both by 
pan-Islamic concerns as well as specific Palestinian circumstances. It will demonstrate 
these links by using examples taken from Hamas leaflets, official statements and wall 
graffiti. In doing so, this section will illustrate how Hamas utilises political Islam to 
construct a unique identity for itself which in turn allows it to adopt the strategy of jihad 
facilitate the use of suicidal violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The second part of
60 Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 
1996), p. 181.
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this section will illustrate how this strategy of jihad and martyrdom constructed by Hamas 
has been accepted and internalised by its operatives and segments of Palestinian society.
Even a cursory survey of Hamas’ politico-ideological tracts, including its Covenant 
(mithaq), leaflets, wall graffiti as well as official statements, reflect its preoccupations with 
a specific set of concerns. These unswerving concerns include: (i) the challenge of Zionism 
and the Jewish-Israeli state; (ii) the crisis within both the Palestinian and wider Muslim 
community and concurrently the challenge posed by the secular nationalist opposition; (iii) 
the sanctity of Palestinian land and the predicament of foreign occupation of Jerusalem; (iv) 
the defence of Palestinian national aspirations as a legitimate Islamic goal and the 
establishment of a Palestinian Islamic state; (v) the declaration and justification of jihad as 
a legitimate strategy to accomplish specifically nationalist goals; and (vi) the defence of 
martyrdom as a legitimate Islamic tool of struggle within this jihad against oppression and 
occupation61. Of these six themes, while the last two are crucial to our analysis, the other 
four are also vital components in Hamas’ step-by-step construction of the overarching 
rhetoric of jihad and martyrdom (as specifically a suicide attack) within the territories.
First and foremost, Hamas’ rhetoric does not make a distinction between Judaism, Zionism 
and Israel and tends to use the terms ‘Jews’ and ‘Zionists’ synonymously and 
interchangeably. The state of Israel is therefore regarded as the product of Judaic faith and 
consequently Hamas believes that the only way to combat it is by establishing an Islamic 
state, as that alone possesses the strength to confront and counter all other faiths and 
ideologies . At its very core, Hamas’ ideology emphasises the ‘Islamic essence’ of the 
Palestinian cause (Islamiyat al-qadiyya al-Filastiniyya) and by extension of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict . For Hamas the conflict is primarily a confrontation not between 
nationalisms but between faiths and as such represents an unbridgeable dichotomy between
61 It must be noted that these some of concerns build upon the categories which were first outlined by Beverly 
Milton-Edwards in her analysis of Islamic solutions to the Palestinian situation in Islamic Politics in 
Palestine, opt, cit. Her categories include: the crisis within the Palestinian Muslim community; the Jews as 
foes; the strategy o f holy war; the marriage o f Palestinian nationalism and Islam; the creating o f an Islamic
state and; the challenge posed by the opposition.
62 See for example: Meir Litvak, ‘Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism: The Case o f Hamas’ in Matthew 
Hughes and Gaynor Johnson (eds.), Fanaticism and Conflict in the Modem Age (London: Frank Cass, 2005); 
Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islam and Violence in the Modern Ear (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Yvonne Haddad, ‘Islamists and the ‘Problem o f Israel’: The 1967 Awakening’, 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992.
63 Meir Litvak, ‘Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism: The Case o f Hamas’, opt, cit.
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absolutes. Hence a leaflet addressed to Israel states: “Get your hands off our people, our 
cities, our camps and our villages. Our struggle with you is a contest of faith, existence and 
life”64 or “So Israel with its Jewishness and its Jewish population challenges Islam and 
Muslims”65. The May 3rd, 1988 Hamas leaflet states:
“O Muslims, the month of Ramadan falls in the shadow of the 
oppression and occupation and the escalation of the actions of the 
tyrannical Zionists: restriction of worship, restriction of the Islamic 
giant, which had begun to pour out of the mosques and tum[ed] this 
battle into a war o f religion and faith , in order to eradicate this 
cancer [of Zionism/Judaism/the Israeli occupation] which is 
spreading...”66 (emphasis added)
Hamas also explicitly aligns itself with broader political Islamic concerns of the modem 
Middle East by identifying and demonising the Jews/Zionists as instruments of the ‘West’ 
in the region. Various references are also made to the power exercised in turn by the 
Zionists over the ‘West’. This association of Israel/Zionism/the Jewish people with 
imperialist Western powers is firmly rooted in the broader anti-colonial, anti-imperialist 
concerns and memories that find echoes elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa:
“With wealth they controlled imperialist nations and pushed them to 
occupy many nations and to exploit their resources and spread 
mischief in them... They [the Jews] were behind the First World War 
in which they destroyed the Islamic Caliphate, picked up the 
material profit, monopolised the raw wealth, and got the Balfour 
Declaration. They created the League of Nations through which they 
could mle the world ... they ordered the United Nations to be 
formed ... so they could mle the world through them ...So the 
imperialist powers in the Capitalist West and the Communist East
64 Undated Hamas leaflet from the first Intifada in Shaul Mishal, ‘Paper War -  Words Behind Stones: The 
Intifada Leaflets’ in The Jerusalem Quarterly 51 (Summer 1989)
65 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 28, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Political Thought 
and Practice (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000)
66 Hamas Leaflet No. 16, 3rd May 1988 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones: Communiques 
from the Intifada Underground (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994)
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support the enemy with all their might, with material and human aid, 
and they change roles”67.
In framing the challenge of Zionism and the Jewish-Israeli state in such explicitly religious 
terms Hamas places Islam and Islamisation at the core of the Palestinian resistance 
movement. In doing so, it bolsters its own position as an Islamic organisation which is 
fighting for a Palestinian homeland. In other words, it uses political Islam to carve out a 
unique space for itself, thereby legitimising its existence and participation in the Palestinian 
national struggle.
Secondly, Hamas is also concerned with the crisis of occupation faced by the Palestinian 
community. The defeat of Arab armies by Israel and the resulting loss of Palestine is seen 
by Hamas as a major symptom of the malaise prevalent in the wider Muslim community. 
For Hamas, Israeli occupation is the direct result of the society’s loss of faith68. Moreover, 
as Israeli occupation is punishment for straying from the path of Islam, the only way to 
remove it is by returning to the faith and an observation of its rules.
“In the absence of Islam, conflicts arise, oppression and destruction 
are rampant, and wars and battles prevail....JF7ze« faith is lost there 
is neither security nor life for those who do not receive religion. And 
whoever is satisfied with life without religion, then he has allowed 
annihilation to be his partner”69, (emphasis added)
“O ye who believe! If ye believe the Unbelievers, they will drive you 
back on your heels, and ye will turn back (from Faith) to your own 
loss. Nay, Allah is your protector, and he is the best of helpers”70.
67 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 22, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, Hamas, opt, cit.
68 See for example: Meir Litvak, The Islamisation o f Palestinian Identity: The Case o f Hamas, Occasional 
Paper (Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 
1996); Andrea Nusse, Muslim Palestine: The Ideology o f Hamas (Oxford: RoutledgeCurzon, 1998); Khaled 
Hroub, Hamas  opt, cit.: Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine opt, cit.
69 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 6, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, Hamas, opt, cit.
70 Hamas Communique dated 18 September 2001 in Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism: 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Ardsley, New York: Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002)
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Hamas, very much like the Muslim Brotherhood, believes that the re-Islamisation of the 
Palestinian community is a crucial predecessor to Palestinian liberation. However, for 
Hamas, unlike its parent organisation, liberation is attainable only through a combination of 
tabligh wa da ’wa and jihad. Furthermore, Hamas believes that because Palestine is central 
to Islam, it can only be recovered as an Islamic state by true Muslims. As such the secular 
national movement is lost and doomed to fail in its intended goal. Hence: “ ...despite our 
respect for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation ... we cannot exchange the Islamic 
nature of Palestine to adopt the secular ideology because the Islamic nature of Palestinian 
issue is part and parcel of our religion, and whoever neglects part of his religion is surely 
lost”71. By using the language of political Islam in this manner, Hamas once again not only 
delineates its own political space but also tries to gain an upper hand by identifying the 
established secular opposition as misguided at best and an obstacle to Palestinian liberation 
at worst.
Third, Hamas stresses that the land of Palestine is sacred for all Muslims for a number of 
reasons. Most importantly, God chose the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem (Al-Quds) as the 
site of the Prophet Muhammad’s ascension to heaven (al-Isra ’ wal-Miraj) and also as the 
first qibla (direction to face during prayer). Hence, Hamas repeatedly refers to the sanctity 
of the mosque and Jerusalem and stresses that the Israeli occupation of Jerusalem is an 
affront not only for the Palestinians but also for the wider Arab and Islamic world:
“Let the whole world understand that the holy Aqsa Mosque is the 
property of more than one billion Muslims and that any tampering 
with it is a red line and a declaration of war against our Nation [the 
umma], its religion and its pride...Let the Palestinian bloodshed 
continue in defence of Al-Quds and the Aqsa. Let our holy land turn 
into volcanoes burning the usurpers”.72
The sanctity of al-Aqsa and Jerusalem is also extended to Palestine as a whole which is 
repeatedly referred to as the “land of al-Isra ’ wal-Miraf\ “land of al-Isra and “M iraf\
71 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 27, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, Hamas, opt, cit.
72 Hamas Communique No. 4, dated 1 October 2000 in Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism, 
opt, cit.
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By virtue of being the land of al-Isra, Palestine is simultaneously distinguished from other 
Islamic lands and also made the inheritance of all Muslims73.
Another component of the sanctity of Palestine is based on it being a designated a waqf, i.e. 
an inalienable religious endowment, for all Muslims by the Caliph ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab. 
Palestine’s special religious significance is consolidated further by the 1935 fatwa 
(religious ruling) declared by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, which 
describes all of Palestine as a trust (amana) given by God and all Muslims to the Muslims 
of Palestine74. Hamas states: “...the land of Palestine is an Islamic land entrusted to the 
Muslim generations until Judgement Day. No one may renounce all or even part of it”75. 
This of course means that Hamas frames any compromise or political settlement over this 
land as tantamount to sacrilege. Furthermore, as an Islamic trust the liberation of Palestine 
becomes a responsibility for the wider Muslim umma. Hamas uses this to identify the 
Palestinian cause with broader Islamic concerns and to rally support from the Arab world: 
“...The problem of the liberation of Palestine relates to three spheres: the Palestinian circle; 
the Arab circle; and the Islamic circle”76. At the same time, Hamas is also keenly aware of 
its isolation and the lack of support forthcoming from the Muslim world. It thus also 
chastises the Arab and Muslim masses for abandoning the Palestinian cause: “It is a shame 
on Arabs and Muslims to stand idle by vis-a-vis the daily and continuous extermination of 
an Arab, Islamic people on the land of al-Isra' wal-Miraj\ There is no excuse for the 
Nation for not shouldering its duty towards Palestine and its people”77.
Hamas’ adoption of a nationalist stance can be seen as a necessity rooted in competition 
with the established secular national movement whose rhetoric was predicated upon 
popular notions of self-determination, independence and democracy. Yet nationalism is 
severely at odds with the traditional Islamic concept of dar al-Islam in that the ‘realm of 
peace’ transcends national and state boundaries. As such, Hamas had to, first and foremost, 
create a narrative whereby it could justify Palestinian Islamic nationalism as a legitimate 
Islamic goal. It did this by carefully constructing links between the Islamic sanctity of
73 Meir Litvak, ‘Palestinian Nationalism and Islam: The Case o f Hamas’, opt, cit.
74 Meir Litvak, The Islamisation o f Palestinian Identity: The Case o f  Hamas, opt, cit.
75 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 11, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, Hamas, opt, cit.
76 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 14, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, Hamas, opt, cit.
77 Hamas Communique dated 1 August 2001 in Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism, opt, cit.
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Palestinian land and Palestinian nationalism. Hamas first depicted the attainment of a 
Palestinian state as a crucial step towards securing a divine territory of immeasurable 
importance in Islam. It then further justified the Palestinian state and nationalism by placing 
it firmly within the boundaries of faith, for example: “Nationalism from the point of view 
of the IRM is part and parcel of religious ideology....giving up any part of Palestine is like 
giving up part of religion”78. In creating this narrative, Hamas successfully retained its 
essence as an Islamic organisation while simultaneously merging this Islamic identity with 
a pragmatic nationalist stance which allowed it to compete with the PLO and the PA. In 
positioning itself as a political group whose nationalism encompassed the “materialistic, 
humanistic and geographical ties” of other nationalisms as well as “divine reasons”79 
Hamas has evolved a unique identity in the Palestinian political arena over the past twenty 
years. Nationalism (wataniyya) can therefore be located as a dominant theme in Hamas’ 
ideology and it repeatedly portrays itself as an Islamic-nationalist organisation with clearly 
Palestinian roots and aspirations of establishing an “Islamic Palestine from the Sea to the
OA
River” . Interestingly, a survey of Hamas leaflets and press releases indicates that Hamas 
defended its nationalist aspirations as a legitimate Islamic goal only in its early years. 
While the literature from about the mid-1990’s continues to depict Palestine as a cause for 
Arabs and Muslims everywhere, it no longer finds it necessary to reconcile Hamas’ 
wataniyya with the traditional Islamic stance on nationalism, suggesting perhaps a popular 
acceptance of Hamas’ Islamic-nationalist identity by this time -  or in other words, the 
successful Islamisation of Palestinian nationalism. Given this background one can now 
focus in-depth on how Hamas uses the concept of jihad and martyrdom to facilitate the use 
of suicidal violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
II. Political Islam, Jihad and Shahadat in Hamas Literature
This Islamisation of Palestinian nationalism and the national struggle constructed by Hamas 
sheds light on how it has built and naturalised the call to jihad and martyrdom as a 
legitimate course of action in the struggle against Israel. In direct contrast to the purely 
ideological call of the Mujamma’, Hamas’ stress upon the strategy of jihad can be traced
78 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 12 and 13, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, Hamas, opt, cit.
79Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 12, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, Hamas, opt, cit.
80 The title o f Hamas Leaflet No. 28, dated 18 August 1988. For the full text see Shaul Mishal and Reuben 
Aharoni, Speaking Stones, opt, cit.
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throughout its literature. In the text of the Hamas Charter alone, there are numerous 
references to jihad as the means to liberating the holy land of Palestine: “There is no 
solution to the Palestinian problem except through jihad”.... “The IRM is a link in the 
chain of Jihad against Zionist occupation” . Furthermore, because this jihad has been 
declared in response to the usurpation of Muslim lands by foes which cannot be repelled 
with a small force, Hamas stresses that every individual Palestinian Muslim is obliged to 
participate in fending off the enemy. Thus, by predicating its logic on the Jewish theft of 
Palestinian lands, Hamas is able to portray its jihad of liberation as a individual obligation 
{fard ayn) as opposed to a collective one (fard kifaya): “If an enemy invades Muslim 
territories, then Jihad and fighting the enemy becomes an individual duty on every Muslim. 
A woman may go fight without her husband’s permission and a slave without his master’s
• •  87permission (stressed in the original)” . Hamas also illustrates its acceptance of the Islamic 
principle that jihad may be waged by multiple means -  both military and non-military. 
Thus for example it states:
“When an enemy usurps Muslim land, then jihad is an individual 
religious duty on every Muslim; and in confronting the unlawful 
seizure of Palestine by the Jews, it is necessary to raise the banner of 
jihad.... Jihad means not only carrying arms and confronting the 
enemy. The positive word, excellent article, beneficial book, aid and 
support ... also constitute Jihad for the sake of God” (emphasis 
added)
Therefore, Hamas intricately weaves its modem call for an interpretation of jihad, as 
harnessed to the Palestinian national movement, with the imagery and narrative of classical 
Islam.
Hamas places martyrdom (shahadat) at the very centre of its strategy of military jihad and 
portrays suicide attacks, or ‘martyrdom operations’ as they are commonly called, as the 
epitome of martyrdom. The Hamas Charter outlines the motto of the IRM as follows:
81 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Articles 13 and 7, August 1988 in Khaled Hroub, opt, cit.
82 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Article 12, August 1988. Ibid.
83 Excerpts from The Hamas Charter, Articles 15 and 30, August 1988. Ibid.
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“God is its goal;
The messenger its Leader.
The Qur’an its Constitution.
Jihad is its methodology, and
Death for the sake of God its most coveted desire”84
However, because suicide (intihar) is a highly problematic concept in Islamic theology 
often categorised by jurists as haram, i.e. forbidden, the Hamas consciously and 
systematically circumvents this theological pitfall by terming its suicide attacks ‘martyrdom 
operation’ (amaliyat istishhadiyya) thereby evoking the notion of self-sacrifice (ishtishad) 
which is extolled through the Qur’anic teachings, commentaries and fatwas as not only 
permitted (halal) but also desirable. The shahid (i.e. the martyr), unlike the suicide, is 
honoured and guaranteed a place in paradise for all eternity85. Hamas emphatically stresses 
this difference between intihar and ishtishad. Suicide is a shameful path adopted by the 
weak, despairing and depressed but martyrdom is the beginning of hope and deliverance 
and is a path chosen only by the strong-willed, noble individual who is therefore worth 
emulating. For example, according to the former second-in-command of Hamas’ political 
wing, ‘Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, if a Muslim wants to “kill himself because he’s sick of being 
alive, that’s suicide. But if he wants to sacrifice his soul in order to defeat the enemy and 
for God’s sake -  well, then he’s a martyr”86. Hamas further substantiates its position on 
martyrdom by referring to the numerous hadith and commentaries that venerate the martyr. 
The medieval Sunni theologian Al-Bukhari describes how Allah bestows heavenly awards 
upon the martyr and describes how “nobody in Paradise would wish to return to earth, with 
the exception of the martyr, who died in battle for God’s cause. He would return to earth to
Q*7
be killed again ten times over after all the salutes accorded to him in Paradise” .
84 The Hamas Charter, Article 8, August 1988. Ibid.
85 See for example: Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History o f Suicide Bombing 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004); Prof. Abdul Hadi Palazzi ‘Orthodox Islamic 
Perceptions o f Jihad and Martyrdom’ and Reuven Paz ‘The Islamic Legitimacy o f  Suicide Terrorism’ both in 
Countering Suicide Terrorism: An International Conference (Herzliya, Israel: The International Policy 
Institute for Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya, Feb. 20-23, 2000)
86 Al-Hayat interview with Rantisi conducted on 25 April 2001 as cited in Christopher Reuter, My Life is a 
Weapon, opt, cit.. p. 123
87 Ibid. p. 117
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The narrative of shahadat constructed by Hamas is a crucial component of its military 
strategy and a key example of the expediency of political Islam and how it is channelized 
into facilitating suicidal violence in the territories. Hamas substantiates its claim for the 
necessity of sacrifice in Palestine by drawing on the abundant Qur’anic verses and 
prophetic traditions that refer to jihad and martyrdom. It thus urges the Palestinians to fight 
persecution and injustice on the path of God and to never fear death, as those killed in battle 
are rewarded by God. A survey of Hamas leaflets indicates that most communiques 
generally begin or end with one or more Qur’anic verses which extol the virtues of 
sacrifice, urging Muslims to be God’s hands on earth. The verses ask them to struggle in 
His path and for His cause, without fear of death, for those who die waging a jihad attain 
Paradise. For example:
Surah 2:154 - “Think not of those who are slain in Allah’s way as 
dead. Nay, they live, finding their sustenance in the Presence of their 
Lord”
Surah 3:139 -  “Fight them! Allah will chastise them at your hands, 
and He will lay them low and give you victory over them, and He 
will heal the breast of folk who are believers”
Surah 8:60 -  “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost 
of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the 
hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies”
Surah 14:52 -  “And what though ye be slain in Allah’s way or die 
therein? Surely pardon from Allah and mercy are better than all that 
they amass. What though ye be slain or die, when unto Allah ye are 
gathered?”88
Hamas’ narrative as it is built through its leaflets thus begins by recalling and aligning with 
Qur’anic tradition before progressively constructing the Palestinian martyr as the spearhead
88 All verses are quoted in Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism: opt, cit. and Shaul Mishal and 
Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones, opt, cit.
204
of its jihad against the Israeli state. It consolidates the position of the martyr in society by 
honouring them and their families after their passing. By insisting that the strength of the 
Palestinians lies in their willingness to sacrifice themselves in a holy struggle Hamas 
juxtaposes the strong, noble Palestinian martyr who embraces death with a smile against the 
weak, frightened Israeli who is instead scared of dying. Hamas’ first communique thus 
asserts:
“..during one week, hundreds of wounded and tens of martyrs 
offered their lives in the path of God to uphold their nation’s glory 
and honour, to restore our rights in our homeland, and to elevate 
God’s banner in the land. This is a true expression of the spirit of 
sacrifice and redemption that characterises our people. This spirit 
has robbed the Zionists of their sleep and rocked their foundations, 
even as it proved to the whole world that a people that welcomes 
death shall never die. Let the Jews understand that ... our people’s 
perseverance and steadfastness shall overcome their oppression and 
arrogance. Let them know that their policy of violence shall beget 
naught but a more powerful counter policy by our sons and youths 
who love the eternal life in heaven more than our enemies love life...
The intifada is here to convince them that Islam is the solution and 
the alternative. Let the reckless settlers beware: Our people know the 
way of sacrifice and martyrdom and are generous in this 
regard...Let them understand that violence breeds nothing but
O A
violence and that death bestows but death” . (emphasis added)
Thus Hamas builds and manipulates an intricate narrative which brings together concepts of 
Zionism, Islam, nationalism, the Palestinian waqf and jihad, which bundled together 
contribute to formulating the consistently escalating rhetoric of martyrdom. In other words, 
by justifying these concepts through the language of political Islam, Hamas is able to frame 
martyrdom operations as a fulfilment of sacred imperatives in the fight against occupation. 
A large number of Hamas leaflets, especially from the late 1990s, end with the slogans
89 First Hamas Communique dated 14 December 1987 in Khaled Hroub, Hamas. opt, cit.
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“And it is Jihad until victory or martyrdom”, “Glory and immortality for our martyrs” or 
“Victory for our Mujahid people” -  reflecting both the growing militarisation and 
religiosity of Palestinian society as well as the increasing centrality of martyrdom in the 
landscape of conflict. Indeed this growing importance of the martyrdom rhetoric is most 
evident when compared with the fact that Hamas leaflets from the first intifada tend to end 
with the slogans “Allah is great, praise to God”, “Let the uprising continue until victory” or 
at the most “And it is Jihad until victory”. Thus even an analysis of Hamas’ martyrdom 
rhetoric shows a significant shift with literature from the first intifada containing only 
generic references to martyrdom and martyrs. In fact, earlier leaflets tended to provide 
directives for action via strike calls, prayers, rejection of settlements, the escalation of 
violence and generally encourage resistance activities. Martyrdom was alluded to and 
honoured but not portrayed as a desirable means of resisting the occupation. A typical 
leaflet from the first intifada reads as follows:
“O our mujahid Palestinian people,...[who] serve as exemplars in 
the jihad, the steadfastness, and the sacrifice... beware of conceding a 
single grain of soil from die land of Palestine. We call on the 
hypocrites and the defeatists and pimps of the enemy: stop the 
concessions and the deterioration because there can be no peace 
with murderers...we call on the merchants to undertake to boycott 
Israeli goods, and we call on our [fighting] arms who are 
everywhere to impose [the boycott] forcibly... Sunday, May 5, 1991, 
a day o f escalating the protest against the policy o f expropriating 
land and establishing settlements...Wednesday, May 15, 1991, a 
general strike marking the creating o f the despicable Jewish state in 
1948...Praise and honour and glory to...our leaders who led the 
people...and are now suffering behind bars. Praise to all the fathers 
and mothers who took leave of their martyred sons... Praise to all the 
members of our mujahidun Palestinian people for their 
sacrifice...Let the uprising continue until victory”90. (emphasis 
added)
90 Hamas leaflet No. 74 dated 3 May 1991 in Shaul Mishal and Reuben Aharoni, Speaking Stones, opt, cit.
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However, by the mid-1990s, this rhetoric is developed into a sophisticated narrative which 
not only extends legitimacy to suicide operations as a means of resisting occupation but 
also provides forceful propaganda for the organisation’s military activities by listing the 
names of martyrs as well as detailed accounts of Israeli attacks and the organisation’s vows 
of revenge. The leaflets and wall graffiti glorify the deeds of martyrs through elaborate 
eulogies and describe in detail the costs and casualties that were inflicted upon the enemy 
in the name of God. Of course, there is a constant reaffirmation of the martyr’s attainment 
of eternal life and his/her place in paradise as one of God’s favourites.
“Our heroic Palestinian people: a star has fallen from the skies o f 
Palestine but its splinters would bum the heart o f Zionists...Who 
will deter the angered (avenging) heroes? Who will dare halt the 
blood-painted revenge? ...The martyr commander was the knight 
that annoyed occupation; its soldiers and settlers in all areas of 
Palestine and his students have learnt from him the arts of combat 
and graduated from his school with distinction. They realise that the 
time has come now to play their role and teach the Zionists 
unforgettable lessons so that they [the Israelis] would know that if a 
knight had fallen a group of cavaliers would show up after him...the 
heinous crime perpetrated by the Zionist terrorist leaders in 
assassinating commander o f the Qassam Brigades the martyr 
Mujahid hero Mahmoud Abu Hannoud and his brothers Ayman and 
M a’moon Has hay ka will not pass unpunished...we in the 
\KM...bear with pride and glory the glad tidings o f  the martyrdom 
o f commander Mahmoud Abu Hannoud and his brothers, a thing 
that they have always yearned for after he and his brothers managed 
to survive the enemy’s various assassination and arrest attempts for 
years. We vow before Allah to remain faithful to blood of the martyr 
and all martyrs of our people and we will remain insisting on 
resistance until end and ejection of occupation from our lands
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sacrificing our souls and blood as cheap price along that road. And it 
is a Jihad until either victory or martyrdom”qx. (emphasis added)
Hamas Military Communiques are even more unique in that they detail and claim 
responsibility for specific military actions. While all those who die in the struggle against 
occupation are termed martyrs there is a often a qualitative difference discemable between 
descriptions of those who die in shelling, grenade and other armed attacks versus those who 
specifically conduct suicide attacks. It seems this qualitative difference is based in suicide 
bombings being politically superior tools of propaganda as opposed to conventional armed 
attacks. Suicide operations are thus marketed specifically to highlight Qassam’s military 
power while simultaneously being legitimised using the language of political Islam. Thus 
conventional armed attacks are generally described plainly and briefly, for example: “the 
Qassam Brigades declare responsibility for the armed attack using hand grenades and 
machine guns against a convoy of Zionist usurpers...[the] Executor of the attack is the 
martyr hero Osama Hillis”92 or “the Qassam Brigades declare responsibility for attacking 
and storming the Zionist army post established on our Palestinian lands in the area called 
Doget settlement ...Three Mujahideen from the Qassam Brigades were martyred in this 
operation: Martyr hero Othman Deeb Al-Razayna, 22, from Jabaliya refugee camp. Martyr 
hero: Iyad Rabee Al-Batsh, 21, from the town of Jabaliya. Martyr hero: Fuad Mustafa Al- 
Dahshan, 17, from Zaitun suburb, Gaza”93. As opposed to:
“The tenth martyr the hero Saeed Hassan Hussein Al-Hoteri, 20, 
approached his target confidently last Friday at 11:30 pm according 
to the plan. He carried out his qualitative martyrdom operation in the 
enemy’s depth and heart and then ascended to heavens to meet the 
prophets, the truthfuls and the martyrs in Allah’s Jannah 
(paradise)...The blast was made using a highly explosive material 
(Qassam-19), which was developed by the Qassam Brigades ’ experts 
in their own factories. The enemy experienced its bitterness in the
91 Hamas Communique dated 24 November 2001 in Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism, opt, 
cit.
92 Military Communique issued by the Qassam Brigades dated 12 November 2001 in Yonah Alexander, 
Palestinian Religious Terrorism, opt, cit.
93 Military Communique issued by the Qassam Brigades dated 26 October 2001. Ibid.
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first test in Netenya at the hands of the martyr hero Mahmoud 
Marmash. We tell our people and Nation to rest assured that the 
Brigades’ reprisal, by the grace of Allah, would always be a 
pioneering retaliation in its implementation, quality and effect”94.
(emphasis added)
Hamas’ spiritual leader Sheikh Yassin voiced this conscious legitimisation of suicide 
operations in 2002 when said: “Our only initiative against the enemy is resistance, until we 
liberate our homeland...The Palestinians have the right to use all their weapons against this 
enemy, including the martyr death attacks. If we are asked to stop these operations, Israel 
must be forced to first stop its occupation of Palestinian lands. If the Israeli enemy wants to 
decide for me how to handle opposition against him that would no longer qualify as 
opposition”95. Hamas ddirectives are also seen to continue being dispersed through leaflets. 
By the late 1990s, leaflets also carry directives regarding martyrdom operations in addition 
to the usual calls for strikes, boycotts and protests. Some of these directives also carry 
details of geographical areas of operation, for example in a December 2001 leaflet Hamas 
declared a hudna (unilateral ceasefire) on martyrdom operations within Israeli territories: 
“we declare a suspension of martyrdom operations (i.e. suicide attacks) in the 1948 
occupied territories and a stoppage of mortar fire until further notice. We affirm that all 
Hamas cadres especially the Qassam Brigades should abide by this matter until Allah 
ordains whatever He wills”96. Hence what is seen is a systematic use of political Islam by 
Hamas with the express purpose of legitimising and facilitating the enactment of suicide 
attacks within the Israeli-Palestinian landscape of conflict. The use of religious rhetoric 
explains how suicidal violence is absorbed under the rubric of jihad.
HI. Political Islam, Jihad and Shahadat in Individual Statements
Apart from organisational rhetoric, individual belief and sentiment are also evident in the 
letters and wills written by the ‘living martyr’ (a suicide bomber in waiting) which are
94 Qassam Brigades’ Military Communique dated 12 November 2001. Ibid.
95 Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islam and Violence in the Modern Ear (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 146
96 Hamas Communique dated 21 December 2001 in Yonah Alexander, Palestinian Religious Terrorism, opt. 
cit.
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widely publicised by Hamas suggesting at least a certain degree of acceptance and 
internalisation of Hamas rhetoric. Individual wills and last testimonies can either be found 
in the form of a document or more recently in the form of a ‘living will’, i.e. a videotape. A 
significant number of these wills reflect amongst other emotions a deep profession of faith. 
In a prototypical letter, the martyr urges his/her family and community not to moum their 
passing but to rejoice and celebrate their martyrdom as if it were their wedding day. They 
stress that through this act of martyrdom they have attained eternal life and the ability to 
intercede with Allah on their family’s behalf. The martyrs also ask their families to pray 
and fast regularly and be good Muslims. The last will and testament of the Martyr Hamed 
Abu Hejleh illustrates some of these elements:
“Rejoice, for I have fulfilled my wish and achieved martyrdom in the 
path o f God with the help o f the determined holy fighters.. .know that 
the Prophet Muhammed, peace be upon him, has said that the martyr 
intercedes with God on behalf of seventy of his family 
members...A/y last wish to you my family is that none o f  you should 
weep in my procession to heaven. Indeed, distribute dates and 
ululate in the wedding o f martyrdom. I conclude by saying we shall 
meet soon, God willing, in a paradise prepared for those who fear the 
Lord, the size of which spans heaven and earth”. 97 (emphasis added)
Muhammad Hazza al-Ghoul who executed the 18 June 2006 bus bombing at the Patt 
junction in Jerusalem killing twenty people and injuring fifty-two wrote similar words in 
his last will and testament:
“The triumphant outcome will be to those who fear the Lord, but this 
will not happen until we champion God and His religion...The 
martyr intercedes on behalf of seventy of his family members, so I 
request of Him that you be from among them. I  ask you, for God’s
97 For the full text o f the will see Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making o f  
Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington, DC: United States Institute o f Peace, 2006), pp. 91-92
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sake, not to cry for my absence, for we will meet shortly in Paradise,
God willing”98. (emphasis added)
Shadi Sleyman al-Nabaheen who carried out a failed suicide operation on May 19, 2003 
said in his last will and testament:
“My dear brothers and sisters...Be from among the patient and 
steadfast and hold tightly to the religion of God. Guide your children 
to the mosque and instruct them to read the Qur 'an and attend the 
recitation lessons, and teach them to love jihad and martyrdom 
(emphasis added)
The act of martyrdom then becomes the vehicle by which to demonstrate and fulfil 
individual commitment to God who urges true believers to fight persecution and never fear 
death, where persecution is successfully framed by Hamas in terms of the Palestinian 
nationalist project. In addition to this, a sense of deep religious responsibility, and 
concurrently religious guilt, also seems to bear down upon a number of these bombers. 
Thus Ismail al-Masoubi states in his last will how: “Love for jihad and martyrdom has 
come to possess my life, my being, my feelings, my heart, and my senses. My heart ached 
when I heard the Qur’anic verses, and my soul was tom when I realised my shortcomings 
and the shortcomings of Muslims in fulfilling our duty toward fighting in the path of God 
Almighty”100 (i.e. in liberating the “land of al-Isra' wal-Miraf'). Most strikingly, this sense 
of deep belief and religious responsibility can be found in not only the personal wills of 
martyrs but also in statements made by their close friends and family. The following 
statement by the mother of a Hamas bomber illustrates this: “I am a compassionate mother 
to my children, and they are compassionate towards me and take care of me. Because I love 
my son, I encourage him to die a martyr’s death for the sake of Allah... Jihad is a religious
98 Ibid. pp. 90-91
99 Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Symbolic Dimension o f  Suicide Terrorism’ in Ami Pedahzur (ed.), Root Causes o f  
Suicide Terrorism: The Globalization o f  Martyrdom (London and New York: Routledge, Taylor and Francis 
Group, 2006), p. 71
100 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, opt, cit.. p. 43
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obligation incumbent upon us, and we must carry it out. I sacrificed Muhammed as part of 
my obligation”101.
Mohammed Hafez in a study of Palestinian suicide bombers locates a certain quality of 
personal and societal redemption in such statements. He points out how the act of 
martyrdom provides individual redemption because it is a privilege accorded only to 
committed believers. Simultaneously, he stresses that the act also attempts to redeem the 
society’s failure to act righteously. This logic can perhaps be further extended to the 
relatives of the bombers who seem to believe that in fulfilling their duty by ‘sacrificing’ 
their sons and daughters they too are not only demonstrating their faith but perhaps also 
participating in the redemptive function of martyrdom.
Other than faith and religious responsibility, a number of other themes can be located in last 
testimonials and ‘living wills’. In many cases, the bomber calls upon the both the 
Palestinian masses and the wider umma to follow the example of jihad set by themselves. 
The last will of Ismail Masawabi from Khan Yunis, who blew himself up at the edge of a 
nearby Israeli settlement killing two Israeli soldiers eloquently states:
“ ...In Paradise I shall be immortal, so you should be glad that I am 
there. To all those who have loved me, I say: don’t weep, for your 
tears won’t give me peace. This is the way I have chosen. So, i f  you 
have really loved me, carry on and carry my weapon ...”
(emphasis added)
Muhammad al-Habashi, who carried out his attack on September 9, 2001 near a train 
station in which three Israelis were killed and ninety wounded also wrote:
“I ask God almighty that my martyrdom is a message to all the Arab 
and Muslim nations to get rid o f  the injustice o f their rulers that 
weigh heavily on their shoulders and to rise to bring victory to
101 Meir Litvak, ‘Religious and Nationalist Fanaticism: The Case o f Hamas’, opt, cit..
102 Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon, opt, cit.. p. 91
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Muslims in Jerusalem and Palestine, and in all conquered Muslim 
lands...103,5 (emphasis added)
These ‘living wills5 thus seem to echo Hamas5 jihad rhetoric, a trait which can be further 
located in the tendency of martyrs to call for the destruction of the Jews and Israel. Some of 
these wills clearly refer to the idea of jihad and indicate that the bomber's self-image is that 
of a warrior fighting the holy battle for Palestine. Jihad Walid Hamada's will articulates 
this particularly well: “ ...I write this testament in the depth of jihad, waiting for the 
ultimate battle against those who violated our homeland (emphasis added). I ask God to 
bless his soldiers and give me the strength to severe the heads of Jews from their 
bodies”104. Hamas martyrs, like their organisation, recognise their isolation in this jihad and 
chastise the Muslim nations for their inaction, urging them to shed their fear of death and 
fight for the sacred land of Palestine. Mahmoud Sleyman Abu Hasanein addresses the Arab 
and Muslim nations of the world and asks: “Why are you so committed to this transient 
world? Why the fear? We die only once, so let it be for the sake of God”105.
Similarly individual rhetoric also echo's the organisational one by equating martyrdom 
with strength, courage and true belief. Fouad Ismail al-Hourani asks in his will: “Can there 
be men of truth if we are not (willing to be) men? A believer without courage is like a tree 
without fruit”106. Thus, these ‘living wills' are a complex combination of religious fervour 
and guilt, national consciousness and social responsibility. Shadi Sleyman al-Nabaheen, 
who was mentioned above, stated:
“How beautiful for the splinters o f my bones to be the response that 
blows up the enemy, not for the love o f  killing, but so we can live as 
other people live... We do not sing the song o f death, but recite the 
hymns o f life... We die so that future generations might live'"101.
(emphasis added)
103 Mohammed M. Hafez, ‘Symbolic Dimension o f Suicide Terrorism’, opt, cit.. p. 73
104 Ibid. p. 71
105 Ibid. p. 73
106 Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing Human Bombs, opt, cit.. p. 44
107 For the full text of the will see Mohammed M. Hafez, Ibid. p. 90
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This combination of national consciousness and religious belief is also evident in Jihad 
Walid Hamada’s last will and testament. Hamada who conducted an operation on August 4, 
2002 which killed nine Israelis and injured forty said: “May our blood become a lantern 
that lights up for those around us the path towards liberation, to raise the banner o f truth, 
the banner o f Islam”10* (emphasis added).
The same complex combination of sentiments is also echoed in the statements made by 
close relatives and friends of the martyr. For example a videotape of a Hamas operative’s 
last will shows him holding hands with his mother, who says: “I am not losing you because 
you are going to paradise...Our message to the Israeli occupiers and killers is that this is 
our land. And our sons that we love are no more dear to us than our land. Their blood will 
redeem it”109. Martyrdom operations thus seem to be regarded, even at the individual level, 
as religious tools that can be implemented to achieve explicitly political ends, in this case, 
national liberation. Therefore martyrdom allows the operative and his social affiliates to not 
only fulfil their duty to God but to their country. In this way the single act of martyrdom 
becomes a mechanism to end injustice and simultaneously seek liberation and vengeance. 
There is thus an intricate weaving of a militant, revenge rhetoric with the ideas and 
language of nationalism and religiosity. Yet while certain dominant themes can be traced in 
the written and ‘living wills’ it is still much more difficult to pin down individual reasons 
for opting for suicide operations. All that can be said with authority is that the reasons can 
range from redemption to national responsibility.
However, what is amply clear is that a number of ‘living wills’ echo the rhetoric 
constructed by the Hamas in its literature thus reflecting the power Hamas exerts over the 
imagination of an entire nation. Because ‘living martyrs’ are taped reading out their wills it 
has been suggested that these statements are scripted by Hamas and not individual bombers. 
But it is unclear if this is indeed the case or if the bombers themselves have prepared these 
wills. The recurring appearance of particular themes certainly suggests that some sort of 
political template either exists or is mimicked. Yet at the same time it must be emphasised 
that suicide bombers sometimes produce two testaments. One is the ‘official’ version that is
108 Ibid. p. 45
109 Ira Sharkansky, Coping With Terror: An Israeli Perspective (Maryland and Oxford: Lexington Books, 
2003), p. 58
used for publicity and the other is a private testament addressed to their immediate family. 
While documentation is limited, it can be tentatively asserted that the ‘official’ statements 
tend to be more politicised than the private statements which are much more personal110. 
Other full texts of wills that could be accessed reflect a combination of personal and official 
statements and no longer reflect the political-personal divide. But because these testaments 
were posted on Hamas’ official website they might potentially have been edited to read as 
one text.
Yet what is clear is that both the personal and official individual testaments reflect a certain 
degree of personal faith. The wills also are a reflection of Hamas’ political concerns, which 
might indicate at least a degree of manufacturing. There are three key points of similarity 
between Hamas rhetoric and the individual wills. Firstly, the individual wills reflect the 
same combination of faith and nationalism as do Hamas leaflets. The excerpts reproduced 
above provide abundant verification of this. Secondly, the same sense of isolation that is 
evident in Hamas rhetoric is also prevalent in the language used by their martyrs. Thirdly, 
individual wills, like Hamas leaflets, also privilege martyrdom and self-sacrifice and 
indicate the successful framing of suicide bombings as martyrdom in the jihad against 
Israel, and not suicide. The end result is the successful manufacturing of the belief that 
martyrdom operations serve the cause of God and the nation. This framing provides the 
final pillar of the proposed theoretical framework of analysis and explains how suicidal 
violence is justified, legitimised and enacted specifically within the Palestinian milieu.
Yet despite attempting to make clear distinctions between suicide and martyrdom, made by 
both the organisation and die individuals who call these operations amaliyat istishhadiyya 
(martyrdom operations) or amaliyya fid a ’iyya (sacrificial operations) and attempting to 
align them with the Islamic legacy of shahadat, obvious tensions still exist within the 
Muslim community regarding the legitimacy of such attacks111. Consequently a fierce 
debate has raged between Muslim scholars and theologians over the validity of suicide 
attacks and no firm societal consensus has been reached either. This tenuous support might 
be what push Hamas towards constructing such an elaborate martyrdom narrative. In
110 As an example of the differences between official and private wills and last statements see Appendix B for 
the wills o f Ismail Masawabi.
111 Israeli Arabic-language media prefer the term amaliyya intihariyya, i.e. a suicide operation.
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various interviews Sheikh Yusef al-Qaradawi, one of the most significant contemporary 
Sunni scholars declared: The operations are the highest form of jihad and are most certainly 
permitted by the Shari’a...the mujahid, the warrior, has total faith in God’s mercy. He does 
battle with the enemy and the enemy of God with this new weapon which Providence has 
put in the hands of the weak so that they are in a position to fight the powerful and 
arrogant”. Qaradawi insists that Israeli women and children are not to be spared “for Israel 
is in its very essence a military society. Both men and women serve in the army. To be 
sure, if a child or old person is killed in the process, then it’s not intentional but an 
oversight; a mistake for reasons of military necessity. Necessity justifies what is 
forbidden”112. Again in a July 2004 interview he reiterated: “I consider this type of 
martyrdom operation [attacks on Israeli civilians] as indication of justice of Allah almighty. 
Allah is just. Through his infinite wisdom he has given the weak what the strong do not 
possess and that is the ability to turn their bodies into bombs like the Palestinians do”113. 
Yet various fatwas also condemn such attacks. Such a series of fatwas were issued 
apparently at the behest of the PA immediately after the wave of bombings which occurred 
in February-March 1996. These fatwas declared that acts of violence against civilians and 
unarmed people were not acts of martyrdom in a holy struggle, thereby implying that these 
were acts of individual suicide instead. In April 1996 Sheikh Muhammad al-Sayyid al- 
Tantawi, Grand Mufti at Cairo’s al-Azhar University, also categorised suicide operations 
and the killing of innocent unarmed civilians as “evil” 114. Then in 2004 Tantawi further 
qualified his 1996 statement by stating that “suicide operations are an act of self-defence 
and a type of martyrdom so long as their intention consists of killing the enemy’s soldiers, 
but not women and children”115.
Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela believe that such denunciation and debate is what led 
Hamas’ initiative of the 1997 Damascus publication, al-‘Amaliyyat al-Istishhadiyya al- 
Mizan al-Fiqhi (literally: The Suicide Operations in the Balance of Jurisprudence). This 
book was aimed ostensibly at refuting all criticisms levelled at Hamas for killing innocent 
Israeli civilians and establishing the Islamic legitimacy of these acts. This publication listed 
Islamic scholars who argued that martyrdom in the course of jihad was a legitimate Islamic
112 Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon, opt, cit.. p. 122
113 Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islam and Violence in the Modern, opt, cit.. p. 145
114 Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, opt, cit.. pp. 76,211
115 Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon, opt, cit.. p. 124
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tool with a sound historical and religious basis. The Palestinian religious establishment 
remained ambiguous and actively avoided issuing a definitive position or sanction to 
suicide operations. For example, Palestinian Grand Mufti Sheikh Ekrima Sabri very 
vaguely stated: “The person who sacrifices his life as a Muslim will know if God accepts it 
and whether it’s for the right reason...God in the end will judge him and whether he did 
that for a good purpose or not. We cannot judge. The measure is whether the person is 
doing that for his own purposes, or for Islam”116. Yet despite such ambiguity the debate has 
continued. In April 2001 the Saudi Grand Mufti Sheikh Abdulaziz bin-Abdullah al-Ashaikh 
rejected suicide attacks and asserted that they had no basis in Shari’a. Thus he stressed: 
“such attacks are not part of the jihad, and I fear that they are just suicides plain and 
simple”117. While not a formal fatwa, this was a very powerful statement nonetheless and 
provoked a series of responses in return. Hamas’ Sheikh Hamid al-Bitawi, for example, 
stated that if even the smallest portion of Muslim land is occupied then jihad becomes 
incumbent upon every individual and consequently suicide attacks permissible. It therefore 
seems that there is no single fixed position on suicide operations and Hamas uses this very 
ambiguity and fluidity in its favour when justifying such attacks. Even so, a great degree of 
debate regarding the legitimacy of suicide operations continues amongst both Muslim 
scholars as well as within popular discourse.
IV. Conclusion
Hamas’ use of suicidal violence represents a conscious transgression of jus in bello 
principles, especially with regard to the means of war and non-combatant immunity. 
Therefore, suicidal violence becomes a total war in practice even though it continues to be 
justified as a jihad. This, as illustrated above, suggests that Hamas, deliberately and 
systematically, uses political Islam to facilitate the incorporation of the total war concept 
within the traditional ideal of jihad (which remains a just and limited war, even if it has 
religious roots, in classical Islam). The fact that this is an on-going process and one that 
occupies a contentious space in Palestinian Muslim society is perhaps best reflected by 
Hamas’ construction of an elaborate jihad narrative which is systematically harnessed to the
116 Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islam and Violence in the Modern Ear (Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 145
117 Christopher Reuter, My Life is a Weapon: A Modem History o f Suicide Bombing (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 123
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Palestinian nationalist project. Within this narrative, both ishtishad and amaliyat 
istishhadiyya, are seen to occupy a central space. Hamas thus builds ishtishad as a key 
aspirational goal for the true believers in Palestinian society. In doing so, it justifies suicidal 
violence as part and parcel of the national struggle for liberation. Hamas seeks to justify 
and legitimise suicidal violence in a variety of ways.
First and foremost, Hamas justifies suicidal violence as a defensive jihad. This involves a 
complex weaving of just and limited war ideals with total war conceptions. Therefore, the 
cause of liberation which is presented to the Palestinian public is a just one and fulfils the 
most basic of jus ad bellum criteria. Hamas also justifies its jihad against Israel as a last 
resort mechanism in which its operatives are fighting for the survival of the Palestinian 
people against a disproportionately strong and brutal occupying force. However, the use of 
suicidal violence in the arena of confrontation violates the jus in hello principles of using 
just and limited means in war and, of course, of non-combatant immunity. Such a 
transgression violates the Western just war ideal which states that, “A justified war (sic) is 
not necessarily a just war. To be fully “just” a war must be characterized by both jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. A war obviously cannot be just if  one is unjustified in entering 
upon it in the first place, but neither can it be just, however just the cause and right the 
intention, if it utilizes indefensible means”118. However, it is this very transgression which 
needs to be comprehended if we are to understand how suicide bombings are justified, 
legitimised and enacted within the Palestinian setting.
However, as stated above, Hamas’ ideology, as that of a modem Islamist organisation’s, 
exists in constant interaction with modem secular concerns and realities. It is perhaps this 
interaction which forces Hamas to acknowledge, albeit tacitly, that suicidal violence 
violates human rights as per the standards established by international law. It is possibly 
this knowledge which forces it to formulate an intricate jihad narrative which consistently 
references back to classical Islam in order to facilitate a contemporary political agenda. For 
example, Hamas consciously uses the Qur’anic idea of ‘they are from them’ which is used 
to deny responsibility for the welfare of non-Muslim civilians (i.e. Israeli citizens), while 
waging a jihad. Muslim forces waging a jihad are not considered to be responsible for the
118 Robert L. Holmes. On War and Morality, opt, cit.. p 175
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welfare o f non-Muslim civilians. Responsibility is instead devolved to those who, in their 
decision making capacities, have chosen to resist Islam and thereby placed these non- 
combatants under risk of attack.
Yet, at the same time, Hamas’ justification for suicidal violence also reflects uneasiness 
with regard to international law ideals. In response, there is an almost unconscious over­
compensation in the language used to justify suicide attacks, which addresses, very 
specifically, a set of concerns that feature prominently in international law. The issue of 
intentionality is, for example, acknowledged and circumvented by Yassin in various 
statements:
“In Islam, it’s always a question of intention...You can have the 
same actions but different intentions. So if a suicide bomber does not 
intend to hurt innocent people, he is blameless for their deaths”119.
Similarly, Hamas attempts to create conditions of supreme emergency when justifying 
suicidal violence. The idea of defensive jihad comes up repeatedly in statements made by 
both the organisation as well as its individual operatives. Hamas leader Mahmoud Zahar, 
for example, summarised this position in an interview conducted in May 1995:
“They [the Jews] made their religion their nation and state...They 
have declared war on Islam, closed mosques and massacred 
defenceless worshippers at Al-Aqsa and in Hebron. They are the 
Muslim-killers and under these circumstances we are obliged by our 
religion to defend ourselves”120.
The idea of non-combatant immunity is also a reoccurring theme. Hamas consistently 
categorises Israeli society as a military society in order to justify its targeting of civilian 
populations. It emphatically states that since all Israeli civilians, men, women and children, 
serve in the army, there are no real non-combatants/civilians in the Israeli state.
119 Joyce M. Davis, Martyrs, opt, cit.. p. 109
120 Beverly Milton-Edwards, Islamic Politics in Palestine (London and New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 
1996), p. 186
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Overall, we can locate key concerns of political Islam in Hamas’ rhetoric and agenda. Most 
obviously then, Hamas, echoing other Islamist organisations, coalesces Israel with the 
West, and sees the traditional conflict between dar al-islam and dar al-harb in the rather 
stark terms of a confrontation between Islam and the West. A key shift that can be located 
in Hamas ideology and concerns is its nationalist political agenda. Hence, unlike its parent 
organisation and al-Banna, the state represents a key arena of contest for Hamas and its 
political, military and social programme is geared towards consolidating its position in the 
Palestinian political arena. In other words, Hamas’ use of political Islam to justify suicidal 
violence as a key component of the jihad directed at establishing a free and Islamic 
Palestine, serves a distinctly modem, state-oriented agenda. Hamas’ ‘martyrdom 
operations’ may therefore be seen as the declaration of a total, holy and just war -  all 
justified and encompassed under the broad rubric of jihad by the use of political Islam.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
“We do not sing the song o f death, 
but recite the hymns o f life 
We die so that future generations might live” 
- Shadi Sleyman al-Nabaheen1
I. Main Findings and Conclusions
This work aimed at constructing a theoretical framework of analysis which could be 
applied to the study of suicidal violence as practiced by Hamas and its operatives in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The proposed framework of analysis attempted to answer why 
and how suicide attacks emerged, escalated and became a mode of engagement in the 
Israeli-Palestinian landscape of conflict from 1993 to 2006. The starting point of this thesis 
was, first and foremost, a rejection of the notion of a monolithic Islamist global threat of 
suicidal violence in favour of an in-depth analysis of a single empirical case-study. Such in- 
depth analysis enabled this work to generate specific answers to a particular manifestation 
of the phenomenon of suicide attacks in a given socio-political cultural setting. Empirical 
investigation revealed that the emergence and escalation of suicidal violence in the 
Palestinian territories was rooted in three interrelated factors, namely:
(i) The expressive and instrumental rationality of suicide missions, which explains 
why suicidal violence emerged and is used as a mechanism of engagement with the 
Israeli state;
(ii) The struggle for a national identity and the culturally entrenched norm of 
militant heroic martyrdom, which explains how suicidal violence evolved 
specifically within the Palestinian socio-political setting; and
1 From the will o f suicide bomber, Shadi Sleyman al-Nabaheen, in Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing 
Human Bombs: The Making o f  Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington, DC: United States Institute o f  
Peace, 2006), p. 90
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(iii) The ideological framework of jihad as reinterpreted by political Islam, which 
explains how suicidal violence is justified, legitimised and enacted within the 
Palestinian milieu.
The thesis then sought to mesh these three interrelated factors with approaches and methods 
in international relations in order to formulate a theoretical framework of analysis which 
could be applied to study suicidal violence specifically in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
Adopting aspects of constructivist grounded theory as its methodological approach enabled 
this work to use the empirical evidence with the clear intention of letting a theory emerge to 
explain these three key factors rather than fitting the data into a preconceived theoretical 
framework. At its core then, this work sought to question if concepts and methods in 
contemporary international relations theory could explain and understand the phenomenon 
of suicidal violence.
This work came to the conclusion that the only way one could answer both why and how 
suicidal violence emerged, escalated and became a mode of engagement in the Palestinian 
territories, was by simultaneously applying three very different theoretical 
methodologies/approaches in an analysis of this phenomenon. The three 
methodologies/approaches that were therefore used in this work are the rationality 
assumption (itself rooted in classical Rational Choice Theory), Social Constructivism and 
the Just War thesis. However, while each of these approaches had the potential to explain 
specific aspects of suicidal violence in the Palestinian scenario they occasionally had to be 
expanded and/or revised in order to be able to encompass and address the complexities of 
the chosen empirical case-study.
As each approach incorporated either a strategic, symbolic, social or ideological aspect of 
suicide bombings, this work concluded that only a synchronised application of all three 
could enable a more holistic and accurate understanding of suicidal violence in the Israeli- 
Palestinian confrontation. Such a coordinated application did not privilege one approach 
over another and also successfully allowed this work to incorporate multiple players into 
the analysis. While the theoretical framework focussed most overtly on the role of two 
levels of analysis, i.e. the organisation (Hamas) and the individual operative in suicidal 
violence, it simultaneously acknowledged and included the role played by Palestinian
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society, which was seen to represent the broader socio-political-cultural milieu that 
generated both the organisation under study, as well as its operatives.
(i) The Strategic and Symbolic Aspect o f Suicidal Violence
The first pillar of the proposed theoretical framework of analysis sought to answer why 
suicidal violence emerged and was used in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter HI 
explored this facet of the phenomenon in-depth. It was seen that both Hamas and its 
individual operatives viewed suicide attacks as a strategic choice which served multiple 
purposes. Both organisational and individual motives were seen as conflating along the 
three broad concerns of survival, retaliation and competition. This chapter stressed the 
equally significant role played by both Hamas and its individual operatives and argued that 
while Hamas could certainly identify, manipulate and/or encourage certain popular 
emotions to facilitate recruitment for its suicide bombing campaigns, exploitation alone 
could not explain the large overall increase in individuals volunteering for such missions in 
the Palestinian territories. Nor could organisational manipulation and exploitation alone 
explain the increasing number of unaffiliated and loosely affiliated bombers, the drop in 
training and indoctrination times and satisfactorily answer why more individuals 
consistently, and repeatedly, volunteered for suicide missions. In other words, while 
organisational support was a crucial factor in the promulgation of suicide attacks individual 
motives also played an equally significant role in propelling the phenomenon. Thus the 
chapter stressed that the emergence and escalation of suicidal violence in the Palestinian 
territories could only be explained by studying the dialectic that existed between Hamas 
and its operatives.
Chapter in also stressed that suicidal violence clearly encompassed a rational logic for both 
levels of analysis, i.e. for both Hamas and the individual bomber. As such the rationality 
assumption was applied to study the phenomenon in a manner where individual rationality 
was not ignored and/or subordinated to organisational rationality. By refusing to privilege 
the organisation over the individual, while also refusing to disengage the rationalist 
approach from individual motivations, this work marked a clear break with both first and 
second generation scholarship in suicidal violence which, either regarded the phenomenon 
as irrational or concluded that rationalist explanations could account for an organisation’s
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decision to use suicide bombings, but not the individual’s. In other words, this work 
marked a departure from studies which believe that one could not conflate individual 
motives with organisational goals. More recent readings of suicidal violence also tended to 
focus on the instrumental logic behind suicide bombings while ignoring its symbolic 
significance altogether. Further, these studies tend to disengage rationality from symbolic 
function, dispossess both individual motivations and symbolic action of rationality and also 
implicitly reject the notion that symbolic action may simultaneously possesses and/or serve 
a functional aspect for both the organisation and the individual. In doing so, these works 
create a false dichotomy between expressive and instrumental violence.
In sharp contrast, this chapter stressed that one could not disregard the rationality of 
symbolic action and non-material incentives and goals when analysing suicidal violence. In 
other words, unless and until both the individual and the symbolic logic were taken into 
consideration, in addition to the traditional organisational and the instrumental logic of 
suicidal violence, any analysis of the phenomenon in the Israeli-Palestinian scenario would 
remain incomplete and, as such, inaccurate. Chapter in therefore adopted an expanded 
reading of the traditional rationality assumption by acknowledging recent innovations in the 
rational actor model, which allow for the incorporation of non-material, ‘selfless’, symbolic 
or normative elements, such as a concern for ones reputation and social standing. This 
chapter then further added to this expanded understanding Durkheim’s concept of ‘altruistic 
suicide’ and Mead’s concept of an ‘inter-subjective social reality’ to account for both the 
increasing number of individuals repeatedly volunteering for suicide missions as well as the 
large increase in unaffiliated/loosely affiliated bombers.
On this basis, it was pointed out how suicide attacks are both acts of expediency and 
practical reason as well as acts that are simultaneously symbolic, ritualistic and 
communicative. In other words, suicide attacks were identified as a complex combination 
of expressive (i.e. symbolic) and instrumental (i.e. functional) violence practiced by both 
Hamas and its operatives in order to fulfill the core purposes of survival, retaliation and 
competition.
The chapter demonstrated how for Hamas, suicide operations overwhelmingly 
encompassed an instrumental rationality in that they were tactically economical, flexible
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and had a powerful impact, both psychologically and strategically, upon target governments 
and populations. In addition, this chapter pointed out how Hamas used suicide operations in 
order to ensure, first and foremost, its survival in a political landscape that was dominated 
by two players -  Israel and Fatah/PLO/PA. Hamas has thus had to constantly balance its 
own agenda and goals vis-a-vis these two external and internal players. All Palestinian 
groups, including Hamas, are under intense pressure to perform within the Israeli- 
Palestinian confrontation, where performance is intricately linked to the group’s legitimacy 
within the Palestinian political arena and is a key determinant of support from the 
Palestinian ‘constituency’. Violent action is seen to have been consistently used by various 
groups to gamer public support. As such, Hamas’ use suicide attacks has successfully 
garnered support from the Palestinian street and ensured its survival within the political 
arena.
Prior to 2000, Hamas used suicide operations intermittently and generally in conjunction 
with other armed attacks to raise group profile and assert a unique group identity. This 
intermittent pattern was primarily the result of Hamas still being a weak and nascent group. 
Hence, unable to pose a direct challenge, it tended to used suicide missions instead to 
compete with Fatah/PA in order to undermine its legitimacy and hinder the Oslo peace 
process. Hamas’ suicide operations in the 1993-2000 period were also clearly a retaliatory 
response to Israeli policies and used to illicit a harsh Israeli response. This engendered an 
escalating tit-for-tat cycle of violence that steadily enabled Hamas to not only successfully 
justify suicidal violence as a defensive policy against Israeli punitive action but also portray 
itself as an able military successor to the now passive Fatah and PA. Over time as Hamas 
became more entrenched in Palestinian politics it was able to make the shift from being a 
social and military resistance party to one that was increasingly capable of challenging 
Fatah in the conventional political arena. At the same time it successfully maintained a 
unique identity by adhering to a dual policy of military and political activism with an 
equally strong social service base. That Fatah also began using suicide missions in 2002 
indicates that Hamas not only successfully normalised suicidal violence in the Palestinian 
scenario but also the intense pressure the PA and Fatah faced vis-a-vis the more strongly 
established group. As such 2002 indicates the beginning of a period in which suicide 
bombings were used competitively by equally influential political factions (i.e. Fatah and 
Hamas) vying for power and supremacy within the Palestinian political landscape. Thus,
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Hamas’ use of suicide operations has an instrumental logic that can be located in its need 
for survival, competition and retaliation. The strategies it has used, alone or in combination 
with each other, to achieve any of these goals have been those of negotiated coexistence, 
controlled violence and finally full political integration.
For individuals, suicide operations encompass an overwhelmingly symbolic rationality 
because a significant number of Palestinian suicide bombers believe that their death will 
contribute to the survival of their society while simultaneously allowing them to retaliate 
against the Israeli state. As such the individual decision to opt for a suicide mission is 
rooted in altruistic motives and martyrdom becomes the mechanism by which the bombers 
assert their affiliation and integration with Palestinian society, while simultaneously 
delineating personal space and carving out a unique personal identity. The belief that these 
missions are crucial to their society’s survival can explain the exponential rise in volunteers 
in direct correspondence with the failure of the peace process and Israel’s increasing use of 
the policy of collective punishment. Furthermore, Palestinian society’s increasingly 
ritualistic portrayals of its suicide bombers as heroic martyrs have also converted them into 
powerful role models and examples to be emulated. As self-sacrifice in increasingly 
honoured, celebrated and idealised it has become an avenue of amassing honour and social 
prestige for individuals and their families. In direct correspondence to Mead’s concept of an 
‘inter-subjective social reality’, martyrdom as a mechanism of accumulating societal 
honour has also become competitive over time, with each bombing also representing the 
stimuli triggering the one that follows in a self-replicating cycle. Thus a concept that was 
introduced and legitimised by Hamas has developed a certain momentum of its own and 
conditions of protracted conflict have created an environment where individuals can use 
their martyrdom, with or without organisational support, as a mechanism to ensure societal 
survival and retaliation on the one hand and enable competition on the other. For the 
individual then suicide attacks are a rational choice because they represent a powerful 
device to communicate the bomber’s message to multiple audiences and achieve equally 
important material and non-material ends. As such no matter what the individual’s 
motivation the cost of sacrificing the mortal life is much less than the benefits they accrue 
in doing so.
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(ii)The Social Aspects o f Suicidal Violence
The second pillar of the proposed theoretical framework sought to address how suicidal 
violence had originated and evolved within the Palestinian socio-cultural setting. Chapter 
IV thus attempted to construct an understanding of how the specific, culturally-rooted 
concept of self-sacrifice/martyrdom was appropriated and rearticulated as suicidal violence 
by Hamas in the period after the first intifada. While the focus of this chapter was most 
overtly on the impetus supplied by the organisation the work simultaneously stressed the 
significance of social context and therefore the role played by both Palestinian society and 
the individual operative in promulgating the phenomenon of suicidal violence. The 
argument was essentially based on adopting a social constructivist approach towards the 
phenomenon and thereby attempting to account for the ‘box’ of Palestinian social reality in 
which suicide bombings operate. In doing so, this chapter identified Palestinian nationalism 
as a vital determinant in the emergence of suicidal violence. Within this context (of 
Palestinian nationalism) this work specifically located ‘identity politics’ and the ‘notion of 
the other’ as crucial elements which facilitated the emergence of a ‘norm of militant heroic 
martyrdom’. This culturally entrenched norm was seen to have historically encouraged and 
lauded self-sacrifice for the national cause within Palestinian society. This work identified 
suicidal violence as a contemporary manifestation of this norm. Such an approach 
countered traditional explanations of ‘brainwashing’ and organisational 
manipulation/recruitment which are unable to account for the society’s willingness to 
support suicide missions.
This understanding of the Palestinian national stuggle and social reality enabled this work 
to successfully trace the trajectory of protest and violence in the Israeli-Palestinian 
interaction over nearly sixty years. Violence was contextualised as being intricately linked 
to Palestinian nationalism and directly related to the crystallisation of Palestinian national 
identity. Suicide violence was, in turn, identified as another step in this escalating scale of 
violence aimed at constructing Palestinian identity and attaining statehood. An analysis of 
the Palestinian struggle for national identity also revealed that the Palestinian narrative of 
selfhood was based on a complex combination of key themes which included oppression, 
emasculation, degradation, dispossession, humiliation, sacrifice, suffering and defeat. Each 
of these themes was seen to have evolved as a direct result of the Palestinian nation’s
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experience in the twentieth century vis-a-vis its most stable ‘other’, represented first by the 
early Zionist settlers and then by the state of Israel and its citizens.
As early as the late-1930s, violence was used to counter traditional themes of impotence 
and degradation and to raise morale and enhance self-esteem by glorifying the heroism of 
those slain in confrontations with the ‘other’. This narrative called upon the Palestinian 
people to participate and sacrifice themselves in the resistance for the homeland. As a 
result, in the early half of the twentieth century, self-sacrifice and martyrdom came to be 
venerated and juxtaposed against cowardice and moral degeneracy. The 1948-49 nakba, 
characterised by violence, fear, displacement and refugee flows, added the themes of 
landlessness, humiliation and suffering to the existing Palestinian narrative of selfhood, 
thereby engendering a Palestinian identity that was overwhelmingly one of the dispossessed 
and oppressed. This period also saw the 1930s narrative of self-sacrifice and martyrdom 
subordinated to that of humiliation, degradation and dispossession.
The next phase of Palestinian national activism was seen to evolve in the late-1950s and 
1960s with the emergence of armed revolutionaries from refugee camps in Jordan and 
Lebanon. With this resurgence violent confrontation, struggle and heroic sacrifice once 
again emerged as the dominant theme in the Palestinian narrative of selfhood, as well as a 
mechanism to redress the loss of land and prestige. In addition, both the Arab defeat in the 
1967 war and the Battle of Karamah in deeply impacted the evolution of Palestinian 
identity. The first fully consolidated the Palestinian narrative of disaster and a resistance- 
based Palestinian identity. The second gave birth to the mythification of the revolutionary 
(the fedayeen) and generated a renewal of self-confidence and hope within the Palestinians. 
After Karamah violence once again emerged as a means to infuse a broken Palestinian 
identity with vigour, pride and dignity. Most importantly, the symbolically resonant 
rhetoric of heroic martyrdom used by Fatah in its leaflets in the post- 1967 period shows 
striking similarities to, not only the literature from the 1930s Great Arab Revolt, but also, 
Hamas leaflets of the 1980s and 1990s. This seems to indicate that militant heroic 
martyrdom was firmly entrenched, and fully and consciously articulated, in Palestinian 
culture as a constitutive and regulatory norm by at least the 1960s, if not earlier.
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The 1987 intifada, and the heavy-handed Israeli response to the same, created the 
immediate context in which the image of the militant heroic martyr, willing to die for his 
homeland, re-emerged. This cultural construction of heroic martyrdom enabled the 
Palestinians to capture the higher moral ground vis-a-vis the Israeli state and fuelled the 
dominant rhetoric surrounding Israeli occupation. Hamas used this opportunity to fully 
articulate a socio-political and religious justification to resort to an increasingly violent 
military struggle. By 1993, the intifada was significantly more militarised, as is evident by 
the appearance of the conflict’s first suicide attacks. This seems to suggest that by 1993, 
Hamas had successfully appropriated and re-articulated the Palestinian norm of militant 
heroic martyrdom as a suicide operation. As a result, a historically developed and 
culturally entrenched norm was consciously and coldly escalated to a new level of violent 
self-sacrifice by Hamas.
This chapter therefore demonstrated that, depending on the time and circumstances, some 
of the key themes of Palestinian selfhood tend to play a more prominent role than others, 
which are temporarily subordinated. The core reason for the prominence and consistent re- 
emergence of the norm of militant heroic martyrdom was located in the sheer 
powerlessness experienced by Palestinian society in every period preceding a resurgence of 
this norm. Thus Palestinian nationalism, when examined in the longue duree, reflects a 
cyclical pattern, whereby powerlessness repeatedly engenders a renewal of armed struggle 
which enables the Palestinians to recapture agency (and therefore, power) and assert a 
proactive national identity. Self-sacrifice is identified as a core ingredient of Palestinian 
national identity and one which allows the Palestinians to maintain a sense of self-respect, 
honour and pride vis-a-vis the Israeli negative other. However, when agency is exercised in 
periods of resistance this ingredient of self-sacrifice assumes the active form of militant 
heroic martyrdom. The seizure of agency thus propels the evolution of Palestinian 
nationalism by regenerating the vital component of active identity creation. Once armed 
struggle loses momentum, as it inevitably does, the core national identity reverts back to the 
passive one of the powerless, dispossessed and degraded and the ingredient of self-sacrifice 
reverts, from its active militant variation, to its passive articulation as suffering and 
forbearance. This chapter therefore demonstrates how the basic narrative of Palestinian 
selfhood and history embodies the basic ‘active-passive ’ cyclical dichotomy of ‘armed 
struggle/heroic martyrdom’ and ‘suffering/sacrifice’.
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The chapter recognises that Hamas merely inserted itself into an established narrative 
framework instead of inventing one. Once this insertion was achieved Hamas channelised 
key themes of Palestinian selfhood into constructing a narrative which glorified and 
actively encouraged a new variant of militant martyrdom, thereby creating a conducive 
environment for the progressive normalisation of heroic martyrdom as suicide attacks. This 
conscious radicalisation of the 1987 intifada served to engender, at least temporarily, a 
climate of relentless violent struggle which opposed any form of negotiation or 
compromise. Further, the increased number of volunteers and unaffiliated bombers suggests 
that events did develop a dynamic of their own in the Palestinian territories which moved 
beyond organisational control and/or manipulation.
(iii) The Ideological Aspects o f Suicidal Violence
The third and final pillar of the proposed theoretical framework of analysis aimed to 
analyse how suicide operations were justified and legitimised within, and enacted by 
sections of, Palestinian society. Suicidal violence is often described by Hamas as a jihad 
waged against the oppressive Israeli state. A segment of academic literature often translates 
this jihad as a declaration of a ‘holy war’, i.e. a religious war, against the state of Israel. 
However, traditionally in international relations, the Islamic concept of jihad is seen as 
closely aligned with, if not equivalent to, the Western just war tradition. This work 
therefore used just war theory as the most logical entry point to address these contradictions 
and to analyse Hamas’ use of suicidal violence in the Israeli-Palestinian context. Yet while 
it is commonly accepted that the Islamic tradition of jihad is equivalent to the Western just 
war tradition (in both jus ad bellum and jus in bello principles), classical Islam does not 
make exactly the same distinctions between just and unjust grounds for war. Hence, the 
modem Islamic concept of jihad accepts religion as just grounds (i.e. jus ad bellum) for 
waging war, and thereby blurs the boundaries between, what are in the Western 
understanding, the traditionally irreconcilable concepts of “just war” and “holy war”. Even 
so, in classical Islam a war rooted in religious causes must still be just and waged with 
restraint. Jihad is therefore used as an umbrella term, which simultaneously refers to, and 
incorporates, the concepts of just war, holy war and limited war.
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It was seen in Chapter V that Hamas’ justification of declaring a jihad on Israel tended to 
echo criteria associated with die traditional just war concept. However, the very nature of a 
suicide attack violated core jus in bello principles, most notably those of restraint on 
legitimate weapons in the arena of war and non-combatant immunity. As a result, this 
‘jihad’ of suicidal violence practiced by Hamas and its operatives violated classical Islamic 
parameters and more closely resembled the Western conception of a holy war (which is 
how so many academics who study the phenomenon classify it), which rooted in religious 
causes tended to degenerate into a war without limits, i.e. into a total war (used as a 
philosophically descriptive category). This work argued that Hamas uses political Islam to 
incorporate suicidal violence into the traditional concept of jihad. This is because political 
Islam facilitates the expansion of the concept of jihad to include the even more 
contradictory conception of ‘total war’, understood in this work as a philosophically 
descriptive category. It is this inclusion of the total war idea within this broad rubric that 
enables Hamas to successfully justify, legitimise and enact suicidal violence as a modern- 
day jihad against the Israeli state.
Identifying these linkages enabled the author to construct what can be best described as a 
spectrum of violence in which the moderate pole was characterised by a just war which was 
waged with restraint while the opposite pole was characterised by a holy war that was total 
and unrestrained in its conduct. It was suggested that the complexity of modem jihad, and 
thus the key to understanding how suicidal violence can be justified and legitimised as a 
jihad, resides in its polyvalent nature and the fact that it can move between and encompass 
aspects of both poles in this spectrum of violence. Indeed it is this fluid, non-static nature of 
jihad that blurs the lines between the traditionally opposing, and hence compartmentalised, 
concepts of just war and holy war in international relations. This allows Hamas to 
legitimately encourage Palestinian society to use force to oppose the Israeli ‘occupation 
forces’ and yet use indiscriminate violence against non-combatants by implementing the 
tactics of a suicide attack. In short, the act of ‘martyrdom’ merges just grounds for war with 
the use of total force in the conduct of that war. Hence the cause of freedom, as presented to 
and subsequently internalised by the larger public and the suicide operatives, is just. 
However, while this would traditionally imply, at least in theory, limiting damage in war, 
the tools used on the ground, i.e. suicide bombings, extend the idea of just cause into the
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realm of total, and hence unlimited, conduct. In fact, a suicide attack represents the exact 
point o f interstice between the concepts of “just war” and “total war”.
Hamas’ militant jihad against Israel and its positioning of Islam as an ideological, political 
and military mode of stuggle against Israeli occupation also enables it to present itself as an 
alternative to the secular national movement. Political Islam therefore provides Hamas with 
its oppositional discourse and is used to create a unique identity for the group through a key 
set of reoccurring concerns, namely: (i) the challenge of Zionism and the Jewish-Israeli 
state; (ii) the crisis within both the Palestinian and wider Muslim community and 
concurrently the challenge posed by the secular nationalist opposition; (iii) the sanctity of 
Palestinian land and the predicament of foreign occupation in Jerusalem; (iv) the defence of 
Palestinian national aspirations as a legitimate Islamic goal and the establishment of a 
Palestinian Islamic state; (v) the declaration and justification of jihad as a legitimate 
strategy to accomplish specifically nationalist goals; and (vi) the defence of martyrdom as a 
legitimate Islamic tool of struggle within this jihad against oppression and occupation. Each 
of these themes contributes to Hamas’ step-by-step Islamisation of the national struggle and 
allows it to construct an overarching rhetoric that can justify the use of jihad and suicidal 
violence, as the very epitome of self-sacrifice and martyrdom, in the struggle against Israel.
Hamas’ narrative brings together concepts of Zionism, Islam, nationalism, the Palestinian 
waqf and jihad, which allow it to frame martyrdom operations as a fulfillment of sacred 
imperatives in the fight against occupation. Hamas’ literature in the first intifada contained 
only generic references to martyrdom and martyrs. However, by the mid-1990s this rhetoric 
is seen to have developed into a sophisticated narrative which not only extends legitimacy 
to suicide operations as a means of resisting occupation but also provides forceful 
propaganda for the organisation’s military activities by listing the names of martyrs, 
detailed accounts of Israeli attacks and also the organisation’s vows of revenge. Hamas 
Military Communiques are even more unique in that they detail and claim responsibility for 
specific military actions and demonstrate a qualitative difference between descriptions of 
those who die in shelling, grenade and other armed attacks versus those who specifically 
conduct martyrdom operations. Suicide attacks are thus ‘marketed’ specifically as more 
honourable acts of resistance and legitimised using political Islam.
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For the bombers the act of martyrdom then becomes the vehicle by which they demonstrate 
and fulfil individual commitment to God who urges true believers to fight persecution and 
never fear death. A significant number of their last wills and testaments reflect, amongst 
other emotions, a deep profession of faith as well as a sense of national responsibility. A 
sense of deep religious responsibility, and concurrently religious guilt, also seems to bear 
down upon a number of the bombers and their close friends and families. Martyrdom 
operations thus seem to be regarded, even at the individual level and societal levels, as 
religious tools that can be implemented to achieve explicitly political ends, suggesting the 
internalisation of Hamas’ jihad rhetoric in the territories. Martyrdom thus allows the 
operative and his social affiliates to not only fulfil their duty to God, but also to their 
country. In this way, the single act of martyrdom becomes a mechanism to end injustice, 
seek liberation and vengeance. These last wills reflect an intricate weaving of a militant 
revenge rhetoric with the ideas and language of nationalism and religiosity. Finally, the 
chapter stresses that while dominant themes can be traced for Hamas operatives it is still 
much more difficult to pin down the wide range of reasons which motivate individuals to 
opt for suicide operations. However, a number of bombers clearly echo the jihad rhetoric 
constructed by Hamas thereby reflecting the power the group exerts over the imagination of 
an entire nation.
II. A Composite Theoretical Framework of Analysis
To reiterate, the strategic and symbolic aspects of suicidal violence were seen to converge 
along the lines of survival, retaliation and competition for both Hamas and its operatives. 
Both these aspects were suitably explained through the application of a neo-utilitarian 
choice-theoretic methodology which, upon the incorporation of non- material incentives, 
provided a cost-benefit analysis of suicidal violence for both the organisational and 
individual levels of analysis. Hence, instrumental and expressive imperatives of suicidal 
violence were seen as harnessed to Palestinian identity formation and notions of active self- 
sacrifice in the national cause.
Social constructivism enabled this work to identify and account for the ‘box’ of Palestinian 
nationalism within which the norm of militant heroic martyrdom operated. Clear linkages 
were made between the choice-theoretic methodology, used in chapter III and constructivist
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approaches, applied in chapter IV. Hence this work located how the culturally entrenched 
norm of militant heroic martyrdom (with suicidal violence as its latest manifestation) was 
used historically in Palestine, as part of the national stuggle, as a mechanism of survival, 
competition and retaliation. In other words, MHM was not only a means of ensuring the 
survival of the Palestinian nation but, as the proactive expression of self-sacrifice, it was 
also an avenue of exercising agency, expressing discontent and retaliating against the 
occupying power. The element of competition was also evident in this process as the 
national narrative constructed the ‘true’ patriot as a heroic martyr who was willing to die 
for the national cause. By lauding militant self-sacrifice this narrative created the context 
for competitive emulation -  i.e. a case of ‘if he/she can do it, why cannot I?’ Hamas was 
identified as appropriating and rearticulating this norm of MHM, as suicidal violence, in 
order to ensure its own survival in the Palestinian political arena. This work also 
highlighted how Hamas was able to use this norm to compete with other, more established, 
political players for the leadership of the Palestinian national movement and how its 
successful re-articulation of the norm facilitated its use as a competitive tool between 
political rivals by the beginning of the Al-Aqsa intifada.
Hamas’ political ambitions were also identified as specifically state-oriented in this work 
and the political language of religion, in this case of political Islam, was seen to be used 
systematically to grant legitimacy to the movement by facilitating the use of its key 
mechanism of amassing support and legitimacy, i.e. suicidal violence. In other words, the 
ideological aspect of suicidal violence was also seen to be clearly linked to the three core 
purposes of survival, competition and retaliation. The expanded understanding of jihad 
established by this work enabled it to illustrate how political Islam was instrumentalised to 
facilitate the necessary shifts between the two poles of violence, i.e. between ‘just and 
limited war’ and ‘holy and total war’, both of which were encompassed by the polyvalent 
concept of jihad. This explained how suicide attacks were qualified and justified by Hamas 
as a jihad against the Israeli state. This work therefore located jihad as a central theme in 
the political Islamic rhetoric adopted by Hamas. Further, it demonstrated how the build up 
of this rhetoric in the occupied territories has facilitated the reinterpretation of the norm of 
militant heroic martyrdom as suicidal violence. In other words, Hamas used political Islam 
to harness religion to the cause Palestinian nationalism which demanded heroic self- 
sacrifice. The jihad of national struggle was thus waged to ensure the survival of the
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Palestinian umma, retaliate against the occupiers of the land of al-Isra ’ wal-Miraj and also 
created a unique identity for the group within the national struggle. On the individual level 
this narrative was seen to have been internalised to the point that the suicide operative was 
willing to die as a mujahidin to ensure the survival of his/her nation, retaliate against those 
who pollute the sacred land of the first qibla, and compete with others to attain the social 
and religious status of an ishtish ’hadi.
Overall then this thesis consolidated what were three very different approaches into one 
holistic framework of analysis and in doing so provided fresh ways of looking at and 
analysing Hamas’ use of suicidal violence within the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation. The 
common link between these approaches was provided by the three core incentives of 
survival, competition and retaliation, for both Hamas and its operatives. Suicidal violence 
was identified as being used consciously and systematically, by both levels of analysis, to 
achieve these core incentives.
HI. Some Limitations, Thoughts and Future Directions
The primaiy limitation of this research was the quality of the sources used. This thesis 
relied on various databases of suicide missions, translated Hamas leaflets and military 
communiques and interviews (both personally conducted as part of primary data collection 
in Israel and the Palestinian territories and also those reproduced in other academic and 
non-academic works) in order to empirically analyse suicidal violence in this conflict. 
However several difficulties were encountered while using these sources.
First, empirically suicide attacks are recorded in various databases without adequate 
distinctions being made between successful operations in which the target was achieved 
and the bomber died during execution and operations which failed either due to 
intervention by Israeli counter-terrorism agencies or as a result of errors made by the 
bomber at the time of executing the mission. A third category of failed missions that are not 
distinguishable from most databases are those that failed due to ‘citizenV’civilian’ 
intervention at the time of execution. Bystander intervention in Israel characteristically 
tends to either limit casualties or result in the complete failure of the suicide mission. In 
addition, different databases used different standards for categorising suicide operations.
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The Israeli Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) database, for example, tends to use the 
category of ‘suicide bomber’ (as opposed to ‘suicide mission’) in a very narrow sense and 
to record incidents of suicidal violence where the perpetrator was killed as a direct result of 
conducting the operations as opposed to his/her death being caused by other external 
sources. Yet at the same time certain internal inconsistencies can be located in the ICT 
database, for example, at times attacks conducted by vehicles carrying explosives are 
categorised as ‘suicide bombings’ and at other times as ‘car bombings’. A final drawback 
of using statistics from databases is that none of the existing databases is complete. In fact, 
Luca Ricolfi believes that even the most complete databases (a category in which he 
includes the ICT) do not record all known incidents of suicide attacks and only cover 
approximately 70 percent of the total2.
This work circumvented some of these inconsistencies by adopting a series of measures. 
First, the thesis used ICT as its main database primarily for its precision in categorising a 
suicide bombing as an attack in which the perpetrator kills, injures and dies as a direct 
result of conducting the mission. This approach excluded all categories of failed missions 
and consequently worked from a more accurate data set. It also circumvented internal 
database inconsistencies to a large degree by categorising all bombings in which an 
individual delivered the explosives, either in a vehicle or in the form of a suicide belt, as a 
suicide mission. The incomplete character of the database was also mitigated to some 
degree by adding to it from three additional sources: academic works (included only if two 
or more sources referred to a particular attack); news sources (again included after 
verifying that two or more sources reported the attack); and from the data compiled by 
Mohammed Hafez3. Hafez’s compilation was favoured over any other source because it 
utilised the ICT as a key source and thereby applied the same standards (though there were 
some discrepancies in the casualty figures between Hafez’s dataset and that of the ICT). 
This enhanced consistencies between the two data sources. Yet despite taking these 
measures this work is fully aware that the compiled data set on suicide bombings in the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict from 1993-2006 is not wholly accurate. However, it is believed
2 Luca Ricolfi, ‘Palestinians, 1981-2003’ in Diego Gambetta (ed.), Making Sense o f  Suicide Missions (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2005)
3 See Appendix A, Palestinian Suicide Bombings Since 1993, in Mohammed M. Hafez, Manufacturing 
Human Bombs: The Making o f  Palestinian Suicide Bombers (Washington, DC: United States Institute of  
Peace Press, 2006)
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that the data used has been made as internally consistent as possible. Moreover, while the 
data set may be incomplete this work believes that it is still sufficient to illustrate the broad 
trends in the suicide bombing campaigns conducted by Hamas since 1993.
A second limitation regarding the quality of the sources used was the un-verifiability of 
Hamas leaflets, military communiques and second-source interviews used. Translations of 
the leaflets and military communiques were accessed from two main sources that were 
authored by either American or Israeli scholars. Hence, this while this work recognised that 
there may be inadvertent biases in these sources they could not be cross-checked. The same 
issue presented itself when interviews and reproduced last wills were used from secondary 
sources. In addition, in personally conducted interviews while every effort was made to 
quote only statements that were repeated by more than one source at the same time issues 
of language, and less often of gender, were acknowledged as potential barriers in gleaning 
the full meaning of statements. Once again these limitations were circumvented to a certain 
degree by recognising that this work still successfully identified the key sentiments 
conveyed by these statements and in doing so traced broad trends to arrive at cohesive and 
conclusive findings.
Finally, while limitations of space have forced this work to ignore regional and 
international linkages between Hamas and other Islamist groups, the author certainly 
recognises that such connections exist and play a role in the development of events within 
the Israeli-Palestinian landscape of conflict. In addition, it is believed that an account of 
economic considerations would also contribute significantly to the analysis presented here. 
This would included researching aspects such as the international sources of funding that 
Hamas has access to, economic assistance it receives through specifically religious 
avenues, e.g. zakat (the obligatory Muslim tax) at the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, as well 
as probing how the funding of its social services network (especially of orphanages and 
schools) contribute to its active membership, etc. However, once again, due to limitations 
of space this aspect had to be more or less excluded from this framework of analysis.
This work has opened up numerous avenues for future research. First and foremost, in 
approaching the phenomenon of suicidal violence in the Palestinian territories from a 
theoretical perspective it has attempted to bridge the gap that exists between empirical
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research and theory in the field of terrorism studies. It is hoped that this work will form a 
stepping stone towards more research which attempts to do the same. In addition, it hoped 
that this work will engender further research which will contextualise and theorise suicidal 
violence in specific socio-political settings, study the role of suicidal violence in various 
conflicts in the Middle East and beyond, and also explore the role of such violence in 
processes of political transitions. The theoretical framework constructed here, while 
providing a more holistic analysis of suicidal violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is 
also a very broad model. At the same time this framework has enabled this work to 
consciously move away from the overwhelmingly strategic focus that is prevalent in 
terrorism studies and incorporate other approaches. As such, a key avenue for future 
research would be to expand each theoretical approach in order to formulate a greater 
understanding of the roles played by nationalism, national identity formation, political 
Islam and political violence in this specific arena of conflict.
The famous journalist, Robert Fisk once asked the head of the Lebanese Hizballah 
movement, Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, if he could explain to him, as a Westerner, how a man 
could immolate himself. It was Nasrallah’s first interview for Western television and he 
responded with a rather original metaphor:
“There are qualities which our fighters have. He who drives his truck 
into the enemy’s military base to blow himself up and to become a 
martyr, he drives in with a hopeful heart, smiling and happy because 
he knows he is going to another place. Death, according to our belief, 
is not oblivion. It is not the end. It is the beginning of a true life. The 
best metaphor for a Westerner trying to understand this truth is to think 
of a person being in a sauna bath for a long time. He is very thirsty and 
tired and hot and he is suffering from the effects of the high 
temperature. Then he is told that if  he opens the door, he can go into a 
quiet, comfortable room, drink a nice cocktail and hear classical music.
Then he will open the door and go through without hesitation, knowing 
that what he leaves behind is not a high price to pay, and what awaits
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him if of much greater value. I cannot think of another example to 
explain this idea to a Westerner”4.
This thesis has attempted to explain what elements form the walls of such a high pressured 
sauna and why so many Palestinians are willing to immolate themselves in the belief that 
understanding is the first step towards providing mechanisms of engagement with, and 
redressal and control of, the suicidal violence phenomenon in the occupied territories. This 
work believes that unless the core concerns of a deep-rooted discontent are understood and 
addressed ‘the room on the other side’ will remain an attractive option, and segments of the 
Palestinian population will continue passing though that ‘door’ with hopes of altering 
prevailing socio-political realities.
4 Robert Fisk, The Great War fo r  Civilisation: The Conquest o f  the Middle East (London: Harper Perennial, 
2006), p. 587
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Appendix A: List of Interviews
Attributable (On the Record) Interviews
Saad Abdel-Haq, Humanitarian Affairs Assistant in Nablus, United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA): 05 January 2005, Jerusalem
Dr. Farid Abu-Dheir, Assistant Professor in Media Studies, An-Najah University, Faculty 
of Art (Journalism Department): 19 January 2005, Nablus, West Bank
Vardit Agassi, Organisational Psychologist: 28 December 2004, Jerusalem
Dr. Hussien Ahmad, Director, An-Najah National University Center for Opinion Polls and 
Survey Studies: 19 January 2005, Nablus, West Bank
Prof. Hisham A. Ahmad, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Birzeit 
University: 30 December 2004, Ramallah, West Bank
Dr. Eitan Azani, Deputy Executive Director, the International Policy Institute for Counter- 
Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya: 20 January 2005, Herzliya, Israel
Hafez Barghouti, Editor, Al-Hayat Al-Jarida: 01 January 2005, Ramallah, West Bank
Dr. Helga Baumgarten, Professor of Political Science Birzeit University and Head of the 
DAAD Information Center (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst), East Jerusalem: 06 
January 2005, Birzeit, West Bank
Pierre Bessuges, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Deputy Head of Office and Field 
Coordination Manager, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA): 08 January 2005, Jerusalem
Dr. Anat Berko, Criminologist, the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism at 
the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya: 27 December 2004, Ramat ‘Gan, Israel
Dr. Musa Budeiri, Research Fellow, Muwatin (the Palestine Institute for the Study of 
Democracy), Ramallah and Professor of Political Science, Birzeit University: 31 December 
2005, East Jerusalem
Dr. Boaz Ganor, Founder and Executive Director of the International Policy Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya: 20 January 2005, Herzliya, 
Israel
Aziz Hakimi, Director, the Killid Group: 18 January 2005, Nablus, West Bank
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Dr. Rema Hammami, Assistant Professor, Birzeit University: 31 December 2005, East 
Jerusalem
Amira Hass, journalist and columnist with Ha ’aretz: 03 January 2005, Ramallah, West 
Bank
Prof. Manuel Hassassian, Executive Vice President, Middle East and International 
Relations Specialist, Bethlehem University: 04 January 2005, Bethlehem, West Bank
Dr. Norma Hazboun, Associate Professor, Social Science Department, Bethlehem 
University: 04 January 2004, Bethlehem, West Bank
Dr. Jamil Hilal, 08 January 2005, Ramallah, West Bank
Omar Ishtaya, Shotokan & Fitness Center, Nablus: 19 January 2005, Nablus, West Bank 
Dr. Islah Jad: 03 January, 2005, Ramallah, West Bank
Dr. Ely Karmon, Senior Research Scholar, The International Policy Institute for Counter- 
Terrorism at The Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya: 21 December 2004, Herzliya, Israel
Mu’taz Khdeir, Project Coordinator, One Voice Palestine, Ramallah, West Bank
Dr. Anat Kurz, Jaffe Center, 27 December 2004, Tel Aviv, Israel
Dr. Meir Litvak, the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel 
Aviv University: 26 December 2004, Tel Aviv, Israel
Dr. Ruven Paz, Director, PRISM (Project for the Research of Islamist Movements): 17 
January 2005, Herzliya, Israel
Dr. Riad Malki, General Director, Panorama (The Palestinian Center for the Dissemination 
of Democracy and Community Development): 01 January 2005, Ramallah, West Bank
Tamar Malz, Jafee Center of Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University: 23 December 2004, 
Tel Aviv, Israel
Taysir Nasrallah, Palestinian National Council (PNC) member: 18 January 2005, Nablus, 
West Bank
Ibrahim Qettami, Field Coordinator, One Voice Palestine, Ramallah, West Bank
\
Andrea Recchia, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Jerusalem: 08 January 2005, Jerusalem
Erik Schechter, Journalist with WorldPress and the Jerusalem Post: 10 January 2005, Tel 
Aviv, Israel
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Dr. Yoram Schweitzer, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University: 23 
December 2004, Tel Aviv, Israel
Yasser Ahmad Shalabi, Associate Researcher, The Palestine Economic Policy 
Research Institute (MAS): 02 January 2005, Ramallah, West Bank
Ziad Abbas Shamrouch, Co-Director, Ibdaa Cultural Center, Dheisheh Refugee Camp, 
Bethlehem: 04 January 2005, Dheisheh Refugee Camp, West Bank
Aram M. Shrif, P.R. Coordinator, One Voice Palestine: Ramallah, West Bank
Salim Tamari, Director, Institute of Jerusalem Studies: 07 January 2005, Ramallah, West 
Bank
Dr. Lisa Taraki, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Birzeit University: 01 
January 2005, Birzeit, West Bank
Graham Usher, Palestine correspondent for The Economist and Middle East International: 
31 December 2004, East Jerusalem
Alaa Yousef, Zajel Youth Exchange Program (Zajel), Public Relations Department, An- 
Najah National University, Nablus: 19 January 2005, Nablus, West Bank
Sheikh Hasan Yusuf, Hamas political leader and spokesperson in the West Bank: 03 
January, 2005, Ramallah, West Bank
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Appendix B: An Example of the Public and Private 
Last Will of a Hamas Suicide Bomber
The following is the last will and testament of Ismail Masawabi, from Khan Yunis 
who committed a suicide operation on 22 June 2001 at the edge of a nearby Israeli 
settlement. Masawabi, who was disguised as a Jew with the traditional head-cover 
(kippa), was instructed to drive his explosive-laden car into the settlement. But his 
vehicle got stuck in the sand close to the gate of the settlement. When two IDF 
soldiers appeared, Masawabi called for help in Hebrew, and the soldiers thinking he 
was a settler approached to assist at which point Masawabi detonated the explosives, 
killing both himself and the two soldiers.
The documents reproduced below are taken from Christopher Reuter’s, My Life is a 
Weapon1, and are a fairly accurate representation of most last wills publicly released 
by Hamas. What is however, both key and interesting to note, is the differences 
between the personal and public statements made by Ismail Masawabi. The first, i.e. 
the ‘official’ statement, is the one that is released for publication. The second, 
‘unofficial’ statement is the one that he left behind for his family.
I. The Public Statement of Ismail Masawabi
“Thanks be to God who brings about the mujahidins’ victory and the dictators’ 
defeat, and praise be to Muhammad, the faithful, honourable Prophet Muhammad, 
and all his friends, and all those who have followed in his footsteps.
Dear Muslim youth the world over: I greet you with the blessed greetings of Islam; 
greetings that I send to all of you who fight in the name of religion and the nation; 
greetings to all those who are convinced fighters and martyrs.
Dear Muslim youth: I wish to let you know that I hold those of you in particularly 
high regard who were always first to come to the mosque for prayers.
Dear brothers: there is no doubt about the situation prevailing in the Muslim Umma, 
the Muslim nation. This situation is clear to everyone, old and young. It’s a situation 
that makes us weep and makes our hearts ache because of what has happened to the 
Muslims. We are truly grieved about it.
Before we had power, then we became weak. We live in humiliation, when we once 
lived in dignity. We are ignorant where we were once wise. We are now bringing up 
the world’s rear, where we were once its leaders.
The wish to become a martyr dominates my life, my heart, my soul and my feelings. 
When I hear the Qur’an’s verses I become sad because I’m doing nothing to change 
the situation.. ..Our nation has become so weak, and people just help themselves to 
whatever they want. We are a nation living in disgrace and under Jewish occupation. 
This happened to us because we didn’t fight them; we didn’t fight for God.
1 Christopher Reuter, M y Life is a Weapon: A M odem History o f  Suicide Bombing (Princeton and 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 90-93
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I reject this terrible and dark situation which I know and experience. And I have 
decided to become a shining light, illuminating the way for all Muslims -  and a 
blazing fire to bum to death the enemy of God. Just standing there and watching out 
Muslim people being slaughtered [by the Jews] and not taking any action to change 
the situation is a dirty game I will not tolerate.. ..Therefore, in the name of Jerusalem 
and the A1 Aqsa Mosque, in the name of God on earth, I prefer to meet God and 
leave humankind behind. Therefore I have told myself that I will be with the Prophet 
Muhammad and his followers tomorrow ....
God will not forgive you if  you accept such a life. The alternative is the true life. 
God will not forgive you if you accept humiliation and don’t fight to put an end to 
the situation and to strengthen Islam.
My brothers and my family: I shall be in Paradise, where everything will be mine. 
So don’t be sad that you’ve lost me. In Paradise I shall be immortal, so you should 
be glad I’m there. To all those who have loved me, I say: don’t weep, for your tears 
won’t give me peace. This is the way I have chosen. So, if you have really loved me, 
carry on and carry my weapon.
I have decided to take up arms and follow the brigade of Izz al-Din al-Qassam 
martyrs in order to make the Jews feel some of the suffering and devastation they 
subject my people to everyday, and have subjected them to for a long time.
Greetings from a martyr who wishes to see you all again one day in the Paradise of 
God, the creator of heaven and earth. Greetings to everyone who knew me and loved 
me, and who loves the way of jihad and the mujahidin.
I hope that God accepts me as a martyr”.
n . The Personal Statement of Ismail Masawabi
“Dear Mama, dear Papa,
You who have taken such trouble with my upbringing; you who woke at night in 
order that I might rest and sleep; you who brought me up as a Muslim: you are as 
dear to me as my eyes and my heart. You did your very best to turn me into an adult 
human. You helped me enormously, and may Allah reward you for it in the best 
possible manner. I can’t find the right words to thank you for everything you’ve 
done for me, but I ask God the Almighty to unite us in Paradise.
My beloved parents, I know that it’s hard and difficult for you to lose me, but don’t 
forget that we will see each other in Paradise. This is God’s promise. What a 
wonderful and lovely promise if we all see each other again there.
Dear Mama: be patient and happy and pray to God to thank him for giving you a 
martyr as a son. And think of al-Khansaa,2 who gave her four sons as martyrs for
2 A mother from Islamic history who lost four sons in the war but was reputed never to have lost her 
patience.
244
God because she knew they would all meet again in Paradise and that she would also 
get there one day, too.
Dear, good father: please forgive me. Forgive me for not fulfilling your dream of 
seeing me complete my university studies and of being proud of me for getting a job. 
But you should be content. Your son will not, it is true, receive the Shihada3 - but 
will instead receive the great Shahada4. You should be proud of that.
You are the one who taught me to be a man in every situation. You are the one who 
raised a lion in his house, who taught me the enemies of God and the Muslims fear. 
Forgive me, dear father, if  you are surprised to receive the news of my martyrdom. 
For I know that you’re just waiting for me to finish my studies any day now -  but 
this is what I have to do in the present situation. And we will see each other in 
another life.
My beloved brothers: I have loved you from the bottom of my heart. Be good to 
father and mother.
My dear fellow believers, dear Muhammad, Ahmed and Mahmud, you are the youth 
of the future. When I am dead, please be good to my parents. Help my father with 
his work, and my mother at home. And go to the Mosque regularly. Don’t make bad 
friends. Read the Qur’an.
My beloved, good sisters: I was always happy to see you and to talk to you. When I 
visited you, you welcomed me with a friendly smile and warm words. Be patient and 
thank God, and please forgive me if I have made a mistake”.
3 The standard diploma
4 The honour o f being a martyr
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Appendix C: Suicide Bombings Conducted by Hamas, 1993 - 2006
DATE TARGET AND 
LOCATION
NO. OF 
BOMBERS
NO. OF VICTIMS NAME OF THE BOMBER ADDITIONAL
INFORMATIONKILLED INJURED
1993
16-Apr Military personnel/ 
Mekhola
1 2 5 - Car bomb
12-Sept - 1 0 2 Aymen Attallah -
14-Sept - 1 0 0 - -
26-Sept - 1 0 0 Ashraf Mahadi -
04-Oct - 1 0 0 Suleyman Zadan -
1994
06-Apr - / Afula 1 8 44 Raed Abdullah Zakarna QB claimed responsibility
13-Apr Bus Stop/ Hadera 1 5 30 Amar Amarna QB claimed responsibility
19-Oct Bus/Tel Aviv 1 22 46 Hassan Abd al-Rahman al- 
Suway
Bus No. 5 exploded on 
Dizengoff St.; 1 Dutch 
citizen was killed
25-Dec Bus stop/ 
Jerusalem
1 0 13 Ayman Kamil Radi The bomber was a 
Palestinian policeman 
affiliated with Hamas
1995
25-Jun - / - 1 0 3 Muawiya Ahmed Roka -
24-Jul Bus/ Ramat Gan 1 6 31 Labib Anwar Azem A ‘Dan Cooperative’ bus 
which exploded at the ‘Elite’ 
intersection
21-Aug Bus/ Jerusalem 1 4 100 Sufian Sbeih Jabarin -
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DATE TARGET AND 
LOCATION
NO. OF 
BOMBERS
NO. OF VICTIMS NAME OF BOMBER ADDITIONAL
INFORMATIONKILLED INJURED
1996
25-Feb Bus/ Jerusalem 1 26 80 Majdi Abu Wardeh Claimed by the Squads of 
the New Diciples of Martyr 
Yahya ‘Ayyash’
25-Feb Bus stop/ Askelon 1 1 0 Ibrahim Sarahneh Sgt. Hofit Ayyash killed at 
hitch-hiking post
03-Mar Bus / Jerusalem 1 19 6 Ra’id Sharnubi -
1997
21-Mar Coffee shop/ Tel 
Aviv
1 3 48 Musa Ghneimat -
30-Jul Market-place / 
Jerusalem
2 16 178 Mouaya Jarara and Bashar 
Zoualha
Attack at Mahane Yehuda 
Market
04-Sept Shopping Centre/ 
Jerusalem
3 8 200 Tawfik Yassin and Yusef Shouli; 
third bomber unknown
Attack at Ben Yehuda 
Pedestrian Mall
1998
29-Oct Bus/ Gush Khatif, 
Gaza
1 1 8 Shuib Timraz -
2000
30 Oct Restaurant/
Jerusalem
1 15 130 - Attack at Sbarro Pizzeria
2001
01-Jan Intersection/
Netanya
1 0 60 Hamed Saleh Abu Hejleh Car bomb
04-Mar Market/ Netanya 1 3 50 Ahmed Omar ‘Alayyan -
27-Mar Bus/ Jerusalem 1 1 27 Dia’a Mohammed Hussein al- 
Tawill
-
28-Mar Bus Stop/ Neve 
Yamin
1 3 4 Fadi Attalah Yousef ‘Amer -
22-Apr Bus stop/Kfar Sava 1 1 60 Omar Salem Abu ‘Ateiwy -
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LOCATION
NO. OF 
BOMBERS
NO. OF VICTIMS NAME OF BOMBER ADDITIONAL
INFORMATIONKILLED INJURED
29-Apr Bus/ near Nablus 1 0 0 Jamal Abdel-Ghani Nasser Car bomb -  exploded near 
a bus
18-May Shopping centre/ 
Netanya
1 6 100 Mahmoud Ahmad Marmash Attack at the entrance to the 
HaSharon Shopping Mall
01-Jun Club/ Tel Aviv 1 20 120 Sa’ed al-Hotary Hamas and PIJ joint 
operation at the 
Dolphinarium night club
22-Jun Military personnel/ 
Dugit, Gaza
1 2 0 Ismail al-Masoubi Car bomb
10-Jul - 1 0 0 Nafez Ayesh al-Nad’ar -
04-Aug Bus/ Jordan Valley 1 0 0 The bomber was disabled 
by2 soldiers who were on 
the bus
08-Aug Military personnel/ 
B’kaot
1 0 1 - Car bomb
09-Aug Restaurant/
Jerusalem
1 15 130 Ezzedin Ahmad al-Masri Hamas and PIJ joint attack 
at Sbarro Pizzeria though 
later investigations seem to 
suggest this may have been 
a Hamas’s mission alone
04-Sept Road / Jerusalem 1 0 13 Ra’ed Nabil al-Barghouti -
09-Sept - / Nahariya 1 3 90 Muhammad al-Habashi Attack near train station
08-Nov - / - 1 0 2 - -
26-Nov - / - 1 0 2 Taysir Ahmed Ajrami -
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LOCATION
NO. OF 
BOMBERS
NO. OF VICTIMS NAME OF BOMBER ADDITIONAL
INFORMATIONKILLED INJURED
01-Dec Pedestrian Mall/ 
Jerusalem
2 11 188 Osama Mohammed Abed Baher 
and Mohammed Nabil Jamil Abu 
Halabiyeh
The 2 different bombs were 
detonated at different points 
along the mall at the end of 
Jewish Sabbath. A car 
bomb also exploded 40 
meters away approx. 20 
minutes later and seemed 
to be aimed at the rescuers, 
though no one was hurt
02-Dec Bus/Haifa 1 15 60 Maher Habashi Attack at Halissa, known for 
peaceful co-existence 
between Jews and Arab
2002
09-Mar Restaurant/
Jerusalem
1 11 54 Fouad Ismail al-Hourani Attack at Moments Cafe
27-Mar Hotel/ Netanya 1 29 150 Abed al-Basat Muhammad Ouda Passover bombing at the 
Park hotel dining room
31-Mar Restaurant/ Haifa 1 15 40 Sh’hadi al-Tubas -
10-Apr Bus/ Yagur 
Junction
1 8 22 Ayman Abu Haijah Haijah was from Jenin and 
carried an IDF bag and 
wore fatigues
07-May Entertainment
facility/Rishon
Letzion
1 16 60 Attack in a billiards hall 
called the Sheffield Club
19-May Market
place/Netanya
1 3 59 Osama Boshkar Boshkar was disguised as a 
solider
18-Jun Bus/ Jerusalem 1 20 52 Muhammad Hazza al-Ghoul Attack at the Patt 
Intersection
4-Aug Bus / Meron 
Junction
1 10 40 Jihad Walid Hamada
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INFORMATIONKILLED INJURED
19-Sept Bus/Tel Aviv 1 6 59 - -
10-Oct Bus/ Ramat Gan 1 1 16 Rafik Hamad Attack at the Bar Nan 
Junction. Bomber was 
pinned to the ground and 
failed to enter the bus
27-Oct - 1 3 20 Muhmaamed Kazid al-Bastami -
21-Nov Bus/ Jerusalem 1 11 50 Nael Abu Hilail -
2003
19-Feb - / - 1 0 0 Karim Batron -
29-Apr 2 3 60 Asif Mohammed Hanifa and 
Omar Khan Sharif
A joint attack conducted by 
Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade
17-May - I  - 1 2 0 Fuad Qaswasmeh -
18-May - / - 1 7 20 Bassam Takruri -
18-May - / - 1 0 0 Abdel-Fatah Ja’abari -
19-May - / - 1 0 3 Shadi Sleyman al-Nabaheen -
11-Jun - / - 1 17 100 Abd el Muti Shabana -
12-Aug -  /  - 1 1 3 Khamis Ghazi Gerwan -
19-Aug - 1  - 1 20 128 Raed Abdel-Hamid Masq Joint attack by PIJ and 
Hamas
09-Sept - 1  - 1 8 15 lyhab Abu Salim -
09-Sept - 1  - 1 7 40 Ramez Abu Salim -
2004
14-Jan - 1 - 1 4 12 Reem al-Riyashi Hamas’s first female suicide 
bomber
06-Mar - 1  - 2 0 0 - Joint attack by PIJ and 
Hamas
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13-Mar - 1 - 2 10 18 Nabil Ibrahim Masoud and 
Muhammad Zahil Salem
Joint attack by Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigade and Hamas
17-Apr -  / - 1 1 3 Fadi al-Amoudi Joint attack by Al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigade and Hamas
31-Aug - / - 2 16 100 Ahmed Qawasmeh and Nassim 
Subhi Jabari
-
2005
18-Jan - / - 1 1 7 Omar Tabash -
2006
23-Nov 1 0 3 Fatima Omar Mahmud al-Najal Hamas’s second female 
and oldest suicide bomber. 
Al-Najal was 57 years old 
and is popularly known as 
the ‘grandmother bomber’
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Appendix D: A Select List of Hamas’ Key Leadership1
Yahva Awash
Yahya Ayyash was bom on March 6, 1966 in Rafat near Nablus. He completed his 
secondary school education in Rafat with excellent grades which qualified him to study 
engineering at Beir Zeit University (West Bank). Ayyash received a Bachelor's degree of 
electrical engineering in 1988 and became active in the ranks of the Qassam Brigades in the 
beginning of 1992, where he specialized in making explosives from raw materials available 
in the Palestinian territories. Ayyash became one of the chief bomb-makers for Hamas and 
earned the nickname “the Engineer.” He is credited with planning a number of suicide 
bombings against Israeli soldiers and citizens. He was killed by the Israeli Shin Bet on 
January 5,1996 following a massive manhunt. Israeli agents were able to compromise one 
o f Ayyash's contacts, who gave him a cell phone full of explosives. When they confirmed 
Ayyash was using it, the Shin Bet detonated it, killing him instantly.
Ismail Haniva
Ismail Haniya was bom in 1962 in the Shati refugee camp which is located to the west of 
Gaza City, after his parents fled their homes near what is today the Israeli town of 
Ashkelon during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. Haniya studied Arabic Literature at the Islamic 
University of Gaza, where he became involved in the Islamist movement. Haniya graduated 
in 1987, just as the first intifada erupted in Gaza. He was detained by the Israeli authorities 
for participating in protests soon afterwards, though his prison sentence was short. In 1988, 
with Hamas coming to the fore in Gaza as a leading resistance movement, and imprisoned 
for six months. The next year, with Israel unable to quash Palestinian resistance, Haniya 
was arrested yet again and sentenced to three years in prison. Following his release in 1992, 
Israel deported Haniya along with senior Hamas leaders Rantisi and Zahhar and over 400 
other activists to South Lebanon. Haniya returned to Gaza in December 1993 and was 
appointed dean of the Islamic University. After Israel released Sheikh Yassin from prison 
in 1997, Haniya was appointed his assistant. The two men's close relationship led to Haniya 
gaining increasing prominence within the movement and he became the group's 
representative to the Palestinian Authority. Haniya was chosen to lead Hamas' campaign for 
the 15 January 2006 election in which his party won 76 seats out of 132 in the Palestinian 
Legislative Council. He is the current Prime Minster of the Palestinian Authority.
Abu Hanud
Mahmud Abu Hanud, former Military Commander of the Qassam Brigades (West Bank), 
was bom in 1967 and graduated from Islamic College in Jerusalem. He was an active 
member of the 1987 intifada, being wounded by an Israeli bullet in 1988. In 1992, he was 
deported to Maij al-Zahur in Lebanon where he is believed to have acquired military 
training. Following his return to the Palestinian Territories, he became the West Bank 
commander of Hamas' 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades. In 1994, he was arrested by the 
Palestinian Authority for firing on settler vehicles near Nablus, though he was released 
soon after his arrest. Israel attempted to assassinate him in Asira al-Shamaliyya in 
September 2000. He surrendered to Palestinian Authority forces and was detained until
1 The information provided here is compiled and/or reproduced from various news articles and the MIPT 
(Memorial Institute for the Prevention o f Terrorism) Knowledge Base, which can be accessed at: 
http://www.tkb.Org/Home.j sp
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May 2001 when Israel bombed his prison in Nablus. He was finally killed on 23 November 
2001 in Nablus when an Israeli missile hit his van.
Izz el-Deen al-Sheikh Khalil
Until his death in September 2004, Izz el-Deen al-Sheikh Khalil was allegedly the Hamas 
military commander for areas outside of the Palestinian territories. Khalil was killed when 
an explosive detonated in his car in the early morning of September 26,2004. Reports state 
that the bomb had been placed under Khalil’s driver’s seat. Khalil was 42 years old at the 
time of his death in Damascus, Syria.
Musa Abu Marzuq
Musa Abu Marzuq was bom in 1951 in Gaza. He studied engineering at Ayn Shams 
(Cairo) and worked in the United Arab Emirates until 1981. He studied in the United States 
from 1981-1991, receiving his PhD and gaining residency rights. After returning to the 
Middle East, he became the head of Hamas’ Political Bureau (originally based in Jordan). 
Marzuq was the first Hamas leader to publicly accept Israel's right to statehood. Marzuq 
was expelled from Jordan in July of 1995. He was arrested at New York's JFK airport 
though the US dropped all charges against him in 1997, allowing him to return to Jordan. 
Marzuq was expelled again from Jordan in August 1999 when Hamas' offices in Jordan 
were closed. Marzuq is now a Yemeni national and operates out of Damascus, Syria. He 
has been cited as an important figure in cases against businesses and charities in the United 
States accused of raising money for Hamas.
Khaled Mishal
Khaled Mishal was bom in 1956 in the Silwad neighbourhood of Ramallah. He moved with 
his family to Kuwait and lived there until the 1990 Gulf War. He holds a Bachelor of 
Science degree in Physics from Kuwait University. He led Islamist Palestinians at Kuwait 
University, challenging the dominance of Arafat's PLO on the Kuwait University campus 
and participated in the foundation of the Islamic Haqq Bloc, which also competed with 
Fatah's blocs on leading the General Union for the Palestinian Students in Kuwait. When 
Iraq invaded Kuwait, Mishal moved his family to Jordan and began his work with Hamas 
as one of its founders. He has been a member of the Hamas Political Bureau since its 
inception and became its chairman in 1996. On September 25,1997, Israeli Mossad agents 
tried to poison him, provoking a crisis in Israeli-Jordan relations. Jordan later expelled 
Mishal to Qatar when Jordan's relationship with Hamas deteriorated. Mishal then moved to 
Damascus (Syria), from where he heads and runs Hamas’ Political Bureau.
Dr. rAbd al-Aziz Rantisi
'Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, founding member and former spokesperson of Hamas (in Gaza), was 
bom in 1947 in Yabna and grew up in the Khan Yunis refugee camp. He was educated as a 
medical doctor (paediatrician) at Alexandria University (1972,1974-1976) where he first 
came into contact with the Muslim Brotherhood. He helped establish the Islamic Centre in 
Gaza in 1973 and joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1976. He worked at Khan Yunis 
hospital as head of paediatrics but was dismissed by Israel in 1983 and was imprisoned 
multiple times. He led Hamas after April 1989 but was deported by Israel to Maij al-Zuhur 
in Lebanon in 1992. In Lebanon, he served as the spokesperson for the deportees. On his 
return, he was rearrested by Israel in December 1993 and held until April 1997. He was 
then held by the Palestinian Authority in detention for 21 months until February 2000. He 
was arrested again in July 2000 after calling the Palestinian participation in the Camp
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David talks an act of treason. He was released in December 2000 but has been rearrested 
multiple times since 2000. He currently operates out of the Shaykh Radwan area of Gaza 
City where he served as the Gaza spokesman for Hamas. Following the killing of Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin, Hamas' founder, Rantisi was elected as the group's leader. Rantisi was 
killed by an Israeli missile strike on April 17, 2004.
Ismail Abu Shanab
Ismail Abu Shanab, Hamas’ former spokesperson (in Gaza), was bom in 1955. He was 
educated as a construction engineer at Colorado State University, where he received his 
Masters degree. He taught engineering at Gaza's Islamic University and served as deputy to 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas. As Yassin's deputy, he functioned as 
Hamas' leader in Gaza. For his involvement in Hamas, he was imprisoned for 7 years. After 
his release in 1996, he served as Hamas' observer to the PLO Central Council (PLO-CC) 
and served as Hamas' representative to the Committee of National and Islamic Forces. In 
1997, he indicated his acceptance for a two-state solution with Israel. He served as the 
Hamas representative to the 2002 talks in Gaza on creating a united Palestinian program. 
He was killed in an Israeli attack in Gaza on 21 August 2003.
Sheikh Salah Shehada
Salah Shehada, a founding member of Hamas, was bom in Gaza on 24 February 1953. He 
obtained a secondary school certificate but his financial circumstances did not allow him to 
pursue his university education, although he was admitted to study medicine and 
engineering in Turkish and Russian universities. He studied in the Higher Institute for 
Social Service in Alexandria where he first became affiliated with Islamic organizations. 
He was arrested in 1984 on suspicion of anti-Israel activities and was jailed for two years. 
After being released in 1986, he worked as director of student affairs at the Islamic 
University until Israeli authorities closed the university during the first Palestinian intifada. 
Salah continued to work at the university and was arrested again in August 1988. Shehada 
was the founder of the first military apparatus of Hamas, known as "Palestinian 
Mujahidoun." Shehada was killed in an Israeli missile strike on his residence in the Daraj 
neighbourhood of Gaza city in July 2002.
Sheikh AhmadIsma’il Yassin
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin was bom in the late 1930s. He became paralyzed from the neck 
down as a result of a childhood accident. After 1948, he was a refugee in Gaza where he 
was influenced by Muslim Brotherhood teachers in his youth. He received no formal 
religious education and worked in Gaza restaurants and trained as a teacher in Cairo. In the 
late 1960s, he began efforts to encourage religiosity and ritual observances among Gaza 
youth. He was briefly imprisoned by Egypt in 1966 and abandoned political activities in the 
late 1960s following Israel's occupation of Gaza. In 1969-1970, Yassin revived Muslim 
Brotherhood activities in Gaza. In 1973, he founded al-Mujamma' al-Islami (Islamic 
Centre), an umbrella organization overseeing Muslim Brotherhood activities in the Gaza 
Strip. He was arrested in 1983-1984 after an arms cache was discovered and was given a 
13-year sentence. He was released in May 1985 following a prisoner exchange. He was 
arrested again in May 1989 and sentenced in to life imprisonment. He was released from 
prison in October 1997 as part of a deal between Jordan and Israel following Israel’s failed 
assassination attempt in Amman of Khaled Mishal, chairman of Hamas’ Political Bureau. 
The Palestinian Authority tried to place Yassin under house arrest in December 2001, 
leading to widespread clashes.
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Known as the spiritual leader and founder of Hamas, the paraplegic and nearly blind Sheikh 
Yassin was, till his arrest in May 1989, the hub of the organisation. He was responsible for 
a number of Hamas activities, such as writing leaflets, managing and arranging finances, 
liaising with organisations abroad, and supervising day-to-day activities on the ground. He 
was involved with and potentially orchestrated the activities of Hamas’ political, military 
and social wings. Yassin established Hamas’ broad and effective organisational network 
during the first intifada. Following his release in 1997, Yassin resumed the leadership of 
Hamas in the territories, though not with the same degree of control he had exercised prior 
to his arrest. He was assassinated by an Israeli helicopter gunship in March 2004.
Sheikh Hasan Yusuf
Sheikh Hassan Yusuf is a school teacher and imam. He is a senior Hamas leader and the 
most prominent spokesperson of Hamas’ Political Bureau in the West Bank. He has been in 
and out of Israeli custody and continues to be an important leader and spokesperson in the 
West Bank when outside prison.
Mahmud al-Zahhar
Mahmud al-Zahhar is one of Hamas’ founders and most senior political leaders. He was 
bom in 1945 in the Zeitoun neighbourhood of Gaza City. He served as chairman of the 
organisation's parliamentary bloc through its surprise victory in the 2006 Palestinian 
Authority elections. He has since taken a post in the government as foreign minister. 
Educated as a surgeon in Cairo’s Ain Shams University, al-Zahhar served as a lecturer at 
the Islamic University's Medical Department in Gaza. He became Hamas’ spokesperson in 
Gaza in April 1989. He then served as Hamas' unofficial representative to the PLO from 
January 1990. He was deported to Maij al-Zahhur in Lebanon in December 1992. Al- 
Zahhar was the target of an unsuccessful Israeli assassination attempt in September 2003 in 
Gaza City. The raid killed his son and bodyguard and injured members of his family. He 
became a member of the "collective leadership" of Hamas in 2004 after Sheikh Yassin and 
Abdel-Aziz Rantisi were assassinated by Israel. With Hamas' victory in the 2006 
Palestinian elections, al-Zahhar joined the government as foreign minister. His first major 
initiative was a tour of several neighbouring Arab countries.
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